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batrak rural labourer, landless peasant
bedniak poor peasant
dekulakisation expropriation and repression o f “kulaks”
desiatili measure of land, equalling 1.09 hectare
detkomissia detskaia komissia (children commission)
fond archival file
GULAG Glavnoe Upravlenie Lagerei (Main administration o f  Labour Camps)
kolkhoz kollektivnoe khozyaistvo (collective farm)
kolkhoznik male member of collective farm
kolkhoztsentr Vserossiskii Sel’skokhozyaistvennykh Kolletivov (All-Russian Union 
of Agricultural Collectives)
komsomol Kommunisticheskiy Soyuz Molodezhi (Communist League of Youth)
kom endatura Administrative organ of the special settlements
krai territory
kulak rich peasant exploiter
MTS Mashino-traktomaya stantsiya (Machine tractor station)
Narkom narodnyi komissar (people’s commissar)
NEP Novaya ekonomicheskaya politika (New Economic Policy)
NKPros Narodnyi kommissariat prosveshcheniya (People’s Commissariat of 
Education)
NKVD Narodnyi kommissariat vnutrennikh del (People’s Commissariat of 
Internal Affairs)
NKZdrav Narodnyi kommissariat zdravookhraneniya (People’s Commissariat 
of Health Authorities)
NKZem Narodnyi kommissariat zemledeliya (People’s Commissariat of 
Agriculture)
oblast province
obispolkom oblasnoi ispolnitel’nyi komitet (executive committee of the oblast’ 
soviet)
OGPU
otkhod
Pioneer
podkulachniki
pud
raion
seredniak
sovkhoz
sovnarkom (SNK) 
spetspereselenie 
spetspereselentsy 
troika
trudposelcnìe
trudposelentsy
VTsIK
zazhitochnyi
Ob” edinennoe Gosudarstvermoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie (Unified 
State Politicai Administration o f Political Police) 
seasonal or temporary labour migration for off-farm work 
political scout movement 
kulak henchmen
measure o f weight, equalling 16,38 kg. 
district, administrative unit 
middle peasant
sovetskoe khozyaisWo (state farm)
Sovet Narodnykh Komissarov (Council of People’s Commissars) 
spetsialnye pereselenie (special settiement/migration) 
official term fo r ‘‘kulak” deportees from 1929-1934 
committee or group o f three persons 
trudovoe poselenie (working settlement/migration) 
official term for deportees from 1934-1944
Vserossiskii Tsentral’nyi Ispolnitel’nyi Komilet (All-Russian Central 
Executive Committee o f  Soviets) 
well-to-do peasant
1. Introduction
All o f us, parents and children, experienced a bitter fate driven away from our house, loosing everything, being
dekulakised and persecuted Our life, our fate is the story o f our country}
Almost immediately after the October Revolution in 1917 the Soviet state was on a collision 
course with Soviet agriculture. The conflict commenced with the swift and violent grain 
collection campaign in 1918, continued with the massive peasant uprising in 1921 and was 
severely radicalised during the forced collectivisation campaign o f 1929-32/33. A common 
figure often emerging during these conflicts w'as the “kulak” (or rich peasant), whom the Soviet 
regime considered to be its worst enemy. Most of the public campaigns related to agriculture 
were directly or indirectly aimed at this particular category of the peasantry. Although the 
definition o f the Soviet “kulak” (which meant “the fist”) was flexible and only had limited 
correspondences with reality in the countryside, it dominated the public discourse throughout the 
1920s and 1930s. The anti-kulak rhetoric drastically intensified during the collectivisation 
campaign, when on 30 January 1930 the regime resolved to deport those designated as the worst 
-  that is counterrevolutionary active kulaks and remaining elements o f  counterrevolutionary 
active -  to the various isolated areas o f the Soviet Union. Thereafter, the physical removal of 
those peasants designated as kulaks (rich peasants), termed as dekulaJdsation (in Russian: 
PacKynaneeaHuef commenced. The dekulakisation lasted from 1930 to 1932/33, and 
approximately 5.1-5.8 million people, adults and children, were removed fi*om their villages of 
origin. Approximately 2 million o f these were deported to either Northern Russia, Western 
Siberia, the Ural and Kazakhstan and resettled in what with an euphemism was called the special 
settlements (in Russian spetspereselenie). The remaining 2.5 million remained in the region of 
their origin, but were removed to the area outside the newly established collective farms.
Children younger than 15 years comprised almost 40% of all those dekulakised, despite the 
fact that the official campaign was aimed at the head o f the family -  the kulak. This may be 
related to the fact that almost 90% of the Russian peasant households were based on a non-wage 
family economy. When the Soviet state therefore decided in January 1930 to liquidate the kulak 
households, they inevitably decided also to deport the families of the kulaks. However, children
‘ Letter of rehabilitation written to the West Siberian authorities on 23 February 1995 by Maria Semenovna 
Mikheeva, CANO, Sh-65,23.02*950.
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were often invisible in various written accounts o f the time, and when they did appear they 
remained secondary and passive. The Russian-born American journalist and writer, Maurice 
Hindus, visiting his native village during the commotion in 1930, overheard a passionate 
discussion between some local villagers and a communist activist who had been sent into the 
countryside by the regime. An elder villager initially asked: Kulaks, kulaks, , t h o s e  kulaks 
no feelings, have they no love for their wives and children? Do kulaks enjoy seeing their dear 
ones fall sick and die?” The young activist responded:
It is always the same...they see nothing but evil in everything the Soviet do.
They can’t get over the fate o f  the wives and children o f the liquidated kulaks.
O f course the women and children did suffer. I was myself a special constable 
and helped to “dekulakise” people. It was not a pleasant job. But neither is going 
to war and shooting and throwing bombs and thrusting a bayonet into another 
man’s flesh, yet sometimes it has to be done. And this was war, and is war. The 
kulaks had to be got out o f the way as completely as an enemy at the front. He is 
the enemy o f the front. He is the enemy o f  the kolkhoz [collective farm], and 
where he could he struck at the kolkhoz with all his might; and that we ju st could 
not allow. And what pity did these same kulaks show to women and children 
when they had their bins loaded with rye and wheat and would let none o f  it go 
to the city, where there were people, millions o f them, yes millions o f women 
and children too, threatened with starvation?
(source: Maurice Hindus, Red Bread, London 1931, pp. 174-175)
In the mind o f  the activist it was a  battle between good and evil: the Soviet regime against a 
perceived enemy. It was “men” fighting “men” in a deadly combat for the universal goodness, 
which legitimised the means taken. This consequently caused a distinct indifference towards the 
repressed children, where the activists ignored the consequences of their actions. The suffering 
o f women and children was a price which had to be paid in order to build socialism.
In the scholarly debate on the nature o f  dekulakisation, kulak children have generally occupied 
a minor place.^ This was probably because the father o f  the household (the “kulak”) was the
 ^ It is, for example, noticeable that of the 40 volumes of the extensive scholarly documentary work undertaken in 
Russia XXeeK. MoKyMeHmbi  ^(in English: Russia in the 2Cf  ^century. Document) only one volume covers
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designated enemy of these campaigns and therefore easier to define as a victim. The neglect may 
also have been caused by the general attitude that children should be seen, but not heard -  that is 
that evidently children suffered, but how they responded and what their experiences were was 
less important. Women and children have generally been “the forgotten victims”, as their 
experiences have often been explained as a by-product o f the repression o f men. They were, 
fi-om this perspective passive, as they became victims because o f another policy. In recent 
research done on women as victims during the purges at the end of the 1930s, it has been shown 
that not only were they not passive, but that their experiences of the repression varied 
significantly from that o f men. Similar examination o f the children as victims still remains to be 
undertaken, and Lynne Viola’s paper “’Tear the Evil From the Roots: The Children o f  the 
Spetspereselentsy of the North,” in Natalia Baschmakoff and Paul Fryer (eds.), ’’Modernisation 
of the Russian Provinces”, special edition o f Studia Slavica Finlandensia, volume XVII, 
Helsinki, 2000 is a pioneer work on this topic. Whereas we know quite a lot about the general 
processes o f the anti-kulak campaigns, our knowledge about this ambiguity towards kulak 
children is more limited. This is one important reason for analysing the fate o f kulak children. 
Another equally important reason is that kulak children add, as do women, a crucial aspect to our 
understanding o f the nature of these anti-kulak processes -  that o f their experiences. The 
experiences o f kulak children represented a diametric disparity with how childhood was 
officially portrayed in the Soviet Union. Whereas the official discourse spoke of a “happy 
childhood”, these kulak children experience death, starvation and illness primarily caused by the 
political repression of themselves and their parents.'* Caught in this deadlock a crucial question 
emerges: why were kulak children victimised and how did it affect them in the longer-term?
There have been various scholarly assessments o f the fate of the kulak children; Robert 
Conquest, for example, states: “An economic class, such as the “kulaks”, which the regime was 
about to crush, consists o f  children as well as adults.”  ^Children from this perspective were class 
enemies like their parents, and as such would always be subjected to discrimination -  that is they 
were passive and became victims because of the campaigns directed against their parents. Sheila 
Fitzpatrick has a somewhat different conclusion, acknowledging that kulak children were
the fate of children -  S.S. Vilenskii, A.I. Kokurin, G.V.Atmashkina, I.Iu. Novichenko (red.), ^em u  ryJIATa 1918- 
1956, Moskva 2002.
 ^Melanie IliC, “The Forgotten 5 Per Cent: Women, Political Repression and the Purges” pp. 116-139 in Melanie Ili£ 
(ed.), Stalin’s Terror Revisited, London 2006.
 ^On this dilemma see Maria Belskaia’s narrative, “Arina’s Children” pp. 219-234 in Shiela Fit2patrick and Yuri 
Slezkine, Life Stories o f Russian Women. From 1917 to the Second World War, Princeton 2000, p. 223.
 ^Robert Conquest, The Harvest o f  Sorrow. Soviet Collectivisation and the Terror-Famine, New York 1986, p. 284.
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vulnerable during the dekulakisation, but that their position was never fixed. Basing her 
argument on Stalin’s declaration in 1935 that “a son does not answer for his father”; she argues 
that even if  kulak children were deported with their parents, attempts to rectify their situation 
were made by the mid-1930s.^ Moreover she asserts: “Kulaks’ children (in contrast to kulaks) 
had never been formally excluded fi'om kolkhoz membership, so there was no moment when 
they were formally readmitted” .^  The conclusions o f  Conquest and Fitzpatrick are consequently 
different. We may, according to  the first approach, argue that the Soviet government always had 
a merciless policy towards kulak children; however, the second proposal addresses the 
possibility that the regime had very different policies related to adults and children, and that this 
furthermore changed during the 1930s.
The core o f the controversy fundamentally reflects different accounts o f the nature o f the 
Stalinist state. Why did the Soviet regime treat kulak children the way it did during the 1930s? 
How did the authorities relate themselves to this specific category of Soviet children? Was there 
one policy or several different policies, changing fi-om one period to another? Were kulak 
children treated differently from their parents? Were kulak children passive, or did they react to 
the circumstances they were brought up under? And what was the long-term impact of exclusion 
on their fate? These questions largely outline the scope o f the thesis, and signify the contribution 
o f this project to the general research on Soviet history. This work studies a social group that has 
been neglected -  a group that was particularly vulnerable, which was not able to organise itself, 
and which was not able to articulate its views. By analysing the fate of kulak children this thesis 
provides a more nuanced understanding o f  the complexity o f  victimisation in the Soviet Union.
1.1 Modernisation, modernity and Soviet ‘^backwardness^
The years 1928-29 saw the introduction o f  what would become a massive transformation of 
Soviet society; through rapid industrialisation and comprehensive collectivisation o f agriculmre.
A
Whilst all Soviet children, and particularly children of poor- and middle peasants, undoubtedly 
were affected by this transformation, kulak children constituted a significant element of what
‘ Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants. Resistance or Survival in the Russian Village After Collectivization, New 
York 1994, p. 240.
 ^Ibid., pp. 364-65 note 10.
* Children are generally overlooked in the discusión of the historical development of Russia and other Soviet 
societies. Catriona Kelly is still preparing her work on Soviet childhood, but has willingly presented chapters o f it to 
the author at an earlier stage, for which he is grateful.
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might be termed as victims of the Soviet model of modernisation. For this reason, this thesis 
concentrates on this particular group.
In order to understand the nature o f the Soviet modernisation, it is necessary to introduce the 
historical background. Pre-revolutionary Russian society was primarily based on agriculture, and 
approximately 80% of the population lived in the countryside. Russian agriculture was 
characterised by serfdom until 1861, when the Tsarist government formally emancipated the 
peasants. The mir or peasant commune was still preserved, despite these agricultural reforms.^ 
This was a collective organisation, which divided the land of the commune among the individual 
peasants; paid taxes to the state; conscripted young men to the army; and set up rules for social 
customs and moral standards. The mir owned the land o f the commune, and aimually distributed 
it in strips among its members. Under these circumstances some peasants were more influential 
than others. The individual members of the mir were bolshaki (administrators) rather than 
khoziain (owners). The bolshak did not own the land, but administrated different sections, 
scattered throughout the territory o f the The old serf categories had also survived the 
reforms of 1861 and were used in official documents and as a term of definition as late as in the 
population census of 1897. Former serfs still had various obligations to landowners, financial as 
well as practical, which often placed them in a relationship o f dependency."
Peasant rebellions and Black Repartition occurred in the Russian countryside by 1904-05, and 
led to violent and illegal divisions o f the property o f  the landowners and o f  the land o f the 
peasants who attempted to free themselves from mir control. These types o f events were repeated 
in 1917. The Tsarist Prime Minister, Petr Stolypin, was aware of the seriousness o f this problem, 
when in 1906 he introduced further land reforms. His main ambition was to give peasants the 
legal right to possess property in land consolidated within one unit, and consequently to abandon 
the previous system of sectional divisions. Henceforth, the peasants were given the right to own 
units o f land, which was a fundamental break from the previous structure o f the mir. The aim 
was to transform the bolshak into a khozian, and subsequently to create a new class of yeoman
’ Theodor Shanin, Russia as a "Developing Society". The Roots o f  Otherness: Russia’s Turn o f  Century. Volume /, 
London 1985, pp. 73-74 and Orlando Figes, Peasants Russia, Civil War: The Volga Coumryside in Revolutionary 
Russia (1917-1921)., Oxford 1989, p. 9.
Orlando Figes, Peasant Russia, Civil War. The Volga Countryside in Revolution (1917-1921), Oxford 1989, p. 13. 
" Fitzpatrick 1994, p, 20 and Gatrell 1986, p. 73.
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farmers. This was based on the theory that a capitalist oriented agricultural model could support 
the development o f society much more efficiently.
Leading Russian intellectuals, whether they were conservative or radical, considered 
agricultural society as “backward” and consequently advocated modernisation. When the 
Bolsheviks took over in October 1917 they adopted this belief and decided that a transformation 
o f society had to  be achieved by massive state intervention.*"* Soviet modernisation was, in this 
context, equated with industrialisation -  development could never become “progressive” until 
the new Soviet republic was transformed into an industrial society. There was an ongoing debate 
with in the Soviet leadership throughout the 1920s regarding the role o f agriculture. In January 
1923 Lenin talked about the importance o f  the cooperatives,*^ and Nikolai Bukharin would in 
1925 (the year after Lenin died) go as far as to encourage the kulaks to enrich themselves. This 
suggests that there were alternatives to the repressive policy later introduced by the Soviet 
government.*^ In 1927/28, as a consequence o f the grain crises, the Soviet state, however, 
prioritised rapid industrialisation, at the expense o f  agriculture. Consequently, the previous semi­
liberal economic policy -  the New Economic Policy or NEP  (1921-27) -  was abandoned, the 
preceding debate about the role of Soviet peasantry was coming to an end and the First Five Year 
Plan introduced in 1928. An assault on the traditional Russian peasantry emerged due to this 
shift, and led to the forced collectivisation o f agriculture from 1929-32/33. Although the 
agricultural market was never completely abolished during this campaign, the main ambition was 
to dissolve the private peasantry. The official aim of the collectivisation campaign was to
Orlando Figes, A People's Tragedy. The Russian Revolution 1891-1924, London 1996, p. 99, Gatrell, 1986, p. 233 
and Judith Pallot, Land Reform in Russia, 1906-1917. Peasant Responses to Stolypin's Project o f  Rural 
Transformation. Oxford 1999.
Vanni Kotsonis, Making Peasants Backward. Agricultural Cooperative and the Agrarian Question in Russia 
1861-1914, London 1999, p. 4.
James W. Heinzen, Inventing A Soviet Countryside, State Power and the Transformation o f  Rural Russia, 1917- 
1929, Pittsburgh 2004, pp. 1-3.
V.l. Lenin, ”On Cooperation” pp. 209-216 in George Fyson (ed.), Lenin's Final Fight. Speeches and Writing 
1922-23, New York 1995, pp. 209 and 211.
For more on the “Bukharin Alternative” see: V.P. Danilov “Kpecn>XHCKOii xoaxiicTBo h Koonepamra b 
KOHuermHH A.B, HaanoBa” in V.P. Danilov (ed.), Henoeex u aeMJui, Moskva 1987, V.P. Danilov, “20-e ro w : Hon h 
6opt6a ajibiepHaTHB” in V.P. Danilov (ed.) HcmopuKu cnopfim, 1988 and V.P. Danilov, ’’EyxapHHCKaa 
aribTepHaTHBa” in V.P. Danilov (ed.) Byxapun: nenoeeK, nonumuK, yneubiu, Moskva 1990.
Regarding NEP and the abandonment o f it see: Mark Harrison, ’’Why was NEP Abandoned?” pp. 63-78 in Robert 
C. Stuart, The Soviet Rural Economy, New Jersey 1983, pp. 63-64 and 73-74, lu. Goland, Kpusucti, paspyuiueutue, 
HET7, Moscow, 1991 and V.P. Danilov, O.V. Khlevniuk, A.Iu. Vatlin (red.) KoKjtOManu HEI7: cmenHoepa\L\tu 
n/tenyMoe IjK  BKU (B), 1928-1929 ee., mow 5, Moscow 2000.
** The Kolhoz-mzi\xx enabled the peasants to sell their products and thus facilitated a semi-private sector both 
during and after the collectivisation campaign o f 1929-32/33, See; Stephan Meri, “Bilanz der Unterwerfung -  die 
soziale und Ökonomische Reorganisation Des Dorfes” in Manfred Hildermeie (Hrsg.) Stalinismus vor dem Zweiten 
WeltkreigNeue Wege der Forschung,MöiiChta 1998.
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channel resources from agriculture into the industrial sector, by binding the peasantry with strict 
grain quotas -  grain was considered the resource wWch should be used to feed the proletariat of 
the cities and to secure foreign investment capital for the ongoing industrialisation.^^ Stalin’s 
modernisation from 1929 onwards has generally been interpreted as the “second revolution” or 
“the revolution from above”; a state transformation o f society, with the purpose o f establishing 
something “new” and desirable. Stephen Kotkin asserts: ’’Stalinism signified the advent o f a 
specifically socialist civilization based on the rejection of capitalism...” *^^ Part o f this implied, as 
Kotkin indicates, the rejection of everything belonging to the past: the Tsarist court, the church, 
the mir, private entrepreneurs, private fanning, traditional child rearing, and religion. These 
changes were undertaken as a revolution, with extremely radical methods -  the past had to be 
swept away, in order to make room for a socialist society.
Soviet modernisation was explicitly characterised by state dominance, and its needs became 
much more important than that o f society.^* On an ideological level the Soviet project was 
carried through by a high level of deception: where the end would justify the means.^ 
Obviously, the practical implementation often proved to be more complex than the ideological 
aim, but it was nonetheless an ambition to fundamentally change the structures o f society and 
create a new socialist civilisation. The crisis o f Soviet modernisation was that this attempt to 
create a “new” and different civilisation also produced a state o f war between state and society.^ 
The root o f this can be detected in the ideological approach of the Soviet leadership to the 
“progressive modernisation”. The Bolsheviks insisted on stratifying the peasantry according to 
social classes. Lenin explicitly spoke of rural labourers (batraki), poor peasants (bedniaki), 
middle peasants (seredniaki), well-to-do peasants (zazhitochnyi) and rich peasants (kulaki). 
Accordingly, the agricultural revolution had to be implemented as an alliance between the city 
proletariat and the poor and middle peasants. The adversaries in this transformation, 
consequently, were the kulaks, zazhitochnyi (well-to-do peasants) and so-called kulak henchmen 
(podkulachniki).
Regarding the debate on collectivisation and industrialisation see: R. W. Davies, The Industrialisation o f Soviet 
Russia 1. The Socialist Offensive. The Collectivisation o f Soviet Ap'iculture, 1929-1930, London 1980, James Millar 
“Mass Collectivization and the Contribution o f Soviet Agriculture to the First Five Year Plan” in Slavic Review, 
December 1974 pp. 750-66 and Alec Nove, fVas Stalin Really Necessary? Some Problems o f  Soviet Political 
Economy, London 1965.
Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain. Stalinism as a Civilization., London 1995, p. 2.
Zygmunt Bauman, ’The Party in the System-Management Phase: Change and Continuity” pp. 81-108 in Andrew 
C. Authoritarian Politics in Communist Europe. Uniformity and Diversity in One-Party States., Berkley 1976,
E.A. Rees, Political Thought from Machiavelli to Stalin, Revolutionary Machiavellism, London 2004 p. 126.
Oleg Khlevniuk, Uojiumbiopo. MexanuSMu nojiumuHeacoit ejiacmu e 1930-eeodbt, Moscow 1996, p. 17.
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The Bolsheviks aimed to limit the economic, political and social influence o f the kulaks in 
order to secure a basis for a socialist agriculture. The transformation of Soviet agriculture 
encountered great difficulties; firstly because the social re-construction o f  the countryside was 
much more complex than the class stratification allowed for; secondly because o f  the significant 
resistance o f  the peasantry towards the Bolshevik plan; and thirdly because the state had 
misunderstood the social stratification o f the countryside. Instead o f supporting the ongoing 
transformation o f the Soviet countryside, the peasantry became increasingly alienated from it, 
leading to resistance, which often escalated into physical uprising.^^ The kulak children add an 
important dimension to this crisis, as they on the one hand were addressed as Soviet children in 
general, but on the other hand were the strangers', those who were neither friends nor enemies of 
Soviet modernisation. This implies that, that which was considered a  progressive benefit for 
society involved numerous paradoxes; one of them being that children, who were supposed to 
live a “happy childhood” {cHHcnuiueoe demcmeof^ were physically and forcefully excluded 
from society, because their parents were stigmatised as “kulaks”. It is this complexity 
surrounding the fate o f kulak children that will be addressed.
L L 1 Diseased power
This thesis will discuss the more sinister legacies o f  modernisation in the Soviet context, rather 
than analysing its positive impact upon society. Michel Foucault in his theories on the 
relationship between subjectivity and power has advanced the term “diseased power”. This 
concept relates to these regimes, labelled as fascist and Stalinist, which emerged by the 
beginning o f  the 20 century. These regimes used and corrupted the instruments of the modem 
state -  science, law and order, hygiene, organisation, aesthetics, discipline and efficiency. A 
classical example of such diseased power in a Soviet context was the censuses o f  1937 and 1939. 
The Soviet regime undertook a census in 1926, and made projections for the demographic 
development o f  the following ten years — it aspired to foresee the demographic situation by 1936.
Silvana Malle, The Economic Organization o f  War Communism 1918-1921, Cambridge 1985, p. 365.
^  Regarding the myth of “the happy childhood” see: Catriona Kelly "Uncle Stalin and Grandpa Lenin; Soviet 
Leader Cults for Little Children” pp. 102-122 in E.A. Rees o.a. (red.) The Leadercult in Communist Dictatorship, 
London 2004 and A.K. Sokolov (pred.red.), Oóufecmeo u etiacmt 1930-e eodbi. iloeecmeoeaHue e doKyMenmax, 
Moscow 1998, p. 299.
T.M. Smirnova, ”«B rrponcxo*neHHH cbocm hhkto hc noBHHCH...»? IlpoOjieMbr HHTHrpairuH nereii «cotmajitHO 
qyacHCHtix aneMCHTOB» b nocjiepcBOjnouHOHHoe poccHucKoe oSmecTBO (1917-1936 rr.)” pp. 28-42 i 
OmeuecmeeHHOii
ficmopux, July/August 2003, Number 4.
Michel Foucault, “The Subject and the Power'’ pp. 326-348 in James D. Faubion, Michel Foucault. Power. The 
essential works 3, London 1994, p. 328.
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In 1937 another census was undertaken, which revealed a dramatically and unexpected 
demographic drop -  primarily caused by the devastating famine of 1932/33. Because of this, the 
1937 census was suppressed, its compilers arrested, and another census, corresponding to the 
official view, w'as completed in 1939. The “statistic” is a modem invention,^* and the Soviet 
state aimed to describe itself as modem by fixing the censuses. The Soviet state was not ready to 
accept the premise of modernity: it was not ready to publicly express itself in a modem manner.
Another example of the “diseased power” was the way the regime divided the population into 
“friends” and “enemies”. Society was separated into a binary state o f normality and abnormality 
-  the abnormal can, according to Zygmunt Bauman, also be seen as the “other”. The Soviet 
regime was obsessed by such separation of its population almost immediately after the October 
Revolution, when it defined vragi narodov (enemies o f  the people), byvshii liudi (former 
people), NEP-men, kulaks etc., and at the same time detected certain allies within society. The 
German philosopher, Carl Schmitt, argued that this dichotomy was fundamental to the political 
constmction of the modem state; Schmitt’s concept o f friends are tmstworthy heroes, like the 
proletariat and poor peasants (in the Soviet context), which were expected to support the 
revolution. Enemies (or in this case ktilaks) were expected to oppose it, and should as such be 
excluded and even liquidated as a class if necessary.^® Zygmimt Bauman has consequently 
argued: “Classifying consists in the act of inclusion and exclusion“.^ * That classification may 
lead to exclusion emphasises that the mechanisms o f  the modem state also have a distinct 
possibility o f  separating and discriminating unwanted elements -  and this may be seen as the 
core o f the “diseased power”.
The “diseased power” often affected denial, because such large scale discrimination had a 
severe impact on the society being subjected to it: some citizens participated in the exclusion of 
others, which, o f course, had a tremendous psychological impact.^^ Denial worked on both an 
individual level -  that is ordinary citizens claimed not to know anything about what had 
happened -  and on a political -  it was an integrated part o f the state ideology to repress any 
condemnation o f this exclusion. The latter has great significance for this thesis, as the Soviet
28 Michel Foucault, ’’Govemmentality” pp. 87-104 in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds.) The 
Foucault Effect^ London 1991 p. 99.
”  Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence, Cambridge 1991, p. 2.
Carl Schmitt, The Concept o f  the Political (translated by George Schwab), Chicago 1996, p. 26.
Bauman, 1991, p. 2,
Both Germany and Russia (and other post-Soviet societies) had/have immense difficulties in coming to terms with 
their “diseased” past. See Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin, “Introduction; The regimes and their dictators: 
perspectives of comparison” pp. 1-25 in Ian Kershaw and Moshe Lewin (eds.) Stalinism and Nazism: Dictatorships 
in Comparison, Cambridge 1997, p. 5.
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State suppressed knowledge about catastrophic events, re-wrote history and described 
modernisation as a progressive breakthrough and necessary leap forward. The best known 
example o f this is, o f course, the death o f at least 5,7 million Soviet citizens during the famine of 
1932/33 -  the Soviet regime completely denied and ignored this. Instead, in January 1934 it 
celebrated its own achievement of the preceding five years during the Congress o f  Victors. The 
political denial o f the famine remained a reality in the Soviet Union until the 1980s, when 
Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary -  although he, of course, never denounced the 
collectivisation campaign which led to the famine.^^
Stanley Cohen advances the concept o f "state o f denial”, which is tremendously useful for the 
project, as it both refers to a political and an emotional state. He talks o f personal, official and 
cultural denial, implying that the suppression works at both a micro-level -  within every 
individual, in every family and in every local community, but also at a macro-level -  within 
government policy and in re-writing history.^"* “Denial” is relevant for the analysis of how the 
kulak children coped with the situation they were placed in; the problem o f  identity, their 
attitudes to their families, their attitudes to the authorities. That is how a person being situated in 
an emotional state o f denial constructs its subjectivity during and after the political exclusion of 
society. Also the concept has importance for the understanding how the diseased Soviet power 
engaged in the suppression o f  information regarding the fate o f this group, the way in which the 
history o f the past was concealed, the way in which official memory erased the kulak children 
from the record. The fate o f  kulak children is therefore significant for a wider understanding of 
the long-term effect o f dekulakisation on Soviet society.
The state o f  denial can either be conscious (that is the subject deliberately refuses to 
acknowledge the event) or unconscious (as a psychological defence mechanism). It is, 
furthermore, important that denial either is literal, meaning that nobody speaks o f  an event (the 
famine was, for example, literally denied); interpretive, implying that the significance o f an 
event is downgraded (people were deported, starved and subsequently died, but this was a 
necessary part o f  the attempt to modernise a backward peasant economy); or implicatory, 
signifying that a person witnesses an assault but refuses to take any responsibility to intervene 
(people see what happens, but do not act).^^ The subject occupies different roles: either as victim, 
perpetrator or onlooker. Naturally, each experience o f an event is different, not the least because
Catherine Marridale, Night o f  Stone. Death and Memory in Twentieth-Century Russia, 2001.
^  Stanley Cohen, State o f Denial. Knowing about atrocities and suffering, Cambridge 2001, pp. 10-11.
Ibid., pp. 3-6. 
Ibid., pp. 7-9.
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their mora] options are different. A victim usually denies an event, because he or she has been 
subjected to a traumatic dehumanisation; the perpetrator does it, because he or she has crossed 
the moral line between respecting and dehumanising others; and the onlooker is confronted with 
the dilemma o f  either reacting or ignoring the event they have witnessed.^^ This scenario is 
crucially important for the analysis o f  the fate o f  kulak children, as they grew up in a “diseased” 
Soviet society, permeated by ideological denial.
L 1.2 Different comprehension o f  Soviet history
The nature of the diseased Soviet power has caused great scholarly discussions, which is related 
to the role o f ideology and circumstances. Scholars working on Soviet history can roughly be 
divided into three schools: the totalitarian, non-totalitarian and revisionist.^® Both the totalitarian 
and non-totalitarian schools emerged in the 1950s and 60s in the wake of the Second World War, 
and the scholarly debate addresses the nature o f the Soviet state. The arguments focused on 
whether the development o f the Soviet Union was a “top-down” process -  “revolution from 
above” -  or whether social pressure from below forced the regime in a certain direction,
Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski both argued (from the totalitarian standpoint) that 
the most important element of the totalitarian dictatorship was the primacy o f ideology and 
psychology and the aims and methods o f the dictator. The Fascist and Communist dictatorships 
were, from this perspective, generally similar on six flmdaraental points: They both had 1) an 
official dominating ideology; 2) a single mass party typically led by one man, the “dictator”; 3) a 
system of terrorising police control directed against internal “enemies”; 4) a technologically 
conditioned near-complete monopoly o f mass communication; 5) a similar technological near- 
complete monopoly of all means o f  armed combat; and 6) central control of the entire 
e c o n o m y T h e  near-complete power was concentrated in the role o f the dictator, whose 
intention defined the daily life o f  citizens living in the country. The non-totalitarian approach, 
whose major representatives with regards to Soviet history were E.H. Carr, Isaac Deutcher and 
Moshe Lewin, rejected this “near-complete control” o f power and argued that the system was 
more complex. Instead o f  examining the intentions o f the Soviet government, they emphasised
Ibid., pp. 14-15.
For example of this scholarly disagreement on the nature o f the Soviet Union see; Richard Pipes, The formation o f 
the Soviet Union: communism and nationalism, 1917-1923, Cambridge Mass 1997, Robert Conquest, The Great 
Terror, London 1990, J. Arch. Getty Origin o f  the Great Purge, Cambridge 1985 and Robert Thurston, Life and 
Terror in Stalin’s  Russia 1934-1941, Binghamton, New York 1996.
Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy, New York 1964, p. 3, p. 5 
and pp. 9-10.
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the circumstance in which this regime emerged. Without rejecting the centrality of the state’s 
role, their emphasis was on the economic, social, cultural and international pressure shaping the 
policy o f the Soviet regime/® The main difference between these two schools is whether the 
emphasis should be on intention or structure: Was the political terror an outcome o f the intention 
o f the Soviet state, or did it rise from structural tension in society? In the 1980s, what Sheila 
Fitzpatrick has termed as the "revisionist" school emerged as a reaction to primarily the 
“totalitarian” approach."** The revisionists suggested that a high degree o f  decentralisation 
occurred in the decision-making, where interest groups, local leaders and ordinary people 
influenced the development o f the state policy. In contrast to the totalitarian school the 
revisionists strove to explain the development o f  the 1930s as an outcome o f  social pressure 
within society according to which the Stalinist leadership responded."*^
Regarding the mechanism o f  dekulakisation and the fate o f kulak children this scholarly debate 
can be reproduced as a matter o f whether the Soviet government deliberately attacked the kulaks 
and their children as part o f a master plan to repress them, as Conquest suggested above, or if  
they lost control during the initial phase o f  expropriation and deportation in 1929, as Fitzpatrick 
would imply. It is evident, as John Keep has asserted, that “If the dreaded “T-word” 
[“totalitarianism” MK] still has adherents outside academia, this may be because there is 
something to be said after all for using it, provided that it can be freed from politically prejudiced 
association” . The argument is that instead o f blindly supporting one school, and by that 
rejecting the other two completely, the three different approaches will be used critically. The 
Soviet system aspired to being “totalitarian” in its institutional construction, yet society did react 
to the policy being implemented. Hence, the latter was anything but passive, in its relations to the 
dominant Soviet state. There was a conflict between different institutions and the various levels 
o f the Soviet command structure. Also, the Soviet government had to consider the problem o f 
non-implementation (that is that the local authorities did not follow orders), and a high amount 
o f ideological zeal o f local officials — often radicalising the initial orders.
The present work thus strives to combine these traditions, and thereby address this fundamental 
debate from an alternative perspective. The point o f departure is social and cultural history, as
^  E.A. Rees, Stalinism and Soviet Rail Transport, 192B-4U London 1885, p. 2.
Sheila Fitzpatrick, “New Perspectives on Stalinism” in Russian Review 45 (1986).
J. Arch. Getty, Origins o f the Great Purge. The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered 1933-1938, Cambridge 
1985, p. 11.
John Keep, “Recent western views of Stalin’s Russia; Social and Cultural aspects” pp. 149-166 in Harold 
Shukman (ed.) Redefining Stalinism, London 2003, pp. 159-60.
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the thesis will analyse the social dynamics in Soviet society and consequently discuss the 
difficulties o f categorising the different groups comprising this society. Yet the scope will also 
widen the discussion, and reflect upon the consequences o f the diseased power -  it will be an 
examination of how state policy affected a specific social group, which per definition was weak. 
Hence the work will be based on a combination of circumstantial and intentional arguments, 
showing that political repression and its affect on ordinary human beings is complex.
1.2 Sources
One o f the limits for this research project has been that it was difficult to find primary sources, as 
individual archival documents specifically covering the fate of kulak children are rare. The 
sources that do exist are o f a different character, either related directly to the fate of kulak 
children, or to the general context, the massive transformation o f Soviet society during the 
1930s, The primary sources were collected from three different archives in Novosibirsk, Tomsk 
and Kiev. The reason for using these archives is that they cover either the places where kulak 
children originated or the regions whereto they were deported. The documents collected in Kiev 
were found in the Central State Archives of Social Organisations o f Ukraine (TsDAGO). The 
material belongs to the archival file (in Russian fond) no. 1 of the Central Committee o f the 
Ukrainian Communist Party (CK KP (b) U) and mainly consists of correspondences between 
high-level officials within the party regarding the situation of the 1930s in general, and kulak 
children in particular. The latter addresses partially the political organisation o f  these children 
and their education. It also reveals the position of the Central Committee o f  the Ukrainian 
Communist Party (CK KP (b) U) in relation to the development of Ukrainian orphanages during 
the 1930s, to the intensification o f  different epidemics in the mid-1930s and the rise in infant 
mortality. These issues, related to the topic of living conditions of kulak children, are, however, 
covered more thoroughly in the material obtained in both the State Archive o f Novosibirsk 
Oblast (GANO) and the State Archives of Tomsk Oblast (GATO). Tomsk Oblast was one o f  the 
main regions for the constructions o f  special settlements'*^ hence these archives contain a lot of 
information regarding orphan kulak children, their education and living conditions in 
deportation. The files used in GANO were no. 895 (the Children commission o f  the Novosibirsk 
oblast) and no. 61 (the educational authorities o f Western Siberia). In GATO the documents 
found belong to files no. 43 (department of education in Narym), no. 590 (health authorities of
The village-like installations of deported kulaks and their families.
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Narym), no. 591 (department o f education in Narym) and no. 1993 (“the file on memory on 
repression o f collectivisation”)-
The GATO file no. 1993 belongs to a body o f sources, which deal with the experiences of 
deported kulak children. This file contains memoirs written by kulak children during the 1990s, 
and collected by the local section o f  the nationwide Russian commemoration organisation 
Memorial in Tomsk, Memorial has also located the photographic material used in this thesis, 
which are stored in the same file in GATO as the written memoirs. A similar source, found in 
GANG, are the letters o f rehabilitation written to the local authorities o f Novosibirsk in the early 
1990s. These letters officially belong to the director of the archive, however, they came to my 
attention during a research trip in August 2003 to GANG. The author will therefore refer to them 
as if  they belonged to collection o f GANG -  although they do not officially belong to any o f its 
files. The letters are dated from the beginning of the 1990s, when the government o f  the Russian 
Federation decided to rehabilitate all victims o f  the Stalinist repression. Thus many former 
repressed, and their relatives, wrote to local authorities in order to achieve political rehabilitation 
and a claim o f economic compensation — which, o f  course, was much more difficult to meet for 
the Russian authorities. These letters unravels the fate o f  the writer, and are therefore useful for 
the establishment o f what happened to them. A third, and even more important source in this 
particular category, is the interview material. I was able to meet with ten former kulaks and 
kulak children in Novosibirsk in the period from 16 August to 6 September 2003. Interviews are 
difficult to work with, because events and details tend to be forgotten. Whilst the sources are 
problematic regarding factual events, individual testimonies remain an important resource for 
considering the psychological impact of, for example, the dekulakisation on its victims -  and the 
interviews are, o f course, significant for our analysis of the experiences o f kulak children.
With regard to the sources a tremendous amount o f material is accessible in published volumes 
and articles like S.S. Vilenskii et.al. JJemu ryJIATa. 1918-1956^ ;^ Viktor Danilov et. al. 
TpaeediiR CoeemcKOu depeenu^^; Viktor Danilov and Sergei Krasilnikov, CneifrtepecejieHtfbi e 
aanaduou Cu6upu^^\V,h Markov and B.P. Trepin, H s ucmopuu seMJiu ToMCKoit\ V iktor 
Danilov and A. Berelowitch, et. al., CoeemcKoa. depeeuH zjiasauu B ^ K  -  O lU y  -  1918-
1939^^ and the highly informative article by G.M. Abidekov on the situation o f the kulaks in
Russian title translated to English: Children o f  GULAG.
^  Russian title translated to English: The Tragetfy o f the Soviet Village.
Russian title translated to English: Special settlers in Western Siberia.
** Russian title translated to English: From the history o f the land o f  Tomsk.
Russian title translated to English: The Soviet countryside in the eyes ofVChK  -  OGPU-  NKVD.
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deportation, «CneiinepeceneHuti — acepTSH «ciuiomHOH KOJLieKiHBHsainiH». H3 aoKyMeirroB 
«OC060H nanKH» nonHr6iopo UK BKIl (6)^°. What these volumes and articles have in common 
is that they are thoroughly edited, extremely ambitious and very extensive in their scope. The 
collection ryJlATa. 1918-1956 is especially significant in the forthcoming analysis, since 
it particularly covers the fate of enemy children.
The evaluation of the primary sources needs to be done on the basis of secondary literature 
related to the development of the Soviet Union during the 1930s. Very little has, as already 
stated, been written about kulak children specifically. The present thesis seeks to widen Viola’s 
approach by focusing on kulak children from a more general point o f view -  that is the fate of 
the kulak children before, during and after the deportation. The Russian language article of T.M. 
Smirnova, ”«B npoHcxoxcaeHHH cbocm hhkto hc noBKHCH...»? rTpofijicMti HHTHrpaimH l^ereH 
«coimajibHo HyztexcHBix aneMenroB» b nocjiepeBOjnouHOHHoe poccHiicKoe ofimecTBo (1917- 
1936 rr.)” *^ has useful and important information on this topic. It is of a more general nature 
than Viola’s article and it discusses the fate of enemy children, and addresses important issues 
regarding the definition o f them. Other useful material, such as Catriona Kelly’s, Pavlik 
Morozov. The Rise and Fall o f  a Soviet Boy Hero, has recently been published. Although this 
book primarily aims to present the story about the boy behind the myth of Pavlik Morozov, and 
thus only discuses the problems o f kulak children in the 1930s on a more secondary level, it is of 
great interest: the myth of Pavlik Morozov is about the boy who denounced his own father as a 
kulak. Thus, the political construction o f kulak children can be deducted from this particular 
myth. The book is largely an attempt to widen and correct the scope of lurii Druzhnikov, 
Bosnecenue IJaenuKa Mopozoea. The responses o f kulak children to the myth o f Morozov, is 
elaborated upon in Jochen Hellbeck, ’’Fashioning the Stalinist Soul: The Diary of Stepan 
Podlubnyi (1931-1939)”.
From a more general perspective, there is a growing body of publication on collectivisation 
and the dekulakisation campaign. Nikolai Ivnitskii’s two books, Kojuieicmueuzaifwi u 
PacKyjiaHueanue (hohcuio 3Q~x eodoef^  and Penpeccuenasi UoAumuKa CoeemcKou Bjiacmu e 
ffepeene^^ are classic standard works. A  third important book in Russian is Sergei Krasilnikov’s,
Russian title translated to English: ^'Special settlers -  victims o f “mass collecirvisation From the documents 
“special files ” o f  the Politburo CK VKP (b)
Russian title translated to English: ”Is nobody to blame for its background....”? Problems with integration of 
children o f’’socially strange elements” in Post-revolutionary Russian society (1917-1936)”.
Russian title translated to English; Collectivisation and dekulakisation (at the beginning o f  the l93Q‘s). 
Russian title translated to English: Repressive policy o f  the Soviet power in the countryside.
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Cepn u MOJiox. KpecmhHHCKOSi cchuiKa e sanaàuoù Cuóupu e 1930~e aodbi,^  ^which is essential 
reading, since it discusses important topics related to kulak children. Vladimir Zemskov’s, 
Cnetfnocejiemibi e CCCP 1930-1960,^^ has a substantial number of statistics regarding the 
development within these settlements and is crucial for our investigation o f the number of kulak 
children.
In Western historiography on the Soviet Union, a very important work is R.W. Davies and 
Stephen Wheatcroft, Years o f  Hunger. Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933 which is, perhaps one of 
the most well documented and complete volumes on the famine year of 1932-33, The following 
works will also be used; Andrea Graziosi’s three books Guerra e rivoluzione in Europa, The 
Great Soviet Peasant War and Stato e Industria in Unione Sovietica', Lynne Viola’s two books 
Peasant Rebels under Stalin and The Best Sons o f  the Fatherland, Sheila Fitzpatrick’s Stalin’s 
Peasants; Stefan Meri, Bauern unter Stalin; Robert Conquest’s The Harvest o f  Sorrow; James 
Mace, Communism and the Dilemmas o f  National Liberation; R.W. Davies’ Collectivisation o f  
Soviet Agriculture, 1929-1930; Moshe Lewin’s Russian Peasants and Soviet Power and Meri 
Fainsod’s Smolensk under Soviet Rule. While the work o f Conquest and Fitzpatrick has 
important sections on the kulak children, these books serve more as sources to the general 
context o f the 1930s; the industrialisation, collectivisation, peasant resistance, dekulakisation and 
everyday life.
1.2.1 Procedure
The thesis is organised into 7 chapters: Chapter 1 and 2 constitute the background and the 
contextualisation o f the scope. Chapter 1, the introduction, consists o f a definition of the scope 
and a discussion o f the method and the material used. Chapter 2 elaborates on the construction o f 
the Soviet kulak and discusses the nature of the dekulakisation. This chapter also considers the 
situation o f  kulak children during the initial phases o f this anti-kulak campaign.
The core o f  the thesis is found in the Chapter 3-6, Chapter 3 addresses the discussion on the 
political culture o f the Soviet Union, with an examination o f the relationship between the Soviet 
regime and the kulak children during the 1930s. The chapter vrill examine the ambiguity in the 
Soviet policy towards the kulak children throughout the 1930s, and also it will discuss how the 
kulak children responded to it. Chapter 4 analyses the living condition o f kulak children in their
^  Russian title translated to English Sickle and Moloch (The Peasant deportation in West Siberian during the 
1930s).
Russian title translated to English: Special Settlers in USSR 1930-1960.
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places o f  origin and in deportation. This chapter opens the discussion on the experiences of kulak 
children during the 1930s. The questions addressed are the demographic development o f the 
1930s, with a specific emphasis on the number of kulak children, their living conditions in 
deportation and the way the authorities related themselves to these problems. Chapter 5 follows 
the discussion on the experiences by examining the definition o f kulak children, and studies the 
educational policy, political manipulation and propaganda directed against them. The discussion 
approaches the matter o f whether a class, like Conquest asserts, consisted o f both children and 
adults, or if  they were, as Fitzpatrick suggests, defined differently. It considers whether kulak 
children were enemies or friends or neither. Chapter 6 moves to the 1990s and the year 2003, 
following kulak children into their old age and how they remember their experiences as children 
o f social outcast and what this tells us about the nature o f the relationship between kulak 
children, their parents and the Soviet authorities during the 1930s. Chapter 6 will be based on the 
interviews conducted by the present author and the written accounts collected by Memorial in 
Tomsk. The chapters are discussed in the concluding chapter 7, which considers the central 
question of this thesis: why were kulak children victimised and how did it affect them?
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2. The construction of the Soviet kulak
The fate o f kulak children was closely connected to that o f their parents. Children would not have 
been deported (and dehumanised) if  the Soviet regime had not decided to liquidate the kulak as a 
class on 30 January 1930. To imderstand the significance o f this, it is necessary to discuss the nature 
o f  the dekulakisation. When it was decided that the New Economic Policy or NEP should be 
abandoned in 1927/28, and that the massive industrialisation drive should be launched, the Soviet 
government revised its policy towards kulaks. It is unclear as to who the kulak group actually was. 
We will now address the question of this chapter, which is related to the debate connected to nature 
o f  the kulak and consequently also the nature o f dekulakisation.
2.1 The definition of Soviet Peasantry
2.7.7 The politica l definition o f Russian capitalism
The “kulak” was not a Bolshevik invention, but existed in the pre-revolutionary Russian 
terminology. Feodor Dostoevsky, for example, wrote in his diary entry of 1873:
Genuine, sound capital accumulates in a country in no other way than by being based 
upon a general labour prosperity; otherwise only capital owned by kulaks and Jews can 
come into existence. And this it shall be if the people will not come to their senses and 
the intelligentsia will not help them. [...] there will be merely uniformly equal paupers, 
mortgaged and enslaved as a whole commune, while, in their stead, Jews and kulaks 
will be providing the money for the budget. There will emerge petty, depraved and 
mean little bourgeois, and a countless number o f  paupers enslaved by them -  such will 
be the picture!
(Source; Feodor Dostoevsky, Tlcmuoe coôpanue coHunenuu e mpudiiamu moAtax, moM , Leningrad 1973 
p.95)
For Dostoevsky both the Jews and kulaks were parasites which threatened the healthy soul o f the 
Russian peasantry. The kulak was a “jww/joed” or ‘Village eater” who, by speculating in grain, usury 
and exploitation o f the peasantry, turned the countryside into a depraved, starved and exploited 
entity. The pre-revolutionary kulak would often be a  moneylender, sub-letter o f land and middle­
man between the peasantry and their customers in the larger cities. Therefore, the peasantry would 
both depend on these “kulaks”, but also -  like in the case o f  the Jews (who likewise served as the
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raiddle-man in agricultural trading) -  consider them to be exploitative and undesirable (especially in 
times of crises, when the harvest had failed, the taxes had to be paid or the livestock to be 
replaced). ‘ An entrepreneur was, however, not a “kulak”, since he often belonged to the complex 
peasant structure -  or he was not considered to be someone working against the commune.^ The 
pre-revolutionary “kulak” rarely belonged to the social structure of the village, and was, like the 
Jew, considered an outsider. Teodor Shanin finds that the pre-revolutionary “kulak” was the “not 
quite peasant” -  he may have lived in the countryside, but he was not member of the mir.^
The Russian Social Democrats -  out o f which the Bolsheviks originated in 1903^ -  were faced 
with a dilemma when it came to the question on the role o f agriculture in a post-revolutionary 
society. According to Marxism two opposed social classes, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, were 
engaged in class struggle leading to a development from capitalism to socialism to Communism. 
Although it could be argued that Marxism is much more than the class struggle, the dialectic of such 
struggle is important for our imderstanding of the course o f events in the Soviet Union, One 
problem for Lenin and his colleagues, who led the revolution in October 1917, was the fact that 
almost 80% of the pre-revolutionary Russian population lived in the countryside, and were 
employed in agriculture. The peasantry differed from the two main class categories -  the proletariat 
and bourgeoisie -  and was seen as a sign o f pre-capitalism and backwardness.^
Lenin himself knew that it was necessary to win over at least part o f the peasantry, if the 
revolution should succeed in Russia. He divided it into different social strata: where some would be 
considered as allies and others were enemies. In his writing on the development o f capitalism in 
Russia in the 1890s, Lenin argued that the peasantry was completely subordinated to the market. A 
social differentiation existed according to this argument, and was termed as a process o f 
“depeasentation”, where the old production forms and social relations were replaced by “[...] new 
types of inhabitants”. Lenin divided the new types o f inhabitants into two larger groups: the well-to- 
do rural bourgeoisie and the allotment owning wage-working rural proletariat.^ The rural proletariat 
was, according to this assumption, threatened by the well-to-do farming oriented peasants and it 
was a permanent and progressing phenomenon in the Russian peasantry. This was the dialectic core
‘ Peter Gatrell, The Tsarist Economy 1830-1917, London 1986, p. 73.
 ^Orlando Figes, A People's Tragedy. The Russian Revolution 1891-1924, London 1996, p. 91 footnote.
’ Teodor Shanin, Russia, 1905-07. Revolution as a Moment o f Truth. The Roots o f Otherness: Russia's Turn o f Century. 
Volume 2, London 1986, p. 123 and p. 172.
* Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party o f the Soviet Union (2°^ edition), London 1975, p. 53.
* E,H. Carr, A History o f Soviet Russia. Socialism in one Country 1924-1926, volume 1, (firèt published in 1958), 
London 1970, pp. 104-107.
® V.I. Lenin, The Development o f Capitalism in Russia, Moscow 1977 (Fifth edition in English), pp. 179-180.
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o f the Russian class struggle: some peasants dominated the market, and others were subordinated to 
their control. Lenin argued that the rural bourgeoisie class comprised 20% of the total peasantry, 
and dominated the economic development o f  the Russian countryside/
A development towards capitalist farming had occurred in some areas o f the country by the turn 
o f the 20^ century. Peter Gatrell points to the position o f grain farming in the Northern Caucasus, 
dairy farming in the Baltic, grain and sugar production in Ukraine and the development o f  the Black 
Earth region -  which clearly indicates that part o f Russian agriculture was developing towards a 
more market-oriented economy by the beginning o f the century/ I f  we examine the development of 
Siberian agriculture we also find that, from 1903 to the First World War, it became competitive and 
it exported a substantial amount o f butter and grain / The development in Siberia may have been an 
exception, as this region had never experienced serfdom. Siberia was not, however, the only region 
experiencing this progressive development.
When Lenin and the Bolshevik’s seized power in October 1917 the above debate became 
increasingly important. Although more than 20 years had past since Lenin wrote about the 
development o f capitalism in Russia, the division o f the peasantry into certain groups appears to 
have been immensely important. Lenin had in the intervening period refined his class division of the 
peasantry, and divided it into five strata: the landless rural labourers (batraki), the poor peasants 
(bedniaki), the middle peasants (seredniaki), the well-to-do peasants (zashitochnyi) and the rich 
peasants (kulaki). The poor peasants and batraki automatically became allies of the revolution, 
whereas the kulaks and zashitochnyi were considered to be enemies. The middle peasants, or the 
petty bourgeoisie o f  the countryside, were difficult to place, but it would be possible to include 
them as allies o f the revolution as well -  although this was not very clear by 1918, when the 
Bolshevik also attacked them during the swift and violent grain collection campaign. It was the 
ambition to mobilise the poor peasants against the more prosperous kulaks, and to stimulate the 
revolution as a social pressure from ‘below’."  By 1918 nearly 140,000 committees o f  village poor, 
or kombedy^ had been established and inside the Bolshevik party 7,370 peasant cells were created." 
The kombedy were extremely unpopular among the rural population, and were abolished in Russia
’ lbid.,pp. 184-190.
*Gatrell,1986,pp- 101-103 andp. 113ff.
’ Inge Marie Larsen, Kampen om det sibirske smer. Kurgan, St. Petersborg, Kabenhavn, London. 1895-1905 
(unpublished PhD. thesis submitted at the University o f Southern Denmark in 2001), pp. 305-306.
Robert Service, Lenin. A  Political Life. Volume 3. The iron Ring, London 1995, p. 53.
” Nikolai Ivnitskii, Knaccoeaa Bophba e ffepeene u JIuKeuàa^uu KyjioHecmea kok macca, Moscow 1972 p. 8. 
Service 1995, p. 53.
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by the beginning o f the 1920s.*^ However, they survived until the forced collectivisation o f 1929 in 
Ukraine. In 1918 the kombedy were considered the instruments whereby the Bolsheviks could 
implement their revolution in the countryside.
The Soviet kulak was, in this context, conceived as essential in this mobilisation o f  the poor 
peasantry. The Bolsheviks clearly leaned against Dostoevsky’s aforementioned definition, by 
asserting that he was an exploiter, a usurer, a grain speculator and a parasite enslaving the peasant 
commune. However, the kulak not only exploited the peasantry, but also constituted a threat to the 
proletariat and the Soviet state. Lenin declared in August 1918:
Kulaks madly detest the Soviet power and are ready to strangle, to shred up hundreds of 
thousands of workers...Kulaks are the most animalistic, the most brutal, the wildest 
exploiters...These bloodsuckers became rich during the war at the expense o f the 
people...These spiders became fat at the expense o f the peasants, who were 
impoverished by the war, and at the expense of the hungry workers. These bloodsuckers 
have been drinking the blood o f workers and became rich while the workers were 
starving in the cities and in the factories. These vampires have been taking and continue 
to take the land o f  the landowners, and make the poor peasants their slaves. Onwards in 
a merciless battle against these kulaks! Death to them!
(source: Vasilii Novokshonov, B mpudifombi -  K<meHdcmtypcKue.(wepKu no ucmopuu mezyjtbdemcKOZO 
pauoH)^ c. TeiyjiMCT 1993, pp. 4-5. My translation into English MK.)
It is possible that Lenin’s outburst was a reaction to the crisis following the October revolution. 
Vladimir Brovkin asserts that a change occurred when the Bolsheviks gained power -  with the 
result that they became more aggressive.*"* Maxim Gorky’s view on the Russian peasantry at least 
underwent a remarkable transformation. In 1907 he argued: “The Russian peasant is willing, skilful, 
intelligent He reads, ponders, works. The Revolution will be his, the liberation will come from 
him”. In 1921, however, he expressed a  completely different view in the Daily News, when he 
asserted: “Our peasants are ignorant, brutal, cowardly, inhuman. I hate them”.*^  We have no 
explanation for Gorky’s change o f  attitude. However, it is likely that the bloody conflict with the 
peasantry from 1918-21 could have had an effect upon his perception. The Bolsheviks were 
suspicious o f the peasantry in general (and the kulaks in particular) because o f  the violent peasant
Bent Jensen, GULAG og Glemsel, K0benhavn 2002, p. 52 and p. 66.
Vladimk Brovkin, lew/n: Politics, Culture and Society, 1921-1929, London 1998.
Ugo Ojetti, As They Seemed to Me, London 1928 p. 95.
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Uprising. This was despite the official policy o f an alliance between the city proletariat and the poor 
peasants. Hence the Soviet regime strove to define the “kulak” as an outsider, a marginalised 
minority, and an alien, who was conceived o f as a parasite and physically assaulted in times of 
crises. But, who was the Soviet kulak? Was he really as dominating as Lenin and the Bolsheviks 
argued?
2.1.2 Post-revolutionary academic debate
The question o f the nature of the kulak preoccupied Soviet academics working on agriculture 
throughout the 1920s in the tense debate on the mechanisms o f the Russian peasantry. One 
argument to be established was that Soviet agriculture was a peasant and not a farming agriculture -  
the differentiation is among other things related to the role o f the market. In a market economy, the 
market determines the production and the demands of the consumers are consequently essential, as 
they guarantee capital for further investments. The peasantry, however, primarily produces 
according to the needs o f  the family and local community, and the market plays no decisive role, 
although obviously money is of importance. According to the Russian rural sociologist, Aleksandr 
Chayanov, 90% o f Russian agriculture was a non-wage family economy.’  ^ Money was naturally 
spent to buy new machines or animals, but an economic accumulation, like that in Western Europe, 
never appeared in Russia, he argued. He asserted that the family was the organisational basis of 
Russian peasantry, since the strategies and possibilities o f the household largely depended on its 
composition -  that is the proportion of females and males; the number o f healthy and sick members; 
numbers o f children, adolescents, adults and elders. A large family was given more land by the 
commune, and the working staff would consequently be more extensive, as there were more people 
available. I f  the family was small, it had fewer possibilities, given that it had less cultivated land 
and fewer members.*^ Such procedures were possible due to the nature o f Russian agriculture -  the 
cultivated land would undergo a periodic partition, where the commune owned the land and divided
R.E.F. Smith, "Farms and Farmers" in R.W. Davies (ed.) The Soviet Union. Second Edition. London 1989 p. 119.
A. V. Chayanov (1888 -  ca. 1938) worked on the Russian peasant economy, and consequently on the construction o f 
the peasantry. He was employed as an agronomist within the People’s Commissariat of agriculture of RSFSR during the 
1920s. He was arrested in 1929, sentenced in 1932 and later shot in approximately 1938. His contributions would be: 
A.V. Chayanov "On the Theory of Non- Capitalist Economic Systems" pp. 1-28 in Daniel Thomer, Basile Kerblay and 
R.E.F Smith, The Theory o f Peasant Economy, Homewood, Illinois 1966(a), and A.V. Chayanov "Peasant Farm 
Organization” Moscow 1925, (published and translated) in Daniel Thomer, Basile Kerblay and R.E.F Smith, The 
Theory o f Peasant Economy, Homewood, Illinois 1966 (b). The Theory o f Peasant Economy was reprinted in 1986 with 
an introduction by Teodor Shanin.
** Chayanov 1966 (a) p. I and Chayanov 1966 (b) p. 47, p. 53 and p. 112.
Teodor Shanin, Russia as a ‘^Developing Country The Roots o f Otherness: Russia’s turn o f century. Volume 1, 
London 1985, p. 66 ff.
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it into strips and distributed it among the peasant members. A peasant therefore did not posses one 
piece o f land, on which he acted as a sovereign holder, but rather administrated several strips.
Chayanov distinguished the capability o f the peasantry according to the following three 
parameters: firstly, the amount o f land for use, since it indicated the actual possibilities o f a single 
family; secondly, the size of the working family or the number o f individuals in a family 
participating in the daily work; and thirdly, the extent o f  its demands, such as the size o f the family 
and its composition. To these factors Chayanov adds migration o f the family, which was an 
increasingly significant issue in the light o f the extensive urbanisation in Russia from the turn of the 
century. If members o f the family, and especially those capable o f performing physical hard work, 
moved from the village to the cities, their families would lose valuable work power, which again 
meant that the families had fewer possibilities in household management. This meant that the 
mobility o f the peasant household and the density and fertility o f the family and local community, 
were o f great significance in management o f the non-wage family economy.^®
Chayanov’s theory can be summed up in the term demographic distinction^ indicating that the 
possibilities o f the individual peasants depended on the current demographic situation o f  the local 
community in general, and the family in particular. The Russian peasantry was never static but 
organic, and its possibilities, strategies and needs changed over time. A rich peasant could 
subsequently fall to the status o f a poor peasant if the composition of his household somehow 
changed negatively, which implied a lowering of the working force and also o f the quantity o f 
cultivated land. A poor peasant could likewise become a rich peasant, if  the demographic 
development was positive. Chayanov therefore rejected the Marxist distinctions o f social classes in 
his definition of the Russian peasantry, as he thought that the internal relation o f  the local 
community in general (and the family in particular) minimised such socio-economic differences.^* 
The Russian peasantry would be sympathetic to its community and family, and any threats, 
jeopardising the daily order, would usually be considered as something originating from “outside” — 
for example the intellectual elite o f the city, who did not imderstand the organic cosmos of the 
village.
The Agrarian Marxists, especially the academic L.M. Kritsman, rejected Chayanov’s position. 
They believed that the Russian peasantry was divided into distinct social stratums, giving some 
more possibilities than others. Some owned the means of productions, and reduced others to an
20Chayanov(a), 1966, p. 12.
Daniel Thomer "Chayanov’s Concept of Peasant Economy” pp. xi-xxiii in Daniel Thomer, Basile Kerblay and R.E.F 
Smith, The Theory o f Peasant Economy, Homewood, Illinois 1966 p. xvii.
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exploited work force, indicating that the first had the financial capacity to hire the latter, an< 
employ them to gain profit. Accordingly a capitalist agricultural class, the self-perpetuating anc 
exploitative “kulaks”, dominated the agricultural economy of the Soviet Union and constituted £ 
significant threat to the poor and middle peasants. In contrast to Chayanov, Kritsman identified 
capitalist farmers within the Russian peasantry, who exploited their neighbours economically. The 
distinction he used in order to categorise the peasantry was the possession o f cultivated land and 
numbers o f horses. Kritsman defined five different social strata: 1) those without cultivated land 
and one horse; 2) two desiatines o f land and two horses; 3) from two to four desiatines and three 
horses; 4) from four to ten desiatines and four horses; 5) with more than ten desiatines and more 
than five horses. He argued that the development from 1917 to 1920 was the following:
Table 1: Distribution of cultivated land and proportion of horses according to Kritsman
i l;j;id
Pi ■jpt)i1;.on oi ,:ic sts
To 2 
desiatines
From 2 to 4 
desiatmes
From 4 to 10 
desiatines
More than 10 
desiatines
30.4% 30.1% 25.2% 3.7%
47.9% 31.6% 15.3% 0.5%
12 horses 3 horses 4 horses More than 5 
horses
49.2% 17.0% 0.9% 0.5%
Í3.6% 7.9% 0.2%
) I I I iL'l: 'fl iznoenueeCoeem acoùdepeene^ Moscow 1926, p. 17)
hese numbers indicate that if  a capitalist class existed in Soviet agriculture, its proportion 
iminished from 1917 to 1920. Fewer peasants had more than four desiatines o f farming land and 
>ur horses, and less was without land and without horses. The proportion o f those with up to two 
isiatines o f  land and two horses increased significantly, indicating that a substantial number o f 
iasants became poorer in the years following the October Revolution. Kritsman accepted that 
)viet agricultural was in severe economic crises in these years. However, he argued that the 
ploitative capitalist “kulak” had survived and still posed a threat to the peasantry. In fact.
Kritsman, Knaccoeoe Pacaioemie e Coeemacou depeene, Moscow 1926, p. 3 ff.
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Kritsman believed that the social class was self-perpetuating — that is the capitalist would always 
reproduce capitalist among themselves.^ He asserted that in 1924 35.6% o f all Soviet peasantry 
households were categorised as poor or landless, meaning they had no horses and held 9.6% of the 
total cultivated land. Those household with one horse comprised 35.1% and held 26% o f the total 
proportion o f  land. 20% of the households had two horses and held 31.4% of the land. Only 5,8% o f  
household held three horses, but, nevertheless, owned 16.5% o f  the cultivating land. That is, they 
held comparatively more land than those with less than three horses. The same pattern arguably 
continued, when the 2.1% of the total households held four horses and 9.8% of the total cultivated 
land. In comparison, Kritsman also stated that 1% of the households possessed five horses, and held 
4.9% of the cultivated land. Finally he argued that 0.4% o f  the households had more then five 
horses and held 1.8% o f  the total cultivated land.^ "*
Table 2: Social composition in the countryside by 1924 according to L. Kritsman
% of households Number o f horses Proportion of land in %
35.6 None 9,6
35.1 1 26,0
20 2 31.4
5.8 3 16.5
2.1 4 9.8
1 5 4.9
0.4 More than five 1.8
(Source: Kritsman, 1926, p. 151)
This would mean that even if  more peasants were getting poorer, the rich still dominated the 
agricultural development of the 1920s. Also, it suggests that there was a disproportion between the 
number of horses and the proportion o f cultivated land: those with more horses tended to hold more 
o f the cultivating land. Kritsman’s solution to the problem was an agricultural revolution consisting 
o f two phases; 1) a merciless class struggle against the capitalist peasantry, destroying their 
economic and social position; 2) an expropriation of the households o f the capitalist peasantry, by 
creating a union o f  the proletariat and the poor peasants and landless.^^ The social class and socio-
^  L. Kritsman, Die Heroische Periode Der Grossen Russischen Revolution^ Berlin 1929, pp, 29-30.
Kritsman, 1926, p. 151.
“  Ibid, p. 15.
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economic differentiation was therefore significant in Kritsman’s theor>  ^-  he believed that an inner- 
social conflict o f the Soviet peasantry could be used in the promotion o f Soviet policy in the 
countryside,
2.L3 The situation o f  Soviet agriculture
Which o f  these two positions, Chayanov’s or Kritsman’s, was correct? Was the Russian peasantry 
constructed upon a non-wage family economy, or was it stratified according to social classes? The 
Stalinist regime clearly preferred Kritsman’s definition o f  social classes, as it was closer to Lenin’s 
view. This became apparent in 1929, when dekulakisation was laimched. Chayanov was arrested 
and, along vrith other leading intellectuals o f the People’s Commissariat o f  agriculture of the 
RSFSR (NKZem RSFSR), sentenced in 1932 to five to eight years imprisonment in the 
concentration camps. Most of these intellectuals never left prison alive.^^
Even if  the Soviet leadership supported Kritsman something implies that the social stmcture of 
the peasantry was much more complex than the class distinction would lead to believe. There was 
naturally a growing tension among the peasantry by the end o f  the 19 and beginning of the 20 
centuries. One important development was the seasonal return o f otkhodniki, who by the turn of 
century had migrated from the villages into the cities in order to find work in the factories, mines 
and building sites. Their leaving would often be temporary, and when returning, which they did in 
large number from 1917-20, a conflict between them and the more prosperous peasants would 
appear. W hen the Bolsheviks organised the poor peasants in the kombedy^ it was, among others, 
these returned otkhodniki, whose behaviour to a large extent caused dissatisfaction among the rest 
o f the villagers. There are many reports o f  clashes between the more productive peasants and the 
otkhodniki during the Civil War o f 1918-21, and it is plausible to assume that this conflict re- 
escalated at the end o f the 1920s, when the Stalinist leadership launched its attack upon the 
kulaks. The kombedy and its members were zealous activists and would use any opportunity to 
turn in those, who had crossed them as kulaks.^^ Such procedures imply a large degree o f 
randomness in the identification o f class enemies, rather than a well-organised attack on a specific 
stratum o f exploiters.
26Heinzen, 2004, p. 217.'7'7 *James Hughes, Stalinism in a Russian Province. Collectivization and Dekulakization, London 1996 p. 5.
^  Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin *s Peasants. Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village after Collectivization, New 
York, 1994, pp. 32-33.
^  Service 1995, p. 54.
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The argximent is not that socio-economic differences were unknown among the peasantry; on the 
contrary, conflicts became more and more frequent during the 1920s. It is, nonetheless, difficult to 
determine the reason for this. Most of the hired labourers in the Russian peasantry originated from 
the family. Eight out o f  ten heads of peasant households traditionally hired members o f their family 
in order to cultivate their land, which supports the view that the different possibilities o f the Russian 
peasantry was determined by demographic distinctions rather than class belonging.^*^ The 
development of NEP benefited some more than others, but this did not necessarily depend on the 
class belonging o f individual peasants.^* The OGPU naturally considered it to be a problem, and in 
July 1924 its head Feliks Dzerzhinskii advocated the implementation of a three-step plan in order to 
minimise the socio-economic differences o f the countryside: 1) To implement an enormous 
agricultural reform, which benefited the poor peasants and weakened the kulaks; 2) Most 
importantly, to give industrial support to the peasantry; 3) To support the development in the 
countryside by offering bank credit and providing technological assistance in order to improve the 
machinery and equipment that was at the disposal o f the p e a sa n try T h e  growing tension within 
the peasantry during the 1920s may explain some of the social pressure behind dekulakisation: it is 
plausible that individual peasants, while given the political authorisation o f the Soviet government 
to pillage the household of their more prosperous neighbours, would do so, in order to gain 
economic profits -  and to weaken their neighbour.
2.L4 The problems o f  Soviet class structure
Western scholars have traditionally accepted that such class structures existed in the Soviet Union. 
E.H. Carr is one o f the most prominent, supporting this assessment in his work. He has recently 
been strongly criticised as being too much of a Kritsmanite, imcritically accepting the Stalinist 
argument about the nature of development in the 1920s.^^ However, Carr accepted that: “... the 
criteria of classification of the peasantry as kulaks^ middle and poor peasants, were tmcertain and 
fluctuating, and were partly dictated by the political requirement of the moment.” *^ Sheila 
Fitzpatrick argues that the classes of Soviet society were invented in order to make the young Soviet
Gatrell, 1986, p. 72.
^'Carr, 1970, p. 112.
A. Berelowitch and V. Danilov, Coeemcan J^epeenn zjunoMU B H K - O TTiy—HKBM. Tom 2. 1923-1929, Moscow 
2000 pp. 223-226.
Hein2en,2004, p. 262, n.59.
^  E.H. Carr, The Russian Revolution from  Lenin to Stalin (1917-1929), London 1979, p. 22.
35
ri !
' (
f t
l-i!*i-
i'A
Ei"
J - ’it
I
k-\it: (
nt.ifh i
g;.!
I
‘I
Ail
I
H M iliH
republic resemble the Marxist theory upon which the leadership based its ideology. People were 
not bom into a class, but ascribed to it by the regime. The class concept was a label o f identification 
or a social construction.^^ The whole design o f  the Soviet peasantry, with the differentiation of 
batraki, bedniaki, seredniaki, zazhitochnyi and kulaki, could clearly be read as a  political 
construction by Lenin and his followers. Rather than a social deterministic stratification, class was a 
concept akin to the “racial concept” o f Nazi Germany: it was a matter of attributing one group 
positive characteristic, and ascribing them with legal rights, and denouncing another by excluding 
them as aliens, idlers, thieves or in short enem ies}^ The class concept is more flexible than the 
racial concept, which also implies that the attack on class enemies in the Soviet Union was much 
more arbitrary than the racial discrimination o f  Nazi Germany. To understand the difficulty of 
stratifying the Russian peasants into classes, we have to look further into the nature o f  the Soviet 
“kulak”.
2 A .5 The flexib le class structure o f the Soviet countryside
The First World War, the October Revolution, the Civil War and War Communism (1918-1921) 
changed the position o f  the kulaks. The Black Repartition o f  1917, which the Bolsheviks eventually 
supported also led to the complete destmction o f  the landowners: the gentry grain estates that 
traditionally had supported the domestic and foreign market, were effectively dismantled during this 
peasant revolution. I f  the kulak had existed before, he was undermined radically alongside the 
landowners and landlords when Lenin and his followers gained power in 1917. This was, in part, 
due to the socio-economic instability, following the events mentioned above, and in part due to a 
restrictive elimination o f  social classes conducted by the Soviet regime,^*
The Bolsheviks had immense difficulties defining the Soviet “kulak”, and Lenin him self was 
never specific when it came to this matter. In 1926 the commissar o f agriculture in the Russian 
Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, A.P. Smirnov, argued that the exploiters o f Soviet agriculture 
had disappeared because o f the restrictive policy following the October Revolution. The academic 
Strumilin in 1929 pointed to the difficulty o f distinguishing the kulak fi'om the middle peasant and
35 Fitzpatrick, 2005, p. 29 and Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism. Ordinary L ife in Extraordinary Times: Soviet 
Russia in the 1930s, New York 1999, pp. 11-13.
’’Social Identities” pp. 15-19 and Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Ascribing Class. The construction of social identity in Soviet 
Russia” pp. 20-46 in Sheila Fitzpatrick (ed.), Stalinism. New Direction. Rewriting Histories, London 2000.
Golfo Alexop>oulos, Stalin’s Chitcast. Aliens, Citizens, and the Soviet State, Ì 926-1936, Ithaca 2003, pp. 10-11. 
” Werth, 1999, pp. 47-52.
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the middle peasant from the poor peasant.^^ While a pre-revolutionary “ktilak” was a moneylender 
and a trader, the Soviet “kulak” was in March 1929 defined as a person who:
1) hired permanent workers for agricultural work or artisan industry;
2) owned an “industrial enterprise” such as a flour mill, dairy establishment or 
equipment for husking, for wool carding or combing, for making starch or potato 
flour, for drying fruit or vegetables, and so fourth -  but only if  provided with an 
engine or a windmill or watermill;
3) hired out, permanently or seasonally, complex agricultural machines driven by an 
engine;
4) hired out, permanently or seasonally, equipped premises for dwelling on business 
purposes;
5) was related to people engaged in commerce or usury or who had other sources o f 
income not derived from labour.
(Source: Moshe Lewin, ”Who was the Soviet Kulak?” pp. 121-141 in Moshe Lewin, The Making o f 
the Soviet System, London 1985, p. 127)
This was a flexible and arbitrary definition, especially as the hiring o f manpower was often a matter 
o f  employing members o f the family.'*^ In addition a peasant, stigmatised as a “kulak”, could be 
degraded to middle or poor peasant by dividing his property among his family. This was officially 
termed “self-dekulakisation”, or, a voluntary subdivision o f properties amongst family members, 
which often appeared during the 1920s.^^ The arbitrary treatment o f  the peasantry became even 
more apparent when poor peasants, termed as “kulak henchmen” or podkulachniki, were placed 
alongside the kulaks. Moshe Lewin argues that the Soviet “kulak” to a large extent was akin to the 
Russian mvzhik -  referring to the traditional Russian peasant. The muzhik would often resist the 
transformation o f Soviet society, as the aims o f the agricultural policy o f the regime were against
39 Moshe Lewin, "Who was the Soviet Kulak?” pp. 121 -141 in Moshe Lewin, The Making o f the Soviet System, London 
1985, pp. 123-24 and E j\. Rees, State Control in Soviet Russia, London 1987, pp. 123-127 -  notice table 4.10 at page 
125.
^  Lewin, 1985, p. 125.
V.P. Danilov, CoeemcKan JTokoxxoshosi fXepeenii: Hacejtenue, SeMjienojibsoeanue, X osxùctbo, Moskva 1977, pp. 
262-63.
42 Mace, 1983 p. 283 and Conquest, 1986 p. 75.
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their interest. Therefore they would and could withdraw from the market, and hide grain away from 
the requisition squads.'^^
James Hughes raises a counterargument to this position, asserting that the development of the 
1920s had caused a social imbalance in the countryside, which created latent conditions for a social 
conflict within the peasantry,^ Whilst conceding that it was immensely difficult to distinguish 
kulaks from well-off middle peasants, Hughes argues that the development of the 1920s had caused 
a significant inequality within the peasantry. His case study on Siberia shows that socio-economic 
differentiations existed in part caused by the procedure o f lending mowing machinery, threshers, 
and draft animals between neighbours. Such services were often paid for by non-monetary 
resources such as helping the lender when his land had to be cultivated, assisting him with the 
harvest, or simply though the payment in kind (grain). Peasants who possessed this machinery 
could lend their machinery out in exchange for valuable working hours or other similar resources. 
The result o f this was that those who borrowed equipment would be dependent on their more 
prosperous neighbours. Those with lesser resources (fewer horses, a smaller quantity o f cultivated 
land and a smaller family) were socially and financially weaker than the more well-off peasants.^^ A 
market-oriented agriculture gained ground in various regions o f the Soviet Union in the 1920s, 
which placed some peasants in more favourable positions than others. It is not, however, very clear, 
as to social tension o f  the Soviet countryside can alone be attributed to class differentiation within 
the peasantry.
The socio-economic differences Hughes refers to could, perhaps have been caused by demographic 
differentiation within the peasantry -  some families were larger than others, and had more 
possibilities in terms o f  cultivating their land. The social differences can therefore also be explained 
through the theories o f  Chayanov. For one thing, it is difficult to  define objectively classes in the 
Soviet peasantry. This became clear during the grain collection campaign of 1928, when the OGPU 
realised that the designated “kulaks” were not alone in resisting the centralised requisition."^^ Several 
reports indicated that poor and middle peasants also concealed grain from the requisition squads. 
The OGPU described the concealment o f grain as a counter-revolutionary act committed by the
Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power: A Study o f Collectivization^ London 1968 p. 252.
”  Hughes, 1996, pp. 5-8.
James Hughes, Stdin , Siberia and the crisis o f the New Economic Policy, London 1991 p. 69, pp. 73-78 and p. 96.
^  The Soviet regime had already by 1917-18 introduced centralised requisition campaigns, where the regime often 
violently confiscated the grain o f the peasantry. The peasantry naturally reacted to this, often by hiding their grain. The 
Soviet regime had not been able to meet its quotas in 1927, 1928 and 1929, and ascribed it to kulak sabotage (or hiding 
of grain). For more on this “grain crises” see: E.H. Carr and R.W. Davies, Foundation o f a Planned Economy, 1926- 
1929, volume 1, London 1969, pp. 42 and 44-45.
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kulaks, who had forced the poor and middle peasants to carry out this criminal act/^ The OGPU, 
however, also realised during this grain collection campaign that the poor and middle peasants 
depended on the supplies of the “kulaks”. This was depicted as a negative correlation, but there are 
indications that if  the “kulaks” were removed and their grain confiscated, the poor and middle 
peasants would not know how to purchase food for themselves and their family. The productive 
peasants had enough supplies to ensure the existence of the local community, and thus the removal 
o f the “kulaks” had wider consequences for the rural society."**
The peasant resistance to the forced collectivisation also indicates that peasant discontent was 
directed towards the Soviet regime. When women violently objected to the state intrusion of the 
countryside they did so not as poor peasants, middle peasants or kulaks, but as women. This 
resistance might have been caused by the fact that the Soviet regime was attacking their domain: the 
private sphere o f the household. The women traditionally looked after the cows, and the 
collectivisation would be an attack on their domain, as the Soviet project implied an attempt to 
absolve the right to possess private livestock. The 'habi bunty’ (Women’s riot) was a  response to 
the start of Communist activity in the countryside. Women led the peasant resistance, perhaps 
because the peasantry was convinced that the regime would not hurt them, and did the “talking” -  
that is they rebelled against the collectivisation o f agriculture and attacked the representatives of the 
Soviet state in the countryside.^^
The destmction o f livestock, machinery and cultivated land during the campaign was done as a 
collective action by the peasantry. One o f the many demands o f the rebellious peasants was also 
that the dekulakised families should be allowed to return to the villages -  this means that what the 
Soviet regime conceived as an exploitative element was considered as being a natural element of 
the village by the p e asa n try T h o se  peasants who supposedly were to benefit fi-om collectivisation, 
the poor and batraki, were moreover sceptical towards entering the newly established collective 
farms. Some joined them, but if  we examine the official statistics o f the Soviet government a very 
interesting paradox emerges. By 1 October 1929 30.5% of the Soviet peasantry belonged to the 
categories of either poor peasants or batraki. However, only 7.6% of the overall peasantry had 
entered the collective farms voluntarily, which suggests that the regime had not managed to capture
Berelowitch and Danilov, 2000, pp. 664-679.
** Ibid-, 667.
Lynne Viola, Peasant Rebels under Stalin. Collectivization and the Culture o f Peasant Resistance^ New York 1996, 
chapter 6.
^  Andrea Graziosi, The Great Peasant War. Bolsheviks and Peasants, 1917-1933, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996, p. 
54.
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a large majority of their expected allies.^  ^ It is plausible that the peasant resistance against the 
Stalinist project in the countryside was comprehensive, and not only comprised a certain category 
of “kulaks”; in 1929 over 1300 peasant revolts occurred against the regime, and the OGPU reported 
in 1930 another 402 incidents in January, 1048 in February and 6528 in March.^^ Molotov 
consequently talked about the united front o f the countryside in 1929, suggesting that the state 
realised its ambition to mobilise the poor peasants and batraki had failed. James Hughes accepts this 
failure of capturing the peasantry in his conclusion, and also asserts that the peasant resistance 
became more organised in 1930 compared to 1929,^^
Mark B. Tauger has questioned the extent o f peasant resistances, arguing that the response o f the 
peasantry was more ambiguous than the “resistance interpretation” would lead one to believe. 
Firstly, he argues that fewer peasants than is traditionally believed responded by violent resistance. 
Secondly, he states that the attitude within the peasantry towards the state policy varied 
significantly. And thirdly, Tauger asserts that far more peasants adapted to the collectivisation 
process and participated in the creation of a new collective sector o f  Soviet agriculture.^^ Such an 
assessment suggests that many peasants supported collectivisation and voluntarily joined the 
kolkhozy and sovkhozy. Tauger, however, agrees that many peasants resisted collectivisation.^^ The 
resistances, like the political terror of the Soviet state, varied from time to time -  while it in some 
periods was radical and violent it would in others be more relaxed. Whereas March 1930 was 
particularly violent, with 6528 cases o f social disorder, April 1930 was less so with 1992 cases. 
Although almost 2000 cases o f disorder in April must be considered significant, the state only 
suppressed 56 o f these incidents (2.8%) by force. In March the state had used force on 807 
occasions (12.4%).^**
It is worth noting that the peasantry had been disarmed by the Soviet regime in 1921, as a  result of 
its defeat during the peasant rebellions,^’ yet they were still able to raise a violent resistance against 
the regime by 1929-30. Their only weapons were pitchforks, axes and other working tools.^* Also,
Ivnitskii, 1996, p. 20.
V.P. Danilov and N.A. Ivnitskii {ed.XffoKyMeHmbi ceudemejicmeyH>m: Hs ucmopuu depeenu HOKOHyne u exode  
KOJUieKmuemaifuu, 1927^1932 aa., Moscow 1989, p. 23 and Viola 1996, pp. 138-39.
® Hughes, 1996, p. 212.
^  Mark B, Tauger, “Soviet Peasants and Collectivization, 1930-39; Resistance and Adaptation” pp.427-456 in The 
Journal o f Peasant Studies, Voi. 31, No. 3&4, April/July 2004, pp. 449-451.
”  Ibid., 428.
“  Ibid., p. 435.
^  The peasantry reacted to the Bolshevik regime by a comprehensive rebellion from 1918-21. For more on these 
peasant rebellions see: Graziosi, 1996 and Nicolas Werth, ”A State against Its People; Violence, Repression, and terror 
in the Soviet Union” in Stéphane Courtois, The Black Book o f Communism: Crimes. Terror, Repression, London 1999. 
Graziosi, 1996, p. 53.
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Molotov’s statement from 1929 implies that the strength of the resistance was terrifying for the 
Soviet state. This would suggest that the sympathy of the peasantry was directed inwardly, and not 
outwardly.
2.2 The anti-kulak campaigns
2.2.1 The liquidation o f  the kulak as a class, 1929-3S
The Communist Party o f  the Soviet Union set up a commission on 5 December 1929 chaired by 
Yakovlev, which was given two weeks to prepare a draft decree on the rate of collectivisation -  it, in 
others words, became a product of the feverish haste generally characterising the political 
transformation o f Soviet agriculture. Various subcommissions were established in order to discuss 
different aspects of the process. The subcommission on the kulaks is particularly interesting, as a 
disagreement between the members emerged. The head o f the kulak subcommission, Bauman 
(secretary of the Moscow region and the former head of the Central Committee department on work 
in the countryside), had already in July and August 1929 implied that some kulaks, under certain 
conditions, could be admitted into the new collective farms. However, at least two other members of 
the subcommission, Ryskulov and Kaminskii advocated strong discrimination o f  the kulaks 
including expropriation o f property and land, physical removal and exclusion from the kolkhozy,^^ 
The members o f the commission reach no agreement, and the discussion continued. On 27 
December 1929, when Stalin delivered his speech to the conference of Agrarian Marxist, he 
proclaimed;
...w e have passed from the policy o f limitation of the exploiting tendencies o f the kulaks 
to the policy of the liquidation o f the kulak as a class.
(source; “K BonpocaM arpapHoK nonimiKH CCCP” pp. 141-172 in J.V. Stalin, CoHUHenuit, Tom 12, anpejib 
1929 -hiohi. 1930, Moscow 1949 p. 169)*®
This would suggest a severe worsening in the political and social position of “kulaks”, yet the final 
decision was not taken until a meeting in a Politburo commission, chaired by Molotov, on 30 
January 1930. Here the resolution “On the Measures for the Liquidation of Kulak Households in 
Districts of Comprehensive Collectivisation” was adopted. This document divided “kulaks” into
59 Ivnitskii, 1996, p. 40 and R.W. Davies, The CoUectivisation o f Soviet A ff’iculture J929-1930, London 1980, pp. 142 
and 188-194.
*® Translated in Lynne Viola, “The Role o f the OGPU in Dekulakization: Mass Deportation and Special Resettlement in 
1930”. The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, number 1406 (2000). pp. 3-4.
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three categories according to which, treatment was decided. The first category was termed as the 
m ost dangerous or “the counterrevolutionary kulak active” (in Russian: KOHTppeBOjnouHOHHtiH 
KynamcHH aicraB). They were to be arrested immediately, placed in concentration camps and 
subdued with the highest repressive measures [in Russian: Btnnefi Mepsi penpeccHH]. What the 
latter implied is unclear: had the authority stated that the first category of kulaks were to be 
subjected to the highest measure o f punishment [in Russian: BtimeH Mepti naKasaHHe or BMH] 
there could be no doubt, as this would have meant execution. The use o f the word ‘repression’ gives 
a  more ambiguous meaning -  impl5dng that death sentences were not automatically adopted. 
Vladimir Zemskov has established that special troikas, consisting o f  the local chairman o f  OGPU 
(PP OGPU), the chairman o f the raikom or obkom of the Communist Party, and the local state 
prosecutor, tried and sentenced the “kulaks” o f  the first c a te g o ry .In  a secret report o f April 1930 
it was noted that 329 persons were shot in Tomsk during March and April that year sentenced in 
accordance with article 58.^^ Article 58 referred to political crime, including counter-revolutionary 
activity in the cotmtryside, and it is probable that the majority of the executed in Tomsk must have 
belonged to the first category “kulaks” .^ ^
I f  the numbers of Tomsk for March and April 1930 was representative of all other provinces of 
the Soviet Union, it implies that we are dealing with a large number o f executions during the first 
wave of dekulakisation.^ Davies and Wheatcroft assert that 18,966 death sentences of first category 
“kulaks” were adopted in the period from January to October 1930. This suggests that at least 
20,000 people, and possible even more, were executed in 1930 as first category “kulaks”.®^ If we 
add the death sentences for counter-revolutionary activity in 1931 (which was during the second 
wave o f dekulakisation) the total number o f executed first category kulaks would rise. V.V. Luneev 
argues that 1481 individuals were sentenced to execution in 1931, while V.P. Popov raises this to 
10,651.^ It is difficult to explain the difference between these numbers (as both have 20,201 death 
sentences for 1930, 2728 for 1932 and 2154 for 1933), but Luneev implies that the statistics
Vladimir N. Zemskov, CneifnocejieHifbi e CCCP 1930-1960^ Moskva 2005, p. 16, He has developed this argument in 
previous publications like: V.N Zemskov, ””Kyjia*iecKofi ccmiKa” b 30-e roabi” in CoifuojiozuHecmie ucaiedoemue^ 
1991X2lO,p.3.
^  V. I. Markov and B.P. Trenin, Hs ucmopttu seMjtu TomckoH 1930-1933. Hapod u ejiacmb, Tomsk 2001, pp. 298-303. 
Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Soviet Criminal Jttstice Under Stalin, Cambridge 1996, p. 92.
Dekulakisation comprised two waves: the first was from January-March 1930 and the second from July 1930 to 
1932/33. On this see R.W. Davies, The Socialist Offensive. The Collectivisation o f  Soviet Apiculture, 1929-1930, 
London 1980 p. 182ff and R.W. Davies/S.G. Wheatcroft, The Years o f  Hunger. Soviet Apiculture, 1931-1933, London 
2004, p. Iff.
Davies/Wheatcroft, 2004, p. 22.
“  Both Luneev and Popov use the term *BMH’ in their statistic, referring to ‘the highest measure o f pxmishment’, which 
must refer to ‘execution’.
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!provides two sets o f  figures for some o f the years. Yet there is no precise explanation to the 
variation in either o f the works. The problem is also that the data were collected in December 1953, 
which would raise uncertainty regarding its reliability. However, the numbers suggests that the total 
death sentences of 1930-31 varied from 21,682 to 30,851,®’ which implies that ‘the highest 
repressive measures’ often resulted in death sentences in these two years. The families o f the first 
category were to be deported to a region far away from their home community. Any traces of this 
group, both o f the kulak himself and his descendants, had to be removed from the villages where 
they came from.
The second category o f “kulaks” was “the remaining elements o f  the kulak active, especially from 
the richest kulaks and semi-landowners” (in Russian: ocrajiLHbie sneMeHTW KyjiamcHH aicTHB, 
ocoOcHHO H3 HanOonee Gorartix KynaxoB h nojiynoMeimncoB), who were likewise to be deported 
along with their families to a region far away from their home district. The third category of 
“kulaks” were considered the less harmful, and could remain within their own district, but were to be 
resettled on new land areas outside the boundaries o f the collective farms (KyjiaKH, KOTOpwe 
no;uie»caT paccejieHino na hobbk otboahmlix hm 3a npenenaMH KOJUiosHtix xoaaiicTB y^tacncax). 
The “kulaks” o f the second category and the families of first and second category were deported to 
the Northern part o f Russia, the Ural, Western Siberia and Kazakhstan.®^ In the period from 1930 to 
1932/33 more than 2 million people were deported from their local communities and placed in so- 
called special settlements or spetspereselenie. Another 2.5 million people were resettled outside the 
newly established collective farms as third category kulaks.®^
2 .2 2  Kulak children and dekulakisation
The Politburo decree “On Measures for the Liquidation o f Kulak Household in Districts of 
Comprehensive Collectivisation” o f  30 January 1930 specifically declared that the whole 
household, including the children, were to be removed from the villages as part o f the liqtiidation of 
the kulak as a class. This suggests that the authorities did not differentiate between kulaks and 
their children in the initial phase of the dekulakisation.
V.V. Luneev, Upecmyrnocrnh XXecKO, Mupoeou ¡qjuMUHonuHecKuii anaius^ Moscow 1997, p. 180 (Table 1) 
and V.P. Popov, ”rocy;iapcTBeHHMH reppop b cobctckoÌì Pocchhk) 1923-1953 rr. (hcto*ihhkh h hx HHrepnperaiiH»)’' 
pp. 20-31 OmeHecmeeuHbie apxuebi, 1992, Volume 2, p. 28 (Table 3) and p. 29. note *.
^  TsDAGO, f. 1, op. 20, delo 3142,11.4-9.
^  S.G. Wheatcroft and R. W. Davies, “Population” pp. 57-80 in R.W. Davies et. al. (eds.) The Economic 
Transformation o f the Soviet Union, 1913-1945^ C^nbridge, 1994 p. 68.
™ TsDAGO f. 1, op. 20, delo 3142,11.4-9.
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It is quite likely that kulak children were deported as a  logical consequence o f  the repressive 
policy, simply because the household o f  their fathers was liquidated -  emphasising the importance 
o f the family in the traditional Russian peasantry. Kulak children, in other words, comprised a 
significant component o f  the traditional peasant household- Furthermore, it is apparent that the 
regime was either blind towards, or simply ignored children at the initial phase o f  dekulakisation. 
For example, when discussing the fate of kulaks their children are rarely mentioned -  it was as if 
they did not exist in the mind of the Soviet authorities.^' In the view o f the officials the plan had 
first priority; confiscating kulak grain and o f emptying the villages o f  these people considered to be 
class enemies. In his classic on the Smolensk region Merl Fainsod quoted a document from the 
grain collecting campaign o f 1929 where an emissary from Moscow asserts: “When you are 
attacking there is no place for mercy; don’t think of the kulaks’ hungry children; in the class 
struggle philanthropy is evil”. The OGPU collected numerous responses to the dekulakisation in 
Ukraine fi’om 29 January to 26 March 1930 discussing how those designated as “kulaks”, the local 
communities and the authorities reacted to the ongoing campaigns. What is significant about these 
documents is that they contain none, or only very little information about kulak children.^^ While 
there exists a significant number o f  documents regarding the situation of kulak children in 
deportation,^"' there is very little information about how kulak children responded to the restrictive 
measures before the deportation. This is despite several reflections about how the kulaks (the 
fathers o f the household) reacted.
However, there were Soviet officials, who warned about the consequences o f deporting kulak 
children alongside their parents. One informer fi*om Arkhangelsk, for example, asserted as early as 
1930: “[...] If  we destroy the kulaks economically, then we destroy their children physically -  it is 
barbarous Such a statement would imply that not everybody decided to ignore the impact
dekulakisation had on children -  even when the situation was most intense.
It is apparent that the OGPU in February 1930 defended the deportations of the first and second 
category “kulaks” and their families. This would also imply that the OGPU was defending the 
measures taken against the children. For example, it was established that:
See TsDAGO, f, 1, op. 20, delo 3142,1.68.
^M erl Fainsod, Smolensk under Soviet Rule^ Cambridge Mass. 1958, p 241.
^  To support see; TsDAGO f. 1, op. 20 delo 3189.
See: S.S. Vilenskii, A.I. Kokurin, G.V.Atmashkina, I.Iu. Novichenko {xed.Xffemu H/JIATa ¡918-1956^ Moskva 
2002, pp. 86-90, pp. 106-110 and V.P. Danilov and Sergei Krasilnikov, CneynepecejieHytit e SanadnoU Cu6upu 1930 — 
eecHQ 1931 e., Novosibirsk 1992 pp. 257-59.
TsDAGO f. 1, op. 20, delo 3142 I. 68.
Vilenskii ct al., 2002, p. 78.
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The transferred are placed in heated box wagons with 40 people in every heated 
box wagon. Taking note that the number o f adults in each heated box-wagon is 
established to 35, the given number o f transportation o f kulak families is not harsh 
[in Russian: ”He XBJwerca xceciKofi”]
(Source: V.P. Danilov ct.al, Tpazedm Coeemacou Mepemu, moM 2, Moscow 2000 p. 168)
However, the members o f  the Politburo, and the leaders o f the OGPU, were probably aware that 
such transportations were extremely hard for children. They only had to remember their own past, 
w here there were plenty o f examples o f how children suffered during these expulsions. 
Deportations o f whole families -  including children -  were a well-known phenomenon in a Russian 
context even pre-dating the Soviet regime. Families were forcefully removed from their home 
regions as early as 1914, as part o f a Tsarist ambition to strengthen their political control over 
certain geographic areas o f  the country. The Soviet regime contmued this practice and it had far 
reaching consequences for the deported children. The influx o f them to the Soviet concentration 
camps in 1919 as a consequence o f the violent campaign against peasant rebellions during the Civil 
W ar is one clear example.^* Since a number o f Soviet officials responsible for the dekulakisation, 
such as the head of the OGPU Genrikh Yagoda, were active in the early 1920s,^^ it was possible he 
in January and February 1930 knew that political repression o f perceived enemies often led to 
neglect and maltreatment o f the children. It has been argued that the Soviet officials were on a 
learning curve through out the 1920s, moderating their radical thoughts in relation to society and 
thus striving to abandon political terror. If such an argument holds it would imply that people 
(such as Yagoda), at least were aware of the impact deportation would have upon kulak children. A 
radicalisation occurred in November 1929, indicating that if  a learning curve existed, it was 
abandoned. It does not preclude the possibility that the Soviet authorities knew very well in 
February 1930 that the deportation of kulak children was anything but “not harsh”. Still, they
^  Eric Lohr, Nationalizing the Russian Empire. The Campaing against Enemy Aliens During World War /, Cambridge, 
Mass., 2003, p. 123 ff„
Vilenskii et al, 2002, pp. 18-19.
™ Nicolas Werth, ”A State against Its People: Violence, Repression, and terror in the Soviet Union” in Stéphane 
Courtois, The Black Book o f Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, London 1999, p.62.
Douglas R. Weiner has established this in his discussion paper, ‘‘Rethinking the Primacy o f Terror The Learning 
Curve o f Feliks Edmunivoch Dzerzhinskii” presented at the annual convention o f AAASS held in Toronto 20-23 
November 2003.
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decided to continue and maintain the liquidation o f the household, which also implies that the 
treatment of children could be accepted.
The OGPU agents and Communist activists thus acted ruthlessly in relation to the children, and to 
a certain point defended it as necessary. They did not consider their deeds as being wrong, but 
conceived it as part o f  protecting the transformation o f society. If  this implied exclusion o f children, 
then it was a price that had to be paid. This means that the deportation of kulak children was a 
logical consequence o f political decision to liquidate the kulak labour unit, and some in the Soviet 
leadership even believed it was necessary to adapt a formal decision to exclude kulak children.^^ 
Several leading officials o f  the OGPU supported kulak children being treated in the same manner as 
their parents. It would also suggest that some m  the Soviet leadership believed it was necessary to 
strike the supposed “kulaks” at their very nerve — the non-wage family economy -  in order to 
weaken them politically and socially. We shall return (in chapter 3) to the ambiguous process of 
defining kulak children through the 1930s.
2.3 The role of the enemy
The ideological construction o f classes within the Soviet countryside and society as such was 
therefore largely based on a misinterpretation o f  the social structure in society -  in which the 
“kulak” concept largely served the purpose o f  legitimising official policy. The role o f the “kulak” as 
an enemy of the Soviet regime needs to be considered, in order to understand the function this 
served for the regime, in terms o f its own ideology, and as a mechanism of controlling society. One 
explanation is that the Soviet government needed a scapegoat, in order to conceal its own 
insufficiency. Rather than describing the grain deficit in 1927/28 as a logical consequence o f a 
failed price regulating policy, the regime spoke o f “kulak” sabotage, grain speculation and 
exploitation o f  the peasantry. Therefore, the official position was that there was nothing wrong with 
the policy; it was an evil and vicious class o f  kulaks that was undermining the transformation from 
succeeding -  and the only logical reaction to this was to liquidate them as a social class.
In Hannah Arendt’s unravellmg of the Adolf Eichmann case in Jerusalem, we are confronted with the dilemma of 
choices among lower level officials -  those who conduct the orders issued by the central authorities. It is evident from 
Arednt’s work that low-level officials did not necessarily consider their actions morally wrong. Though there are 
several differences between Nazi and Soviet officials, this notion of moral superiority seem to apply to the actions of 
low level Soviet officials during dekulakisation. For more on Eichmann see: Hannah Arendt, A Report o f the Banality o f 
Evil. Eichmann in Jerusalem^ Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1964, pp. 21-23.
On the debate o f this issue see; Larry Holmes, The Kremlin and the Schoolhouse. Reforming Education in Soviet 
Russia, 1917-193ly Indiana, Michigan 1991, pp. 111-113.
^  Dorena Caroli, L 'enfance abandonee et délinquante dans la  Russie soviétique (1917-1937), Paris 2004, pp. 140-156.
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Something suggests that the Soviet kulaks served the same role o f the scapegoat as the pre­
revolutionary Russian Jews had done. This became particularly evident in 1932, when the story of 
the murder on Pavlik Morozov emerged in the Soviet press. Although the crime was never fully 
investigated or solved, the kulaks were accused of the brutal murder o f this young boy and his 
brother. Not only were the perpetrators kulaks, as rumour had it, but they were also related to the 
boys and committed the crime as acts o f revenge. Pavlik Morozov had reported his own father to 
the Soviet authority for speculatmg in grain, and his uncles and grandparents killed him in order to 
set an example. This was the vicious reprisal o f  the kulak.*^ Although the murder was not motivated 
by religion, like the infamous myth of the Blood Libel,*^ there were some resemblances in how 
child murder was used to exclude Jews from the Tsarist Russian society and kulaks from the Soviet 
Union. The last European Jew to defend him self against the Blood Libel was the Russian official 
Mendel Beilis, who was on trail from 1911-13. His case has often been compared to the notorious 
Dreyfus affair (1894) in France; however the Beilis affair is complex not the least because he was 
acquitted by the Tsarist court. In both the Beilis case, as in the case of the murder on Pavlik 
Morozov, the perpetrators were depicted as inhuman monsters, who would stop at nothing, not even 
infanticide, in order to achieve their goal: that o f  subjecting the rest o f society to their speculative 
enslavement. One might argue that the Blood Libel myth was based on groundless accusations and 
had a much more wide-ranging effect on the European Jewish communities, whereas the murder of 
Morozov was a fact and only limited to a specific group o f people -  his relatives. However, the 
“kulaks” as a group were accused in the latter case with the specific purpose of attributing to them 
barbaric characteristics and thus institutionalising paranoia in society: not even children were sacred 
so “ ...Onwards in a merciless battle against these kulaks! Death to them!”*^
By January 1933, when the famine was at its peak, Stalin delivered a speech, which emphasis the 
importance of the kulak scapegoat. The dekulakisation campaign had officially ended by 1933 
hence it was unnecessary for Stalin to use the “kulak” concept. Nonetheless, he explained the low 
grain yield of the previous year in the following way:
** Catriona Kelly, Pavlik Morozov. The Rise and Fall o f a Soviet Boy Hero, London 2005.
“  In ancient Europe Jews were accused of slaughtering young virgin children, whose blood they used to bake the 
religious Passover bread “Mazzot” For more on this see: Cecil Roth, D. Phil., F.R. Hist. S. (editor) The Ritual Murder 
Libel and the Jew. The report by Cardinal Lorenze Ganganelli (Pope Clement XIV) The Woburn Press, 1979, p. 22.
“  More on this see Albert S. Lindemann, The Jew Accused (Dreyfiis, Beilis, Frank 1894-1915), Cambridge 1991.
Vasilii Novokshonov, B mpudyarntt -  KOMendarnypcKuefonepiOi no ucmopuu meeyjibdemacoeo paùon), c. Teryjttaer 
1993, pp. 4-5.
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„.the defects in our work in the countryside is the instability of a number of 
our comrades in the localities to reorganise the front of the struggle against 
the kulaks; their failure to understand that the face o f the class enemy has 
changed o f late, that the tactics of the class enemy in the countryside have 
changed, and that we must change our tactics accordingly if  we are to 
achieve success.
(Source: J,V. Stalin, “Work in the Countryside [January 1933]” in J.V. Stalin, WorkSy 
Volume 13, July 1930-January 1934, Moscow 1955, p. 234.)
Stalin asserted that the kulaks had entered the collective farms, even i f  the official policy had been 
to exclude them, and thereby subverted them from within. The kulak was everywhere, and the 
activists needed to be aware o f the constant danger he represented -  even if  he supposedly had been 
liquidated as a class in the preceding years. Later in February 1933 Stalin went even further and 
stressed that any compromise with individual farming implied a revival o f the kulak:
The restoration o f  the kulaks is bound to lead to the creation o f a kulak 
power and to the liquidation o f  the Soviet power -  hence, it is bound to lead 
to the formation o f  a bourgeois government
(Source: J.V. Stalin, “Speech at the first Congress of Shock Brigades [19 February 1933]” 
in Stalin, 1955, p. 248)
While it is true that the regime had fought the kulak for the preceding couple of years, these 
designated class enemies had survived the struggle, changed form and reorganised. The Soviet state 
believed that the spirit o f the kulak class lingered, regardless of the official abandonment o f the 
dekulakisation policy; any compromises would inevitably lead to its own collapse. The “kulak” 
concept therefore continued to serve a political purpose, both as a scapegoat for the failed policy 
leading to the devastating famine, and as a  motivation factor for the Soviet activists working in the 
countryside to continue fighting the resisting peasants. It would, moreover, legitimise the repressive 
policy carried through in relation to the peasantry, despite the catastrophic impact this had on the 
situation in the countryside -  it was probably not a coincidence that Stalin depicted certain elements 
of the peasantry as vicious at a time when famine was ravaging society. Stalin and the Soviet 
eadership needed staying power in order for transformation of Soviet society to succeed. The 
oncept o f an enemy was important in order to maintain vigilance among those Stalinist activists
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who from November 1929 onwards had been sent into the countryside from the larger cities in order 
to secure collectivisation o f agriculture.
In  the  field of genocide studies, Helen Fein argues that an exterminated scapegoat serves no end.** 
This is important, when deciding the role o f the enemy; however, the theory o f  the need o f  a 
scapegoat has some relevance in the Soviet context. Instead o f being a fixed category, like Jews, 
Gypsies and homosexuals in Nazi Germany, the kulak was a flexible and arbitrary concept 
.dictated by the political requirement of the moment.’"*^  It would suggest that the enemy concept 
could never disappear from the Soviet rhetoric, implying that it had a fundamental function in 
controlling society. The question, at least from a Stalinist position, is whether the collectivisation 
cam paign could have been carried through without the enemy -  whether or not the regime 
understood the world order in a very specific way necessitating the enemy label.
The mobilising effect o f the kulak concept became clear in 1937, with the Great Purges. In 
August 1937 Order No. 00447, or the “round-up o f former kulaks and other criminals”, intensified 
these campaigns significantly. The NKVD issued quotas for those to be executed and imprisoned. 
The campaign was in part an attack on the kulaks; however, it also had another clear function in the 
inwards organisation of the NKVD. In late February and early March 1937 the Central Committee 
of the Soviet Communist Party held a plenary session, where the head o f the NKVD, N.I, Ezhov, 
denounced his predecessor, Genrikh Yagoda, who had been in charge o f the dekulakisation process 
in 1930-33. Yagoda had, according to Ezhov’s speech, failed to understand that even if  the battle 
was won in 1933, and Soviet agriculture was collectivised, class war continued. The NKVD 
misunderstood this and failed to continue its attack on the “kulaks” -  they could carry on their 
“quite sabotage”, Avithout any significant disturbances from the state. Therefore the Soviet regime 
of 1937 had to respond to this situation, and new methods had to be invented. Ezhov’s speech 
clearly served as a justification of the preceding purge in the NKVD, which had already begun in 
late 1936.^® We shall return to the significance o f Order No. 00447, and its impact on kulak children 
in chapter 3.
! i
** Helen Fein, Accounting fo r Genocide. National Responses and Jewish Victimization during the Holocaust., New York 
1979, p. 7.
” Carr, 1979,p.22.
^  David Shearer, “Social Disorder, Mass Repression and the NKVD during the 1930s” pp. 85-117 in Barry 
McLoughlin and Kevin McDermott (eds.), Stalin's Terror. High Politics and Mass Repression in the Soviet Union, 
London 2003, p. 88. ! {
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2.3. J The ending o f the debate
That the “kulak” was a construction is not unique in a Soviet context, since the whole class- 
structure to a large extent was based on a simplistic design. Even the proletariat, supposedly the 
natural ally o f the Soviet regime, was an ideological construction.^* And violence was not 
something, which emerged during the dekulakisation campaign.^^ It could be argued that the newly 
established Soviet regime was confronted by enemy forces already from the outset — one could 
mention the Civil War, where Tsarist officers organised violent resistance against the Bolsheviks, or 
the massive peasant uprising in 1921. This could lead to the conclusion that Soviet violence was an 
unintended consequence o f  social conflicts within society. Political violence was not, however, a 
malfunction in the system, being caused by circumstances outside its control, but rather the logical 
outcome of the forceful transformation of Soviet society. In order to understand this, we need to 
explore further the nature o f the Soviet revolution.
As with the Fascist takeover in Italy by 1922, the Nazis rise to power in Germany by 1933, and 
Franco’s victory in Spain in 1936, the Bolshevik conquest of Imperial Russia in October 1917 
marked the end o f the Old World order. What these regimes all had in common was that they were 
non-democratic.^^ Another thing the Nazi and Bolshevik regimes had in common was that they 
were structured according to the values o f the modem world -  order, hygiene, efficiency, science, 
control and aesthetics. With it also came a classification or naming o f  the world order -  standards 
for right and wrong behaviour were defined.^ The world order was differentiated into binary 
opponents; healthy versus unhealthy; hygienic versus unhygienic; control versus chaos; Aryan 
versus Jew; or progressive versus backward. The problems o f order would always be conceived as 
something jeopardising and undennining the values o f order -  the unhealthy influence from within 
had to be eliminated in order to create a healthy and pure society.^^ The exclusion o f unwanted 
elements was carried through by administrative means. The deprivation and dehumanisation of the 
unhealthy “other” became possible due to the modem invention o f  state bureaucracy and social 
science. Society was organised according to certain political and social priorities. All these regimes 
devised efficient means, whereby the population could be categorised and differentiated.^^
Jonathan Aves, Workers Against Lenin: Labour Protest and The Bolshevik Dictatorships London 1996.
Peter Holquist, “State Violence as Technique: The Logic o f Violence in Soviet Totalitarianism” pp. 131-156 in David 
L. Hoffinann (ed.) Stalinism. The Essential Readings, Oxford 2003, p. 138.
Juan J. Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes, London 2000, pp. 53-55.
Z y^w n X ’Bzvtman, Modernity and Ambivalence, Cairibndgt 1991, pp 1-6.
Richard J. Evans, Rituals o f  Retribution. Capital Punishment in Germany. 1600-1987, London 1996, pp. 702-703.
^  Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Deutsche Cesellschafisgeschichte. Vierter Band Vom Beginn des Ersten Weltkriegs bis stir 
Gründung der beiden deutschen Staaten, 1914-1949, München 2003, pp. 898-899.
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In the Soviet case, this led to a division o f society into categories such as: the Socialist regime 
versus kulaks; the State versus its opponents; the patriotic versus the unpatriotic; modernity versus 
backwardness and moral versus amoral. The regimes represented the positive features o f this 
classification, whereas the “other” or the “enemy” embodied its negative attributes — that is the 
“problems of order”. Therefore, the Soviet regime used “violence as a bureaucratic technique” in 
order to separate unhealthy “elements” in its ambition to create a beautiful and pure society.^^ 
“Political violence” became a political practice in modernising a society otherwise considered 
immensely backward. The argument is not that every single act was determined by such 
classification, but rather that the discourses o f the Nazi and Stalinist regimes were heavily affected 
by it. The understanding o f the world was based on Manichean oppositions of right and wrong. The 
process was complex, but the situation was more and more intensified and the state became 
increasingly involved in exclusion of unwanted elements from society.^*
The more radical the Soviet discourse became in 1928-29, the more important it was for even low 
level officials to demonstrate their obedience to the General Line o f  the Soviet Communist Party. 
Any alternatives to the course of the Politburo often implied a purge, which became apparent in 
1928-29, when leading intellectuals like Smirnov, Chayanov and others were expelled from the 
People’s Commissariat o f Agriculture o f RSFSR and eventually arrested and charged with anti- 
Soviet activities.^ With this radicalisation the remaining Soviet officials knew too well that it was 
impossible to hold an alternative position to the policy of the Politburo. They also knew that it was 
impracticable to include kulaks in the kolkhozy, when the decision o f  expropriating their properties 
was approved by the Politburo in January 1930. The debate was being concluded by the regime at 
this point. The designated kulaks became an increasing problem o f  the Soviet order -  those who 
rejected state control and subordination to the plan. One o f the slogans o f the forced collectivisation 
campaign after all was ‘^ o se , who do not enter the kolkhoz, are enemies o f the Soviet power”, 
indicating that a large proportion o f the Soviet peasantry, even poor peasants and batraki, was 
considered to be latent kulaks orpodkulachniki}^
It was an escalation o f  repression, in which the development followed different steps before 
ending up with the expulsion of the kulaks and their families from society. There were different 
options open until the beginning of 1930, however, every time the regime made a choice they made
i ■
^  Holquist, 2003, pp. 155-156.
^  Hans Mommsen, ”Die Realisienmg des Utopischen: Die “Endlösung der Judenfrage” im Dritten Reich” in 
Geschichte und Gesellshqß 9/3 1983, p. 399 and p. 417.
”  Heinzen, 2004, pp. 192-219.
Ivnitskii, 1996, p. 20.
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it increasingly impossible to retreat from this path.^®  ^ One possibility was to persuade the kulaks to 
join the collective farms voluntarily; another was to re-educate them in order to turn them into 
enlightened Soviet citizens; thirdly there was the possibility to deport them; and finally there was 
elimination, which was used on a large scale in 1937. The question is how the Stalinists legitimised 
such choices, and consequently why the enemy became important in the ideological comprehension 
of this development.
Since the Bolsheviks argued that they had undertaken the first socialist revolution in 1917, they 
also had to construct a  society, at least rhetorically, which developed according to the mechanisms 
of Marxism: that is the dialectic o f the proletariat versus the bourgeoisie. The kulak term made 
sense to the Russian populists and socialists, both before and after the October Revolution.*®^ It is in 
this context secondary as to what extent the termed applied to reality o f the Soviet countryside. The 
more intense the situation became during the first winter o f 1929-30, the more frequent the 
ideological justifications o f the actions o f  the Soviet officials. This continued throughout the 
1930s. W hen the Soviet regime recruited political activists in November 1929 known as the 
25,000ners the main concern was whether or not these people could be trusted ideologically. Their 
agricultural skills were secondary, as they were sent as emissaries with the specific purpose of 
implementing Soviet policy in the countryside.*®^ When these people arrived in the villages they 
saw “kulak sabotage” and grain speculation in the peasant resistance and reacted accordingly. This 
was intensified by the fact that these emissaries often were the immediate targets of the resistance. 
Since the Politburo had legitimised the deportations of first and second category kulaks and their 
families on 30 January 1930, the emissaries and other activists used this in what they conceived as a 
battle against the petty bourgeoisie o f the Soviet countryside. Also, it serves to explain the nature of 
the round-up o f  former kulaks in 1937: the Soviet regime needed the enemy in order to mobilise 
and motivate its activists.
There was a  self-confirming logic attached to this comprehension. Those peasants being excluded 
from the villages by the Soviet government as “kulaks”, either in the years following the October 
Revolution or during the dekulakisation campaign, would find themselves alienated and even
Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmaiin, The Social Construction o f Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology o f 
Knowledge, London 1966, p. 71,
Kelly, 2005, p. 22.
David L. Hof&nan “Was There a “Great Retreat” from Soviet Socialism? Stalinist Culture Reconsidered” pp. 651- 
674 and David L. Hoffinan “Ideological Ballast and New Direction in Soviet History*’ pp. 731-733 in Kritika, Volume 
5, Number 4, Fall 2004.
Lynne Viola, The Best Sons o f the Fatherland Workers in the Vanguard o f Soviet Collectivization, New York 1987, 
chapter 2.
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hostile towards the invading state. If these peasants were not hostile beforehand, they would 
become so when the regime and its emissaries attacked them as “enemies of the Soviet state”. The 
Soviet treatment o f the peasantry created enmity among those being separated from society as 
“unwanted”. This exacerbated the development immensely, leading to a war-like situation. And 
thus, the violent peasant uprising, both in the early 1920s and during the collectivisation of 
agriculture, was a logical consequence o f Soviet policy in the coimtryside.
The ideological aspect is only one possible explanation for the function of the enemy. Another 
would be that the term served as a mechanism o f controlling society in general, and the peasantry in 
particular. By showing decisiveness towards certain groups o f society, the regime made an effective 
example -  no one desired to be the next to undergo dekulakisation. The random stigmatisation of 
peasants as “kulaks” must have made the villagers reluctant, when confronted with the choice of 
joining the peasant resistance or entering the newly established collective farms. The regime 
intensified a notion of paranoia in society, when constantly speaking about a “kulak” jeopardising 
socialist development Bearing in mind that the only possible way for a vast majority o f the Soviet 
public to achieve knowledge about the situation, would be through the official media, it is possible 
that they would be inclined to believe that society was confronted by a constant threat from internal 
enemies. The Soviet government, and in particular the Central Committee o f the Communist 
Party and the General Secretary, had a knowledge, which was deliberately suppressed. The best 
known example is the public denial o f the famine of 1932-33.
The “kulak” also had a significant function within in the Communist Party and the NKVD, in the 
ongoing political struggle between the different fractions. The party was permeated by a strong 
conflict in 1928-1930 between what was termed the left wing (Stalin and his henchmen) and the 
right wing (Bukharin, Tomsky, Rykov etc.).*°^ The Stalin group won this struggle by 1927-28 and 
was about to consolidate its power when the grain crises erupted. The right was denounced for 
being pro-kulak and therefore in support o f  capitalist restoration. This made them weak in a tense
Robert Thurston has developed the theory in relation to the Great Purges that the public really believed that it was 
necessary to eliminate a grave threat: see: Robert Thurston, Life and Terror in Stalin 'j Russia 1934-1941, New Haven 
1996, p.228.
Niels Erik Rosenfeldt, Knowledge and Power. The Role o f Stalin's Secret Chancellery in the Soviet System o f  
Government, Knbenhavn 1978, p. 34,
Nikolai Bukharin had in 1925 encouraged the “kulaks” to enrich themselves; for more on Bukharin’s position see: 
V.P. Danilov “KpecTbSHCKofl xosjiÌÌctbo h KOonepauHii b KOHuenuHH A.B. HaanoBa” in V.P. Danilov (ed.), WeaoeeK u 
sestjui, Moskva 1987, V.P. Danilov, “20-e roitw: nan h 6opt6a aniTepHaniB” in V.P. Danilov (ed.) ffcmopurcu cnopxm, 
1988 and V.P. Danilov, "EyxapHHCKaa ajitTepRaTUBa” in V.P, Danilov (ed.) Eyxapun: neitoeeK, nojiumuK, yvcHW«, 
Moskva 1990,
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1 nstsituation, where any suspicions o f kulak-sympathies implied purges. Therefore, the enemy not 
only served a  control mechanism o f  society but also o f the Communist Party and NKVD -  any 
protection o f  the kulaks in 1929 and 1937 would logically be denounced as right vring opportunism.
tos R.W. Davies, The Industrialisation o f Soviet Russia 1. The Socialist Offensive. The Collectivisation o f  Soviet 
Agriculture 1929-1930, London 1980, p. 399.
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3. Kulak and kulak children
The chairman o f the All-Soviet Central Executive Committee (VTsIK), Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, 
received a number o f letters in 1930 regarding the situation of repressed and deported children. One 
o f  these, written by a group of prisoners in Vologda, read: “The terrible condition o f prison life, 
poor nourishment and other causes, which our children live under -  all this scourge o f  innocent 
children, the humiliating death, may be the sin for us as a class. But children should not answer for 
their parents and die like a class; and thus we urge you, honourable Mikhail Ivanovich, to save our 
children, the future o f the Soviet Union...”* There is no information about Kalinin’s response, 
which would create uncertainty regarding the stand point o f the Soviet authorities on the position of 
children. The present chapter will discuss the relationship between the Soviet regime and the kulak 
children during the 1930s. Part o f the discussion is related to development o f the official policy, and 
part o f  it addresses the reaction of the kulak children to their life situation.
3.1 The distinction of kulak children and kulaks
Kulak children belonged to a certain category of Soviet society, which we might term as enemy 
children. Since the October Revolution enemy children had already posed a significant dilemma in 
the general Soviet attempt to define childhood, because they -  as children, on the one hand -  were 
important in the construction o f the new society, while, on the other hand, they were heavily 
affected by the ongoing restrictive policy against their parents -  naturally, children could not be 
unaffected by this. As early as July 1919 Kalinin received a letter from the children o f  arrested 
parents which read;
2 im i l9 1 9 . . .
Moscow. Kremlin. To Chairman Kalinin,
We ask you imploringly to send your and comrade Lenin’s order [about] the 
liberation o f our parents Kulibanov [to] Vitebsk. Unhappy children.
(Source: S.S. V i\tr)s]d\,ffem uryjIA ra, 1918-1956^ Moscow 2002, p. 29)
* S.S. Vilenskii, A.L Kokurm, G.V.Atmashkina, I.Iu. Novichenko (red.),27emu FyjIATa 1918-1956  ^Moskva 2002, p. 
77.
^Ibid.
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This was one o f the many petitions Kalinin received throughout the 1920s and 1930s from childrer 
asking him to assist their parents, or, as shown above, from parents urging him to save theii 
children. The emotional aspect -  as presented by the Kulibanov children -  was one significant 
problem emerging as a consequence o f the repression o f their parents. Another problem was that 
children often were arrested alongside their parents, as was argued in the preceding chapter. From 
August 1918 onwards the Bolshevik regime used concentration camps as means o f repression.^ 
Three years later in 1921, during the massive peasant resistance in Tambov, the construction of 
more camps was discussed. During this process it was revealed that: “In the camps a large number 
o f  children arrive, down to the very youngest age, even babies”  ^ Naturally, this raised a question 
regarding what to do with these children -  one thing was evident that “Because o f the large influx 
into the concentration field camps o f  minors, from babies upwards, and these camps were unfit for a 
longer-term keeping o f  children [.,.] it is necessary to acknowledge [...] means o f improving the 
position o f children”.  ^ The placement o f  children in these camps, in other words, caused a 
significant problem, increasing the level o f  hunger, disease and infant mortality. Consequently, 
something had to be done in order to relieve the situation and it raised a principal matter; how far 
could the regime go in its political repression? Were children also to be repressed or was their 
position different? This question was raised again when the dekulakisation campaign commenced,
3.1.1 Kulak children and special settlements
In a document detailing the arrival o f deported kulak families in  Western Siberia, issued on 26 
February 1930 by Bazovskii, the deputy chairman o f  the executive committee o f Siberskii krai, and 
Zakovskii, the chairman o f the local OGPU, the kulak households were discussed. Their focus 
would be on the collective body o f the family rather than on individual needs. Rations for the 
deported would, for example, be examined with no discussion as to  what amount was for children in 
relation to adults.^ This suggests that kulaks and kulak families were defined as one group at this 
point -  or there were at least only limited attempts to differentiate between generations. This, 
however, changed shortly afterwards due to problems associated w ith the newly established special 
settlements.
 ^ Ibid., p. 29, p. 30, p. 55, p. 60, p. 65, and pp. 77-83.
* Nicolas Werth, ”A State against Its People: Violence, Repression, and terror in the Soviet Union” in Stéphane 
Courtois, The Black Book o f Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression^ London 1999, p. 80.
 ^Vilenskii, 2002, p. 18.
*Ibid.,pp. 18-19.
 ^V.P. Danilov and Sergei Krasilnikov, Cneunepecenenyhi e Sanaduou Cuôupu 1930 — eecna 1931 a., Novosibirsk 1992, 
pp. 44-45.
56
Lynne Viola has argued that the deportation of kulaks and their families was, to a large extent, 
carried through na khody or in an ad hoc manner. There were few attempts to prevent any negative 
side-effects o f the development beforehand, since in reality very little was planned in advance. The 
ambition in January 1930 was to liquidate the kulak households, but there was no discussion as to 
how this could in practice be carried out -  aside from the fact that people had to be moved from 
their places o f origin. Therefore, the deported kulak families arrived at empty construction sites, 
where they were expected to build their future settlements from scratch.* The deportees were then 
divided into two groups: the able-bodied and the non-able bodied. The latter would generally be 
breastfeeding mothers, children younger than 15 years, and the elderly. These would be placed in 
temporary settlements, often confiscated church properties, former jails or stables. Meanwhile, the 
deportees capable of working were removed to the sites of the future settlements, where they were 
expected to build roads, houses, sewers, hospitals, schools and post offices.^ Since children 
comprised 40% of the newly arrived deportees, the authorities were forced to react to the problems 
emerging as a consequence of this situation: infant mortality rose dramatically, the disease 
frequency among kulak children grew significantly and food supply to the settlements dropped 
catastrophically. When it came to the question of food supply in the temporary and permanent 
settlements Soviet officials refused to take any responsibility immediately.*® However, the 
authorities, or at least the OGPU, reacted to the situation as early as February 1930 “  indicating that 
the situation was already from the start acute. On 10 April 1930 the Council o f  People’s 
Commissariat o f  the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (SNK RSFSR) issued an order 
“On the Measures for the regulations o f  Temporary and Permanent Settlements o f Kulak Families”, 
which stated the following concerning the kulak children:
[The SNK RSFSR] suggests the kraivyi [regional] (pblastnyi [provincial]) executive 
committees of Ural, Siberia, the Far East and the Northern krai to immediately 
adapt measures for organising medical attendance points for the permanent 
settlement of kulak households, and also to the attendance o f children (the re­
education work within the schools).
* Lynne Viola ’T he Other Archipelago: Kulak Deportation to the North in 1930” pp. 730-755 in Slavic Review  60/4, 
(2001) pp. 732-734.
’ Michael Kaznelson ”Den lykkelige bamdotn. En analyse af kulak bomenes skaebne i àrene 1929-33” pp.120-138 in 
Den Jyske Historiker nr. 101, July 2003, pp. 129-30.
V iola,’Tearthe evil...” 2000, p. 46.
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Examining the increase of the disease frequency among children, to suggest the 
named executive committees to adapt the necessary measures at the temporary 
settlements and transportation to establish more normal circumstances for children
(Source: V.P. Danilov and Sergei Krasilnikov, CneifnepeceJteHiibi e Sanadnou Cu6upu 1930- eecna 
1931 Novosibirsk 1992 p. 29)
The focus was, in other words, aimed at the symptom (the increased disease frequency) rather than 
the cause (the deportation of kulaks and their families). This became increasingly evident when the 
matter of ‘Svrongly deported” was discussed by the SNK RSFSR on 10 April 1930. Children 
younger than 15 years fell into this category, and although not every child was returned, almost
35,000 were sent back from Northern Russia to their relatives by December 1930.^* The limit was 
shortly afterwards lowered to the age of 10 years, which suggests that it was a controversial issue. 
The lowering o f the age limit indicates that a debate regarding the placement o f  children was going 
on within the Soviet authorities. The procedure also reveals that the dominating notion among 
officials was that the plan of transforming Soviet society always had first priority: the emotional 
relationship o f parents and children was unimportant. It was most important that the problem was out 
o f  sight, (the suffering children were returned to their relatives), so the regime could continue to 
repress the parents and the remaining children and those older than 15 years (later revised to older 
than 10 years). It is also important to note that by “wrongly deported” the SNK RSFSR was not only 
referring to children, but also to third category kulaks, who had been deported. It is, nonetheless, 
clear that the authorities had to react to the situation, which also suggests that children first became 
noticeable when they constituted a  serious problem. This underlines the nature o f the na khody 
philosophy: a  failure to foresee and anticipate problems.
It is evident that by spring and summer 1930 the authorities to a larger extent agreed that children 
differed from their parents -  creating a distinction between the generations o f the liquidated 
households. We can find such a notion in one particular case; the living conditions o f the special 
settlements were terrible during the winter o f  1930, with a significant number o f deportees escaping 
from the settlements. The West Siberian OGPU reacted in a letter from 11 May 1930 “On the fight 
against arbitrary return o f  kulaks from the regions of settlements” . The escapes, which often were 
caused by the desperate conditions in which the deported people lived, were made a criminal 
offence. However, in relation to the children, a very interesting point was made. As the OGPU
V.P. Danilov et al, Tpoeedim CoeemcKou ffepeenu. moM 2, Moskva 2000 p. 785. 
Danilov and Krasilnikov, 1992, p. 29.
58
mm
emphasised that children could not be held responsible for the criminal action o f their parents, they 
could not be blamed for the escape o f their parents, even if they went with them. It was only natural, 
even from the point o f view of the OGPU, that children followed their parents.*^ The terrible living 
conditions o f the special settlements were one reason for this shift in the official approach to the 
children.
j^ o th e r  was that the authorities thought it possible to use the remaining children for a very 
specific purpose. In a  secret report o f a  special commission o f the SNK SSSR issued on 11 April 
1930, the budget for controlling the special settlements was discussed in paragraph 7v^ :^
In the planning o f  the financial sources for the maintenance o f the administration o f 
kulak settlers at the end of the current budget year for every 500 families there may 
be one commandant and one leading militsioner^ though not costing more than 800 
thousand roubles
(Source: Danilov and Krasibikov, 1992, p. 32)
Complete control could not be maintained under these circumstances, and even if  the leading 
m ilitsioner was assisted by 1 police officer for every 50 families^^ it was still impossible to prevent 
the deported kulaks from also living an autonomous and independent daily life in the settlements. 
This was against the intention o f dekulakising these peasants, and therefore the regime was 
concerned with this. The Bolsheviks had always had the ambition to recruit children, as they were 
conceived as “the potentiality” o f the future, contrary to “the backwardness” o f the older and more 
stubborn generations who apparently prevented modernisation from succeeding. The Soviet 
authorities began to show a growing interest in deported children during the spring o f 1930. These 
would be -  i f  the authorities could reach them ~ a cheap and efficient way to control their kulak 
parents in the special settlements. An objection to this idea may be that this hardly corresponds to the 
aforementioned fact that children were returned from deportation during the spring and summer of 
1930. We should remember that the age limit was lowered to ten years old during 1930, implying 
that children from this age up to 15 years old remained in the settlements. There were children left in 
the settlements, despite attempts to relieve the catastrophic living conditions by returning some of 
them  from the settlements as wrongly deported.
Î
Sergei Krasibikov, Cepn umojiox. KpecntbJiHCKaii cctuiKa e sanadnoü Cu6upu e 1930-eeodbt. Moscow 2003, p. 153. 
** This would be 7c m Latin, smce the first three letters of the Cyrill alphabet are a  6 v.
Viola, 2001, p. 738.
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On 9 May 1930 the leaders of the OGPU in the Urals discussed the result o f the preceding 
dekulakisation. The number of deported kulak families, numbers o f individuals, distributions within 
the special settlements o f the region, problems emerging among the settlers, and the relation to the 
local non-deported population were discussed. In the section o f “The operation, intelligence and 
information service” (in Russian: “OnepaxHBHO-areHTypHoe h HH(J)opMaiiHOHHoe oGcjiy^saHHe”), 
we find a very interesting information. This discussed the situation within the information 
department o f the OGPU (INFO), the counterrevolutionary department of the OGPU (KRO) and the 
secret department o f  the OGPU (SO). The recruitment of informers, working for the INFO, was 
established in paragraph 3:
Mark out a framework of information enrolment in the size o f  no less than two 
informants for every 50 families. Out o f this 50% of the network should be found 
among the young 
(Source: Danilov, et.al., 2000, pp. 449).
It is clear at this stage that the kulak young who were older than 15 years were considered important 
in maintaining control within the special settlements.^^ Whether this also implied that such 
recruitment applied to the treatment o f children younger than 15 years is another matter. The myth of 
Pavlik Morozov, which was not laimched until 1934 (but outlines events that took place in 1932) 
would suggest that at some stage it became an ambition to mobilise children younger than 15 years 
against their parents (Morozov was 13 years). It was presented as heroism to report upon any 
unusual activities of the parents, which in this particular case involved the hiding o f grain and money 
firom the Soviet authorities. The myth of Morozov was based on a commonly-used Soviet method, 
being rooted in this early attempt o f the OGPU to control deported kulaks: that is to mobilise 
children against their parents.
At this point the Soviet regime distinguished between adults and children living in deportation. 
Several minutes from meetings held in various special commissions o f  the Politburo, imply that this 
notion became dominant from late 1930 until 1931/32. One such commission meeting was held on 
15 May 1931, headed by A. A. Andreev and attended by the head o f  the OGPU, Yagoda and the 
head of the GULAG Matvei Berman, This discussion was on the situation o f  deported kulaks.
V.P. Danilov and S.A. Krasilnikov, Cneynepecenenybi e SanadnoU Cu6upu. Becua 1931 -ncptaio 1933 2., 
Novosibirsk 1993, p. 9.
Catriona Kelly, Comerade Pavlik. The Rise and Fall o f a Soviet Boy Hero, London 2005, p. xxiii.
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however, it is evident from the minutes that a distinction between the generations of deportees was 
drawn -  while the kulaks were enemies, and considered “backward”, the children and young could 
be included into Soviet society under certain conditions.** We shall return to the significance of this 
meeting in a later chapter, and it is sufficient to establish that a  shift in relation to kulak children 
must have happened. Another meeting in the Andreev Commission from 7 August 1931 likewise 
suggests that the Soviet regime was about to redefine its policy towards kulak children and young. 
The Commission discussed the situation among special settlements, and proposed that: “ . . . i t  is to be 
deemed possible to restore rights to young who have reached the age o f  18 prior to expiration o f the 
five-year period in those cases in which these young people have shown themselves in a  positive 
ligh t” '®
We can detect a counter-position to Andreev in a letter written by Stalin to Kaganovich on 31 
A ugust The General Secretary responded to a correspondence o f  26 August, and among other 
things commented upon the proposal from 7 August by the Andreev Commission. He stated: “8. 
There is no need for any law by TsDC [the Central Executive Committee o f Soviets] on restoring the 
rights o f certain former kulaks ahead of schedule. I just knew that the jackasses among the petty 
bourgeoisie and the philistines would definitely want to crawl into this mouse hold. Please put off 
this issue until the fall”.^° This harder line towards kulak children can also be seen in a document of 
July 1932, when the able bodied special settlers were categorised by the GULAG administration -  a 
document signed by Berman. It was established here that the category o f “able bodied” included 
children as young as 12 years old. This would at least imply a  worsening, o f their status by 
legalising their employment in local industries. This work was extremely physically demanding and 
increased the death rate among the special settlers. This suggests that i f  a distinction between kulaks 
and their children existed within this system by 1931-32 it was not very clear as to where the line 
was to be drawn between adults and children. Therefore someone, in this particular case the 
GULAG administration (and most notably Berman), must have been against a rapprochement to 
kulak children, while others (like Andreev) supported i t  Something implies that the softer line was 
adopted by the Soviet regime, which becomes particularly evident in a resolution issued by the 
presidium of the Central Executive Committee in the Soviet Union (VTsIK) leaded by Kalinin on
: f
‘® G.M. Adibekov, "CneunepeceneHUu -  acepiBu «cruiomHofi KOJUieKTHBHsauHH». Hs aoKyMCHTOB «ocoöoft naracH» 
rioaHTÖiopo UK BïCn(6)” in Hcmopmeacuü apxue, Volume 2, number 4,1994, p. 158.
”  Ibid,, p. 169 (clause 31) -  translated in R.W. Davies, Oleg Khlevnyuk, and E.A. Rees (ed.), The Stal in-Kaganovich 
Correspondence 1931-36, New Haven 2003, p. 70 (clause 6).
“  Davies, Kaganovich, and Rees, 2003, p. 69,
Ibid., p. 91.
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17 March 1933. This docmnent granted kulak children living in the special settlements the voting 
rights for local Soviet elections, provided they had acted expediently.^^ It is not clear whether Stalin 
changed his mind from the aforementioned statement from August 1931 to the adoption of the 
resolution in March 1933. Yet the different signals suggest that a debate regarding the policy 
towards kulak children was unsolved by 1932-33. Kalinin’s resolution followed a very dramatic 
period in Soviet history, which may explain the shift towards a softer line in March 1933.
3.1.2 Kulak children and the fam ine o f 1932/33
The Soviet countryside underwent a  catastrophic turn during 1932 and 1933 when devastating 
famine affected large areas o f  the country.^ A letter written by a schoolboy to the local village 
Soviet in Kalinov raion in Vinnitsa oblast in Ukraine in the spring o f  1933 depicts the catastrophe:
Kuzma Petrovich [...] A week ago my father died from the famine. My mother lies sick on 
the stove and is completely swollen [ ,..]  Besides me there are three children. They are 
swollen as well. Please help us with what you may. Today we do not have anything to eat not 
even a beet. Save the children. We entered the kolkhoz. And I along with mother are working 
to provide bread for the children [...]
(Source: Nikolai Ivnitskii, Penpeccuenafi nonumuKa coeemcKoü ejiacmu e depeene (1928-1933 a.), Moscow 
2000, p, 295 [my translation and underline MK.])
The family, including the boy writing this letter, would shortly die from hunger. There are several 
traveller and eyewitness accounts from those years that give a picture of the devastating situation. 
People collapsed in the streets dying from hunger, children were left on their own unattended, since 
their parents could not take care o f them, and there were even cases o f cannibalism.^"* In work done 
on Italian reports on the situation in Kharkov, Andrea Ciraziosi concludes that the famine resembled 
a war situation. Despite the chaos and massive starvation, the Soviet regime continued to confiscate 
grain until at least the end of 1932 -  that is while the situation was most acute.^^
In contrast to the Soviet famine o f  1921-22, the Stalinist government never officially recognised 
the ongoing starvation o f  1932-33. This denial can be detected among even the highest ranking
^  V.P. Danilov and S.A. Krasilnikov, Cneiinepece.ieHi(bi e Sanadnou Cudupu. 1933-1938, Novosibirsk 1994, p. 14,
“  Mark B. Tauger, ’’The 1932 Harvest and the Famine o f 1933” pp. 70-89 in Slavic Review 50/1, (Spring) 1991 pp. 88-
89.
24 See, for example: Edwin E. Dwinger, Og Gud Tier... ? Beretninger og opraab, Kobenhavn 1937, pp. 84-95 and 
g.l03.
Andrea Graziosi, Guerra e rivoluzione in Europa, 1905-1956, Bologna 2001, pp. 74-75,
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people within the regime. Stalin, for example, instructed the Politburo on 18 June 1932 to: “fulfil 
the plan...at any cost”.^ ® Another instruction from Stalin to his right hand Lazar Kaganovich on 25 
July 1932 asserted: “ ...the  harvest prospects will become clear (they have already become clear!), 
that they are undoubtedly good for the USSR as a whole”^’ This was at a time when starvation was 
becoming evident. Nikolai Ivnitskii argues that the Politburo was probably well-aware o f the 
consequences o f  its policy in the countryside, and as Vyacheslav Molotov asserted in the autumn of 
1932: “We are confronting a real ghostly famine and this is in the richest grain areas...[we] will 
[however] not stop the fulfilment o f  the claimed plan for the grain requisition”.^ * This would not 
only suggest a knowledge but also intensification of the tragic development 
The denials continued and the Soviet media never reported the famine, and in addition, aid from 
abroad was rejected -  unlike the policy adopted during the famine of 1921-22.^® During the famine 
o f 1932/33 starvation was blamed not on a failed policy, but rather on kulak sabotage.^® Whenever 
these accusations were mentioned, the Soviet regime often spoke about the designated kulak, even 
if  the term was not used explicitly. In this context the distinction o f kulaks and their children 
becomes interesting. In diary entries from January 1933 Kaganovich discussed this by stating:
On a number o f occasions it has been noticed that children are swollen from hunger, 
where they obviously are extremely underfed and they begin to search and find 75- 
100 pud  grain [...] When asked, the head of the family keeps silent, or says “We 
should not get used to it”
(Reproduced in V.P. Danilov etal. Tpazedta. CoeemcKouJlepeeHu, most J ,  Moscow 2001, p. 639)
Kaganovich, in other words, believed that the peasants were in possession of grain even when the 
famine tormented society. The “kulaks” were not ready to share it with anybody, not even their own 
children, and hence their exploitative nature was exposed. TTie quantity of grain mentioned in 
Kaganovich’s dairy entry justifies that he spoke of “kulaks” and that the swollen and hungry 
children were kulak children. Kulak children were used as an example to illustrate how cynical their 
kulak parents could be. The children were used to demonise “kulaks” even more than they had
“  Davies, Khlevniuk and Rees, 2003, p. 139.
^  Ibid., p. 167.
28 Nikolai Ivnitskii, Penpeccuenoii IlojtumuKa CoeemcKoù Bnacmu eJHepeene, Moskva 2000, p. 296 [my translation]
^  Dana G. Dalrymple, ”The Soviet Famine o f 1932-34” pp. 250-284 in Soviet Studies, Voi. 15, No. 3, January 1964, 
pp. 267-68.
Andrea Graziosi, The Great Soviet Peasant War. Bolsheviks and Peasants, 1917’1933^ Harvard University 1996, pp. 
59-70.
63
i h
: i
i
i
i
■
I
already been in the previous period ~  “kulaks” loved nobody but themselves, not even their own 
children. This diary entry was written at the same time as the Soviet press launched the Morozov 
myth, where a similar denouncing o f  grain speculators (that is “kulaks”) was launched. One of the 
first elements of the case was infanticide -  the relatives of Pavlik Morozov murdered him and his 
brother as revenge for having denounced their father. The nature o f the crime committed by the 
“kulak” relatives of these boys was related to the fact that children by definition were “innocent”. 
Who could kill an innocent child, but really evil people? The role o f the child as a victim has one 
important significance: it underlined the inhumanity of the excluded “other”. Children, and most 
notably kulak children, were used to depict, dehumanise and exclude their parents in the public 
discourse. This was by no means a coincidence: famine raged the country, and the authorities were 
looking for scapegoats in order to mobilise its activists. Consequently, they attacked the “kulak” by 
ascribing them vicious motives such as hiding grain even from their own children.
3.1.5 The prelude to the First Stakhanovite conference
While the discussion o f  a distinction between kulaks and kulak children appears to have been 
affected by conflicts in 1932/33, the regime came to a sort o f agreement by April 1934. Again the 
voting rights o f kulak children were under discussion. In a secret report from 13 April 1934 Berman 
issued the following order:
Explanation to the GULag OGPU on the question on re-establishing the voting rights 
fo r  children o f  special settlers (spetspereselentsy)
Top Secret
1. Re-establishing the voting rights for children of spetspereselentsy for the executive 
committees o f  the Raion in areas where the special settlements [spetsposelki\ are 
located is necessary to conduct after having developed a  broad enlightening work, 
using this restitution to heighten the youths work outcome in production, to carry 
through the sowing and to improve cultural work.
2. The restitution primarily concerns model workers (in Russian: udarnik) and social 
volunteers (In Russian: obshchestvennik).
Kelly, 2005.
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3. The restitution o f the voting rights o f children does not affect their parents" rights
4. Infonn about the number o f re-established at the GULag OGPU and at the same 
time note the number of not-included in the settlements after the restitution.
Head of the Chief Administration of the Camps of the OGPU [GULag OGPU]
M. Berman
(Source: V.P. Danilov and SA. Krasilnikov, Cnetfnepec&teNJfbi e SanadHoii CuÖuptL 1933-1938^ 
Novosibirsk 1994, pp. 55-56)
There are several interesting features in this document: notably the clear distinction between adults 
and children. Whereas Berman in 1932 appeared as the hardliner, lowering the age of able bodied in 
the special settlements to 12 years, he in 1934 followed Andreev’s and Kalinin’s more moderate 
line in relation to this particular category o f  childrea Furthermore it is important that not every 
child had their civil rights re-established -  it was only those who participated in the transformation 
o f  Soviet society and did so voluntarily (that is udarniki and obshchestvenniki). It is not revealed 
what this implied in reality, but, as we shall discuss in a later chapter, it involved a possibility of 
discriminatmg against certain children. In addition, it is important to mention that voting rights were 
limited to the areas o f the settlements, raising uncertainty as to whether these children would hold 
this right in the event that they moved to another region. This again would raise uncertainty as to 
what extent children were meant to leave the regions of the settlements.
On 27 May 1934 the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) adapted a resolution for the restitution 
o f  civil rights for “the most distinguished special settlers, particularly the youth” . In January 1935 
Berman elaborated on the problem of the outflow of former settlers, having their rights re­
established, First of all he suggested to Yagoda that “1. To forbid a mass restitution o f civil rights 
for special settlers” This repeated the aforementioned idea that these rights were not meant for 
everybody. Importantly it was insisted “4. To prevent special settlers whose civil rights have been 
restored from returning to their home regions [...]” The argument was based on the assumption 
that a  departure o f special settlers meant a decline in the workforce o f the area o f special 
settlements. Also, it was crucially important for the Soviet state to prevent “kulaks” and their 
families to return to the villages o f origin. Yagoda responded to this by asserting that it was urgently 
important to emphasise that the restitution o f  civil rights “ ...does not give the right to leave [the 
special settlements]”. He then established that it was necessary to obtain the acceptance of the 
Central Committee and TsIK on this specific issue. On 10 January 1935 he contacted Stalin,
32 Oleg V. Khlevniuk, The History o f the GULAG. From Collectivization to the Great Terror^ Yale University 2004, p, 
131.
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explaining the necessity o f adding to the resolution of May 1934 that the “restitution o f civil rights 
does not give labour settlers the right to leave their place of residence”. The General Secretary 
responded “exactly” , underlining that restored civil rights were not necessarily a return ticket.^^
The complexity o f  this debate was once highlighted further during a very significant event in 
1935. From 14-17 November 1935 the Soviet regime held the first congress o f  the Stakhonovite 
movement in the Great Hall o f the Kremlin. A number of udarniki, or model workers from industry, 
were invited to deliver speeches in celebration o f the mineworker, A.G. Stakhanov, who had over­
fulfilled his personal quota and by this became a Soviet hero. It is in this context, the concept of 
Stakhanovite workers originated. Participating in this congress were -  aside from a number of 
specially invited workers -  members o f the highest cadres o f the Soviet system: Stalin, 
Odzhonikidze, M olotov, Zhdanov, Khrushchev and Kaganovich.^'* It was during this event that a 
very strange intervention occurred. A Bashkirian, a collective farmer, A.G. Tilba, introduced 
himself as “a  son o f a  kulak”. He had not been invited for the congress, as he was related to these 
‘Vicious” enemies o f  the Soviet state. However, on Yakolev’s personal initiative he was invited to 
participate in this congress o f which Tilba was grateful. He stressed: “Although I am a son of a 
kulak, I will sincerely struggle for the cause o f  the workers and peasants and for the construction of 
socialism”. Stalin then spontaneously expressed his famous words: “A son does not answer for his 
father”.^ ^
Even though the statement became an integral part of Soviet folklore, as most clearly 
commemorated in Aleksandr Tvardovskii’s poem “By the Right o f Memory” (1969)^^, it was never 
reproduced in any public propaganda campaign during the late 1930s. It is therefore unclear what 
Stalin actually meant by his famous statement.^^
3.1.4 Problems o f  rehabilitating
Stalin’s statement in November 1935 led to a  debate concerning the status of kulak children, which 
was difficult to assess and implies that even he was not clear on this matter. On 15 December, that 
is, approximately one month after the Stakhanovite congress, the Central Committee and the SNK 
proposed in a resolution to allow kulak children and young living in the special settlements access
Ibid.
”  On this particular congress in November 1935 see the transcript: Ilepeoe ececofosnoe coeeufanue paSoMioc u padoHuif 
CTAXAHOBIJEB, Moscow 1935.
Khlevniuk, 2004, p. 129.
Aleksandr Tvardovskii ’’Ho npasy naMJiTH” (1969) see pp. 312-320 in I.I. Kore et al. (red.), C iLMcneM Teapdoeacozo. 
fi36paHHbienpoioeedeuvsi A.T. Teapdoeacozo Cmpanutibi 6uoapa<puu no3ma Cnoeo o luKaie, Moscow 2001. 
Fitzpatrick, 1994, p. 240.
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to middle and high schools, and also to colleges. The NKVD opposed the rapprochement and used 
various means to prevent the implementation o f the resolution. However, local leaders appear to 
have considered the initiative as a sign o f changing policy, and began sending proposals to Moscow 
with suggestions as to how the situation o f kulak children could be improved. For example, R.I. 
Eikhe, the chairman o f the West Siberian Party Committee, and F.P. Griadinsky, the chairman of 
the territorial executive Committee, proposed on 26 December:
...W e think that the children o f the special settlers who have reached 
adulthood before their parents* civil rights have been restored should 
automatically receive their civil rights i f  they have broken with the parents 
and are independently and productively working.
(source: Oleg V. Khlevniuk, The History o f  the GULAG. From Collectivization to the Great 
Terror, Yale University 2004, p. 132-33)
W ith this also came a proposal on allowing children admission to schools, the Komsomol and 
similar public institutions.^* Even if  their admission had the condition that they broke away from 
their family and engaged in work that differed from the tradition o f  their fathers (probably meaning 
working in industry) it signified that influential people on the local level believed it was necessary 
to change policy towards the kulak children. Eikhe and Griadinsky also propose that those special 
settlers, who already had their civil rights restored, should be allowed to move around between the 
different districts of Naiym -  they were not forced to remain in the which settlements they had 
initially been deported. One of the more interesting arguments was that, as the settlers had often 
lived more than five years in a particular settlement they had adjusted to the living conditions and 
would be reluctant to move away. Eikhe and Griadinsky saw no danger in the granting the 
rehabilitated kulaks the right of movement (though this was not the same as allowing them to leave 
the region of the special settlements completely).^^ Interestingly the procurator of the USSR, 
Vyshinky, appears to have responded positively to this proposal, and even Yagoda seems to have 
been interested in at least discussing it -  which would be a counter position to the aforementioned 
rejection o f the NKVD. Though it is important that both these men insisted (like Yagoda and 
Berman had done earlier in 1935) that rehabilitated kulak settlers could not be allowed to return to 
their places of origin. That is that rehabilitation was not an automatic return ticket to society, and
Khlevniuk, 2004, pp. 132-33. 
Ibid., p. 133.
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continued to have certain reservations attached to it. The SNK and the Central Committee approved 
the above proposal from Eikhe and Griadinsky, and on 17 January 1936 a resolution was passed on 
the matter with the important deletion of the suggestion for allowing rehabilitated settler to leave 
the settlements. Children, nonetheless, appear to have received civil rights."^ ®
However, the rehabilitation of kulak children was paradoxical, as revealed in a letter o f 25 May 
1936 addressed to Stalin and Molotov. The letter was written by city secretary o f  the distant 
Siberian town of Igarka, V. Ostroumova who advocated for an improvement o f the situation of the 
deported kulak children, and called for further steps to be taken. Even the most enthusiastic kulak 
children, or the Stakhanovites, had not been admitted into the Komsomol, or the local schools, 
indicating that it was not always enough to “[break] with parents and [work] independently and 
productively This also suggests that there was a significant resistance within the Soviet
system towards upgrading kulak children to full citizens.'^* Molotov appears to have been in favour 
o f the improvement at this point, because he wrote “agree” to every point in Ostroumova’s letter. 
There is no infonnation on Stalin’s position, yet the matter o f rehabilitating still appears to have 
been controversial. The controversy was related to the dilemma o f  addressing kulak children, and, 
o f course, o f  trusting them -  a paradox, which the Soviet regime never managed to solve.
3.2 “A son does not answer for his father”
It is evident from the above that there was no fixed General Line towards kulak children from 1930- 
36, as there were only marginal adjustments towards this particular group. After having discussed 
the development in a  chronological order, it would be useful to focus more specifically on the 
political shift in 1934-35 and discuss a possible reason for this.
3,2.1 The Three Good Years
By late 1933 and early 1934 a relaxation was adopted in relation to agriculture following the 
preceding famine. Naum Jasny terms this as “The Three Good Years”, that is a period where the 
regime toned down its aggressive stance on agriculture and instead strove to implement the 
transformation by more moderate means.'^^ The political terror o f  the past, most clearly articulated 
in the dekulakisation campaign, was officially abandoned at the end o f 1932, where the numbers o f
^rbid,,pp. 134-35.
IbiA,p. 135,
Naum Jasny, The Socialized Agriculture o f  the USSRy Stanford 1949.
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deported kulaks and individual members o f their faznilies dropped from 1.8 to 1.3 million.^^ This 
clearly indicates a stuttering in this restrictive banishment of people, which would also signify that 
fewer children lived in the special settlements at this stage. In relation to agriculture as such the 
Stalinists refined the kolkhoz-system in 1932/33. The peasants were given the possibility to grow 
crops on private plots and to sell their produce on the kolkhoz-market The NEP (the New 
Economic Policy o f  1921-27) was never revived; however, the regime clearly chose another policy 
than the previous draconian confiscation of grain and other agricultural products, which 
characterised the collectivisation campaign.^ With this also came some compromises in the 
treatment o f the peasant family, indicating a less severe line where it, within the framework of the 
collective farms, was possible to protect the private interests -  including childrearing — from 
interference by the state."*  ^This did not mean that the Stalinists abandoned their ambition to control 
the development o f  the Soviet countryside -  on the contrary. The kolkhoz system was another less 
resource consuming instrument o f achieving control. Even if a quasi-market was accepted, and the 
peasant families given some autonomy, its survival would still be at the mercy of the state.^^ In 
relation to children, and kulak children in particular, we can also see that the decrease o f  repression 
did not necessarily mean a complete abandonment o f discrimination -  it was not a return to the 
petty-bourgeois peasant family.“*’
W hy did this shift happen? And, why did the Soviet state supposedly introduce this calmer policy 
in 1933? One possibility is that the state, in its revision o f the previous year, were reconsidering the 
necessity of using terror in order to obtain control of the countryside. After all, the famine had if not 
ended the peasant resistance then weakened it significantly, which also made the peasantry more 
cooperative. The starvation o f 1932-33 may have served more or less the same purpose as the 
deportations o f 1930-32: namely to repress and discipline the most rebellious elements of the 
peasantry.*^ Sheila Fitzpatrick states that resistance remained in one significant form after 1933 -
R. W. Davies and Stephen Whcatcroft, Years o f Hunger^ London 2003, p. 47.
^  Stephan Meri, "Bilanz der Unterwerfung -  die soziale und ökonomische Reorganisation des Dorfes" pp. 119-145 in 
Manfred Hildermeier (ed.) Stalinismus vordem Zweiten Weltkrieg Neue Wege der Forschung^ München 1998, p. 122- 
129.
Ibid., pp. 138-39.
^  Ibid., p. 142.
David L. Hoffinann, “Was There a “Great Retreat” from Soviet Socialism? Stalinist Culture Reconsidered” pp. 651- 
674 in Kritika: Exploration in Russian and Eurasian History Volume 5, Number 4 (Fall 2004) p. 656.
^  D’Ann Penner, "Stalin and the Ita l’ianka of 1932-1933 m the Don Region” pp. 27-68 in Coheirs du Monde Russe^ 39 
(1-2) janvier-juin 1998, pp. 40ff.
Michael Ellman, "The Role of Leadership Perceptions and of Intent in the Soviet Famine o f 1931-1934” pp. 823-841 
in Europe^Asiz. Studies, Voi. 57, No. 6, September 2005, p. 831.
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the form of passive resistance,^® Hov^^ever, she also notes that it was not the violent uprising of 
1929-30. Consequently, the Soviet state did not need to respond to the situation in the same 
aggressive manner as before -  in other words, it did not need to set an example by deporting kulaks 
or by starving the peasantry. Instead, it could concentrate on stabilising the kolkhoz system, which 
would achieve its initial goal for lower prices: namely the control o f the development within 
agriculture. Therefore, the Soviet state won the battle against the peasantry in 1933, and could 
celebrate it during the “Congress o f  Victors” in January 1934.^'
The 17* Party Congress also offers another explanation to the softer line towards society. 
Whereas the previous years had been characterised as a struggle o f  interest between the centre of 
Moscow and local authorities of the Soviet Union, a clearer harmonising happened at this point. 
Stalin’s persona] power was affirmed and no unpleasant issues, such as the previous years’ famine, 
were discussed during the congress. Stalin and his “henchmen” were at the peak o f  their power; 
violent resistance from the peasantry was eliminated and local officials did not oppose the General 
Line to the same extent as previously. The argument is not that society in 1934 was dominated 
completely by a mammoth state, but rather that the central government had won the struggle of 
power. Under these circumstances it is quite plausible that Stalin wanted a relaxation in relation to 
society, involving a calmer approach towards to kulak children.
3.2.2 Besprizornosti
Another explanation for Stalin’s position towards kulak children in 1935 may also be detected 
within the development o f policy towards children in general during these years. It is evident that 
the forced collectivisation and the diverted dekulakisation had intensified a serious social problem -  
namely that o f  homeless children, orphans or in Russia besprizornyeP  The phenomenon was 
known even before the October Revolution of 1917. However, social collapse, the Civil War of 
1918-21, and the famine o f 1921-22, made the problem much more acute. Influential leaders, 
including the head o f  the OGPU, Feliks Dzerzhinskii, were extremely concerned about the problem, 
and did m uch during the 1920s to remove children from the streets and place them in orphanages 
administrated by the OGPU. Dzerzhinskii is not otherwise known for his humanity, and therefore 
his engagement reveals something much more interesting: besprizornye constituted a serious
^  Fit2patrick, 1994, p. 5-7.
Robert Conquest, Stalin. Breaker o f Nations, London 1998 (3"* edition), p. 177-78.
E.A. Rees, "Republican and Regional Leaders at the XVII Party Congress in 1934" pp. 65-91 in E.A, Rees (ed.). 
Centre-local relations in the Stalinist state, 1928-1941, London 2003.
A. lu. Gorcheva, Upecca rVIlaza, 1918-1955, Moscow 1996, p. 75.
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problem, which, if  not taken care of, could have seriously destabilised the social order. From the 
mid to the end of the 1920s the numbers o f  besprizomye dropped; however, by the beginning of the 
1930s it again increased dramatically.^^ The level of besprizomye already appears to have increased 
by 1930, when the local authorities of Novosibirsk ordered the Pioneers and Komsomol to develop 
several plans for assisting these children.^^ By 29 January 1933 (that is at the very same time as 
famine ravaged the country), the Kremlin issued a decree that urged the local authorities to handle 
the “battle with the anti-social situation o f groups of children on the streets and public places”.^ * 
The problem appears to have been widespread, and not only concentrated in regions to which 
kulaks and their families had been deported. By 1 January 1935 the People’s Commissariat of the 
State Farms (NKSovkhoz) in Ukraine, discussed the number o f  orphans within the state-owned 
farming sector. Apparently the number had soared, and most o f  the local authorities within the 
Ukraine were concerned with it. In Dneprepetrovsk on 2 May 1935 it was reported, for example, 
that from 1 August 1934 to April 1935 the number o f homeless children grew from 6200 to 
10,873.’*
A very important reason for this growth must be detected in the fact that the central authorities 
more or less deliberately depopulated the villages. Part o f this was caused by the dekulakisation, 
where people were banished from their native villages, but a substantial number of peasants also 
fled, or became otkhodniki. Many prosperous and productive peasants reacted to the collectivisation 
and dekulakisation by selling their equipments and livestock, in order to avoid discrimination, and 
thereby underwent what officially was termed self-dekulakisation (samoraskulachivanie). 
Henceforth a substantial number moved to the cities in order to find work, or sent members of the 
family, usually the eldest sons, so they could find seasonal work. In any case, it implied an 
enormous outflow o f peasants from the villages, and subsequently a tremendous in-migration to 
various cities and construction sites.^^ The seasonal work changed in its character throughout the 
1930s, in comparison to the beginning of the 20^ century, as the otkhodniki often settled down more 
permanently in the constructions sites or the larger cities. One o f these sites was Magnitagorsk, 
located in the Urals, where Stephen Kotkin argues that the influx o f settlers came primarily from the
^  For more on besprizomye see: Dorena Caroli, L * enfance abandonée et délinquante dam la Russie soviétique (Ì917- 
I937)y Paris 2004, Alan M. Bail, And Not My Soul Is Hardened. Abandoned Children in Soviet Russia, Ï918-Î93Q, 
Berldey 1994, and Wendy Goldman, Women, the State and Revolution. Soviet Family Policy and Social Life. 1917- 
1936, Cambridge 1993.
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“  GANG, f. r-895, op. 1, delo 58 1.14.
”  TsDAGO f. 1 op. 20, delo 6645,1.1.
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countryside. Moreover, he asserts that they came not only from the Uralian countryside, but also 
arrived from villages located further away.^° Hiroaki Kuromiya, in his work on the Donbass region, 
recounts that many fleeing peasants arrived in the 1930s, who believed that they could hide away 
from the central authorities in one o f  many mines.®* The massive influx of peasants to Donbass 
affected tension between the old mining staff and the new comers, which suggest that the in- 
migration was high. As a majority o f  the migrating peasants were men, it must necessarily imply 
that they, provided, o f  course, they were married and had children, left their families behind. This 
also means that some children may have been abandoned as a direct result of this outflow from the 
countryside.
Many o f the male members of the families paradoxically returned from the urban areas to the 
countryside as a reaction to famine in 1932/33. Apparently they believed that all the grain was in 
the countryside, and hence that it had to be easier to survive this catastrophe. Reality was, o f course, 
much different, but it indicates that many o f  the otkhodniki must have come back at this point -  
which also implies that some o f the fathers o f  the abandoned children returned.®^ However, the 
archival material clearly suggests that the situation in the 1930s was tremendously problematic for 
the situation of homeless children. On 31 May 1935 the Central Committee o f  the Soviet 
Communist Party (CK VKP (b)) and the SNK issued an order on the “liquidation of besprizornosti 
and beznadvornosti [in English: street urchins MK.]”.®^ The resolution and its contents were 
discussed on a national level in the Central Executive Committee (TsIK) of the USSR on 23 July 
1935. The report from this meeting indicates concern about the growth in number o f  homeless 
children.®^ This can also be seen in a report written by the deputy head of the Ukrainian People’s 
Commissariat of Internal Affairs, Z. Katsnelson on 25 November 1935. It was addressed to the two 
influential secretaries o f the Ukrainian Communist Party S.I. Kossior, and P.P. Postyshev and to the 
chairman o f the Ukrainian People’s Commissariat (SNK) P.P. Liubchenko. Katsnelson expressed 
his worries about the development within the orphanages in the countryside.®® It is clear from 
several directives issued by Postyshev on 25 November that the situation also concerned him.®  ^The
Stephen Kotkin, M agnetic Mountain Stalinism as Civilization^ London 1995, p. 85.
Hiroaki Kuromiya, Freedom and Terror in the Donbas. A Ukrainian-Russian Borderland, J860s~ J990s, Cambridge 
1998, p. 157.
Hiroaki Kuromiya, Stalin 's Industrial Revolution Politics and Workers, 1928-1932^ New York 1988, pp. 235-236. 
Gijs Kessler, The Peasant and the Town. Rural-Urban M iration in the Soviet Union, 1929-40, (Unpublished 
Doctoral Thesis submitted at the European University Institute 2001), pp. 147-148 
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question is why the Soviet authorities bothered with this situation, and consequently why it was so 
important to launch the liquidation o f besprizomosti and beznadvomosti in 1935. The answer may 
be found in a document issued on 21 December 1935 by the executive committee o f the West 
Siberian Krai (Zapsibkiaiispolkom) where the liquidation o f besprizomosti (that is to remove them 
from the streets, install them in orphanages and secure a  successful education) was defined as an 
attempt to establish control.®* The Soviet leadership in 1935 strove to rectify this chaotic situation 
and therefore achieve the desired development of society.
The problems of besprizomosti diversely affected kulak children in the Soviet regions. Each 
identification forms o f  oiphans were divided into different categories, whereof the first four were: 
1) name, 2) age, 3) place o f birth and 4) social position. Based on this it is possible to establish the 
actual number o f kulak children in the orphanages of Western Siberia. In Narym and Tomsk we 
find that they comprised a significant proportion of the local besprizomye. O f the 21 personal cases 
being examined for this work, 11 children were explicitly categorised as “members o f  kulak 
families”.®^ In five cases the homeless children were related to arrested parents, which was not 
necessarily an outcome o f  the dekulakisation -  in one particular case, for example, the parents were 
categorised as kolkhozniki (members of a collective fann), and even though it is highly possible 
that they were arrested as kulaks, this was not given as a specific reason. Four of the children 
became homeless as a result of the death o f either one or both o f their parents, which is not further 
clarified -  they were not categorised as “kulaks”.^ * Finally one o f the children was a  son of a 
worker, who became homeless due to “other mobilisation in the family”.^  This child must have 
been related to one o f the many peasants, who either fled or became otkhodniki. Bearing in mind 
that these numbers are difficult to compare to the general situation o f besprizomye in the Soviet 
Union, as Western Siberia was one o f the main regions to which kulaks and their families were 
deported, the numbers are clear -  those children, who with certainty can be related to kulaks 
comprised 52.4% of the total number o f besprizomye in this region. It is likely that of the remaining 
45% o f  children, a majority were classed as besprizomye due to the preceding dekulakisation 
campaign of 1930-33
** GANO, f. r-895, op. 1, délo 184,1.4.
GATO, f. r-430, op. 3, délo 28061.1; délo 2867,1.1; délo 2878,1.2; délo 2894,1.2; délo 2895,1.2; délo 2902,1.2; 
délo 2903; 1.2; délo 2903,1.2; délo 2904; 1.2; délo 2905; 1.2; délo 2910,1.2; GATO, f. r-591, op. 1, délo 15,1.1.
™ GATO, f. r-591, op. 2. délo 18,1.8; délo 19,1.1; délo 22,1.1; délo 26.1.6; GATO f. r-591, o. 3. délo 27,1. 6 (the son 
o f the arrested kolkhozniki).
’’ GATO, f. r-591, op. 2 délo 16.1.1; délo 17; délo 28; délo 30.
^  GATO, f. r-591, op. 2 délo 29,1. 19.
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Table 1: Categorisation of besprizornye in Narym
Social category Fixed num bers Percentage
Kulak children 11 52.4%
Children o f arrested 5 23.8%
Homeless children caused by 
death o f parents
4 19 %
Others 1 4.8%
Total 21 100 %
(Source; GATO, f. r-430, op. 3 and GATO, f. r-591, op, 2)
Again, it is important to mention that Narym and Tomsk were regions of the special settlements, 
which may explain the overrepresentation o f  kulak children in these local orphanages. However, if  
we examine the whole region o f Western Siberia, including those oblasts where there were no 
special settlements, we find a very important pattern emerging. O f the 11,394 homeless children 
living in West Siberian orphanages by 1 January 1937, 2606 were settled in Narym. It would 
indicate that 22.9% o f  the total number of besprizornye in Western Siberia lived in the region of the 
special settlements. I f  we accept that some o f  those homeless children, who lived in the countryside 
of the region, were related to the local peasants classed as kulaks, the proportion of kulak 
oesprizomye may have been even higher. Evidently, we should also recall the fled peasants and the 
jtkhodniki when categorising orphans of the coimtryside. What is important about this statistic is 
hat Narym was the only West Siberian region mentioned explicitly, indicating a special position in 
elation to the rest o f the krai.^^
GANG f. r-61, op. 1, delo 1607,1.4.
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Table 2: Distribution of besprizomye in Western Siberia
Region Fixed num ber
City areas 4,344
Narym 2,606
Countryside 4,444
Total 11,394
(Source: GANO f. r-61, op. 1, delo 1607,1.4)
The dekulakisation campaign must therefore have had an intensifying effect on increasing the level 
o f  besprizomye by 1935-37. Having all these reservation in mind, as this distribution is based on 
material from the regions of the special settlements, it would suggest that when the Soviet regime in 
1935 was concerned with re-establishing control of the situation among homeless children they also 
had to consider its position on orphan kulak children.
3,2.3 Responses to the social disorder
Stalin’s famous statement in 1935 may have been a response to the growth of orphan kulak 
children, and thus it would be useful to discussion what the official position was henceforth. It is 
certain that the Soviet regime continued, even after 1935, to discriminate and dehumanise at least 
part o f the kulak children. To understand this, we need to discuss the complexity o f besprizomye 
further. Homeless kulak children, as besprizomye in general, often survived on theft, begging and 
prostitution and lived an extremely violent life.’  ^ One o f the main concerns o f the OGPU by the 
mid-1930s was that o f fighting organised crime, and this must also have been aimed at marginalised 
orphan children.^^ By 1934-35 it was reported that hooliganism, juvenile criminality and 
prostitution was growing alarmingly in the bigger cities, such as Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev. The 
public response was the edict “On the Struggle against Juvenile Crime” issued on 7 April 1935. One 
o f  the consequences o f this edict was that the age of criminal responsibility was lowered to 12
77years.
This indicated that liquidation o f besprizomosti w^ as not only a matter o f placing children in 
orphanages, but also led to a revision o f the distinction between adults and children significantly.
Alan M. Ball, And Now My Soul Is Hardened. Abandoned Children in Soviet Russia, 1918-1930, Berkeley 1994, pp, 
36-44.
David Shearer, “Social Disorder, Mass Repression and the NKVD during the 1930s”, pp. 85-117 in Barry 
McLoughlin and Kevin McDermott, Stalin’s Terror. High Politics and Mass Repression in the Soviet Union, London 
2003, p. 90.
^  Peter Salomon, Soviet CriminaUustice Under Stalin, New York, 1996, p. 197.
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This aspect o f the liquidation policy towards homeless children is o f great importance, since the 
sharpening o f the Juvenile legislation by April 1935 appears also to have been significant for the 
public approach to deported children (that is, kulak children). On 23 July P.S. Perepelkin, the head 
of the department o f working colonies within the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (OTK 
NVKD SSSR), discussed the treatment o f children sentenced by the edict o f 7 April 1935. The 
NKVD was at this point both responsible for the system of special settlements and the working 
colonies used for the incarceration of children. The latter type o f  imprisonment was divided into 
three different categories and contained children aged 12 years. The colonies ranged from: 1) the 
normal type o f  colonies, where boys and girls were separated; 2) special colonies for boys and girls; 
and finally 3) isolation prisons belonging to the national NKVD prison system (although in 
Moscow this was administrated by the local NKVD committee o f the oblast). The children living in 
these colonies were categorised as: 1) “socially neglected”; 2) children who required re-education; 
3) besprizoraye and others.^*
Kulak children, and especially those living in the special settlements, answered to all three 
categories for inmates in the working colonies as classified by the head o f the OTK NKVD SSSR. 
This implies three things: firstly that the orphan kulak children living in Narym and other regions 
for the special settlements, were most likely placed in these working colonies if  sentenced by the 
edict; secondly that at least some o f them were as young as 12 years old and could be punished with 
internment in an isolation prison; thirdly at least some of the kulak children remained to be 
punished by legal measures, also after Stalin had expressed his view on the distinction between sons 
and fathers. While it is certainly true that not all kulak children were incarcerated into these 
working colonies, those living in deportation comprised a majority o f the local besprizomye. 
Certainly, some o f those children being tried by the edict were hardcore criminals, but some o f the 
victims might just have been those, who unfortunately became besprizomye as a result o f the 
preceding dekulakisation campaign.
On 29 July 1935 Yagoda elaborated upon the purposes o f these working colonies and defined the 
following five aspects:
II. Purposes o f  the working colonies
• The basis o f  working education and the material basis for covering all expenses in 
the colony is the industry organised within each colony.
Vilenskii, 2002, pp. 194-195.
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• Industrial training in the colony should be organised in such a way that each 
person before leaving the colony, should have obtained professional qualifications 
in one field or another.
•  Each person educated [in Russian: eocnumamw^ from the moment o f his arrival 
in the colony, whether he belongs to the category of kandidat or members o f the 
colony [in Russian: nneu kojiohuu\, must be attached to one o f the industries in the 
colony (industrial workshop, business or agriculture).
•  The salary in the colonies is to be established on piece rate and by taking into 
account the expenses of covering the price for monthly maintenance, the members 
o f the colony receive full payment and the payment of the kandidat is paid to their 
personal account, and can, in some cases, be paid directly to them with the 
permission of the head of the colony and by the amount decided by him,
• For the best workers there is organised teaching in social, general educational and 
industrial disciplines.
The purpose o f the colonies is to attract all its members and kandidaty to study 
(Source: Vilenskii et. a t, 2002, p. 196)
1^ !
From these instmctions there was limited change in the treatment of excluded children, simply 
because those as young as 12 years old, who were interned in the settlements in 1932 and in 
working colonies in 1935, were used basically for the same purpose: their working power was used 
to promote industrialisation. Whether this changed for kulak children after November 1935 is 
possible, however, the working colonies for minors still existed in 1938 and were used for the same 
purpose as previously -  to fulfil the order o f  31 May 1935 and thereby to liquidate besprizomosti 
and beznadzornosti. This could have been a coincidence, but it is worth mentioning that at least 
some kulak children must have been exposed to incarceration even after Stalin’s statement. On the 
one hand, the regime appeared to have treated kulak children as any other Soviet children, but they 
would, on the other hand, always be approached with suspicion. Being paranoid as it was, the 
Soviet system expected that kulak children always would be hostile towards the state: the 
experiences o f especially deported kulak children only intensified such believe. Having asserted 
this, it can hardly surprise that the Soviet system continued to discriminate and to also dehumanise 
the kulak children.
rli ■
79 Ibid., p 301.
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3.2,4 The Round-up o f  Former kulaks
Another element o f the discrimination would be the launching o f mass operations in the summer of 
1937, The round-up o f  former ‘‘kulaks” and other criminals emphasises that the terror was not just 
aimed at certain high cadre individuals, but affected a substantial number of non-political groups in 
Soviet society.*® On 30 July 1937 Ezhov issued Order No. 00447 “On the operation for the 
repression o f  former kulaks, criminals and other anti-Soviet elements”, which initiated a  round-up 
o f socially unwanted elements. Regarding the measures o f this campaign the order established that:
1. All repressed kulaks, criminals and other anti-Soviet elements were divided into two 
categories:
•  In the first category belongs all remaining o f the most hostile o f  the former 
elements. They are objects for immediate arrest, and, after their case has been tried by 
the troika, shot.
• In the second category belongs all remaining of the less active elements, who 
nonetheless are still hostile elements. They are to be arrested and placed in camps for 
periods from 8 to 10 years, and the most vicious and socially dangerous o f  these, are to 
be locked in prison for a period decided by the troika.
(source: OnepaxHBHuii npracaa Hapojmoro KOMHCcapa BHyrpHHHX aeji Coiosa C.C.P Ns 00447 «o6 
onepaiiHH no penpeccHpoBaHtoo 6tiBniHx KyjiaKOB, yronoBHHxoB h aP- aHTHcoBeiCKHX ajicMCHTOB»,
Moscow, 30 June 1937 1. 4 -  my underlining MK) **
In Other words, the Soviet government was apparently interested in those “kulaks”, and their 
families, who belonged to the original first and second category o f the dekulakisation campaign -  the 
third category is not mentioned in this order.
Immediately after these instructions Ezhov issued quotas for the numbers of first and second 
category in the different republics and autonomous republics o f the Soviet Union. The quota for 
arrest had a total figure of approximately 270,095 individuals from 64 different regions, which were 
divided into either o f  the two categories — with the majority coming from the second category. 
Moscow oblast was the region that had the largest number o f arrested people with a total o f 35,000; 
the first category comprised 5,000, whereas the second 30,000 -  that is the second category was
M. Junge and R. Binner, Kok meppop cmcutb «6ojtbtuu.\t». CeKpemnbiu npuKoa M  00447 u mexHO/ioeusi eeo 
ucnofiHeHux, Moscow 2003, p. 9.
This document has very generously been lent to the author in its original version by Memorial in Tomsk.
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remarkably larger than the first. In the Ukraine, divided into Kharkov, Kiev, Vinnitsa, Donetsk, 
Odessa, Dnepropetrovsk, Chemigovsk and Moldova (being included into this region), 28,800 people 
were to be arrested. 8,000 of these belonged to the first category, whereas the second category 
comprised 20,800 people -  the same pattern as in Moscow. Another pattern is that apart fi’om the 
oblast surrounding the larger Soviet cities, Moscow, Leningrad, and Sverdlovsk, Ukraine, Western 
Siberia and the GULAG were the regions hardest affected by the new round-up. This would imply 
that the campaign o f 1937 was specifically aimed at the agricultural regions and those areas and 
cities where the previously-designated kulaks and former special settlers lived or were incarcerated. 
It is also worth mentioning that the regime arrested first category kulaks in the GULAG, which also 
suggests that the NKVD was re-arresting and executing people, who were already incarcerated.*^
Table 3 Samples for the NKVD quotas for those to be rounded-up by Order No. 00447 on June 1937
First category Second category Total
Moscow oblast 5,000 30,000 35,000
Leningrad oblast 4,000 10,000 14,000
Sverdlovsk oblast 4,000 6,000 10,000
West Siberia 5,000 12,000 17,000
Ukraine SSR 8,000 20,800 28,800
Kharkov oblast 1,500 4,000 5,500
Kiev oblast 2,000 3,500 5,500
Vinnitsa oblast 1,000 3,000 4,000
Donetsk oblast 1,000 3,000 4,000
Odessa oblast 1,000 3,500 4,500
Dnepropetrovsk oblast 1,000 2,000 3,000
Chemigovsk oblast 300 r 1,300 1,600
Moldova oblast 200 500 700
NKVD camps 10,000 10,000
Total o f all oblasti, 
krai, ASSR and SSR
78,095 192,000 270,095
(Source: OnepamBHUH npiocaa napoanoro KOMHccapa BHyrpHHHX aeJi Coioaa C.C.P J^ s 00447 «o6 onepauHH no 
penpeccHpoBaHHK) Oubiuhx KyjiaKOB, yrojiOBHHKOB h ap. aHmcoBercKHx ojieMeHroB». Moscow, 30 June 1937,11.6-7)
® Cristopher Joyce, ’’Recycled Victims: The Great Terror in the Komi ASSR” pp. 191-220 in Melanie Ilic (ed.), 
Stcdin’s  Terror Revisited^ London 2006, pp. 215-216.
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The numbers were incomplete, as certain regions o f the Soviet Union were not included, and the 
order gave the local authorities the right to raise the number o f executions. This implies that the 
actual number of executed was much higher than the total 78,095 suggests.®^ Both Luneev and 
Popov give a number o f 353,074 death sentences in 1937, which is significantly higher than the 
above quota. Yet it is unclear whether the executions only concern those being rounded up as 
former kulaks or if  it also includes other groups, being executed during the Great Purges,*^ The 
main problem is that the quota does not represent one specific group, as it was a round up of ah 
“social aliens”. This would also suggest that it is difficult to define the “social group” being 
rounded-up, as the possibilities o f who they actually were are manifold. It is, for example, unclear 
how many o f  them were designated as “kulaks”, as there is no indication o f the quota o f anested 
within the system o f  the special settlements. Furthermore, it can be established that whereas 
916,787 lived in the settlements by 1937, this dropped to 877,651 in 1938, but rose again to 
938,522 in 1939.*^ The drop from 1937 to 1938 is particularly interesting, as it implies that Order 
No. 00447 not necessarily meant that the number o f stigmatised “kulaks” in the settlements rose -  
at least the number o f special settlers did not rise until 1939. The stigmatised kulaks could, of 
course, have been sent to another sector o f the GULAG system in 1937 and 1938, however, there is 
no specific information about this. The quota in Order No. 00447 might have represented escaped 
special settlers, former kulaks (who had been released fi-om that system of special settlements by the 
mid-193 Os) or even already incarcerated kulaks, but it is significant that the data is not clear on this 
matter.
The main concern is how Order No. 00447 is to be understood, and subsequently why the Soviet 
regime decided to engage in these mass operations. It is generally accepted that the order largely 
reflected a desire to strengthen the control o f  society in the preparation for war, which had always 
been an ambition o f the Soviet leadership, but which was particularly sharpened from 1933. The 
local authorities spoke only rarely about social chaos and instability in 1937, but would instead 
show concern about “the formation o f organised opposition”. Based on the many experiences with 
war and civil war, the Soviet leadership was convinced that an organised opposition inevitably
“  Oleg Khlevnyuk, ’T he Objectives of the Great Terror, 1937-1938”pp. 158-176 in Julian Cooper, Maureen Perrie and 
E.A. Rees, Soviet History 19Ì7-53, London 1995, p. 162.
V.V. Luneev, llpecntynHocmh X X  eaca. Mupoeou KpuMUHonuHeoam anaiuSy Moscow 1997, p. 180 (Table 1) 
and V.P. Popov, ’TocyaapcrseHUbiii reppop b coBexcKofi Pocchhio 1923-1953 rr. (hcto»ihhkh h hx HHTepnperaiuw)” 
pp. 20-31 Ome'iecmeeHHbte apxuetiy 1992, Volume 2, p. 28 (Table 3) and p. 29. note *.
“  V.N. Zemskov, CnetfnepecejieHtjbt e CCCP 1930-1960, Moscow 2005, pp. 21-22.
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would launch an attack on the state. From the experiences with the Civil War in Spain in 1936, the 
Soviet government only knew to well what organised opposition groups could achieve, and the 
creation o f a Fifth column had to be prevented at any cost.*^ That is Order No. 00447 intensified the 
above criminalisation of society, and depicted certain groups (including former ‘‘kulaks’*) as 
particularly dangerous.
3.2.5 Kulak children and Order No. 00447
Regarding kulak children Order No. 00447 was not explicit. The document discusses the fate of the 
arrested families, which again appears to be ambiguous. Those members of the family who did not 
conduct anti-Soviet activities were not to be repressed. It is at the same time established that those 
members of the family conducting “anti-Soviet” activities were to be arrested, tried by the troika and 
placed either in camps or special settlements (trudposelenie). Furthermore, the document reads that 
families o f the first category arrested, living in Moscow, Leningrad, Tblisi, Baku, Rostov-on-Don, 
Tagentor and the regions surrounding Sochi (Stalin’s Black Sea dacha), Gagry and Sukhumi, were to 
be expelled. Families o f  both the first and second category were to be kept under systematic 
observation. This clearly supports the argument of the wide range o f  political terror from 1936-38 
as a phenomenon directed against society: ordinary people, and even their children, at this point 
could not be sure, when or if they would be stigmatised and arrested as “enemies o f the people”.
The treatment of kulak children may be deduced from Ezhov’s order “On the operation of 
repression of wives and children of traitors o f  the motherland” of 15 August 1937. Though this order 
was aimed at the families of the members o f  the political elite, it is important to remember that the 
campaigns against the kulaks and the Great Purges within the political elite were parallel operations. 
We can in this document detect a distinction of children: that is some were considered more 
dangerous than other. The indicator o f this was their age. The children were divided into four 
categories; babies (who were allowed to remain with their mothers) infants from 1 to 114 and 3, 
children from 3 to 15, and adolescents 15 years old and older. The last category, that is the 
adolescents, were automatically arrested and termed “socially dangerous”. These were placed in 
camps, working colonies or homes for special re-education. The third category -  children from 3-15 
~ w ere to be placed in orphanages administrated by NKPros (People’s Commissariat of Education).
Ì l! :l|
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** Oleg Khlevniuk, “The Reasons for the “Great Terror”: the Foreing-Political Aspect” pp. 159-169 in Silvio Pons and 
Andrea Romano (ed.), Russia in the Age o f Wars. 1914-1945^ Milano 2000, Shearer, 2003, pp. 104-107 and Junge and 
Binner, 2003, p. 242 if.
OnepaTHBHwii npracas napoaHoro KOMHCcapa BHyrpHHHx aeji Coiosa C.C.P 00447 «o6 onepauHH no 
penpeccHpoBaHHJO 6biBmHX icyjiaKOB, yronoBHiocoB h ap. aHTHCOBercKHX 3neMeHTOB», Moscow, 30 June 1937,1. 8.
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The second category -  infants from 1-1 i4 to 3 -  became the responsibility of the NKZdrav (People’s 
Commissariat o f Health Care). Regarding the preparation for the placing of children from the age of 
1 to 15 years, that is both the second and the third category, the document reads:
24) In every city involved in the operation, special measures to establish: 
a) reception and dispatch centres where the children will be taken immediately after 
their mothers’ arrest and from which children will then be sent on to orphanages
30) At the reception and dispatch centre the children are received by the manager or 
head o f the children reception o f OTK NKVD and a special selected expert o f UGB 
[State Security Service MR].
Each accepted child is registered in a special book, and his or her documents are 
sealed in a separate envelope.
The children are then divided into groups, depending on where they are sent, and 
taken in groups by specially selected workers to the orphanages o f NKPros, where 
they are handed over with their documents to the manager on his personal signature.
31) Children under 3 are handed over personally to the manager of the orphanages 
or nurseries o f  NKZdrav on their personal signature. The birth certificate is handed 
over with the child
33) Supervision o f the political attitudes of children of the convicted, and o f their 
education and upbringing, is assigned to the People’s Commissariat o f Internal 
Affairs o f the republics and to the heads of the districts and oblast offices o f  the 
NKVD.
(Source: A.I. Kokurin and N.V. Petrov et.al., rVJlAT (Tnamoe Ynpaenenue jiazepeu) 1917-1960,
Moscow 2000 pp. 108-9).**
Such instruction evidently signified that the placement o f children in these orphanages, which also 
included those, as young as 1 to 1V2 years old, was akin to imprisonment, and this is supported by 
the fact that the registration involved photographing the child, with a number of registration hung
** This document is translated to English in: Alexander N. Yakolev, A Century o f Violence in Soviet Russia, New Haven 
2002, pp. 30-31.
82
around their necks and the taking o f  their fingerprints for easier identification.®^ The NKVD was 
also assigned the task o f “supervision o f the political attitudes o f children”, emphasising that the 
Soviet authorities still would be sceptical about the political observation of these children.
It became increasingly important in 1938 to maintain control o f the enemy children (including 
kulak children). On 11 February 1938 the NKVD discussed methods for strengthening the network 
o f informers within the special working colonies designated for young children. It is important to 
remember that this part o f  the round-up o f former kulaks was not just a matter o f placing children 
in orphanages and re-educating them: some o f these families had previously, less than ten years 
before, experienced the dekulakisation campaign. Also, which is more important, most of the 
fathers had just been shot. Again the same people, and their families, had to prepare themselves for 
the breaking up o f their intimate sphere -  even brothers and sisters were separated during these 
placements.^^
3.2,6. Kulak children and passports
The escalation o f political repression o f former “kulaks” in June 1937 seems to have had a 
negative impact on the Soviet treatment o f kulak children and young. Yet it is important that this 
still remained ambiguous, even when terror reached its peak -  that is that even when the situation 
was most intense, certain people in the Soviet leadership would argue for the necessity of 
rehabilitating kulak children. The dilemma becomes particularly clear in the discussion on 
passports and kulak children, which occurred in 1938-1939. The significance of passports was 
emphasised in 1932-33, when the Soviet regime introduced them in order to control the movement 
o f people. Because o f the famine, 1932 had been particularly dramatic, vrith people moving in 
huge numbers from the countryside to the cities. With the passport regulations introduced on 5 
January 1933, the regime had means whereby it could control who lived in the cities -  if  a person 
did not have a passport, it was not possible to gain a residence p e rm itS p e c ia l settlers could not 
attain this passport when it was initially introduced.®^ By September 1938 the Soviet government 
discussed the right o f movement o f  exiled kulaks, which on 22 October resulted in a decision to 
release children fi-om the special settlements when reaching the age o f  16 -  provided, o f  course.
Corina Kuhr ’’Children o f ’’Enemies o f the People” as victims of the Great Purges” pp. 209-220 in Cahier du Monde 
RussCy 39 (1-2), janvier-juin 1998, p. 209.
Vilenskii et al., 2002, pp. 278-79.
Kuhr, 1998, p. 212.
”  Fitzpatrick, 1994, pp. 92-95.
”  Edwin Bacon, The Gulag at War. Stalin *s Forced Labour System in the Light o f the ArchiveSy London 1994, pp. xii, 
29-31
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they could be trusted. This would also indicate that they gained a  passport and thereby had the 
right to move to the cities and receive an education.®"* Yet most kulak children older than 16 years 
had since August 1937 belonged to the group o f “socially dangerous”, which might explain that 
the GULAG administration stressed on 19 February 1939 that:
In relation to the issuing of passports to working settlers, who leave the 
workings settlements for studying it must be kept in mind that in accordance 
with the SNK SSSR decision o f  22.10.1938 it is illegal to live in the places o f 
education [...] the regulation for the release from the working settlements to 
study remains in agreement with the current regulation no. 2663 o f the SNK 
SSR and CK VKP(b): a working settler who temporarily (in a specific period) 
is released for submitting an entrance exam to a given institute, is afterwards 
obliged to return to the settlements.
(Source; V.P. Danilov and Sergei Krasilnikov, CneifnepeceJieHmu e 3cmadHOu. 1939-1945^ 
Novosibirsk 1996, p. 17.)
This means that the passports issued for kulak children after 22 October 1938 had special 
restrictions for residency: a kulak child or adolescent could, in other words, only leave the system 
o f  settlements for a shorter period for education. The specification from the GULAG 
administration in 1939 may not have had anything to do vrith the NKVD order of August 1937 on 
the treatment o f wives and children o f traitors of the motherland, but at least it suggests that the 
Soviet regime never came to a complete clarification on its view on kulak children and yoimg. It 
would imply that it was never an unreserved rehabilitation of this particular group, emphasising 
that despite ongoing debates throughout the 1930s kulak children remained secondary citizens 
even at the end of the decade. Hence any civil rights o f kulak children were contradictory, and the 
shift by the mid-193 Os did not affect any fundamental changes in their legal position. Also it 
means that the Soviet regime would always consider kulak children and young as potentially 
dangerous, which, o f  course, had essential implications for their future possibilities.
^  Khlevniuk, 2004, p. 262.
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3 3  The Blatnoi -  a way of responding
How did kulak children respond to these experiences? Were they passive or did they react to the 
dehumanisation? It is obvious that the orphan kulak children living in the Soviet penal system were 
brought up under extremely harsh circumstances, which must have shaped their behaviour 
significantly. In his famous book The GULAG Archipelago, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn spoke o f a 
certain category o f “Blatnoi” or “blatari” existing in the Soviet penal system by the 1940s. They 
were organised within an informal network, had specific tattoos on their bodies, developed a certain 
language and had a detailed code of honour. Each member belonged to a  complex structure parallel 
to society, implying that these thieves were well organised.^^ The “Blatnoi” is rooted in the broader 
Russian term of “Blat”, which refers to an informal network exiting parallel to the official system of 
control. It was an immensely widespread phenomenon in Soviet society, also in the Stalin era, and 
its significance can be summarised in the sentence: is higher than Stalin”. “Blat” would refer
to a  black market economy -  that is an economy outside the control o f the state, but it was also a 
very specific way o f living parallel to the official life.^
The “Blatnoi” refers to a criminal organisation emerging in the Soviet penal system by the 
beginning of the 1930s. Often “Blatnoi” and “vory-v-zakony” (thieves-in-law) are used as 
synonyms, and signifies criminal organisations within the Soviet camp system, who consistently 
opposed and imdermined the authorities.^^ There was an enormous rivalleiy within the camps 
system between the different fi“actions o f underworld organisations. The main opponents o f the 
Blatnoi was the suki (the bitches), who was considered traitors. The conflict between the Blatnoi 
and the suki escalated from 1949-51 in what was known as the bitches’ war (such’ia voina), which 
largely broke down this parallel structure o f camps. However, the Blatnoi structure was 
immensely strong in the 1940s, and often comprised a realistic alternative to the official camp 
administration.
”  Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, The GULAG Archipelago. 1918-1956, London 1974, pp. 503-506.
On the “Blat” phenomenon see: Joseph S. Berliner, “”Blat” is Higher than Stalin!” pp. 22-31 in Problems o f
Communism, Voi. 3, No. 1,1953; Alena V. Ledeneva, Russia's Ecomy o f Favours. Blot, Networking and Informal 
Exchange, Cambridge 1998, p. 3 and 11; Sheila Fit^atrick, “Blat in Stalin’s Time** pp. 166-182 in. Stephen Loveel, 
Alena V. Ledeneva and Andrei Rogachevskii (ed.). Bribery and Blat in Russia. Negotiation Reciprocity from  Middle 
Ages to the 1990s, London 2000, p. 178.
Frederico Varese, “The society of the Vory-V-Zakone, 1930-1950” pp. 515-538 in Cahiers du Monde russe, 39 (4). 
Octobre-décembre 1998, pp. 516-517 and Andrea Graziosi, “The Great Strikes o f 1953 in Soviet Labor Camps in the 
Accounts o f their Participants. A Review” pp. 419-446 in Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique, 33(4), octobre- 
décember 1992, p. 426.
^  Graziosi, 1992, p. 426..
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The “Blatnoi” phenomenon is fairly understudied, and, for example, it is still uncertain as to wh( 
they were. Federico Varese examines their national and ethnical background, and establishes tha 
they primarily came from the Russian Soviet Republic and were o f Slavic origin.^ He has 
however, very little information about their social origin, and it is difficult to decide whether the 
dekulakisation process had an intensifying effect on the phenomenon -  the only thing in his writing 
suggesting that this might have been the case, is that the origin o f the Blatnoi in the camps is dated 
to the beginning of the 1930s. Graziosi likewise suggests that the life as a spetspereselentsy had 
hardened a significant number o f  the camp inmates during the 1930s.^^® We know from 
contemporary writing of, for example, Calvin B. Hoover that: ”In some cases the more desperate 
kulaki turned to banditry”.'^* This implies that most kulaks reacted to the dekulakisation by 
becoming thieves or Blatnoi. In Bernhard Roerder’s autobiography regarding the situation of the 
camps by the 1940s Blatnoi are specifically characterised as: “ ...the children o f the kulaks who 
grew up in the lawlessness o f Siberian exile and saw their parents dying around them in the despair 
produced by homelessness and starvation”. This would suggest that kulak children, and more 
specifically those being deported with their parents, participated in the establishment o f the Blatnoi.
In his novel “Blatnoi” from 1971, Mikhail Demin describes his youth in the Soviet penal camp 
system of the 1940s. Aside from telling the story o f his life as a Blatnoi, Demin portrays his family 
background. He explains how he grew up in the 1930s in a Soviet village outside Moscow, which 
was mainly inhabited by heroes o f the Civil War. In 1937 his uncle (a high level local official) was 
arrested as an “enemy o f the people” as one o f the many victims o f  the Great Purges. His father was 
certain that sooner or later the same fate would befall upon him as well. And life in the family as 
well as in the village was immensely affected by this paranoia,*®^ Demin’s father died before being 
arrested, knowing that his arrest order had been issued. On a later occasion, in the 1940s, Demin 
had a talk with some of his fellow Blatnye about the political situation in the Soviet Union, and 
again it is revealed that they in general originated from high position families -  and therefore at 
some point had experienced the arrest o f their parents. One o f Demin’s friends was called Kostia 
G rq f^ \ as he was a son o f repressed Polish aristocratic family. This text therefore suggests that
99 Varese, 1998, p. 522.
Graziosi, 1992. p. 422
Calvin B. Hoover, The Economic Life o f Soviet Russia^ New York 1932 (4* edition), p. 106. 
Bernhard Roerder, Katorga. An aspect o f  Modern Slavery^ London 1958, p. 96.
Mikhail Demin, Enamnoù. Pomqh New York 1981, pp. 66-69.
Ibid., p. 71.
“Graf’ is ‘‘count” in Russian 
Demin, 1981, p. 195.
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some Blatnoî in the Soviet penal camps must have come from families, which had been repressed 
by the Soviet state during the 1930s -  that is that they had either belonged to kulak families or 
families of the high Soviet cadres.
We know from research done by Alan M. Ball on homeless children or besprizomye in the 1920s 
that they often were engaged in criminality. Furthermore, it is commonly accepted that the criminal 
besprizomye were organised in specific gangs and developed a certain language, habits, costumes, 
conventions and solidarity. The life these children lived was extremely hard and they defended 
themselves physically against their surroundings.*®^ Above, it was established that one o f  many 
consequences o f the dekulakisation and the later round-up of former “kulaks” was a growing level 
o f besprizomye and orphans. Bearing in mind that these children were meet with hostility from the 
Soviet regime and that their situation was desperate, it is plausible that they reacted in the same way 
as besprizomye traditionally had done during the 1920s and even earlier. Therefore, it is also likely 
that they became criminals, since this was one way of surviving as a child of a social outcast. From 
this perspective, it is reasonable to suggest that some of the besprizomye kulak children became the 
Blatnoi, which were spoken of in the Soviet penal system. This is not to argue that every orphan 
kulak child became the Blatnoi, but some might have responded to the repression o f themselves and 
their parents in this particular manner. It is important to emphasis that those who did become the 
Blatnoi might have been a minority, even among orphan kulak children.
Although there are no statistics on the social composition o f the Blatnoi, which can precisely 
determine the number o f kulak children, it is generally accepted that they came from the orphanages 
-  that is they came from the environment, where kulak children were installed during the 
incarceration o f their parents.*®* Varese asserts that a number of the senior Blatnoi were adolescents 
as young as 18 years, suggesting that the junior members were even younger. We know from an 
autobiography, written by a besprizomye, who became a Soviet w aif in 1929 (because o f the 
repression of his father), that organised theft was a common way o f surviving in the Soviet 
orphanages. The organisation he was part o f  was based on a “patrone versus client” relation: the 
young children carried out the theft and paid fees to older adolescents. If the children were caught 
during the operation, the older adolescents would help them and would protect them in any ways
Alan M. Ball, And Now M y Soul Is Hardened. Abandoned Children in Soviet Russia, 1918-1930, Berkeley 1994, pp. 
36-38.
The previous political prisoner, Boris Weil, gave this valuable information to the author, after having consulted and 
discussed the issue with a lawyer from Moscow.
109 Varese, 1998, p. 516.
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p o s s i b l e . W h e t h e r  this organisation was akin to the structure o f  Blatnoi can not, however, 
elaborated from the text. When interviewing for her book on the GULAG, Anna Appelbaum askt 
a Russian friend to help her finding some o f  those, who had lived in the orphanages. The frier 
responded: “Don’t [...] we all know what such people became” implying that the kula 
besprizomye, and other similar orphans, often became members o f  what Appelbaum terms as th 
“ [...] large and all-embracing criminal class’’."^ This implies that some of these children not onl 
grew up in an atmosphere of criminality in the orphanages, but continued to live a life in the under 
belly o f society. This suggests that at least some kulak children, even if  it was only a minority, wen 
not passive in their interaction with the Soviet state, but instead reacted according to the policy tc 
which they were submitted. The Soviet system criminalised kulak children, most notably whet 
issuing the edict “On the Struggle against Juvenile Crime” on 7 April 1935, but also in the day-to- 
day treatment o f them in orphanages and other places. And this criminalisation must have detoriated 
by the round-up o f former kulaks in July 1937. If kulak children were not criminal before, they 
would become so, as a reaction to this criminalisation. There was, as in the case o f  stigmatising 
“kulaks” as hostile, a self-fulfilling prophecy to the policy o f the Soviet state. It is, nonetheless, 
important to remember that it based on the current material is difficult to conclude that kulak 
children comprised the main body o f  the Blatnoi.
It is possible that the “Blatnoi” was a realistic alternative for at least some kulak children to the 
oppressing Soviet state -  even if these only comprised a smaller percentage o f  the total number of 
kulak children. Whether this also meant that blatari, could live a life without any level o f interaction 
with the Soviet state is inconceivable. The Blatnoi structure did not have a central core, like the 
bureaucracy o f  the state, binding all o f the individual criminal networks together into one coerced 
entity -  instead it was a number o f  entities working in parallel to one other. Furthennore, the 
Blatnoi was no longer a realistic alternative by the beginning o f the 1950s, when the whole structure 
was destroyed in the GULAG camp system as a consequence o f the aforementioned bitches’ war.”  ^
A  substantial number o f kulak children also desired, as we shall see later, to be re-integrated into 
society when that was made possible, so even if  some might have been a Blatnoi, he or she would 
most probably also have strived to gain an education, to be enrolled into the political child and 
youth organisations and to find a job if that was made possible -  this would, after all, be a more 
prosperous and long-term way of living even for kulak children. Not that they forgot about their life
Nicholas Vionov, Outlaw. The Autobiography o f a Soviet Waif, London 1955, p. 25 and 28. 
Anne Applebaum, GULAG. A History o f  the Scrviet CampSy Lodnon 2004, p. 306.
Varese, 1998, p. 526.
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in exclusion, but they had to invent survival ctrati^ inVc ^ i. , .  . . . .ai strategies in a society that would generally be hostile
towards them.
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4. The living conditions of kulak children during deportation
While the Soviet authorities rarely spoke about kulak children, or even completely ignored them, 
during the initial phase o f dekulakisation in the winter o f  1930, they became increasingly concerned 
about their fate by the mid-1930s. A significant reason for this was (as mentioned in chapter 3) the 
terrible living conditions under which these deported children lived. A question is whether the 
experiences o f the kulak children were radically different from what children generally experienced 
in these years. Since famine tormented the Soviet Union in 1932-33 and infant mortality generally 
was high, it is only natural to discuss differences and similarities between the experiences o f kulak 
children and Soviet children as such.
Given that the devastating fate of kulak children primarily arose from the policy o f deportation, it 
is mainly the living conditions of kulak children in the system o f  the special settlements, which will 
be examined. Our m ain concern is children o f  the first and second category kulaks. By following 
the general development o f the Soviet Union, arid discussing as to whether the development in the 
special settlements was significantly different from what children and adults experienced in society 
a whole, the living conditions of third category kulak children will also be addressed -  even if  this 
appears as a secondary issue.
4,1 The demographic situation of Soviet countryside in the 1930s 
V.P. Danilov asserted that by the time o f the First World War (1914-1917) the population of the 
area, which later became the Soviet Union, comprised 139.3 million. Of this 114.5 million, or 
82.3%, lived in rural areas.^ In the pioneering work of E.Z. Volkov o f 1930, we can find a similar 
figure, as he asserted that of a total 140.9 million, 115.3 million, or 81.8%, lived in the countryside 
by 1918.^ Despite urbanisation during the 1920s the distribution between the rural and urban areas 
was more or less unaltered by the end o f the decade. In 1930 126.2 million Soviet citizens lived in 
the rural areas (80.7%) while 30.2 million lived in the cities (19.3%).^
* V.P. Danilov, Coeemanasi JJ,okoio:o3hq!l¡lepeeusi: Hacejtenue, SeMJienojtbsoeaHue, Xosniicmso, Moskva 1977, p. 19. 
 ^E Z . Volkov, HapoÒHQce^eHvx CCCP. 3a Bocejubdecjim Jiem  ^Moscow 1930, p. 208 (table 115).
 ^Danilov, 1977, pp. 21-22.
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T able 1: Estimation o f  population growth in the Rural and Urban areas from 1924-1930 (in
millions)
Year Rural Urban Total Rural proportion 
in percentage
1924 115,0 22,4 137,4 83.7
1926 118,6 25,0 143,6 82.6
1928 122,9 27,5 150,4 81.7
1930 126,2 30,2 156,4 80,7
(Source: Danilov, 1977, p. 21)
The distribution between the rural and urban areas changed from 1926 to 1937, as a result o f the 
collectivisation and industrialisation campaigns — in part because o f an extensive urbanisation, 
especially in the early 1930s. The réintroduction o f the internal passport by 1933 was largely a 
response to this dramatic situation.^ The growth rate of the cities in the years from 1926 to 1937 
was according to V.B. Zhiromskaya 208.7%, whereas the rural population fell to 90.8% of its 1926 
level.^ According to her calculation this implied that 73 million lived in the cities by 1937, whereas
122.1 millions remained in the rural areas.^ The distribution had therefore changed from 19.3% and 
80.7% in 1930 to 37.5% and 62.5% in 1937 -  even if  the rural population still comprised a majority 
o f the total Soviet population, the increase in the cities was remarkable. It is, of course, important to 
recall that Soviet society remained rural until 1959.
Table 2: Estimation of growth in the rural and urban areas in 1937 (in million)
Distribution in fixed 
number
Distribution in pet. (jTOWth rate in pet. 
from 1926-1937
Rural 122,1 62.5 90.9
Urban 73 37.5 208.7
(Source: Zhiromskaya, 2004, p. 68 and 73)
* For more on the rural migration and the passport regulation see: Gijs Kessler, The Peasant and the Town Rural-Urban 
Migration in the Soviet Union, J929-40 (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis submitted at the European University Institute in 
2001), chp. 3.
* V.B. ZiaromskaytLj MsAtoepa^uHecKOit ucmopunpoccuu e 1930-eeodbt, Moscow 2001, p, 68.
*Ibid., p,73.
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4.1.1 Age distribution in the countryside
Danilov calculated that in 1926 the rural child population (those younger than 15 years) comprised 
38.9% or 46.9 million of a total 120.7 million.’
Table 3: Estimation o f rural age distribution on 17 December 1926 (in millions)
Age/distribution Fixed numbers Percentage
0-4 years 19,2 16.1
5-9 years 13,2 10.9
10-14 years 14,5 12.0
> 15 years 73,8 61.0
Total 120,7 100
(Source; Danilov, 1977, p. 24, Table 2)
From 1926-1937 according to Zhiromskaya, the number o f  children younger than 15 rose in the 
countryside.* Rural children up to the age o f  one year, comprised 3.21% o f  a total o f 122.1 million 
(3.9 million); those from 1 to 4 years comprised 8.88% (10.8 million); while those from 5 to 9 years 
comprised 14.22% (17.4 million); and finally those children from 10-14 years comprised 13.46% 
(16.4 million). Children therefore comprised a total o f  48.5 million o f the total 122.1 million rural
citizens in 1937 (that is 39.7%).^
Table 4: Estimation o f  rural age distribution in 1937 (in millions)
Age/distribution In fixed number In pet. i
> 1 3,9 3.21 !
1-4 10,8 8.88 1
5-9 17.4 14.22 1
10-14 16,4 13.46
<15 73,6 60.27 1
Total 122,1 100
(Source: Zhiromskaya, 2004, p. 96 (Talole 14))
’ Danilov, 1977, pp. 24-25.
* Zhiromskaya, 2004, pp. 96-97. 
’ Ibid.,p. 96 (Table 14).
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Zhiromskaya’s data reveals that children were not unaffected by the development o f the 1930s. For 
example, it is important to note that the group of children from 0 to 4 years old dropped from a total 
o f 19.2 million in 1926, to 14.7 million in 1937. There are several explanations for such a 
development; one would be the famine o f  1932-33, which had a devastating impact on infant 
mortality. Another explanation is the drop in the birth rate, experienced in the country at large 
during the 1930s.
4.1.2 The number o f  “kulaks ”
This leads us to consider how big a proportion of the total rural population was designated as 
“kulak”, and consequently how many kulak children we are talking about for the whole 
dekulakisation. The question is difficult to answer precisely, as the “kulak” concept was flexible, 
arbitrary and largely a political construction used in order to legitimise Soviet policy in the 
countryside. Nikolai Ivnitskii, using two contemporary Soviet investigations o f 1927 and 1929, 
calculates that whereas 3.9% o f the total peasant households in the Soviet Union could be 
characterised as “kulaks” in 1927 it had dropped to 2.3% in 1929. In comparison, he states, that the 
batraki in the same period dropped from 9.8% to 8.9%; the bednoty dropped from 22.9% to 21.6%; 
whilst the middle peasants (seredniaki) rose from 63.4% to 67.2%. What is striking about these 
statistics is the regional variation; whereas the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic 
(RSFSR) corresponds to the general statistic of the Soviet Union, regions like the Northern 
Caucasus and Siberia differed remarkably. In the Northern Caucasus, for example, kulak 
households comprised 5.7% in 1927, but dropped to 2.4% in 1929. In Siberia a  similar development 
occurred, where 6.7% o f  the households in 1927 were categorised as kulaks, this dropped to 1.8% in 
1929 10 Sucjj developments indicate that the proportion o f kulak households had dropped 
significantly in the very same year as the policy o f liquidating the kulak as a class was launched.
Nikolai Ivnitskii, PenpeccueHOX nmumuKa CoeemacoH eaacmu e depeene (1928-19$i  zz.)  ^Moskva 2000 p. 96.
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Table 5: Social construction o f the countryside according to Ivnitskii
General Kulak Middle Peasant Poor Peasant Batraki
Development of
the USSR
1927 3.9% 63.4% 22.9% 9.8%
1929 2.3% 67.2% 21.6% 8.9%
Regional
differences:
Siberia
1927 5.7%
1929 2.4%
North Caucasus
1927 6.7%
1929 1.8%
(Source: Ivnitskii, 2000, p. 96)
There was considerable disagreement about the actual number o f kulaks among the Soviet 
¡authorities, and the estimation differed depending on which state agency or research organisation 
undertook the investigation. Whereas 3.9% o f  a total 25 million households was the official 
estimate for the “kulak” population in 1927, the People’s Commissariat of Agriculture (NKZem) 
later that year claimed that the kulak percentage was 4.2%. A year later, in 1928, Stalin argued that 
the estimation should be raised to 5%}^ Stalin thereby gave the top estimate, suggesting that not 
sven the most radical within the Soviet regime would claim that the designated “kulaks” comprised 
more than 5% of the total peasantry. This also means that the number of “kulaks” was relatively 
small. The official number o f kulak households differed from 780,000 at the lowest in 1927 to 1.2- 
t.3 million in 1929. The latter estimation was made by Molotov, and does not include the categories 
3f “kulak henchmen” (podkulachniki) -  that is middle and poor peasants being placed alongside 
‘kulaks” for showing sympathy -  nor well-to-do peasants (zazhitochnye). This necessarily 
increased the number o f  those peasants who were designated as class enemies, during the forced 
collectivisation of Soviet agriculture. By 19 February 1933, when dekulakisation was about to end,
toshe Lewin, ”Who was thè Soviet Kulaks?” pp. 121-141 in Moshe Lewin, The Making o f  thè Soviet System^ 
oiidon 1985, p. 129.
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Stalin argued that the zazhitochnye had comprised 8-10% of the total Sorict peasantry' at the 
beginning of the campaign. According to such estimation 3 million households, or bem cen 7 and 8 
m illion individuals (adults as well as children) were designated as “kulaks’’ and 2a2hiiochn\ c by the 
Soviet regime,^^ The attack upon the designated “kulaks”, was therefore aimed at least 1.2-1.3 
million households or, according to Moshe Lewin, 5-6 million individuals -  adults as well as 
children.*^ Danilov lowers this number to 1 million households, or between 4-5 million 
individuals.^^ Either way, this implies that an average kulak family comprised of 4-5 people, 
meaning two adults and between two and three children.
Davies and Wheatcroft establish that from 1930 to 1933 between 5.1 -  5.8 million people were 
categorised as either first, second, or third category kulaks. They divide the dekulakised into the 
following groups (in million persons):
1) Exiled outside their own region (first or second category kulaks) 2.1
2) Exiled within their own region (third category kulaks) 2-2.5
3) “Dekulakised themselves” (self-dekulakisation) 1 -1.25
(source; R.W. Davies and S.G. Wheatcroft “Population” in R-W. Davies, Mark Harrison and S.G. WTicatcroft (ed.). The 
economic transformation o f the Soviet Union, 1913-1945, Cambridge, 1994, p, 68)
Based on these figures it is possible to calculate that between 4 and 6 million individuals -  adults as 
well as children -  were designated as “kulaks” during the 1930s. It is important to remember that 
the first category kulaks suffered more than any of the other categories, as they were treated much 
harder -  often even executed. Luneev argues that 208,069 individuals were sentenced for 
counterrevolutionary activity in 1930, which drops to 33,539 in 1931, raises to 141,919 in 1932 and 
rockets dramatically in 1933 to 239,664.^^ Popov gives similar numbers for 1930, 1932 and 1933, 
but raises the 1931 figure to 180,696 sentences.'® Thus between 623,191 and 770,348 were 
sentenced for counterrevolutionary activity from 1930 to 1933. These numbers must also have 
included the first category kulaks, although there is no clear specification in the statistics. However, 
the data at least provides us an idea of their total number.
S.I. Golotik and V.V. Minaev, Hacenenue u ejtacmb. 0>iepKU denoepatpukecKOu ucmopuu CCCP 1930-x eodoe, 
Moscow, 2004, p. 115.
Lewin, 1985, p. 129.
Golotik and Minaev, 2004, p. 115.
** V.V.Luneev, npeemynnoemb XXeexa. Mupoeou KpuMUHOJiukecKuu oHaivs, Moscow 1997, p, 180 (Table 1).
V.P. Popov, TocyiiapcTBeHHwii teppop b coBcrcKofi Pocchhio 1923-1953 rr. (hctoshhkm h kx HHTepnpcraia«)' 
pp. 20-31 OmeHecmeeHHbte apxuevi, 1992, Volume 2, p. 28 (Table 3).
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TTie question is how many o f the dekulakised were children: rural children in general comprised 
approximately 38% o f  the total population, a number which appears to correspond to the average 
“kulak” family. Based on the figures o f  Davies, Wheatcroft and Lewin, kulak children must have 
comprised between 1.52 and 2.3 million (38% o f 4-6 million individuals).
Table 6: Estimation of proportion o f kulak and age distribution for the whole dekulakisation
process
Total number o f  Kulak’s Children (approximately 38%)
According to Lewin (before 5 - 6  million 1 .9 -2 .3  million
deportation)
According to Davies and 5.1 - 5 .8  million 2 -  2.3 million
Wheatcroft
(Sources: Lewin, 1985, p. 129; Davies and Wheatcroft, 1994, p. 68)
Again it is important to recall that the first category kulaks suffered more, which may have had 
implications for their children. Yet it is also worth remembering that children o f both first and 
second category kulaks were treated more or less similarly by the Soviet authorities -  that is they 
were deported to the special settlements. The question to be pursued is therefore, how many kulak 
children were deported.
4.L3 Proportion o f  Kulak children in deportation
When the resolution “On the Measures for the Liquidation o f Kulak Households in Districts of 
Comprehensive Collectivisation” was adopted by the Politburo, estimates for families to be 
deported to the sparsely populated areas o f  the Soviet Union were given. It was established that
70.000 families were to be deported to the Northern Regions o f  Russia -  that is near Arkhangelsk -
50.000 to Siberia, 20-25,000 to Ural and 20-25,000 to Kazakhstan. If we accept that an average 
kulak family comprised 4 - 5  individuals, the Politburo, in other words, ordered the deportation of 
between 736,000 and 782,000 individuals (adults as well as children).^’ Given that Davies and 
Wheatcroft above argued that 2.1 million were deported as either first or second category kulaks 
from 1930-32/33, it implies that roughly 1.618,000 must have been replaced after January 1930.**
V.P. Danilov et al, Tpazedw Coeemacou ffepeenu., moM 2, Moskva 2000, p. 127. 
** Davies and Wheatcroft, 1994, p. 68.
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In an OGPU report from 28 March 1930, elaborating on the situation in the area o f Arkhangelsk, 
we are told that 169,901 individual deportees arrived (that is 53% o f  the estimates from 30 January), 
o f which 54,447 were men, 51,967 women and 63,487 children. M en deported as kulaks, in other 
words, represented 32.1% of the deportees, women 30.5% and children 37.4%.*® Lynne Viola 
asserts that by 20 May 1930 this had risen to approximately 72,000 men, 70,000 women and 88,000 
children -  a total of 230,000 individuals or 46,500 deported families lived in Northern Russia by 
mid 1930. It is important to underline that the “kulaks” and their families also were deported to 
Western Siberia, the Urals and Kazakhstan, and hence Viola’s figures only give us an impression of 
the proportion o f children. It is relevant to note that the chairman o f the children commission o f the 
All-Soviet Central Executive Committee (DTK VTsIK), Savchenko on 9 July 1930 asserted that 
56,500 of the deportees living in the Urals were children younger than 16 years.^* Savchenko gives 
no precise information about the total number o f deportees in the Urals, and it is therefore difficult 
to compare it with Viola’s age distribution.
Sergei Krasilnikov asserts that by December 1932 229,078 individuals had been deported to the 
system of special settlement of Western Siberia, He distinguishes between the northern and the 
southern region; the northern region comprised the area surrounding the village o f Narym, and was 
located approximately 500 kilometres north o f the city of Tomsk. The southern regions were the 
areas surrounding Tomsk, Barnaul, Kuznetsk and other places. The largest proportion o f  settlers, 
that is 142,477 or 62.2%, lived in the northern areas. The remaining 86,601 or 37.8% were settled in 
the southern areas. Children younger than 12 years comprised 78,067 o f the total number o f  settlers 
(34.1%) and adolescents from 12 to 16 years 24,672 (10.7%). It is noteworthy that there was a 
regional difference, meaning that the number o f children in the northern region was comparatively 
larger than that o f the southern. In the northern region children yoimger than 12 years comprised 
51,780 of the 142,477 special settlers (36.3%), whereas the share for the same group in the southern 
regions was 26,287 o f  the 86,601 settlers (30.4%). For adolescents between 12 and 16 years the 
distribution for the northern region was 16,626 (11.7%) and for the southern 8,046 (9.3%). The 
regional differences become clearer, when we include the number o f  men and women older than 16 
years. For the West Siberian region as a whole men older than 16 years comprised 63,277 (27.6%) 
and women 63,062 (27.5%). For the northern region it was respectively 34,915 (24.5%) and 39,156
Danilov, 2000, p. 345.
^  Lynne Viola, “ ’Tear the Evil From the Roots: The Children of the Spetspereselentsy of the North,” Natalia 
Baschmakoff and Paul Fryer (eds.), "Modernisation o f the Russian Provinces”, special edition of Studia Slavica 
Finlandensia, volume XVII, Helsinki, 2000 p. 36.
S.S. Vilenskii et aI.,2fcOTK ryjIATa 1918-1956, Moskva 2002, p. 86.
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(27.5%), whereas in the southern part it was 28,362 (32.8%) and 23,906 (27.6%). Children younger 
than 12 years comprised by far the largest group o f the total number o f special settlers, however, the 
number o f men was comparatively larger in the southern region.
The above estimations show that the deportation o f Iculaks also meant the forceful removal of a 
substantial number o f  children. A considerable number remained with their deported parents or in 
the orphanages o f the special settlement as late as 1932. There were also more children removed 
than men. And, the composition of a  family in deportation was akin to that o f families in rural areas 
in general (children comprised approximately 40%). In Krasilnikov’s work we can furthermore 
detect an interesting aspect, namely that the number of children was larger in the northern region of 
Western Siberia. Although we should be careful about this assessment, since children were still a 
significantly large group o f deportees in the southern region, it indicates that more babies were bom 
in the settlements o f  the northern regions -  at the very least the number o f women and children 
younger than 12 years was remarkably larger here than in the southern region. It also indicates that 
more men were settled in this region, which could imply that the first category “kulaks” primarily 
lived in this part o f the oblast -  the most dangerous “kulaks” were settled closer to the political 
centre, the city of Tomsk, in order for the authorities to keep a closer eye on them.
The initial order o f OGPU from January 1930 issued that between 736,000 and 782,000 had to be 
deported, yet the above numbers from Northern Russia and Western Siberia only amount to 
approximately 450,000. This number is evidently much smaller than the initial quota, which may be 
because the remaining deportees were sent to either the Urals or Kazakhstan. Yet this cannot 
explain everything, as the aforementioned total figure for deported kulak families from 1930-32/33 
according to Davies and Wheatcroft was 2.1 million. The above numbers are incomplete, and 
primarily serve the purpose to provide us an idea of the proportion between adults and children in 
the special settlements. Also it is important to underline that the demographic situation in the 
system of the special settlements was never static. This makes it difficult to present a precise picture 
of the situation. There was, in other words, an enormous movement o f people to and from the 
settlements, and the numbers vary from year to  year.
The death firequency, as will be revealed, was particularly high by the beginning of the 1930s, and 
the proportion o f deportees would drop as a  consequence. It is also important to remember that 
some special settlers were returned to their places of origin as “wrongly deported”. Children in 
particular were sent back in the initial phase, but also third category kulaks. In 1934/35 a substantial
Seigei Krasilnikov, Cepn umojiox. KpecmhRHCKOii ccbuiKo e sanadnou Cu6upu e 1930-e, Moscow 2003, p. 171.
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number of those previously dekulakised were released as part o f so-call amnesty campaigns.^ Some 
deported kulak settlers escaped from the special settlements throughout this period, o f which some 
were recaptured and returned to the system. Furthennore the number o f  special settlers was affected 
by newborns and newly deported arriving throughout the 1930s. The motion o f people can be 
exemplified by the development of Narym krai. During the spring and summer o f 1930 28,400 were 
deported to the region, but there is no information about the total numbers living in the settlements 
at that point. However, by 1 June 1931 the total figure for the special kulak settlers grew to 50,687. 
The primary explanation to this rise was the launching of the second wave of dekulakisation by 
autumn 1930. By September 1931 more than 215,261 lived in the settlements o f Narym, but this 
number dropped to 182,298 in June 1932. The situation \vas, in other words, intense, as 
approximately 200,000 people would be sent to Narym from 1930 to September 1931, and another
30,000 would leave again during the short period from September 1931 to June 1932. It is difficult 
to give a precise picture o f  the movement from September 1931 to June 1932, as the numbers are 
incomplete; however, Krasilnikov asserts that the balance between “incoming” and “leaving” in this 
period would be approximately minus 45,000.^^
The statistic for Narym krai additionally shows from June 1931 to May 1932, a total o f  3,841 
newborns; 7,721 returned fugitives; 25,213 deaths; 27,178 fugitives and 10,669 returned from the 
special settlements to their place o f origin. The figures for fugitives are unclear, as they do not 
specify whether the recaptured fugitives are included in this number.^^
Table 7; Development in Naryms Krai from June 1931 to May 1932
Newborns 3,841
Returned Fugitives 7,721
Deaths 25,213
Fugitives 27,178
Returned from the special settlements to place 
o f  origin
10,669
(source: Krasilnikov, 2003, p. 161)
“  David Shearer, "Social Disorder, Mass Repression and the NKVD during the 1930s” pp. 85-117 in Barry 
McLoughlin and Kevin McDermett, Stalin's Terror. High Politics and Mass Repression in the Soviet Union., London 
2003, p. 106.
Krasilnikov. 2003, pp. 160-161.
“  Ibid.p. 161.
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This movement o f people is important, as it evidently had an immense impact on the situation of 
deported children ~  either because they experienced the inhuman transportation, were returned to 
their relatives, died from exhaustion, lost members o f their families due to the high death frequency 
or were raised as newborns in the settlements. The development is furthermore important, as it 
implies that the proportion between adults and children in the special settlements could vary, 
depending on which period we analyse. It would therefore also be worth examining the situation of 
children in the special settlements on a longer term.
4.1 À  The situation o f  deported children by 1941
Vladimir Zemskov has analysed the situation in the system o f  special kulak settlements by October 
1941 -  that is 111^ year after dekulakisation was launched. He works on the development of 35 
different republics, autonomous republics, oblasts and krai, and consequently provides a complete 
picture o f the age distribution -  which is worth examining for understanding the situation of 
deported children by 1941. The region with the highest number of deported “kulaks” was 
Kazakhstan, with 175,788 so-call special settlers (adults as well as children). Children younger than 
16 years comprised 70,605 (40%). A similar distribution may be detected in Novosibirsk oblast, 
which had the second largest contingent o f  deportees, where children younger than 16 years 
comprised 76,751 o f  the total 170,645 (44.9%). In Sverdlovsk oblast children and adolescents 
younger than 16 years comprised 35,246 o f  the total 86,640 settlers (40.6%). In Arkhangelsk 
children younger than 16 years comprised 11,397 o f the total 33,660 (33.8%).^®
Zemskov’s age distribution for o f all 35 republics, autonomous republics, oblasts and krai implies 
that children yotmger than 16 years comprised 378,877 o f the total 936,547 deported kulaks 
(40.4%).We can conclude that even if  the number o f deported kulak families dropped throughout 
the 1930s (for example in Arkhangelsk it  is significant that the total number of individuals dropped 
from 230,000 to 33,660 from 1930 to 1941), the number of children in deportation remained ver>' 
high. It is also noteworthy that the number o f  children was even higher than the group traditionally 
considered to be the primary enemy o f the Soviet state and thus the main target o f the repressive 
dekulakisation policy -  namely adult men or the head o f  the household. This remains a fact even in 
1941, when men, or the designated “kulaks”, comprised 272,473 o f the total 936,547 deportees j 
(29.1%), which is significantly lower than the number o f children.^’ This is, o f course, due to the j 
fact that a family comprised 1 adult father and approximately 2-3 children -  there were by nature j
V.N. Zemskov, CneiinepecejieHifu e CCCP 1930-1960, Moscow 2005, pp. 98-99 (Table 19). 
^ Ib id .
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more children than men. Also it mtist be recalled that NKVD issued Order No 00447 in 1937, 
which must have had a  devastating impact on some of the adult men in deportation.
What the table also reveals is that despite the ending o f the dekulakisation in 1932, the system of 
special settlements remained in existence until the 1940s, and was widespread in various parts of 
the Soviet Union. The settlements were not just concentrated in the initial four regions o f  Northern 
Russia, Siberia, Urals and Kazakhstan, Other regions, such as the Leningrad Oblast and Ukraine, 
also had settlements for deported “kulaks”. It is also important that almost one million people still 
lived in the settlements in 1941, and that children younger than 16 years remained to comprise 40% 
in the system of settlements.
T able  8: Age distribution among deported kulaks in October 1941 and geographical distribution of
the settlements
Oblast, Krai or 
republic
Total
number
of
deportees
Men Women Adolescents 
14-16 years
Children younger than 
14 years
1 Kazakhstan SSR 175,788 51,472 53,711 16,835 53,770
2 Novosibirsk
oblast
170,645 45,071 48,823 13,592 63,159
3 Sverdlovsk oblast 86,640 24,517 26,877 6,283 28,963
4 Molotovsk oblast 71,793 21,350 23,885 4,215 22,343
5 Krasnoyarsk
oblast
48,308 14,135 15,372 4,185 14,616
6 Chelyabinsk
oblast
45,475 13,055 13,045 4,470 14,905
7 Ordzhonikidzev
oblast 43,360 11,844 12,415 3,562 15,539
8 Omsk oblast 35,593 9,055 10,870 2,400 13,268
9 Arkhangelsk
oblast
33,660 11,556 10,707 2,116 9,281
10 Karel-Finish SSR 29,619 10,137 9,298 2,774 7,410
11 Irkustsk oblast 28,165 8,237 9,085 1,837 9,006
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12 Khabarovsk krai 25,376 7,976 7,861 1,429 8,110
13 Chitinsk oblast 23,152 7,214 6,977 1,378 7,585
14 Komi ASSR 17,809 5,493 5,498 1,362 5,456
15 Murmansk oblast 14,483 4,881 5,220 866 3,515
16 Uzbek SSR 11,784 3,840 3,086 571 4,287
17 Bashkirsk ASSR 11,144 3,112 2,819 746 4,467
18 Vologodsk oblast 9,880 3,331 3,136 823 2,590
19 Kirovsk oblast 8,514 2,795 2,497 493 2,729
20 Tadzhiksk SSR 8,423 2,567 2,842 779 2,235
21 Kirgizsk SSR 7,355 1,968 2,022 687 2,678
22 Ukrainsk SSR 6,490 1,404 1,801 379 2,906
23 Yarkutsk SSR 3,461 1,386 1,007 173 895
24 Leningradsk
oblast
2,973 983 1,100 197 693
25 Altai krai 2,815 890 1,030 235 660
26 Kuibyshev oblast. 2,709 751 752 204 1,002
27 Stalingrad oblast 2,419 719 807 165 728
28 Chkalovsk oblast 2,257 698 721 162 676
29 Buriat-Mongolian
ASSR
1,663 554 500 92 517
30 Vorkutlag NKVD 1,607 457 512 55 583
31 Kalmytskaya
ASSR
1,005 258 353 75 319
32 Primorskii krai 1,002 310 267 56 369
33 Kombinat
“SevnikeP”
NKVD
876 260 240 76 300
34 Severo-
Ostinskaya ASSR
158 90 35 10 23
35 N oril’lagNKVD 147 107 26 1 13
Total 936,547 272,473 285,197 73,280 305,597
(Source: Zemskov, 2005, pp. 98-99)
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4.2 Life in the special settlements
4.2.1 Expropriation o f  kulak households and deportation
Having established the proportion o f  kulak children living in deportation from 1930 to 1941, we w ll 
move on to discuss their living conditions. The liquidation o f all kulak households automatically 
implied the banishment o f whole families from their villages o f origin. Various personal accounts, 
from activists and others assisting the Soviet regime, explain how the expropriation of the household 
was carried out. These accounts reveal an inhumanity, which shocked even people in charge o f the 
operations. Y. Maslevits, who was employed in the land division o f  a local Ukrainian administration 
by 1929/1930, was sent to the village o f Birky in the Poltava region in order to assist the initial phase 
o f dekulakisation. Regarding one specific kulak family Maslevits described: “Thus by the end of 
December all those destined to be dekulakised were driven out o f  the homes with the exception of 
Roman Yablonowsky who had six small children.’*^* Later we are told that Roman Yablonowsky’s 
family was: “[...] dispossessed and expelled, from their homes. The mother had a baby on her arm 
and two children, a little bigger, were holding on to her dress. The father led two children by the 
hand, and the eldest girl, behind, carried a bundle of clothing”.^  ^This family was like so many other 
dekulakised families in the village removed to temporary and improvised relocation facilities, such 
as huts, sheds, bams and confiscated church facilities, awaiting their future fate. Later these families 
were expelled by armed bands, the OGPU and the local militsia: ”[...]from their improvised 
dwelling and [taken] to a gathering point. Small children and old people, unable to walk, were put on 
wagons. Then a column was formed which moved sadly out o f Birky A former Komsomol
member Galina Zatmilova remembers that I saw dekulakisation and collectivisation with my 
own eye. It left a  terrible impression [...] Those crowds of people driven out of their homes, the wild 
howling o f the women, and the wailing o f the children, were so awful that I did not recover for long 
after.”^^  The Soviet state turned the worst case scenario into a reality by insisting on a merciless 
handling o f the policy o f dekulakisation. Entire families were expelled from their homes, 
dehumanised and degradated by the regime, the local authorities and their former neighbours. Moshe 
Lewin has in his classical work on the first winter of collectivisation argued that the central
^  Y. Maslevits, “Collectivisation and “kurkuP liquidation" pp, 187-191, in S.O. Pidhainy et al (eds.), The Black Deads 
o f the Kremlin. A White Book, Vol. 7. Book o f  Testimonies, Toronto 1953 p. 188.
^^Ibid.,pp. 189-190.
’“ lbid.,p. 190.
Galina Zatmilov ”A Part o f History” pp. 171-178 in Simeon Vilensky (ed.) Till hfy Tale is Told. Women's Memoirs o f  
the GULAG, Indiana 1999 p. 173.
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government did everything in its power to turn the dekulakisation campaign into a predaton 
expedition.^^
The expropriation o f the kulak households was only the first step in a long trajectory to an 
uncertain future. The second step would be deportation o f  the first and second category kulaks and 
their families, which was accompanied by enormous human privation — including an immense 
neglect o f children. This started as soon as the families were removed from their homes and 
deported into the wilderness. The “not harsh” treatment, as the OGPU termed these 
transportations, was described in a complaint from a  deported kulak to the political Red Cross 
during 1930. The letter was forwarded to the OGPU on 8 August 1930, and detailed a specific trip 
in a cargo train from Sevastopol in Ukraine via Moscow and Sverdlovsk in the Urals to 
Nadezhdinsk. The trip was undertaken from 26 March to 4 April 1930, and the complaint read:
They loaded only part of the luggage; the rest was left behind in Sevastopol or lost 
There were forty to forty-two people in each car. [We] were let to go to the toilet no 
more than four or five times, irregularly and without regards to sex. A t other times, 
people had to  use buckets. They gave free bread in  Sevastopol upon departure. Later 
it was possible to buy some more at the stations. As a rule, drinking water was scarce. 
We often spent a whole day without water. Children suffered from thirst the m ost We 
received hot food three times in ten days, twice at night and once during the day, 
when they filmed us.
In Nadezhdinsk the receiving officers were particularly rude. The air was filled with
profanity: they pushed and hit people, men and women alike. This was in sharp 
contrast with the polite behaviour in Massandra and during our train ioumev to
Nadezhdinsk.
We were then put on a narrow-gauge train, from Nadezhdinsk to Sosva. Two cars, 
loaded mostly with flour, as well as fats, dry fimit, etc., were not reloaded onto the 
narrow-gauge train. It is unclear who disposed o f  them or how they did it. The cargo 
consisted o f  the confiscated property o f the settlers. We travelled thirty-two 
kilometres on a narrow-gauge track to Pospelkovo, where we immediately stepped off 
into the snow but were forbidden to enter the station to warm up. People spent three
days and nights in the snow, in the -12° C cold, including children, many o f whom
Moshe Lewin, Russian Peasants and Soviet Power. A Study o f  Collectivization The social, political and ideological 
problems o f  a society in the throes o f  a gyeai transformation London 1968 p. 488.
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were barefoot. Children formed at least 40 percent o f the entire mass of people. For 
three days officials did not show up. except for one warden. We received neither hot 
water nor bread for three davs.
It took three days to transport the luggage to the villages, and only the old women 
were allowed to ride. Often children under seven walked in the snow u p  to their knees 
and in the -15° C cold through the night. [„ .]
(Source: Oleg V. Khlevniuk, The History o f  the GULAG. From Collectivization to the Great Terror^
Yale University 2004, pp. 14-15. My underlining MK)
TTie striking thing about this complaint, which also reveals significant elements about the nature of 
the deportation, is that the “not harsh” conditions described in the secret report o f the OGPU firom 
February 1930 did not correspond to the reality imder which these transportations was taken: 
everything was lacking, including heat, hot water, food and basic sanitary requirements. Only once 
was hot food served during the day, and this was because of the recording o f a propaganda film 
supporting the official view of the “not harsh” nature of these transportations.
It might be argued that Maslevits’ account o f the expropriation o f  kulak households and this 
written complaint about the circumstances during the deportation only represents specific 
incidents, and thus that they are not representative o f the nature o f  these deportations. Other 
sources, such as German eyewitness accounts, however, suggest that the high mortality, hunger 
and disease -  especially among children -  generally were significant on these trips.^^ Lynne Viola 
has established that the nature of the transports was akin to that described in the above letter. The 
deportees usually arrived in numbered train wagons at a regional centre -  often one o f the larger 
towns, such as Arkhangelsk in Northern Russia, or Tomsk in Western Siberia. The first deportees 
arrived in February 1930, when the temperatures were below zero. What was characteristic about 
this, according to Viola, was that there was no water on the trips, and rarely any hot water as the 
OGPU had promised. Food was meagre (in other words, the deportees starved), and money was 
taken away fi-om the deportees. Finally, a significant number o f the deportees became ill during the 
trip and the mortality rate was very high. Aside from the designated leader o f the deportees 
{starost) and his assistant, who were allowed to get off once a day in order to acquire food for 
themselves and the others, all deportees were forbidden to leave the train. All this had a 
devastating impact on the well-being of the transported: From one specific trip, o f 189 train 
wagons, we learn that 390 individuals (of which there were 173 children, 168 women and 49 men),
Stephan Merl Bauem unter Stalin. Die Formierung des sowjetischen Kolchossystems, I930~194f Berlin 1990 pp. 78- 
79.
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were removed from the trains because o f  illness* Furthermore, 58 people died (47 children, 10 men 
and 1 woman).^'^ Although this is based on incomplete numbers, the impression is that the trips 
were extremely hard.
That the conditions on the trains were inhuman, and often caused the death o f the deportees, 
became apparent even to the OGPU leadership in 1932-33. In a report from the head of the 
GULAG, M.D. Berman, to Yagoda on 8 May 1933 (concerning the trainloads o f  deported kulak 
families leaving Northern Caucasus) it was noted: “Every train [...] has remarkably high mortality 
and disease rates, mostly from typhoid fever and acute stomach diseases”. Concerning the death rate 
of deportees going to Siberia, it was established that “ ...m any died from exhaustion [on the 
t r i p s ] T h i s  implies that the human privation, as described in the aforementioned complaint of 
1930, was not exceptional. Berman’s reflection in fact suggests that the horrible conditions on the 
trains were widespread and continued to be so throughout the whole dekulakisation process. Also it 
implies that even hardliners in the Soviet regime at some point were concerned about this fact. This 
point can also be justified from the directions from Yagoda to  Evdokimov, added in the margins to 
Berman’s reports, which asserts: “I w ill be forced to stop receiving [trainloads] if  you do not 
urgently improve the situation with transportation”.^  ^ It should be noted that such concern was not 
necessarily a sign o f humanitarianism, as both Berman and Yagoda had other practical matters to 
think about -  such as securing a  workforce to the forced labour economy of the special settlements. 
It was a demanding task for the OGPU to rectify the situation o f the transports, and they were not 
interested in using uimecessary resources on securing food supplies to the exhausted and sick 
deportees. Hence it could also be seen as a way to disclaim any responsibility of the situation, and 
instead put pressure on other people and institutions and expect them to solve it.
Viola places the blame for these conditions with the OGPU; however, rather than placing the 
liability at the top o f  the command structure, that is on Yagoda, Berman and others, she explains it 
as a result of the actions of those local GPU officials who were in charge o f the transports. It was 
termed as “criminal neglect”, since these apparatchiki often sent deportees to their destination 
poorly dressed and completely unprepared.^^ The question is to what extent the leadership of the 
OGPU can be acquitted from this neglect o f human lives -  was this vast degrading treatment of
Lynne Viola *” Tear the Evil from the Roots: The Children o f the Spetsperesenlentsy of the North” in Natalia 
Baschmakoff and Paul Fryer (eds.) “Modernisation o f the Russian Provinces” (special edition of Studia Slacvica 
Finlandesia, Volume XVII) Helsinki 2000 p 39.
Khlevniuk, 2004, p. 69.
Ibid., p. 69.
’^ ibid, p. 39.
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designated kulaks and their families only caused by disobedient low-level officials? It is always 
easier to place the responsibility of those being placed on the floor -  that is of those who directly 
carried out the issued order. It also is more convenient to ascribe the catastrophe to an individual 
“criminal neglect”, rather than the system in general. It is evident that the “criminal neglect” o f 
individual GPU officers reflects the nature o f Soviet society during this specific period. The 
Politburo, which authorised the dekulakisation, bore the main responsibility for the policy and the 
manner in which it was implemented. Of course, OGPU officers could have allowed children 
warmer clothes, to have supplied them with water, food, blankets and medicine, and some did. On 
the micro-level, that is at each cargo train, each temporary reloading location, and each individual 
construction site o f special settlements, things could have been very different, provided there had 
been more resources and time.
At the same time it is evident that such dehumanisation could not have occurred without some 
sort o f  approval or, at least, acceptance from the central leadership o f Moscow. The structure and 
choices o f the Soviet leadership accumulated the development and made it possible to actually 
deport and exile innocent groups, such as kulak children, and dehumanise them completely. The 
action and neglect o f individuals was an abnormal situation, caused by the political development of 
the Soviet Union during the 1930s.^* The consequences for the OGPU officials o f mistreating the 
deportees, including children, were minimal. Hence, the nature o f the deportation, and by that the 
responsibility o f the massive neglect was a correlation of indiridual action and institutional policy.
4,2.2 The placement o f  deported kulaks
The deported kulaks and their families were placed in some of the most deserted and isolated parts 
o f  the Soviet Union, which made it difficult to get there.^^ The settlers, as the deportees were termed, 
had their official label changed throughout the 1930s: from 1929 until 1934 they were 
“spetspereselentsy”(special settlers), which changed to “trudposelentsy” (working settlers) from 
1934 until 1944, when it was changed back to “spetspereselentsy”, and in 1949 it was changed to 
“spetsposelentsy”.^ ® It is worth mentioning that these stigmas were synonymous with each other. It is 
also necessary to note that the nature o f the settlers changed from the beginning o f the 1930s to the 
mid 1940s. Initially the deportees were mainly social outcasts, but by the autumn o f 1935, when 
Finns living in the Soviet Union were displaced from Leningrad Oblast, more and more ethnical and
Stephen Wheatcroft, “The Scale and Nature of German o f Soviet Repression and Mass Killings, 1930-1945” pp. 
1319-1353 \nEitrope-Asia Studiesj Voi. 48, No. 8,1996, p. 1335.
Vladimir Zemskov, Cneiptepece/ieNtfbt e CCCP1930-1960^ Moscow 2005, p. 4.
^  Ibid, 2005, p. 18.
national groups were subject to this discrimination. This escalated during the Second World War, 
when the Volga Germans were banished from their home region in 1941, and later in 1944 whenth; 
Crimea Tartars and other national groups from the Caucasus became victims o f this repression.' 
Since we are analysing the fate of kulak children in the present thesis, we shall only address the 
development o f the social deportees, although this should not be read as an argument of 
differentiation.
The special settlement administration — the '‘'‘komendaturct'' — was chaired by a commandant who 
was appointed by the administrative leadership o f the krai with consent o f the raiispoîkom  (the 
executive committee of the raion) and the OGPU. The commandant subsequently reported to the 
local administrative leadership o f  the region, at raion as well as krai level, and to the OGPU. On 2 
August 1930 it was specified that the commandant o f the komendatura possessed the same legal 
rights as the executive committee o f  the raion. The commandant was furthermore assisted in 
carrying out his work by a police officer for every 50 families. In August 1930 it was clarified 
that the main purpose o f the komendatura was to administrate the financial, economic, social and 
cultural construction o f the settlements.“^  This included the registration of births, deaths and 
marriages of all settlers, which had to be reported to the komendatura within a specific period of 
time depending on how far they lived from the office building. Those living more than 20 
kilometres away were given 45 days to report births and 30 days to report deaths, whereas those 
who lived closer had 15 days and 3 days respectively.^^ It is important to specify that there was not 
just one commandant and one komendatura, but rather a series o f commandants and komendatury, 
acting as administrators over extensive settlements and settlers. Within Narym krai, located 
approximately 500 kilometres north o f  the city o f Tomsk, for example, there were seven 
komendatury: Parabel, Vasyugan, Kusov, TeguTdet, Kolpashev, Parbig, and Aleksandrov.^
Ibid,pp. 76-78. p.93ff.
Sergei Krasilnikov, Cepn uMonax. KpecmhHHCKOH ccbuixa e sanadHou Cu6upu e 1930~e zodbi, Moscow 2003, p. 147. 
Lynne Viola, ’T h e  Other Archipelago: Kulak Deportations to the North in 1930” pp. 730-755in Slavic Review, 60/4, 
Winter 2001, p. 738.
^  S.A. Krasilnikov et a l,  CneifnepeceneHifbi e Sanadnou Cu6upu 1930-BecHa 1931, Novosibirsk 1992, p. 198.
V.P. Danilov and S.A. Krasilnikov, CnettnepecejteHifbi e SanadHOu Cu6upu Becna 1931-HOHOJto 1933, Novosibirsk 
1993, p. 130.
** Krasilnikov, 2003, pp. 216-238. In the appendix o f V.P, Danilov and S.A. Krasilnikov CneifnepeceneHybt e 3anadHOu 
Cudupu 1933-1938, Novosibirsk 1994, we find a map of these different komendatury.
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4.2.3 From temporary to permanent instalment
Vladimir Zemskov asserts that “the terms “deportation” and “special settlements” are not 
synon3mious* , implying that the nature o f these terminologies varies significantly. Even if  the 
living conditions during the deportation were extraordinarily bad and abnormal, everyday life in the 
special settlements may have been stabilised and even normalised at some point. The deported 
“kidaks” and their families were expected to constmct a new way o f  life in deportation. Officially, 
this was termed as a re-education, that is a way of socially transforming the kulaks into useful 
citizens o f the Soviet state. In a propagandistic analysis o f the dekulakisation process, it was 
established: “The basic mass of kulaks was moved to sparse regions o f the Western Krai o f Siberia, 
Kazakhstan and the Urals. They all received accommodation and work. Some were occupied in 
industries, others in agriculture. The Soviet government supported these former kulaks by giving 
them credits in order for them to build houses, to help them procure horses and other necessary 
equipment [...] Agronomist, doctors and teachers were sent to the settlements o f the former
¿ftkulaks”. From this point o f view there was nothing wrong with life in the special settlements, even 
if the initial phase had been harsh; all the Soviet government did was to assist their enemies in a 
process o f transforming them into better people. Hence the modernisation o f the Soviet Union and 
colonisation of Siberia, which involved a massive replacement of human beings to the wilderness of 
the country, was considered to be a scientific assignment: human behaviour could, like a machine, 
be changed if moderated according to the plan. This led leading Stalinists to believe that people 
were cogs in the machinery, which became particularly obvious in the use o f the Russian term 
'‘’‘BunmuKiT (Vintiki) when characterising Soviet citizens.
It is apparent that the Soviet regime believed that human beings, through the right re-education 
and upbringing, could be “nationalised” and consequently become an asset o f the state. Human 
beings were, from the perspective o f the Soviet government, not subjects but objects without 
feelings and emotional relations to other human beings. The consequences o f such notions were 
described in a letter o f a deported “kulak” living in Kotlas addressed to Mikhail I. Kalinin also in 
1930:
[...] In every barrack [of the special kulak settlement] more than two hundred
souls live. It is terribly crowded [...] In the daytime it is packed in the space
Zemskov, 2005, p. 3.
** A.P. Finarov, ”K Bonpocy o jiracBunauKH Kyjia^ ecTBa Kax KJiacca h cyai>6e 6tiBmHx icyjiaKOB b CCCP” in Mcmopm 
CoeemcKoeo KpecmtJiHcmea u Kojaovtozo cmpoumejibcmea e CCCP Moscow 1968, pp. 276-277.
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between the plank beds, and at night people lay on the plaiik beds close to 
each other packed like sardines. Many can’t find a place on the plank beds, 
and they sit on the earth floor. Three iron stoves can’t heat these barracks as 
they ought to, even more so because there is a great shortage o f firewood. 
People cover themselves in clothes, sand falls from the roof, there is a lack o f 
bed linen and warm clothing, there is nothing to wash clothes in; People are 
eaten up by parasites. The food is bad, the hard oat biscuits are coming to an 
end, and in many cases the bread is not sufficient. People are cooking outside 
in the frost and windy weather. During the day, when the sun is wann and 
begins to thaw the ground around the camp, a smell rises from the decaying 
waste. The only well can’t supply the whole camp with water; for this is used 
a brook in which the water is sometimes so dirty that tea made on it tastes o f 
soap and dirty laundering. Several people are buried each day at the cemetery. 
The people, who are not used to the climate, some o f them very poorly 
dressed, often catch cold and becom e ill. Infection with contagious diseases -  
typhoid fever, diphtheria -  have already broken out, there have already been 
cases o f fatalities due to the latter. This is all threatening to become an 
epidemic towards spring. But it is alright for now [...] Children rub shoulders 
to shoulders around the stoves, while they try to get as close as possible, 
pushing each other and getting burned by the hot iron. The whole barrack is 
full o f the screams and cries o f  children. It might very well be they were 
kulaks, even i f  many o f  them had a  position lower than the middle peasants 
{serednîaK). It might very well be they are harmful elements, even if many o f 
them arrived only because o f  the evil tongues of their neighbours. They are, 
nonetheless, human beings and not cattle, and their living conditions are even 
worse than those o f a decent peasant’s cattle. One should not pursue these 
people to this place o f  certain death. It would be better to exterminate them 
immediately. The state would have fewer worries, and these thousands o f 
unhappy people, whose fate is determined without their participation, would 
have the satisfaction o f  a quick death without starvation and illness. It may be 
that the fathers, mothers and grandparents are guilty, but for what reason do 
the children suffer!? Many teenagers were removed from schools, where they
no
studied and were brought up. And they live here without anything to do and 
without teaching [...] All in all; to leave these people for a long time under 
these conditions is monstrous (ssepcTBo) [...] All these people are already 
uneducated and backward, but here they completely turn into wild beasts. A  
man cannot remain a man under these circumstances [...]
(source: S.S. VUenskii iLdl^ffemuryJIATa I9Ì8-1956, Moscow 2002, pp. 80-81)
This picture is supported by several medical reports issued by Western Siberian authorities in the 
spring o f 1930. A report from Omsk dated 20 April 1930 and written by the leading assistant doctor 
o f a local settlement states: “I inform you as leader that at the present time children o f all ages are in 
the worst state. Regarding nourishments, let us take those from two months to 7 years: there is no 
milk, no meat or sugar, no cod-liver oil and no oatmeal. Bread is insufficient [ . . . ] !  previously wrote 
for you to send at least some sugar or some oatmeal, some of the infants don’t suckle or there is no 
milk left in their mother’s breasts, so the child is left with nothing but water. Stomach and intestinal 
diseases are furiously ravaging the children, due to their starving mothers”.^  ^ A similar picture 
emerges from a report issued by a medical assistance point in the Ust’-Iagiliaskii region on 31 May 
1930; recently the disease level has increased, the diseases axe most of all progressive, people 
o f all ages, adults and children, are suffering from swollen bodies, gory diarrhoea, penetrated by 
pain in the stomach, catarrh, common diarrhoea, constipation, swollen stomachs and inflamed 
abdomens, children are swollen and dying from malnutrition” .^ ® Finally, a secret medical report 
from Tomsk, issued on 18 December 1930 establishes: “In the barracks of the camp ‘Tomsk-T 14 
children died during the night o f 18/XII [...] In the camp of ‘Tomsk-1’ there is only one doctor, 
covering several positions at once, for almost 6000 special settlers [spetspereselentsy]^ living 
extraordinarily packed and unsanitary conditions. Since the mothers are hiding their ill children, it is 
necessary to conduct a medical inspection o f  the barracks everyday, which one doctor, not even 
with a complete workload, is not capable o f doing.” ‘^
The question is whether these conditions changed during the 1930s, and if life varied significantly 
from the deportations to permanent placement in the special settlements. It is evident, from Viola’s 
analysis o f the situation of kulak children in the Northern region, that the level o f  epidemics.
V.P. Danilov and S.A.Krasitoikov, CnetfnepeHtfbt e SanadHOu Cu6upu 1930- eecna 193lz.y Novosibirsk 1992, p. 258 
and S.S. Vilenskii et al, JJemu ryjlATa 1918-1956  ^Moscow 2002, p. 89.
^  Danilov and Krasilnikov, 1992, p. 259 and Vilenskii cL al., 2002, p. 90.
Danilov and Krasilnikov, 1992, p. 267 and Vilenskii et al, 2002, pp. 87-88.
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mortality and hunger remained very high especially in the temporary instalments. The situatic 
was catastrophic by 1930-31, and the death rate very high. The settlements were in a chaoti 
situation, due to a fundamental lack o f basic things, such as housing, hospitals and other medic; 
services, a road system, railroads, and schools. Most of these settlements were placed in remot 
areas, and isolation made it even more difficult to maintain even the simplest o f  services. Hen« 
food and medical supplies were immensely difficult to maintain.
In a secret OGPU report about the situation in the 189 settlements o f the Northern regions o; 
Russia, it was established on 22 December 1930 that the total number of settlers, including children 
comprised 103,970. Of these 64,996 lived in barracks, and the remaining 38,974 were settled ii 
temporary huts. From information about the living conditions in the special settlements oi 
Western Siberia, obtained in July 1932, we leam that the average living space per person in the 
barracks was 2.2 m^. Moreover it was revealed that barracks constructed for one family (that is 4-6 
people), accommodated 2-3 families (that is, 12-18 people). Regarding nutrition among the settlers, 
the daily ration was adjusted as to whether they were “able bodied” or if  they belonged to the 
category o f nursing mothers, children and the elderly. The head o f the family (provided, of course, 
he was “able bodied”), received 17 kg o f flom, 3-4 kg of oatmeal and 1 kg o f sugar for himself and 
his family. There is no information regarding the interval for the distribution o f  such rations 
(whether it was daily, weekly or monthly), however, food was generally described as monotonous, 
low in calories and lacking in fat. There were no vegetables, meat arrived at the settlements 
irregularly, and the nutritional level was very poor. This is despite the fact that the supply situation 
to the Western Siberian settlements was considered to be better in 1932 than it had been in 1931.^ 
This says more about the supply situation in 1931 than about that in 1932: famine was, after all, 
tormenting the country already in the spring o f 1932.
Regarding the occupation o f the special settlers, we leam that o f those deported to Northern 
Russia in 1930, 23,623 were involved in the constmction o f  the settlements, whereas 6,000 were 
employed in the local timber industry. Another important task was the construction of 790 
kilometres o f roads linking the settlements together with each other, the komendatura and the local 
administrative centre o f the region. The timber and road work was extremely hard, due to the harsh 
terrain, and such circumstances -  combined with the poor food supply -  significantly augmented 
the death rate. The OGPU accounted for a total lost o f 21,214 dead during 1930, that is 20.4% of
Viola, ’Tear the evil...” 2000, pp, 42-43, and p. 46.
Danilov, 2000, p. 785.
^  V.P. Danilov and S.A. Krasilnikov, C/ jifnepecjneniioi e Sanadnou Cu6upu. Becna 1931-HaHOJto 1933z.^ Novosibirsk 
1993, pp. 229-230.
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the total 103,970 placed in the settlements of Northern Russia,^^ The share o f  children is not 
revealed in this statistic; however, in data from Western Siberia, it is possible to conclude that they 
comprised a significant proportion. The data is incomplete and covers July and August 1932. There 
is, however, no reason to believe that the situation of children should have worsened from 1930 to 
July and August 1932. In fact it should be the other way around, i f  the situation really improved in 
the settlements of Western Siberia -  as suggested in the report from July 1932. The statistic from 
Western Siberia, at the very least, provides an impression about the distribution o f mortality among 
adults and children.
Children younger than 16 years old comprised 333 of the total 1256 dead in Western Siberia by 
July 1932, with 274 o f the remaining deaths being adults -  there is no information about the ages 
distribution o f  the remaining 649 deaths. Assuming that the age distribution was not significantly 
different in this group o f deaths, children younger than 16 years old comprised approximately 55% 
o f the total mortality rate, A month later, in August 1932, 860 died in the regions, whereof 328 were 
below 16 years old, while 331 were above 16 .years old -  the age o f the remaining 201 is not 
elucidated. Children younger than 16 years old thus comprised 50% o f the total deaths.^® If we 
accept such distributions, it can also be asserted that o f  the 21,214 deaths in the settlements of 
Northern Russian in 1930, children quite possibly comprised approximately 50% -  that is 
approximately 10,000 dead children. Since children comprised 40% o f the total number o f settlers, 
that is approximately 41,588 children, it can be established that the infant mortality rate was 24%. 
The infant mortality rate was consequently slightly higher than the number o f deaths for the total 
number of settlers (adults as well as children).
Table 9: the demographic situation o f the special settlements o f Northern Rxissia by 1930
In numbers Death rate
Total Number of settlers 103,970
Number of children (that is 
40%)
41,588
Total o f deaths 21,214 20.4%
Infant mortality (that is 50%) 10,000 24%
(source: Danilov, 2000, p. 785)
”  Danilov, 2000, p. 785.
^  Danilov and Kiasilnikov, 1993, pp. 29-30.
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Zemskov elaborates thoroughly upon the demographic development o f the settlements and 
establishes that 381,173 families or 1,803,392 individuals were deported in 1930 and 1931. If the 
above death rate is correct, that is 20.4% o f  the total number o f  settlers died, it would imply that 
approximately 360,000 people (adults as well as children) died in the settlements in those two 
years. If this can be accepted it can furthermore be elaborated that approximately 184,000 children 
died in the first two years o f exile. There is no certain indication of this in the work of Zemskov, 
but what he does assert is that one o f the main explanations for the massive drop in the population 
o f the settlers from 1931 to 1932 was death. Zemskov asserts that the explanation of this decrease 
primarily was due to the working conditions of the settlers. He also calculates that 1,317,022 
individuals lived in the settlements by 1932, which implies a drop o f  approximately 486,000 
individuals. If  the main reason for this decrease was death, it would support the high number of 
approximately 360,000 victims during the first years o f 1930 and 1931.^^ We should also 
remember that the reduction from 1931 to 1932 was caused by fewer deportations, when the 
dekulakisation officially ended in 1932.^* Lynne Viola, nonetheless, accepts that the death-rate 
among deported kulaks was very high in 1930-1931, but argues that there appears to have been a 
slight drop in 1931, although this intensified in 1932/33 because o f the famine.^^ This is supported 
by the data o f Zemskov; 1,317,022 individuals were placed in the settlements by 1932, of whom 
89,754 died (6.8 %). The death-rate, however, rose significantly in 1933 when 151,601 died out o f 
the total 1,142,082 settlers (13.3%). The main explanation for this rise was starvation and illness 
caused primarily by the famine. However, in 1934 the death-rate once more dropped, as the dead 
comprised 40,012 o f the total 1,072,546 settlers (3.7%). In 1935 the number o f dead comprised 
22,173 o f  the total 973,693 settlers (2.3%), and in 1936 there is a  rise in the number of deportees to 
1,017,133 individuals. The proportion o f  dead dropped that year to 19.891 (1.9%).^®
There is no certain explanation for the increase in the number of deportees in 1936, even if  
arrests following the commencement o f the Great Terror is a  possible answer. However, if this was 
the only reason, it is still difficult to explain the drop to 916,787 settlers in 1937, when political 
terror was intensified and the new round up o f former kulaks and criminal elements followed 
Order No. 00447. What is noteworthy in 1937 was that the number o f  dead comprised 17,037 
(1.8%), which does not imply a worsening but rather a stabilisation in the death-rate in comparison 
with the previous years. This continued in 1938 when the dead comprised 16,961 of the total
Zemskov, 2005, pp. 16-21.
R.W. Davies and Stephen Wheatcroft, Years o f  Hunger^ London 2003, p. 47. 
Viola, ’T ear the evil...”, 2000, p. 50.
“  Zemskov, 2005, pp. 20-21.
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877,651 settlers (1.9%); in 1939 the distribution was 16,691 dead o f the total 938,522 (1.8%); and 
finally in 1940 it was 16,401 dead o f the total 997,513 deported kulaks and their families (1,6%).^^ 
Stephen Wheatcroft has established that while the forced labour force rose during the 1930s, 
implying that the rise must have appeared in another sector of the GULAG system than the special 
settlements, the living conditions of incarcerated people improved considerably from 1930 to 
1937/38 -  except for 1932/33, when famine also ravaged the settlements. The indicator of a 
stabilisation was that the mortality rate dropped.^^ And, a drop from 20.4% in 1930/31 to 1.6 -  
1.9% in 1936-1940 should be considered significant
Table 10 Death rate in the special settlements from 1932-40 (in thousand)
1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 Tota
Total 1.317 1.142 1.072 973 1.017 916 877 938 997
Deaths 89 151 40 22 19 17 15 16 16 38
Death 
in % 6.8 13.3 3.7 2.3 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.6
(Source; Vladimir Zemskov, Cnetfnepece/teHtfbi e CCCP 1930-1960, Moscow 2005, pp. 21-22 (Table 2))
Another indicator that a stabilisation o f the living conditions in the special settlements must have 
occurred by the mid-193 Os can be found in the rise o f the birth-rate especially from 1934-1935 
onwards. In 1932 18,053 newborn children were reported, and they comprised 1.4% o f the total 
number o f settlers. In 1933 the number o f newborn was 17,082 (1.5%); and in 1934 it was 14,033 
(1.3%). However, in 1935 this rose to 26,122 (2.6%), which in 1936 again increased to 27,617 
(2.7%). In 1937 the number of newborn rose additionally with a drop in the total number of 
settlers, implying that the proportion o f babies grew remarkably. Newborn babies comprised 
29,036 o f the total settlers (3.2%), and this development is difficult to explain as anything other 
than an indicator of a stabilisation o f the living conditions of the deported families living in the 
special settlements. 1937 was the year of the intensification of the Great Terror, however, this did 
not prevent the settlers from conceiving children -  to the contrary. A natural explanation to this is, 
o f course, that a pregnancy last 9 months and babies bom in 1936-37 may very well have been 
conceived before the terror reached its peak -  and maybe even before their parents were deported.
‘‘ Ib id , pp. 20-21.
“ Wheatcroft, 1996, p. 1331.
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Thus it may also be discussed whether the rise in the birth-rate alone can be explained as a sign of 
stabilisation. The development nevertheless continued in 1938, when the birth-rate rose to 31,867 
newborns (3.6%); in 1939 this was 33,716 (3.6%); and finally in 1940 32,732 (3.3%). While 
focussing on the rising birth-rate, indicating that the kulak families were returning to some sort of 
daily routine even though deported, it is important to mention that the total birth-rate of the 1930s 
would remain lower than the total death-rate, due to the catastrophic impact on the development of 
the first 4 years o f dekulakisation. The total number o f deaths firom 1932-40 was 389,521, while 
the newborn comprised 230,258.
Thus, the crude death rate (CDR) o f  the special settlements was significantly higher than the 
crude birth rate (CBR). Adding the numbers o f deaths from 1930-31, it can be established that 
approximately 749,000 people died during the 1930s. The rate o f  infant mortality is not revealed in 
this calculation, but they may have comprised approximately 50% of this number during the first 
couple o f years. A  stabilisation, and even a  lowering o f the number of infant deaths, occurred by 
the mid-1930s. It is remarkable that a  high proportion o f total deaths appeared in the period when 
the dekulakisation policy was most intense -  that is from 1930 to 1932/33. The impact of this 
period was so damaging to the “kulaks” that even if  the birth-rate overtook the death-rate by 1935- 
36 it was never able to transform the development into a positive demographic situation. 
Regardless of the exact numbers of deaths directly caused by dekulakisation, it can be established 
that while the living conditions assumingly were stabilising by the mid-1930s, the demographic 
development in this particular sector o f  society was generally negative. This is supported by the 
fact that whereas the input in the settlements, that is newborns, newly deported, and returning of 
fugitives, comprised 2,176,600 from 1932-40, the output, that is deaths, escaping, returning of 
wrongly deported, and people being moved to other sectors o f the GULAG (most notably the 
concentration camps), comprised 2,563,401. Those dying, escaping and being moved comprised 
the biggest number o f the “outputs”. This would support the idea that the negative demographic 
development o f the special settlements was primarily caused by the living conditions in this sector 
-  it was a direct result o f the dekulakisation policy. It is crucial to remember that the low number 
o f incomers from 1932-40 can also be explained as an outcome o f fewer deportations by the mid- 
1930s. This gives the demographic drop a different character.^^
63 Zemskov, 2005, pp. 20-21.
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Table 11: Birth rate and demographic development in the special settlements from 1932-40 (in
thousands)
1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 Tot
Input 201 398 254 246 164 128 424 220 137 2 ,i:
Births 18 17 14 26 27 29 31 33 32 2:
Birth
in %
1.4 1.3 1.5 2.6 2.7 3.2 3.6 3.6 3.3
Output 376 467 353 202 265 167 363 161 204 2.56
(Source: Zemskov, 2005, pp. 21-22 (Table 2))
4.2.4 Plans and Reality
Although living conditions stabilised by 1935, the nature of such stabilisation should be discussed 
more thoroughly. How did the Soviet authorities respond to the demographic situation o f the 
settlements? That the situation o f settlements was dramatic became evident for the Soviet 
authorities at a very early stage. The local health authorities in the Narym region o f Tomsk Oblast 
submitted statistics on the development o f  diseases for each month in 1932-33. Twelve different 
types o f  epidemics are recorded in this period, but three were more significant: typhoid fever, 
malaria and influenza. Illness was common, but it is also significant that the diseases were caused 
by natural conditions -  even if they were by-product of a political repression. Since the settlements 
o f Western Siberia were located in the Taiga and Tundra, they were affected by the presence of 
mosquitoes, which intensified the rate o f  malaria. In the final three months o f  1932, 358 people 
suffered from typhoid fever, 1181 from malaria, and 172 from influenza.^ The development 
continued the following years, and grew dramatically in Jime 1933 when 336 had typhoid fever, 
1461 malaria, and 382 influenza.®^ In the months that follow, July to December 1933, the reports 
are inconsistent, and there is not sufficient data on the level o f the epidemics. This could either 
imply that the authorities had gained control over the epidemics, or that the situation was chaotic. 
Based on the total numbers of diseases in 1933 -  published at the end of that year -  it is most 
likely that the health authorities at some point lost control of the situation in the region.^
The Soviet authorities were not indifferent towards this negative development, and discussed it at 
the highest level. In December 1931 the Politburo was increasingly concerned about the illnesses
GATO, f. r-590, op. 1, A 30,1.8.
“  GATO, f. r-590, op. 1, A 31,1. 169.
^  IbiA 11. 198,237,274,275,309,344,377,413.
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in the special settlements, and ordered the People’s Commissariat o f Health (NKZdrav) to 
intensify the medical effort; more doctors, nurses and medical equipment had to be sent to the 
settlements.^^ On 21 February 1932 the Council of People’s Commissariat (SNK) issued an order 
signed by V. Molotov and P. Kerzhentsev about the poor sanitary situation in the settlements. It 
established that the ambition was “To assume the necessary acceptance o f the decisive measures 
for improving the health situation in the districts {raion) o f special settlements, and to minimise the 
death, o f the children The SÎÎK subsequently elaborated on seven specific areas where all 
the relevant commissariats (the OGPU, the People’s Commissariat o f the Timber Industry, the 
People’s Commissariat o f  Trade, the People’s Commissariat o f Agriculture and the NKZdrav) 
were sent to assist in improving the sanitary situation in the special settlements.^* In relation to 
children it was specifically emphasised that:
To accept the necessity to organise in the coming six months supplementary 
nourishment o f the weakest underage children (up to eight years) firstly social 
nourishment in nurseries, preschool institutions, special children’s canteens and 
by direct hand-outs.
The organisation o f extra child nourishment is to be delegated to the consumer’s
cooperative [potrebkooperatsiia] in agreement with the health authorities [...] In
order to make the extra child nourishment cheaper, and to delegate the most
important necessities for free, it is to be suggested to the OGPU to give the
consumer’s cooperative subsidies from the sources of the OGPU taken from the
wages of the special settlers o f 1 million roubles in order to organise this matter.
(Source: V.P. Danilov and SA . Krasilnikov, CneifnepecejteHtfu e SanadHov Cuôupu. Becaa 1931- 
HcPiOJio 1933a., Novosibirsk 1993, p. 30)
Whether these initiatives improved the living conditions o f children shall be discussed further. We 
can recall that children younger than 15 years old comprised 526,800 (40% of 1.3 million) o f the 
total settlers in 1932, which suggests that the SNK granted 1.89 roubles per child for this 
supplementary nourishment. Even if  the age limit was 8 years old, implying that the “social 
nourishment” was aimed at fewer children and thus that the personal contribution was higher, the
Adibekov, G.M. ”CneiuiepeceJieHin»r — »epraw «ciuionmoii KOJUieicTHBHsamiH». Ha aoKyMenroB «ocoôoii narocH» 
IloJiHTbiopo IfK BKn(6)” in McmopuHecKuû apxue. Volume 2, Number 4,1994, p. 175.
^  Danilov and Krasilnikov, 1993, p. 29-30.
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impression is that the resources set aside for this attempt “ ...to minimise the death, o f  the children 
[ ...]” was hopelessly inadequate. One might also ask why children from 8 to 15 years old were 
excluded from this special programme of nourishment: did they not qualify as victims?
The impression that the measures of the Soviet regime were insufficient and contradictory is 
supported by a report from July 1932 by leading medical officials o f the special settlements in the 
region surrounding Tomsk. This report established that the situation o f children as young as five to 
seven years old was critical. They were described as “apathetic”, “old looking”, “immobile”, 
“malnourished”, and “poorly clothed” This continued to be evident on 14 December 1932, when 
inspecting officers o f the OGPU and the local health organs checked the medical situation o f the 
special settlements in the same region. Initially, it was reported that the annual budget for the 
improvement o f the sanitary situation was the following:
Social insurance (sotsstrakhovanie)
Epidemic fund
Nurseries
Housing for mother and children 
Investment
307,265.00 roubles
13.601.00 roubles 
31,000.00 roubles
21.995.00 roubles
19.560.00 roubles
Total
(Source: GATO, t  r-590, op.I, delo 1,1.12)
393,421.00 roubles
It was also asserted by the inspecting team that there was no financial plan for medical staff, 
emphasising that the ambition of rectifying the sanitary situation was made difficult. Furthermore, it 
was stressed that there was a significant gap between the resources o f the budget and real needs. For 
example, it was established that the medical treatment in all komendatiay o f Western Siberia 
required a total o f 254,177 roubles -  resources which could not be found in the aimual budget of 
1932. Moreover, it was evident that the resources earmarked for epidemic treatments were much 
lower than the actual need, since instead o f  being a total o f 13,601 roubles needed it turned out that 
the authorities actually required 35,516 roubles. Finally there was no information about the financial 
situation o f the nurseries, or the special homes for mothers and children. It is reasonable to argue that 
these sectors were also neglected financially. Based on the conclusion o f this report it was
69 Ibid., 231-232.
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established that there was: 1) an incomplete allocation for medical staff; 2) no estimation for the 
requirements of 1932; 3) no financial plan for medical workers; 4) no budget for medical workers; 5)
'7Han incomplete financial estimation of actual needs. I f  the central authonties in Moscow had an 
ambition to rectify the living conditions in deportation, this was impeded by weak financial planning 
and imderfunding.
The problem o f finding resources became increasingly apparent in the relation between the 
authorities and the children. In December 1935 the West Siberian Children’s Commission 
{Detkomissi po zapsibkrai) sent a report to the chairman of the West Siberian Executive Committee 
of Soviets, about the living conditions in the local orphanages administrated by the NKVD. This 
would primarily be orphanages where kulak children were placed. The report was written three years 
after the Molotov-commission established that special resources were to be found in order to 
nimiinise the rate o f child morality among the deported. Living conditions had stabilised in the 
special settlements as such by 1935/36. Therefore, it could be expected that the living conditions of 
orphan kulak children improved considerably at this point. However, the report suggests that the 
situation o f kulak children remained extremely problematic. The main issue to be addressed w’as 
overcrowding in each orphanage. The number o f  homeless children {besprizornye) rose, and the 
orphanages of Western Siberia had to take in  a large number o f  children by 1935. There were not 
enough orphanages to handle this problem. The capacity o f the orphanages in Novosibirsk was 200 
children, however, by 1 December that year 494 children lived there. A similar picture can be found 
in Barnaul, where the capacity was 70 children, however, 128 children were homeless. Instead o f the 
facility o f 50 children in Stalinsk, 119 lived in the orphanages in this region. In Anzherke there were 
64 children instead o f the capacity o f 50. The Children’s Commission o f Western Siberia established 
that the capacity o f 1070 o f the whole region had been exceeded, and the real number of children 
placed in different orphanages was 1702. This overload would imply a significant lack of resources 
in public education of orphan kulak children.^^
The situation o f  these orphanages was chaotic. First o f all because there was no overview o f the 
situation: children came and left and no-one knew their exact whereabouts. The orphanages often 
lost contact with the children when they were moved to other facilities -  for example if they were 
placed with other families. Names of the regions where the children were sent, the names of the 
cities and new addresses were almost always lost. They only explanation attached to their personal 
files would be “sent out to parents”. This must suggest that a significant number o f orphan kulak
GATO, f. r-590, op.l, delo 1,11.12-13. 
”  GANO, f. r-895, op. 1, delo 184,1.35.
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children had run away from orphanages. Additionally, it was recorded that a significant number of 
children living in the orphanages suffered from illness. Of the sixteen school children living in an 
orphanage in Bamual only two were recorded as “healthy” the rest suffered from various diseases. 
Moreover, twenty-one pre-school children were recorded as “sick”. The problem was also intensified 
by the fact that there were no proper bathrooms, dormitories, and lavatories. Children often slept two 
or three together in the same bed, and the air in the dormitories was poor. Finally, there was no 
proper sanitary facilities, and everything, including trained medical staff, was lacking. There was a 
doctor, but no nurses or nursing auxiliaries. What is evident from this account is that the medical 
situation of orphan kulak children was extremely bad in 1935.
What is striking about this situation is that it appears to have been more permanent than one would 
expect, especially in light o f the fact that the living conditions had stabilised by 1935. This becomes 
even clearer following the development from 1935 to 1937, as the problems in the orphanages still 
appears to have been numerous. On 16 June 1937 The Children Commission o f Western Siberia 
{Detkomissii po Zapsibkrai) received a request from the head o f the Novoselovskii orphanage in the 
komendatura o f  Kolpashev raion, as there was an insufficient supply of resources reaching this 
orphanage. In the annual budget o f 1936 the orphanage was allocated 112,000 roubles from the 
komendatura, yet by Jime 1937, only 9000 roubles had arrived.’  ^ Not only was the orphanage 
underfinanced, but it was also the komendatura that was blocking the delivery o f finances. The 
komandatura answered to the NKVD (which took over the OGPU in 1934), which emphasises the 
dilemma of the relationship to kulak children. The consequence o f  such priorities became apparent 
in September 1937 when the conditions in this and other orphanages were reported. The 
Novoselovskii orphanage housed 125 children from 4-16 years o f  age, and the situation was as 
problematic as it had been in 1935. Two to three children slept in the same bed, which intensified the 
level of epidemics in the orphanages and significantly jeopardised the sanitary situation in the 
home.^"* There were still complaints about the sanitary situation and the working conditions of the 
special settlements from the medical staff, as late as December 1937.^^ In 1940, an inspection team 
that had visited several orphanages in the special settlements complained about the conditions of the 
buildings, dormitories, canteens, and kitchens. Mattresses were dirty, children slept in the same bed 
together, special working clothes for the children were lacking, and fundamental repairs to the
^  GANO, f. r-895, op. I, délo 184,11.38-40. 
^  GATO, f. r-590, op. 1, délo 16,1.21. 
GATO, f. r-590, op. 1, délo 16,1.70. 
GATO, f. r-590, op. 1, délo 16,1.1.
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buildings were urgently required. About the issue o f nourishment for the children it was asserted 
“The nourishment is unacceptable -  dinner consist of only one dish” ®^
Despite the plans issued in order to rectify and stabilise the situation, in reality such measures hai 
a  very limited impact on the living conditions of the children. Infant mortality may have dropped ii 
the special settlements as such and the birth-rate increased, but the attempts to rectify the sanitarj 
conditions of the orphanages remained seriously inefficient as late as 1940. The consequence of this 
was wide-ranging: if  the authorities wished to re-educate kulak children to become future Soviet 
citizens, the physical fiamework -  in this case the orphanages -  was in such a poor state that in 
practice it turned out to be extremely difficult to achieve this. When children voiced resistance in the 
orphanages, it must also have been against these poor living conditions. They vocalised a discontent, 
which the local school authorities interpreted as a sign o f  ideological disobedience -  the authorities, 
in other words, were shorn o f any responsibility.
4,2.5 Responsibility fo r  living conditions
The question is who was responsible for the neglect o f homeless kulak children living in the 
orphanages: was it the local authorities, handling the daily distributing of resources? Was it caused 
by the vast pressure created by incoming besprizomye to the orphanages? Was it “criminal neglect” 
caused by individual actions o f local commandants in the komendatura? Or, was it a product of 
institutional policies laid out by the Stalinist leadership? Viola explains that, especially the initial 
phase -  from the first months o f 1930 to 1931 -  the difficult situation of deportation and placement 
o f  kulaks and their families primarily was an outcome o f  conflict of interests and structural 
problems. The different levels o f the Soviet system coimteracted each other and this was not solved 
until the OGPU during 1930 took over the responsibility o f  constructing and administering the
*77settlements. Various agencies participated in the administration o f the special settlements: the 
OGPU, the system o f komendatury, the various Commissariats o f Industries -  most notably the 
timber and fishing industries -  the People’s Commissariat o f Health, and the People’s Commissariat 
o f  Education. The interests varied significantly o f these departments and commissariats, as their 
approaches to the situation were different: in the view o f  the timber and fishing industries the special 
settlers and children as young as 12 years old were only conceived as “man-power” (rabsila). Their 
interest was anything but humanitarian — a fact largely supported by the OGPU and even Stalin
GATO, f. r-590, op. 2, delo 128,1.6.
^  Lynne Viola, “The Other Archipelago: Kulak Deportation to the North in 1930” pp. 730-755 in Slavic Review 60/4, 
(winter 2001).
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himselfj* The People’s Commissariat of Health, the People’s Commissariat of Education, and the 
various Children’s Commission {detkomissii) focussed on the human aspect of this development -  
not that they questioned the General Line, but their primary task was to assist sick settlers and 
children who had been abandoned.
This suggests that there was some sort o f countervailing interest also within the system, which is 
considered “totalitarian”. Yet, it is unclear as to whether this also changed the course o f the system 
fundamentally -  the conditions mentioned above especially among orphan kulak children would to 
some extent suggest that any measures undertaken by the Soviet system to rectify the living 
conditions were highly insufficient. It may very well be that even hardliners were concerned about 
the impact the dekulakisation policy had on the fate o f children, yet the changes in the overall 
situation were on the whole limited. Even if  there were initiatives to rectify and stabilise the living 
conditions of the special settlements, children continued to live under appalling circumstances until 
the late 1930s and even into the 1940s. The conditions o f the 1940s can be explained as an outcome 
o f the Second World War, where the whole country was suffering. However, conditions during the 
1930s are difficult to explain as anything else but a result o f a repressive Stalinist policy and neglect. 
It m ay be that the main concern o f the Soviet regime was not to kill deported kulaks but rather to 
suppress and discipline them, yet the outcome was a mass production o f corpses -  including the 
corpses o f children.^^ Even if the demographic situation was stabilised by 1935-36, life was never 
normal. From this point there can be no doubt, even if countervailing interests existed, that the 
leading organs o f the Soviet system -  that is the circle surrounding Stalin and his henchmen -  bore 
the main responsibility for the course o f  action. It should be remembered that the Council of 
People’s Commissariat (SNK) as early as August 1930 legitimised the maximal usage o f  settlers in 
the daily work o f the region. As late as 1932 this decision had a devastating impact on kulak 
children, when the leading officials o f GULAG lowered the age o f  “able bodied” settlers to 12 years. 
We should also remember that the financing o f the stabilisation o f  the children’s conditions, as 
Molotov ordered in 1932, had to come from the settlers themselves and not as a subsidy from the 
authorities -  the resources had to be located within the wages o f  the special settlers. This order 
furthermore granted 1.89 roubles per child, which was completely inadequate.
The priorities o f the Stalinist regime were to transform society ideologically -  those opposed to the 
project were viewed as being “backward” or “primitive” and had to be “re-educated”. From this
^  See the debate within the OGPU in 1935 about the possibilities of returning pardoned kulaks and their families: Oleg 
V. Khlevniuk, The History o f the GULAG. From Collectivization to the Great Terror^ Yale University 2004, pp. 129- 
132.
”  Anne Applebaum, GULAG. A History^ London 2004, pp. 23-24.
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perspective it may be that the experiences o f kulak children was unintended; however, the “project” 
could not allow the authorities to retreat from the General Line. This also implied that even if orders 
were issued, the resources to successfully implement the changes were only rarely available. 
Therefore, it is necessary to nuance the meaning o f stabilisation: it was not a return to life as it had 
been before the forceful banishment o f  unwanted elements from society; neither was it an 
era^cation o f the experiences these people already had been subjected. Stabilisation was in this case 
a  matter o f putting a temporary fix on an open wound.
4.3 The socio-historical context
Did the living conditions in the special settlements, and thus the fate of first and second category 
kulak children, differ significantly from that o f society as a whole? The scope is now widened in 
order to discuss the demographic development among children in Soviet society in the 1930s. Infant 
mortality had always been high within the rural parts o f  the Russian Empire. Pre-revolutionary 
Russia had one o f  the highest, i f  not the highest infant mortality rates in Europe. In a  comparison 
between Russian Jews, Muslims in  the Volga regions, and Russians, David Ransel has shown that 
infant mortality was especially high among Russian peasant families. Between 43.2% and 54.5% of 
all children, depending on which region o f  the country is analysed, died before their fifth birthday. 
Almost one-third o f all Russian infants died before their first birthday, which, even when other 
Slavic nationalities, like Ukrainian and Byelorussian are included in the comparison, is significantly 
high. Ransel argues convincingly that the explanation lies in cultural rather than environmental 
reasons, as all children o f the Russian empire, Jewish, Muslim, Ukrainian, Russian and other 
nationalities, were exposed to the same environmental conditions. Three reasons are given; firstly, 
the high consumption of alcohol among Russian women; secondly, syphilis, and, thirdly, the poor 
hygienic circumstances during birth. A fourth explanation was the harsh living condition of the 
peasant family. Women, like men, engaged in manual work in the agricultural workforce. 
Subsequently, many children were left alone in the house for hours, exposing them to greater risk, 
which had an accumulative effect on the mortality rate.**^
Infant mortality remained high after the October Revolution, and had not been rectified 
significantly in the 1930s. Davies and Wheatcroft amount that the infant mortality rate for the whole 
Soviet Union had been 174 per thousand in 1926, and had only dropped slightly to 161 per 
thousand in 1939. There is no specification on the age group o f  the children at the time of death. In
80 David L. Ransel, Mothering, Medicine, and Infant Mortality in Russia: Some Comparisons^ pp. 4-5.
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a recent analysis of the development, conducted by Zhiromskaya, we learn that in 1933 718,700 
children died before their first birthday in the Soviet Union. This nximber comprised 14.4% o f the 
total death rate in the Soviet Union for 1933. This number dropped in 1934 to 537,000, yet the 
infant mortality rate comprised 20.4% of the total death rate (indicating that the proportion o f dying 
children increased in comparison to 1933). In 1935 the number o f  infant deaths increased to 
706,100, implying a serious worsening in the situation. This negative development continued until 
the end o f the 1930s, and in 1939 1,053,600 children would die before their first birthday. Not only 
was this a dramatically rise in the total number of infant death, but the proportion o f the total 
num ber o f dead children also rocketed fiom  14.4% in 1933 to 35.4% in 1939.** This clearly 
suggests that infant mortality increased dramatically throughout the 1930s. One explanation would 
be a  fall in the living standard caused by the preceding chaos of the 1930s. Another was the impact 
o f  dekulakisation, famine and political repression by 1937 -  the social breakdown of Soviet society 
m ust also have had a negative impact on the demographic situation o f children.
T ab le  12: Estimation o f  Infant mortality in the USSR and Russian federation from 1933-1939 (in
thousand)
Year USSR Russian federation
Fixed number % of the total 
death
Fixed number % o f the total 
death
1933 718,7 14.4 602,9 20.5
1934 537,5 20.4 454,1 22.9
1935 706,1 27.5 576,7 28.9
1936 938,1 31.5 747,4 32.9
1937 1031,3 34.4 762,1 34.8
1938 1023,3 34.6 757,4 35.4
1939 1053,6 35,4 781,0 36.5
(Source: V.B. Zhiromskaya, 27£«o^pa^ttvecKas ucmopun Foccm e 1930-e eodbt^ Moscow 2001, p. 23 (Table 4))
4.3.1 The conditions o f  Soviet children in the 1930s
The death of at least 5.7 million people during the famine in 1932-33 emphasises that the human 
privation of the 1930s was not limited to a  specific sector of Soviet society -  and therefore not
V.B. Zhiromskaya, ucmopnn poccuu e 1930-e zodbi^ Moscow 2001, p. 23.
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something that just existed in the special settlements. In late 1932 the medical authorities registered 
a  massive growth o f  epidemics and mortality in society. The Ukrainian Red Cross, for example, 
submitted a  report on the health situation in the Odessa region in this particular period. From this 
we learn that two doctors, eight nurses and twenty-two voluntary workers in June 1932 investigated 
conditions of: 1) the local hospitals, 2) the local nurseries and nursery schools, 3) nourishment in 
these nurseries and nursery schools; 4) the sanitary situation among children; 5) medical assistance 
in society; and 6) the sanitary work o f the city. The significant aspect of the conclusion is that
The majority o f children were dirty, lice-infected, looking depressed, reacting slowly to 
questions. They were constantly laying or sitting down as a  consequence of exhaustion 
and dehydration... The death rate in the hospitals is 8 %... A n insufficient quantity o f 
products o f an extraordinarily tainted quality is distributed to children in the 
nurseries...
(source; TsDAGO, f. 1, op. 20, delo 5310,11.33-34)
It is relevant to mention that the inspection team o f  the Ukrainian Red Cross especially was focusing 
on local villages, and thus also upon children o f both kolkhozniki and edinolichniJd (individual 
peasants). Despite the previous collectivisation campaign, private holders remained and lived outside 
the collective farms. The document does not reveal who these edinoUchnild were, but it seems 
plausible that they included third category kulaks not being deported, but instead re-settled outside 
the collective farms. Therefore, this report has great significance for our imderstanding of the 
condition o f  the children o f poor and middle peasants and the remaining third category kulaks. An 
important element o f  this survey concerned the sanitary conditions o f several villages and towns 
surrounding Odessa. A statistic regarding the situation in May and June 1932 in Nizhnii-Mirgorod 
raion was released, and it dealt with the proportion of the sick. The subjects being investigated were 
divided into three categories: the elderly, adults, and children. O f the total o f 860 sick in the village 
o f  Panchevo, the elderly comprised 236, adults 302, and children 322. A similar pattern was detected 
in Kalezh where children comprised 258 out o f the total 663, the elderly 180, and adults 225, The 
distribution varied slightly in Martynoshcha where it was the elderly, who comprised the largest 
proportion o f  the total -  324 of the 767 -  children comprised 249, and adults 194. The conclusion 
which can be drawn from this and the above elaboration on infant mortality in general is that the
82 TsDAGO, f. 1, op. 20, delo 5310,11.33-34.
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distribution detected in the special settlements where children made up if  not the largest, then a 
significant share o f the total nximber o f those affected, can also be found in Soviet society as a  whole 
during this period. 1932 generally appears to have been a period o f widespread epidemic. This 
became increasingly apparent by the autumn o f  1932, when famine intensified.
T ab le  13: Proportion o f the sick in selected town o f the N-Mirgorodskii Raion of Southern Ukraine
by May-June 1932
Elderly Adults Children
Palchevo 236 302 322
Kalezh 180 225 258
Martynoshcha 324 194 249
(source: TSDAGO, f. 1, op. 20, delo 5310,1 35)
A nother feature o f the legacy of collectivisation was naturally the living conditions among those 
besprizornye, who were not related to either first or second category kulaks. Although they 
com prised a significant proportion in those regions they were deported -  such as Western Siberia, 
N orthern Russia, Ural and Kazakhstan -  not all of the homeless or abandoned children were related 
to these designated class enemies. Here, we focus primarily on two aspects: public resources 
generally used to assist besprizomye and the living conditions in those orphanages not located in the 
system o f  special settlements, Ukraine was ravaged by this social problem, as this republic was one 
o f the main agrictiltural regions of the Soviet Union, and the preceding collectivisation campaign 
had a devastating impact upon its social, economic and political situation. Ukraine was not the only 
region in the Soviet Union thus affected; however, it appears indisputable that this Soviet republic 
was significantly influenced by previous policies. The structure of many Ukrainian peasant families 
was dissolved as a result of the preceding collectivisation campaign. On 2 May 1935, that is 
approximately a month before the Council o f People’s Commissariat o f the Soviet Union (SNK 
SSSR) issued the decree on “the liquidation o f besprizornosti and beznadzornosti*\ a report about 
the situation in the south-eastern Ukrainian oblast o f Dneprepotrovsk was sent to Kossior, the First 
Secretary o f the Central Committee o f the Ukrainian Communist Party, and to Liubchenko the 
chairman o f the People’s Commissariat of the Ukrainian Soviet republic. Herein we find two pieces
83 TsDAGO, f. 1, op. 20. d eb  5310,1.35.
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o f relevant information. Firstly, it is significant that the number o f orphans increased dramatically 
from 1 August 1934 to April 1935. While the number was 6200 in 1934, by 1935 it had increased to 
10,873. This supports the impression that the situation for children was dramatic. Secondly, it is 
notable that resource supplies did not correspond to the actual needs in Dneprepotrovsk: the relevant 
officials appealed for another fifty thousand metres o f cloth fabrics, fifteen thousand meters of 
mattresses, 800 pairs o f  trousers, six thousand pairs o f shoes, eleven thousand duvets and seven 
thousand pairs o f cloth fabrics.^ This reveals that additional children to those related to the first and 
second category kulaks, lived in dire circumstances.
This became even clearer in another report issued by Z. Katsenelson the deputy chairman of the 
Ukrainian People’s Commissariat o f  Internal Affairs, to Kossior, Liubchenko and Postyshev in 25 
November 1935. The report dealt Avith the living conditions o f  homeless children in the sovkhozy, 
kolkhozy and industrial areas of Ukraine. The total number o f  besprizornye in these three sectors 
was 112,000. The majority o f departments o f  public education had no or only very little interest in 
the situation o f these children. The physical state o f  the existing orphanages was so poor that they 
were unsuitable for childcare. Regarding childcare, the quantity o f  beds was insufficient, as in 
relation to those orphanages placed in Narym, and children had to sleep in the same bed together. 
This was a general problem. In the kolkhoz ‘T2 let Kr. Armii” (located in Odessa Oblast) it was 
reported that boys and girls slept naked on the floor; in another kolkhoz “Khleborob” (also located in 
Odessa) it was reported that children existed only on bread, were poorly dressed, hungry and without 
supervision; in a third orphanage, also located in Odessa, healthy children had scabies. Similar
AC
scenes were reported in Vinnitsa, Kiev, Stalino and Kharkov. These reports suggest that the low 
priorities within the Soviet authorities regarding living conditions in the orphanages were not only 
related to kulak children -  that is those who had been deported. From this perspective it can be 
argued that there was nothing unique about the living conditions o f kulak children, and thus the 
conditions found in, for example, the Narym  orphanages may have reflected a general trend in 
Soviet society rather than a specific problem in the system o f the special settlements.
4.4 Similarities and differences
Although not every Soviet citizen was victimised by the ongoing warfare against society, and even 
i f  some lived a comparatively normal life (going to cinemas, theatres, reading books and general
”  TsDAGO, f. 20, op. 20, delo 6645,11.11-12. 
Ibid., 11.18-21.
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were happy) it is evident that the attack on Soviet agriculture from 1929 onwards was much more 
wide-ranging than simply a  matter of liquidating a certain kulak class. It is, however, on a very 
banal level apparent that even if the living conditions of the 1930s were generally characterised by a 
demographic drop and social instability, life in the special settlements was different. The special 
settlers comprised a significant element o f what has been termed “Stalin’s forced labour 
economy”.*^  The deported kulaks were reduced to ^'rabsila^ and were exploited to the absolute 
maximum in the timber and fishing industries, and within the many ambitious construction 
complexes in the Soviet Union. The work was extremely physically demanding, and the kulaks 
were treated much more ruthlessly than other workers who had voluntarily come to the construction 
sites. Given that this was an outcome of dekulakisation, the consequence of the maltreatment o f the 
special settlers was limited: they had to work, despite the low food rations, and they were 
“dispensable” (a dead person could easily be replaced by another deportee).** Even if the living 
conditions in the special settlements was stabilised by the mid-193 Os, the purpose of the settlers 
remained the same, which became increasingly evident when in 1934 they were termed 
trudposelentsy -  working settlers.*^
Society may have been “the big camp”^ ; however, life in the special settlements was notably 
different: it was primarily a penal system, affecting the families of the accused; secondly, the 
settlers being interred would, be regarded as second class citizens. This was evident when a 
majority o f them lost their rights, and became “lishentsy” (“social outcast”). But even when kulak 
children had their voting rights restored by 1934 they could not simply leave the settlements. This 
was, as we saw above, still a  fact when they in October 1938 received the right to gain a passport -  
kulak children were never allowed to return to their places of origin. Thirdly, even if mortality, 
epidemics, and starvation were common occurrences in the Soviet Union, it was far more 
widespread in the settlements. Stephen Wheatcroft argues that the death-rate was four to five times
** Robert Conquest asserted in one of many tense debates with Robert Thurston: “At the height of Ezhovshchina, life 
went on, games were played, holidays taken, people went to theatres, young people danced and wooed. And if Thurston 
supposed that those who have used general expressions like “terror now ranged in the USSR” or (Anna Akhmatova’s 
phrase) “innocent Russia withered” thought otherwise, this shows a certain desk-bound parochialism and lack o f 
commonsense perspective. As to Thurston’s bugbear of a “total fear’ theory”, this commentator has never heard of it...” 
See: Robert Conquest, “What is Terror” pp. 235-237 in Slavic Review 45:2, 1986 p. 235 and Robert Thurston, “On 
Desk-Bound Parochialism, Commonsense Perspectives, and Lousy Evidence: A Reply to Robert Conquest” pp. 238- 
244 in Slavic Review 45:2,1986.
^  See: Charles A. Orr (ed.) Stcdin's Slave Camps. An Indictment o f Modern Slavery, Bruxelles 1951 and David J. Dallin 
and Boris Nicolaevsky, Slavearbejde i Sovet, K0benhavn 1949.
** Sergei Krasilnikov, Cepn uMOJtox. KpecmbHHCKosi ccwiko e sanadnou Cu6upu e 1910-eeodbi, Moscow 2003, 
chapter 5 (titled ”Pa&cHJia”).
^  Zemskov, 2005, p. 18.
^  As argued in Erik Kulavig, Stalins H jem m ^ont 1941-1945, Odense 2004.
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higher in the GULAG than in society as a  whole, and that during the famine years o f 1932/33 the 
death-rate was more than ten times higher.^ ^  The system o f  special settlements was a cornerstone of 
the GULAG, and this elaboration has great significance. The living conditions o f  the special 
settlements were worse than those o f  the prison camps it appears: food supplies were much more 
irregular, which implies that the lack o f resources was even more common in the settlements than in 
other camps.^^ In addition, there is the importance o f the deportations. This was not a  variant of 
social mobilisation, as with the massive mobilisation o f  people moving to enormous construction 
sites as found in Magnitagorsk,®^ nor was it akin to migration, as when peasants moved from the 
countryside into the cities.^ Rather it w as a  forcefiil and repressive banishment o f  unwanted 
elements from society, carried through with such cynicism that a significant number o f  designated 
kulaks and their families -  and others stigmatised as “enemies o f  the people” -  died as a  direct 
result.^^ The deportations reveal the true nature o f the diseased power in the Soviet state: the regime 
considered itself superior to all moral questions and deported human beings at will in the name of 
ideology.
This feeling o f supremacy and the willingness to neglect and dehumanise individuals in the name 
o f a higher ideal has clear similarities to N azi Germany. It was a mechanical understanding of the 
world order, where redundant components could be removed and placed in specially established 
facilities. Or, to put it differently, it was a scientific comprehension o f  the nature of the 
development, where society could be adjusted and made “perfect” with those opposing it removed 
and reinstalled elsewhere: “out o f  sight, out o f mind”. From this point of view redundant 
components, that is enemies o f the state, had no emotional feelings -  the regime could remove 
children from their parents without considering the human consequences o f doing so. This makes 
the kulak deportations and the living conditions in the special settlements, quite different from what 
happened in society as a  whole: this was prison and these people got punished not for what they had 
done, but for who they were.
Wheatcroft, 1996, p. 1346.
^  This information was given to the author during a discussion with Vasilli Khanovich from the local department of 
Memorial in Tomsk.
See Stephen Kotkin M agnetic Mountain. Stalinism as a Civilizationy London 1995.
^  See Gijs Kessler, The Peasant and the Town. RuraUUrban M ira tion  in the Soviet Union, 1929-40^ (unpublished 
Doctoral Thesis submitted in 2001 at the European University Institute in Florence).
Pavel Polian, He no ceoeù ease. Hcmopuit u zeozpatpttx npunydumenuba Mvepaipm e CCCP, Moscow 2001.
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5. Education of kulak children
Soviet childhood became increasingly ideological by the mid-193 Os, and this may be one o f the 
m any reasons for Stalin’s statement in November 1935 that a kulak child did not answer for his or 
her fathers. A good field to investigate such developments is in the schools and in the public 
education o f children in general and kulak children in particular. Here we will focus on the relation 
betw een the kulak children and society. The question to be addressed is how kulak children were 
defined in public education and propaganda in the 1930s, and whether this differed significantly 
from  how  other Soviet children were defined in general.
This will primarily be discussed by using archival material from the West Siberian region of 
N aiym . Some of the issues will also be covered using material from the archives of Kiev, giving us 
a  possibility o f also imderstanding the developments in the regions from which kulak children were 
deported. The material from Naiym means that we are primarily analysing the education o f those 
children in deportation, which also implies that they must have been related to the first and second 
category kulaks. Consequently it may be argued that these children, who were probably considered 
the m ost dangerous by the regime, might have been defined differently from children o f  third 
category kulaks. It is, nonetheless, difficult to distinguish these three categories of children from 
each other as the documents are rarely specific.^ Hence it will be asserted that even if the archival 
m aterial used mainly addresses the situation in deportation -  that is among first and second category 
kulak children -  the general considerations must have corresponded to how the Soviet state defined 
all three categories o f kulak children -  with the possibility that the authorities adopted a less 
restrictive line towards the third category kulak children.
5.1 The Kulak Children and Soviet education
The Soviet newspaper, KoMCOMOJieijh VKpamUy discussed the relation of education and class 
struggle in a long article on the “Stmggle for collectivisation” (18 February 1930). The argument 
put forward was that kulaks had infiltrated the schools and influenced children by their 
“counterrevolutionary work” . Therefore, it was necessary to mobilise children through education 
against these elements. Education was conceived as means of mobilisation, whereby children could
* See for example the consideration of the relationship between schools, the pioneer organisation and kulak children in 
Ukraine from 1930: “Ilpo aiTeii icy pK yjiiB  b  notaTKOBÜí, cepejUHiü, B H m iñ m K O J ir  in TsDAGO, f. 1, op. 20, delo 3088, 
U. 8-10.
 ^”y  6oax 3a KoneKTHBÍ3auÍK)”in KQMC(moJte^ b yKpaiHu, 18 Febniary 1930, p. 4.
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be made useful citizens participating consciously in the construction o f a new society. Thus, the 
strong anti-kulak rhetoric also permeated the discourse o f education. Teachers were expected to 
participate in  the harsh attack upon kulaks and denounce them as enemies of Soviet education. This 
also made the teachers vulnerable, and there are several examples of physical assault upon them 
carried out by angry villagers and designated kulaks. The question is how kulak children were 
defined by the Soviet educational authorities in this context o f  class stmggle. The nature of the 
relationship between them and the regime must have been unveiled here, since education: “ ...could 
not be ideologically neutral”.^
That the education o f  kulak children and kulak adolescents had some priorities can be seen from a 
meeting held by a special commission o f the Politburo on 15 M ay 1931. It was chaired by A A . 
Andreev and among the participants were key figures in the Soviet command structure such as 
Postyshev, Genrikh Yagoda, Evdokimov, Nikolaev, OTshanskii and Matvei Berman. Their main 
focus was upon the development o f  the special settlements, and they among other things addressed 
the question o f the younger settlers, and how they were being educated.
On the Young Special Settlers
The OGPU suggests in its organisational, economic and administrative work to 
afford special attention to the young and to use all means to attract them to work, 
placing them on a  special level, in developing among them  collective methods and 
not enlarge the same strict routines, which is spread out by the head o f  the family 
[...]
(Source: G.M. Adibekov, ’’CneiuiepecejicHuu -  Keprau «ciuiomHoîi KOJuieicTHBHsamm». Hs 
aoKyMeHTOB «oco6oa naracH» IToJiirreiopo UK BKI1(6)” in fîcmopuvecKuû apxue^ Volume 2, number 
4,1994, p. 158).
The young settlers had to have their “collective methods” refined, indicating that education was to 
restructure their way o f conceiving production. An OGPU plan, issued on 6 June 1931 asserts that 
“the work among the young” was a  matter o f  “Demonstrating special attention in deportation to the 
young kulak with the goal of re-educating them, through attraction of production, organisation of
young hardworking brigades, and implementation o f socialist methodological work”.'
 ^Lany Holmes, The Kremlin and the Schoolhouse. Reforming Education in Soviet Russia 1917-1931 ^  Indiana, 
Michigan 1991, p. 132.
* Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front. Power and Ctdture in Revolutionary Russia^ Ithaca 1992, p. 92.
 ^V.P. Danilov and S.A. Krasilnikov, CneifnepecejteHifbt e 3anaÒHOÙ Cu6upu. Becna 1931-HaHano 1933z.y Novosibirsk
1993,pp.41-42.
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It is important to emphasis that this idea o f creating Soviet citizens corresponds with the 
fundamental characteristic o f public Soviet education throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The Soviet 
government was — at least until the mid-193 Os — convinced that it was environment and not biology, 
which shaped behaviour, and subsequently a child, if  subjected to the correct teaching, could be 
brought up according to the needs o f the Soviet state.* The purpose o f  Soviet pedagogy, whether it 
was related to “enemy” children or children in general, was to create a  “new Soviet man”. This was 
not an easy task, since other institutions, such as the nuclear family, the Tsarist intelligentsia, or the 
heritage o f  the pre-revolutionary schools, intervened and undermined its effectiveness. Nonetheless, 
it was a theory that such a transformation could be achieved if the state assumed responsibility for 
the upbringing o f children.’ This broader context explains in part why the Soviet regime 
concentrated its attention on the education o f kulak children. However, there \vas a significant 
difference: the main feature of the dekulakisation policy was to undermine the social position o f 
kulaks, and their children were their achilles heel. Non-enemy families had the possibility of 
influencing their children’s upbringing, since the Soviet state never managed to abolish this social 
institution completely. Kulaks, or more specifically first and second category kulaks, were 
marginalized much more efficiently in relation to their children, given that they were deported or 
incarcerated the nuclear family was often dismantled. Public education related to kulak children 
was not simply a matter o f  shaping a “new Soviet man”, but also o f  preventing certain imwanted 
elem ents — their parents -  from influencing the socialisation o f their offspring.
The significance o f this became clear when examining a number o f applications from kulak 
children regarding the restitution of their civil rights, which (as we saw in chapter 3), was discussed 
in 1933 and 1934,^ Most o f the applicants received a positive response, which indicates that some 
kulak children received voting rights.*^ It is interesting to read the application o f these children, as 
they reveal important aspects of the nature o f the relationship between kulak children and the Soviet 
authorities. Children had to assure the authorities o f their commitment to the construction o f  the 
future society, and show that they were conscious of the class hostility o f their parents. They wrote 
their application aware that someone in a higher position in the system could reject them. Such an
* Lynne Attwood, The New Soviet Man and Woman. Sex-Role Socialization in the USSR, London 1990, pp. 35ff.
 ^W. Berelowithch, La soviétisation de l ’école russe 1917-1931, Lausanne, 1990, p. 12-13.
* Bent Jensen, GULAG og Clemsel. Ruslands tragedie og Vestens kukommelsestab i det 20. ârhundrede, Copenhagen 
2002, pp. 179-180.
® V.P. Danilov and S.A. Krasilnikov, Cneifnepecenenîfbt e Sanadnou Cuôupu. 1933-1938, Novosibirsk 1994, pp. 14 and 
55.
See; GATO f. r-430. op. 3, delo 2806,1. 1; GATO, f. r-430, op. 3. delo 2867,1. 1 ; GATO f. r-430, op. 3. delo 2878,1. 
2; GATO f. r-430, op. 3, delo 2894,1.2; and GATO, f. r-430, op. 3, delo 2903,1.2.
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idea is revealed in the letter o f Elizabet Kirilovich Zykova, who was bom in 1916 and deported to 
Narym firom Ukraine with her parents as “member of a kulak family” in 1931 and employed as a 
measurer in the local West Siberian timber industry in 1933. On 30 November 1935 she addressed 
the local authorities o f the Tomsk city Soviet -  the central administrative centre o f  the oblast. 
Despite being nineteen years old Zykova still lived in a local orphanage. After having outlined her 
participation in the proposed educational programme, gaining work in the local timber industry, and 
showing sincere participation in the transformation of society, she finished the letter by saying:
I ... urge Tom sk city Soviet to restore [in Russian eoccmaHoeum] my right as a  full 
citizen. I ask you not to reject my request...
(Source: GATO, F. R-430, op. 3, delo 2806,1.2)
As a kulak child Zykova knew that as long as she was identified with her parents, she would be 
considered a non-citizen and even an “outcast”. At the same time she was also aware that the 
system could reject her attempt, and term it unsatisfactory -  which the last sentence suggests. Such 
an idea would also imply that the restitution o f the civil rights o f  kulak children implied a near 
complete subordination to the demands o f  the authorities.
5.7.7 Life chances
What were the demands of the Soviet authorities? This is partly revealed in an article in the Siberian 
newspaper CoeemcKuu Ceeep (^^The Soviet North**) of 22 May 1936. It stated: “The illiterate and the 
semi-literate can not be conscious constructors o f socialist society, and therefore the Party and the 
Soviet government has conducted and still conducts a determined battle for the completion of 
liquidating illiteracy and semi-literacy [ .. .]” . Moreover that “Comrade Stalin teaches us that for the 
triumph o f Communism it is necessary to have a working class w ith a [high] cultural and technical 
level [...]”.”  The \iltimate goal o f Soviet education was not literacy in itself, but rather a literate 
working class, aware o f the values o f Communism. The impression that the teaching of kulak 
children was dominated by such discourse is supported by the Soviet education programme horn 
1937-38 issued in Narym. The pupils o f  this region, who were largely kulak children, were to be 
taught “constitution” for fourteen lessons during the summer semester -  later this was increased to 
another twenty lessons on “Soviet constitution”. In comparison “Russian language” and
"  GANO, f. r-61, op. 1, delo 1431,1.8
134
“mathematics” comprised fifty-six and sixty lessons. It is important to notice that a teacher only 
attended half the "Russian” and “mathematics” lessons, whereas “constitution” had a full-time 
teacher. Therefore, Russian and mathematics only had an effective teaching o f thirty lessons each 
w ith in  the whole summer term, whereas “constitution” and “Soviet constitution” had thirty-four 
lessons. This implies that political education had a  very high priority. Unfortunately, the content o f 
such education is not revealed in the document, and it is difficult to say anything about what 
“constitution” and “Soviet constitution” in reality meant. However, it is evident that the aim was to 
replace the traditional and religious upbringing o f  the kulak family with the political indoctrination 
o f  the  state.
Table 1: The content o f the Naiym school programme in 1937-38
Subject Planned teaching Effective teaching
R ussian 56 hours per term 30 hours per term
M athematic 60 hours per term 30 hours per term
Constitution 14 hours per term 14 hours per term
Soviet Constitution 20 hours per term 20 hours per term
(Source: GANG, F. 61, op. 1, delo 1498, II. 75-78)
The Pioneers and Komsomol members were responsible for this political education, which can be 
seen in many documents from the 1930s.^^ In May 1929 the local party committee o f the Siberian 
tow n o f  Achinskii, for example, published a proclamation on “...strengthening the leadership and 
the involvement o f the Pioneer organisation in the societal and political work o f the cities and the 
countryside”.*^  This suggests that children were to mobilise other children politically in order to 
secure the maintaining o f political power by the local Communist Party. In two Soviet official 
documents, written in 1935 and 1937, the responsible committees spoke o f a “communist 
upbringing o f children” independently.*^ A number of plans were issued throughout the 1930s in 
order to construct Pioneer clubs, children’s clubs or Komsomol clubs, all o f which were to 
undertake the “ ...work o f mass upbringing among children”.*^  Pupils were generally termed
GANO, f. r-61, op. 1, délo 1498, L. 75-78.
GANO, f. r-61, op. 1, delo 1127,1.4 and GANO, f. r-61, op. 1, delo 1452,11.17-18.
Vasilii Novokshonov, «B mpudifambi -  KOMeHdamypCKue.(ovepKu no ucmopuu mesyjibdemacozo pauon)»^ c. 
TeryJiM er 1993, p. 6.
GANO, f. r-61, op. 1. delo 1272,1.10 and GANO, f. r-895, op. 2, delo 4 , 1 .16.
GANO, f. r-61, op. 1, delo 1272.1. 8.
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“vospitanniki” -  those to be brought up -  and education as “vospitanie”.^  ^ The pupils were to
1undergo “politvospitanie” or political education.
The Soviet authorities constructed 1,105 elementary, 370 preparation and 136 middle schools in 
the whole system o f  the special settlements. Additionally, it built 230 schools for higher technical 
education and twelve technical colleges in this sector. There were 217,454 pupils in the schools of 
the special settlements, distributed on each level o f the educational system, and a  total of 8,280 
teachers.*^ Having in mind that 378,877 children and adolescents younger than 16 years old lived in 
the special settlements by October 1941, this implies that 57.4% of the total number o f deported 
children were admitted to either o f  the schools. It is important to remember that not every child m 
the special settlements had reached school age, as a substantial number o f the deported children 
were either babies or infants. This means that the percentage o f  kulak children attending schools 
(old enough to actually do so) must have been higher than the 57.4%. Aside from the schools the 
authorities also constructed 813 clubs, 1,202 reading rooms, 440 cinemas and 1,149 libraries in the 
settlements.^* This reveals a certain priority o f the “political-cultural work among the young 
settlers”, although there is little information on the distribution o f these institutions among the 
individual settlements. By 15 December 1935 the SNK SSSR and Central Committee of the 
Communist Party likewise approved that children of the special settlers could be admitted into a 
higher educational institutions.^ We discussed the reservations concerning the rehabilitation of 
kulak children in chapter, by asserting that most directives issued by the Soviet authorities during 
the 1930s were contradicting. Yet the approval o f December 1935 at least indicates that the Soviet 
system in theory was willing to offer kulak children a possibility to achieve an education (which on 
a longer term could improve their possibilities o f being reintegrated into society). Also, it implies 
that the Soviet state was very interested in establishing institutions (schools as well as clubs) that 
could fulfil the political education o f  kulak children in deportation.
Another institution that participated in the political education o f  children was the army. All males 
were at the age o f  18 enrolled in the ranks o f  the Red Army. Upon entering they were often either 
illiterate or semi-literate, which was changed due to intense education during their service. Many of 
these young men received their basic education in the army as part o f the “liquidation o f illiteracy”,
”  GANG, f. r-895, op. 1, d. 154,1.253.
'* S.S. Vilenskii et zl.^J^emu lyJIATa 1918-1956, Moscow 2002, p. 143.
S.I. Golotik and V.V. Minaev, Hacenenue u ejtacmb. Onepm deMozpa(pmecKOu ucmopuu CCCP 1930-x eodoe, 
Moscow, 2004, p. 120.
V.N. Zemskov, CneifnepeceacHifia e CCCP 1930-1960, Moscow 2005, pp. 98-99 (Table 19).
Golotik and Minaev, 2004, p. 120.
“ Ibid.,p. 120.
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and would have their identity shaped by this institution. As a participant of the first Stakhanovite 
congress in November 1935 stressed: “The Red Army not only teaches how to shoot, but also 
socialises, and teaches how to build our socialist society”.^  During their basic education these 
young men were subjected to patriotic propaganda, in which they were taught to be the saviours and 
heroes o f the Soviet Union, and this is only for those who served their compulsory military service, 
and were employed in another sector o f society. These men often returned to the countryside and 
were re-integrated into the kolkhozy, sovkhozy, MTS and other similar institutions o f  newly 
collectivised agriculture. When it came to those men who made a career in the army, it is possible 
that they were even more influenced by the rhetoric of the Soviet state in their daily work. 
Therefore, the impact o f  the state upon the generation, bom after 1917 was immense and the 
political influence great. "^* Soviet research shows that some kulak children were enlisted as soldiers 
in the Red Army during the Second World War, although it is important to remember that they were 
not allowed to be conscripted before the outbreak of the war. The latter implies that the Soviet 
regim e remained suspicious towards kulak children, until it was absolutely necessary to redefine the 
policy  towards them. It is possible that those kulak children enlisted as soldiers would be affected 
by the education they received in the army, not the least because the patriotic propaganda was 
particularly intense during the war. However, they would probably still be addressed as second 
grate soldiers by the Soviet authorities. The plea of Elizabet Kirilovich Zykova mentioned above, 
nonetheless, reveals how important many kulak children found such re-integration.
The question is why kulak children were eager to be reintegrated into society. In order to 
understand this, it is necessary to address the complexity o f their life chances. When associated with 
their kulak parents the children were excluded, isolated and denied the most basic rights. Being a 
kulak child meant that he or she, if  related to a first or second category kulak, lived in an area far 
away from their place o f origin. They were non-citizens or social outcast like their parents, with 
lim ited chances o f surviving. Such experiences (including the physically demanding transportation 
m any had experienced) had, with good reason, left the impression among them that the alternative 
to the Stalinist way o f living involved a life with increased mortality, disease epidemics and hunger. 
Alternatives to the Soviet system resulted in a person becoming a complete outsider or a “Blatnoi”, 
N ot everyone considered this as an alternative, therefore a majority of the excluded children 
logically decided to adhere to the demands o f  the Soviet regime. Under such circumstances it is not
^  Tlepeoe ececoiosHoe coeeu^amepa6oHUX upadomoi CTAXAHOBliEBy Moscow 1935, p. 49.
Viktor Zaslavsky, The neoStalinist state: class, ethnicity, and consensus in Soviet society. New York 1982.
^  David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation o f M odem Russian National 
Identity, 1931-1956, Cambridge Mass. 2002.
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surprising that kulak children desired the inclusion promised to them if they participated in the 
required education and socialisation. To survive, and be considered citizens o f the Soviet Union, 
clearly required that kulak children became either members o f the komsomol, the Communist Party, 
the trade union, had an education, an internal passport and a residence permit. All o f these also 
required that kulak children distanced themselves from their family background -  even if it was not 
always a guarantee. Without this it was difEcult to find proper work or even to exist. There were 
subsequently only very few options for kulak children: either they accepted the premises of the 
Soviet state and renounced their kulak background, or they remained outcasts like their parents 
constantly living under threat o f the Soviet state. The wish o f  kulak children to be included in 
society can be imderstood in the words o f Sheila Fitzpatrick as “survival strategies” : they had to 
survive and had to develop strategies in order to do so, even renouncing their parents^^
5.1.2 Kulak children and education
Political education reflected the way children in general were shaped by the Soviet state.^^ On 
several occasions kulak children lived alongside “non-enemy” children, which raises an uncertainty 
as to what extent there was a distinction between them.^* Nonetheless, kulak children were treated 
differently from other children, and were constantly subjected to a general distrust by the 
authorities. It was, for example, difficult to find schools for kulak children in the initial phase of the 
dekulakisation process, which seems paradoxically in the light o f the abovementioned elaboration 
on the quantity o f schools, clubs and institutions o f higher education in the special settlements. 
Something, nonetheless, suggests that kulak children were not given the same educational 
opportunities as other children. The lack o f  schools during the initial construction phase of the 
special settlements in 1930 forced the authorities to use facilities located outside the settlements in 
the nearby villages. In theory this was an easy manoeuvre, since the children simply had to be 
removed to a  school in a village. In reality it turned out to be problematic, and the OGPU realised in 
1932 that a  number o f kulak children were denied access to these schools due to the resistance of 
teachers and other local officials -  these officials did not distinguish between kulak children and 
their parents. The OGPU was concerned about the rejection o f  kulak children from classrooms, 
because it jeopardised the intention o f  eradicating the links between the generations of the
Fitzpatrick, 1994, pp. 24 Iff.
^  For more on this see: TsDAGO, f.l, op. 20, delo 6643, II. 41-42.
Maria Mishenchinka and Aleksandr Toshchev, «M tt U3 HzapKu» H e demacaji cydh6a dem cKoù m m u , Moscow 2000,
p. II .
Viola, ‘T ear the evil...”, 2000, pp. 53ff.
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designated class enemies: if  children were not allowed to attend school, how could they be exposed 
to the intended political indoctrination? Therefore, it was stressed that this procedure had to be 
changed immediately, and that kulak children should be permitted access to the schools outside the 
settlements.^®
Exclusion from the schools remained a problem for kulak children until at least the naid-1930s. In 
1936 the West Siberian department o f the People’s Commissariat o f Education recorded a 
widespread illiteracy and semi-literacy among the deported kulaks and their relatives. It was stated 
in Narym that 18,151 o f the 35,914 illiterates lived within the special settlements, which again 
implies that the deportees comprised more than 50% of the total illiterates and semi-literates o f the 
region. This would suggest that the special settlers had not received even the basic teaching, and 
consequently some remained excluded from the classrooms. Aside from this aspect, it is clear that 
the m ain ambition of educating kulak children was to renounce the agricultural tradition o f  their 
parents and by this we find a very important aspect of dekulakisation -  that is to remove all traces 
o f the kulaks from society. The children were given new skills unrelated to the farming traditions of 
their kulak parents. The homeless kulak children o f Narym were, for example, prepared for work in 
the tim ber and fishing industries:
Table 2: Professions o f  kulak children in deportation
1. Timber industry {lespromkkozy)
2. Sawmill Qeszavody)
3. Machine Tractor Stations {MTS)
4. Train service {Khozstantsi)
5. District union o f consumption {okrpotrebsoiuz)
6. Fishing industry (rybtrest)
7. Fur industry (sibpzishmm)
8. Multiple union o f  industries (M nogopromsoivz)
9. Typography
10. Timber chemistry
11. Post services
12. Trading {Sibtorg)
(Source: GATO, F. R-591, op.l, d. 97 II. 88 and 90)
30 Adibekov, 1994, pp. 158ff.
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What is significant about this table is that all o f the jobs were related to work located within the 
region o f their special settlements. Kulak children were given a formal right to leave the settlements 
in October 1938, however, they almost never returned to their place of birih.^^ And this right also 
had, as seen above, special notations with residency restrictions. When made possible kulak 
children moved to the larger towns o f the region and some gained higher education and found more 
permanent work there. In the case o f  Western Siberia this would indicate that kulak children 
primarily moved to Novosibirsk, Tomsk, and Omsk. These children were almost never allowed to 
live in Moscow, Leningrad or other more prestigious places.^^ The Soviet regime had quite efficient 
means to control this: namely the passport. All applications had to be handled by the local 
authorities that is the work place, house administration, or in the case of the special settlers the 
komendatura. The social background, and especially kulak ties, in this context did have great 
negative significance.^^ It is possible that kulak children, as in the case o f the voting rights, were 
able to gain a passport -  however, their social background would almost always be known to 
someone within the Soviet system. Thus, it was also more difficult for them to get a permanent 
residence permits in the larger cities.
5.1.3 Problems o f political education
The Soviet authorities had to consider who would be appropriate for fulfilling the required work of 
educating kulak children and how such teaching could be successfully carried through. Viola argues 
that one o f  the initial problems o f  1930 when the deportation o f kulaks and their families first 
began, was the recruitment of trustworthy teachers. When the construction o f the system of special 
settlements was in its initial stage everything was missing -  for example the whole system of 
schools had to be established out o f nothing. Therefore, the only teachers to be hired under such 
circumstances were the deported kulaks. Thus, the regime was confironted by a dilemma: how could 
the education be carried through satisfactorily if  the enemies o f  the people conducted the teaching 
themselves?^'* Such speculation regarding the trustworthiness o f  Soviet officials also applied to how
Jonathan Bone has elaborated on what happened to the kulaks afterwards; see: Jonathan Bone, “Peasant Life after die 
Gulag” (discussion paper presented at the annual convention of AASSS 20-23 November 2003 held in Toronto).
This information was given to the author in August 2003 during a conversation with the Siberian professor, S.A. 
Krasilnikov, who is a descendent of a kulak.
Gijs Kessler, The Peasant and the Town. Rural-Urban Migration in the Soviet Union. 1929-40 (unpublished Ph.d. 
Thesis submitted at the European University Institute, 2001).
”  Viola, "Tear the Evil”, 2000, p. 54.
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the Soviet authorities in general strove to solve the question o f  the political organisation o f  society — 
who were reliable?^^
Closely connected to this is the problem o f recruiting trustworthy Komsomol and Pioneer 
members from among the kulak children. When elaborating upon the content of education it was 
established that the matter of “constitution” -  including “Soviet constitution” was o f  great 
significance and that it had to be carried through by the Komsomol and Pioneer members. As in 
the recruitment of teachers, the Stalinist regime had to enrol the members of these two 
organisations from among the kulak children. From a quantitative perspective the recruitment was 
a success. In a registration o f kulak orphans between the age o f 14 and 17 in 1938, we learn that in 
the U st’-Chuzhan Raion one out o f two children were Pioneers. In Novosibirsk fifteen out of 
twenty children were enrolled in the Pioneer organisation, and o f the remaining five children two 
became Komsomol members; in Bokchar twenty-six out o f thirty-six children were Pioneers; in 
Kruglov all thirty-one children were Pioneers, and the distribution in Grishkin was seventeen out 
o f  th irty  children; In V as’iugan thirteen out o f  seventeen were Pioneers, and four out o f five had 
been enrolled in Aipolov. In Toin twenty-seven out of thirty-two were Pioneer, and the remaining 
were Komsomol members.^^
T able  3: The recruitment of kulak Pioneers and Komsomol members in Western Siberian
orphanages in 1938
Orphanages Pioneer members Komsomol members Pet. o f political active 
kulak children
U st’-Chuzhan 1 o f 2 - 50
Novosibirsk 15 of 20 2 of 20 85
Bokchar 26 of 36 - 72,2
Kruglov 31 of31 - 100
Grishkin 17 of 35 - 48,6
Vas’iugan 13 of 17 - 76,5
Aipolov 4 o f 5 - 80
Toin 27 of 32 5 of 32 100
(Source: GATO, F. R-591, op. 1, delo 98, II. 168-171)
35 See for example N.K. Krupskaya, “BwciyiuieHHx na coBepmaHHH saae^ iyiODHix KpañoHo” (First published in the 
journal Hapodnoe npocseu^enue, no. 3-4,1929), here pp. 7-14 in N.K. Krupskaya UedazozmecKue cohuhchvíi e mecmu 
moMox, TOM HeTBepTuii (1929-1930), Moskva 1979.
GATO, f. r-591, op. 1, delo 98,11.168-171.
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Kulak children remained opposed to the Stalinist regime despite these enrolments, and on several 
occasions the authorities reported a number o f disciplinary problems amongst Pioneers and 
Komsomol members. In an investigation o f the Bokchar orphanage from 4 to 9 September 1937 it 
was recorded that a number of problems related to the behaviour o f kulak children had risen. On 
one occasion a Komsomol member was supposed to have said, while he and a number of other 
children stood under the picture o f  Stalin: “You are here friends, look and remember what he 
[Stalin] has done for your parents”. In another incident, the inspection team found pictures of Stalin, 
Lenin, Maix, Engels and Zhdanov tom  to pieces in the canteen, which was interpreted as a sign of 
resistance. Similar incidents were recorded in all the other orphanages o f  Narym, and a report 
from the West Siberian Communist Party Committee on 16 December 1936 read: “Despite the 
enormous work conducted by the division o f the working settlements of the department of the 
People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (OTP UNKVD) in the orphanages o f the West Siberian 
Krai (ZAPSIBkrai) [ ...]  [the orphanages] are in a difficult situation”.^  ^One o f the problems noticed 
was the “Weak condition of the work o f Communist upbringing o f  children” .^^  The following day, 
17 December 1936, the Children’s Commission o f Western Siberia {detkomissi p o  Zapsihkrai) 
narrowed the problems to the following: disciplinary; teachers leaving the orphanages; the poor 
standard o f  school material; and bad sanitary conditions within most of the orphanages.'^^ This 
supports the above assessment that kulak children were not passive to the oppressing regime, but 
instead reacted to their situation.
The disciplinary problem was never rectified, or at least still remained a concern at the end of the 
1930s. A case from a Novosibirsk nursery school in 1937 illustrates this. An inspector overheard a 
child stating: “I do not need Stalin, I kiss the Tsar”, but the child was not identified. Subsequently 
the inspector started an investigation in order to find the child. He gathered all the children in the 
canteen to have a serious talk about what he had heard and to make sure that the children 
understood how caring and loving Stalin and Lenin were. Afterwards, when the children were 
preparing their dinner, a boy came to the inspector and revealed that he had heard another boy 
saying: “I will take a  revolver, go to M oscow and shoot Stalin” . Another child confirmed this, and 
this time the inspector managed to identify the child. The responsible teacher o f the nursery school 
was told o f the incident by the inspector, and as she paid no attention to it, the matter was forwarded
GANO, f. r-61, op. 1 delo 1452,1.34. 
GANO, f. r-895, op. 2, delo 4,1.11-13. 
GANO, f. r-895, op. 2, delo 4 ,1.16.
40 Ibid.
GANO, f. r-895. op. 1, delo 184,1.82.
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to the local authorities. Because there had been several complaints about her the nursery school 
teacher was dismissed for negligence. The remarkable aspect about this story is that adults 
w orking with children were constantly aware o f  what children said, and interpreted their statements 
w ith  the greatest o f  care. I f  not, they would be condemned by other inspectors. Another report from 
6 N ovem ber 1938 details the situation of the Tutal’ orphanage o f  Taigin raion, the Malo-Pichan 
orphanage o f Maiin raion and the Tatar orphanage. This report again focused on inefficient political 
upbringing, and the director of the Tatar orphanage, the Communist Party activists, the Komsomol 
and the Pioneers were made responsible for this. Resistance tov^rards the Stalinist regime and a basic 
inefficiency could, in other words, be detected at every level within the local structure, which
underlines the extent o f the problem.43
5. i .  4  The ambiguous manner o f speaking
In order to understand the nature of these problems we need to accept that Soviet documents are 
very often ambiguous; in other words, that certain statements may have had different implications. 
W hen, for example, the West Siberian Communist Party Committee on 16 December 1936 
diagnosed resistance among orphan special settlers, it could also be understood as a way whereby 
the officials protected themselves from any criticism. Instead o f focusing on their own part o f the 
problem , meaning that they had not prevented these incidents from occurring or even rectified them, 
they could always explain the problems as being something that emerged from among the children 
them selves -  it was, for example, never disputed as to whether the OTP UNKVD actually had done 
adequate work within the West Siberian orphanages.'*^ The children were made the scapegoat, 
w hich diverted attention from the incompetence o f the system away from the real problem -  the 
repressive policies of the regime. This would also explain the nature o f the problem addressed -  
nam ely that the regime considered itself to be without any responsibility, and that any inconsistency 
em erging would come from a stubborn population, or a population, that was “backward” and 
“ignorant” -  holding back development.
Returning to the zeal o f the regime, addressed before, from the point o f the Soviet regime the 
projects were correct, as they offered society a  key to a bright future. I f  the price for this was to 
deport unwanted peasants and their families in order to reorder and discipline society as such -  and 
agriculture in particular -  it was a price that had to be paid. Society was, as Stalin claimed in April
GANO, f. r-61, op. 1, délo 1602,11. 68-69, 71. 
GATO, f. r-591, op. 1, délo 103,1.1.
^  GANO, f. r-895, op. 2, délo 4,1.16.
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1929, facing a turbulent period, and the leadership had to show willingness. In this atmosphere of 
ideological devotion the authorities rarely confronted the core o f  the problem -  that is, that the 
repressive policy against their parents had led to this situation. When, for example, the authorities 
had problems with undisciplined kulak orphans it would never be discussed whether or not it had 
been wrong to dehumanise and deport their families -  this was, after all, the main reason for 
children being homeless or orphans. Children could not be unaffected, either emotionally or 
physically, by the turmoil they had experienced. When they did react the regime would, apparently, 
respond as if  it did not understand the cause. So, instead o f  reconsidering the policy fundamentally, 
it was argued that the “Communist upbringing” o f the orphanages was weak and that it had to be 
strengthened -  discipline would still be required despite the above problems.
Another aspect o f this ambiguity was the nature o f the resistance among the children directed 
against the Soviet regime. If we re-evaluate this “weak Communist upbringing” a more complex 
picture than the one being reproduced in the above reports may be detected. The tearing to pieces of 
the pictures o f  Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, as recorded in Bokchar orphanage in September 
1937 is difficult to explain as anything but resistance. Yet the phrase, as made by one of the 
Komsomol member under a picture o f Stalin, can be interpreted differently: “You are here fiiends, 
look and remember what he [Stalin] has done for your parents”. Here the member was speaking to a 
certain audience -  other kulak children. They understood the message in one way, yet they could at 
the same time argue that the inspection team  had misunderstood it. When addressing other children, 
the message may very well have been negative -  that whatever came from the regime was bad. On 
the other hand, it could also be argued that it was a positive expression: “ ...look and remember 
what he [Stalin] has done for your parents” can be interpreted as a way o f emphasising that the 
kulak parents had been offered a  more privileged way o f living by being re-educated by the Soviet 
regime in Narym. “You are h ere ...” suggests that the regime offered children a  more conect 
education, upbringing and care taking in the oiphanages.^^ Consequently, it is important to 
remember that when addressing a particular document on “inconsistency” and “disciplinary 
problems”, its content expresses the view o f  the Soviet regime and not necessarily what actually 
happened.
GANG, f. r-895, op. 2, d e lo 4 ,1 11-13.
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5.2 Propaganda and kulak children
5.2,1 Political manipulation
The discussion, which w e shall follow more closely, is whether the above difficulties necessarily 
proved the teaching o f kulak children to be an ineffective exercise. Did the Soviet regime at any 
tim e abandon its initial encounter with the kulak families, because it realised the political education 
o f  the children was problematic? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to conduct a more 
thorough analysis o f the language tised in relation to kulak children. Peter Kenez has defined the 
Soviet regimes as a Propaganda state, in the sense that the leaders believed it possible to organise 
society through propaganda. It is given that V.I. Lenin found it necessary to implement the 
Bolshevik revolution through propaganda, agitation  and organisation -  society was to be organised 
through propaganda, which was agitated by specialists (activists of the communist party).“*^  A  form 
o f  communication would be through art, books, films, cartoons, radio programmes and other 
cultural productions. While the cultural landscape o f the Soviet Union was fairly manifold during 
the 1920s, with a number o f cultural fractions, unification occurred during the First Congress o f  
S oviet Writers in 1934 -  where the premises o f “socialist realism” were defined. This unification 
w as closely connected to the abovementioned victory of Stalin, during the Congress o f Victors in 
1934. “Socialist realism” introduced a more ideological rhetoric, and every development o f  society 
w as understood within the framework o f the evolution towards Communism -  and especially the 
Stalinist version. Life was not to be reproduced as it was, but rather as it was supposed to be in a 
grand historical context."*^ One o f the main inventors o f “socialist realism” was Maksim Gorky, who 
also paid attention to the position o f kulak children.
G orky used his speech during the congress presenting the myth o f  Pavlik Morozov. Although 
Pavlik, in reality, was a son o f a chairman o f a  rural Soviet in an isolated and not yet collectivised 
village, Gorky presented him as a kulak son and Pioneer, who felt repulsion towards his father’s 
hiding o f grain. Thus, Pavlik saw no other option but to turn his father in for treason.^* In other 
words, he was the ultimate hero for whom the cause of the state and Communist Party was much 
m ore important than his family ties. This myth was strengthened when Pavlik and his brother Fedor 
were murdered in 1932 -  who committed this murder is unclear, but his grandfather, grandmother
^  Peter Kenez, The Birth o f the Propaganda State. Soviet Methods o f Mass Mobilization 1917-1929, Cambridge 1985. 
Philip Boobbyer, The Stalin Era, London 2000, p. 109.
lurii Druzhnikov, Bosnecenue UaejiUKa Moposoea, London 1988, pp. 30-55 and Catriona Kelly, Comrade Pavlik. 
The R ise and Fall o f  a Soviet Boy Hero, London 2005, pp. xxii-xxiii.
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and uncles were accused and the young Pavlik was turned into a  Communist icon.^^ The interesting 
aspect is that Gorky, by presenting Pavlik as a hero, in theory also included kulak children in the 
construction o f Soviet society: as long as they denounced the hostility to the state by their parents, 
these children could be defined as being fiiends o f the revolution. The nature o f such inclusion was 
discussed above, yet we should be aware that the Soviet regime believed that it was reaching out a 
hand to kulak children -  even if  such a hand implied renunciation o f  their family ties.^®
Catriona Kelly has argued that even i f  Soviet propaganda aimed at children was initiated by 
Lenin’s death in 1924, 1934 marked a change. It was here pictures o f Stalin appeared more often in 
magazines for the Pioneers, and the relationship of the ruler and children began to  become more 
significant, intimate and passionate in Soviet propaganda.^' This was closely coimected to the 
general situation o f  society, in which the celebration o f heroism and personalities became even 
stronger fi:om 1929 onwards. Heroes were found in most sectors o f society, as a  contrast to the 
“enemy o f  the people”. The best example o f  this is, of course, the Donbass miner, A.G. Stakhanov, 
who over-fulfilled his quota and consequently had a  whole movement called after him -  the 
Stakhanovite workers. He was celebrated in  November 1935 during the Stakhanovite-congress in 
Moscow, which was also a celebration o f  Stalin, his henchmen and the Soviet system.
The relationship between the Stalinist leadership and children took a very distinct direction in 
1936 when the myth o f “the happy childhood” was launched. This happiness should be imderstood 
in psychological rather than materialistic terms, since it was related to the awareness o f  the beauty 
o f  Communism. The children o f the Soviet Union had a project to fight for, which officially was 
reflected by enormotis gratitude to the Soviet leaders, who were dearly thanked for giving the 
Soviet children the opportunity o f gaining an insight in this best way o f living.^'* A very interesting 
element of this happiness theme originates firom the small transpolar town of Igarka, where a 
significant newspaper editor arrived in 1935 -  Lenin’s former secretary Valentina Petrovna 
Ostroumova. She saw  a  possibility in encouraging children to write about their life, in this, the land
Fitzpatrick, 1994, pp. 255-56 and Kelly, 2005, p. 1 ff.
See for example the conclusion in A.P. Finarov, ”K eonpocy o J iH K s n a a u H H  K y jia* iecT B a  K a x  K j ia c c a  h  cym>5e
6 w B m H X  KyjiaKOB b  CCCP” 273-279 in Mcmopim Coeemacozo KpecmbJiHcmea u kojixoshozo cmpoumejihcmea e CCCP, 
Moscow 1963, pp. 277-278.
Catriona Kelly ’’Uncle Stalin and Grandpa Lenin: Soviet Leader Cults for Little Children” pp. 102-122 in EA . Rees 
et al. (ed.) The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorship^ London 2004, p. 106.
“  E.A. Rees “Leader Cults: Varieties, Preconditions and Functions” pp. 3-26 in E.A. Rees et al. (ed.) The Leader Cult 
in Communist Dictatorship^ London 2004, p. 106.
riepeoe ececotosHoe coseutanuepa6onux upadoHutf CTAXAHOBILEB, Moscow 1935.
^A.K. Sokolov (pred.red.), Odufecmeo u ejtacmb 1930-e zodbt. IloeecmeoeaHue e doKyMenmaXy Moscow 1998, p. 299 
and Kelly, 2004, p. 108 and p. 111 ff.
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o f frontiers.^^ Every day people could read stories about how wonderful it was to be a child in the 
furthest reaches of the Soviet Union. At one point some -  it is not clear who (although A.M. 
Klimov takes the credit) -  saw the possibility o f  publishing these short accounts. In 1938, they were 
published under the title Afw la  M zapm  (Us from Igarka). The book was a collection o f  letters by 
children in which they described their daily life: what it was like to be a child in Stalin’s Soviet 
Union; to go to school; to join the Pioneer and Komsomol organisations; to organise cultural and 
political exhibitions, and games.^^ They lived on the frontier of culture and nature, or o f civilisation 
and the Taiga and Tundra It was not easy to get there; in fact one had to expect more than a week’s 
travel from the European areas o f the Soviet Union -  most notably Moscow -  by train, boat and by 
foot. Igarka was a typical frontier town, whose main enterprise was timber. It was a new town and 
all its inhabitants had moved there: either voluntarily -  in order to seek wealth and prosperity -  or 
as deportees during dekulakisation from 1930 to late 1932 -  early 1933. The surroundings did not 
make life easy, but the book told o f how everyone worked hard and how the children especially 
were aware of educating themselves, and thereby develop the cultural sphere of their hometown.^^ 
Although M u m  H zapm  (Us from Igarka) (1938) was forgotten for almost fifty years, it is an 
excellent example o f how the ideal childhood was portrayed in the Soviet Union. To be a  child did 
not mean complete innocence. The book was in many ways part o f  an overall manipulation in 
which the childhood o f  the post-revolutionary Soviet Union was seen as being endlessly happy.^* 
Kulak children lived side by side with non-enemy children in Igarka, and were offered the same 
educational and living conditions.^^ Igarka was a case-study o f  how  the Soviet regime defined 
children in general and kulak children in particular. By December 1935, or so the editor o f  M u la  
MzapKU relates to us in his preface, the children contacted Maksim Gorky in order to seek his 
literary assistance.
Dear Aleksei Maksimovich,
This letter is written to you by thousands of pioneers and school pupils from 
the transpolar town of Igarka...Now the sun is not sh in in g  at us. We only see 
the daylight for three hours. In the remaining hours it is Polar nighttimes -
Mishenchinka and Toshchev, 2000, p. 8.
A.M. Klimov (red.), Mta V3 MzaptoL Khu2o, HOnucaHHOSi nuonepoMu zanojtxpbx no soMtia^ u many AneKcesi 
A/apicoffiivdt/cpbico^o, Moscow 1938.
Ibid., pp. 5-9 and pp. 12-14.
^*SokoIov, 1998, p. 299.
’’ Mischenchinka and Toschchev, 2000, p. 11.
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often frost and snowstorm. Yet our life, Aleksei Maksimovich, is not dark and 
gloomy, but happy and good...W e live a cultural and cheerful life...W e -  the 
pupil o f  the fifth school -  live cheerful, intrepid and well with the whole 
tow n...A ll the conditions for a  good, complete, cheerful and serious study o f 
life has been given to us, children o f the transpolar region, by the party, the 
Soviet power and our loving leader -  Comrade Stalin...Thank you for this 
good life to Comrade Stalin, thank you Molotov, Voroshilov, Kalinin, thanks 
to the whole Communist Party and the Soviet state...
(source: A.M. Klimov M ti m  MzapKiu Knnza, HamtcaHHOft nuonepoMU sanojuipbfi no 
zoMtaaiy u wiany AjiCKceji MapKoeuna FopbKOZOt Moscow 1938, pp. 15-16)
Gorky responded to the letter from the Crimea on 15 December 1935 by stating:
A hearty greeting to you, doctors, engineers, tank soldiers, poets, pilots, 
teachers, actors, inventor, geologists o f the future!
It was a  nice letter you sent me. Its simple and clear words shine rich with 
your courage and your clear consciousness about the road to the highest goal 
o f life, about the road to the goal, which your fathers and grandfathers have 
put in front o f you, and in front o f  all working people o f the world.
(Klimov, 1938, p. 23)
The French writer, Roman Roland, was likewise contacted by the Igarka children. He chose a 
similar heroic tone in his reply:
Here [in Switzerland] many are unemployed, and the children who finish 
school, do not know how to survive. And when their parents are unemployed, 
the children are very unhappy. But, maybe, we in the West will also discover 
the victory o f Socialism!
(Klimov 1938, p. 28.)
Soviet children, in other words, had something which children o f the western capitalist world were 
denied: safety, prosperity and the correct ideology. There was naturally resistance from kulak 
children, especially towards this public portrayal o f  life in  Igarka: on several occasions it was 
recorded that kulak children threw stones at pictures o f  Stalin. However, it was not the children who
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were blamed, but instead their parents for conducting an upbringing that was class-hostile or, in 
other words, ‘‘the product of the class enemy”.^ ® The correspondences between Gorky, Roland and 
the Igarka children coincided with the moment Stalin issued his statement that “a son does not 
answer for his father*’. Thus, it appears convincing that Stalin’s statement must have initially been 
motivated by this increasing ideologisation o f Soviet childhood by 1934-36. The question is how 
the experiences of kulak children could be related to the above happiness found in the public 
rhetoric -  after all, many of them lived in physical isolation as relatives of special settlers. The 
reasoning must have been that although there were difficulties in implementing the Communist 
project, society, and also kulak children, would in the longer-term benefit fi’om the measures taken 
by the state. In the film Lenin in 1918, produced in 1939, Lenin and Stalin were depicted sitting on 
a bench with a small girl between them. While both were looking at the girl Stalin said; “Look, 
Vladimir Ilich \pointing to the girl], for whose sake we must be merciless to our enemies. She will 
not live like us, but better than us” .^ * Such a  notion reproduces the content of “socialist realism”; 
every event had to be understood within a broader historical context. Even if  kulak children saw the 
darker side of the regime, they were, or so must the assumption have been, offered something from 
which they benefited in the longer term: the beautiful Communist project.
The happiness of Soviet childhood was constructed upon the basis o f  the loving leaders: Lenin 
represented the dedushka and Stalin the diadia.^^ This also applied to the discourse used in relation 
to orphan kulak children, which can be supported by a proclamation issued at seven different 
orphanages in Narym by 1940:
The Communist Party and the Soviet government are especially concerned about the 
people’s education. Vladimir Ilich Lenin has already said that the task o f the yoimg 
generation was to study, study, and study. Josef Vissarionovich Stalin, the leader o f the 
working people, loving father and fiiend o f the young uses every means to fulfil the 
testament of Lenin, so that the workforce o f  the USSR becomes educated ...
(source: GATO, f. r-501, op. 1, delo 133, U. 7 ,11 ,12 ,15 .16)
The interesting aspect here is the use of the words “father” in relation to Stalin and “testament” in 
relation to the continuation o f Lenin’s educational policy. This is a  rhetoric applied to a bourgeois 
family, where the generations played a significant role in reproducing a specific way o f living.
“ Ibid,pp. 10-11.
‘‘The picture and text is reproduced in Boobyer, 2000, p 209.62 Kelly, 2004.,
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Society as such was supposed to  become the “large family” by the end o f the 1930s, in which the 
leader o f the state was akin to being a father and grandfather. This places the quotation of Gork}^  
who talked about fathers and grandfathers showing the w ay to the highest goal, in an interesting 
context From the above it is possible to conclude that Stalin was the father and Lenin the 
grandfather. Kulak children, as with Soviet children in general, should in other words find the care 
taking not fi'om their families and biological parents but rather fi-om society, the state and, of 
course, Stalin and Lenin. In addition it is important to remember that kulak children were taught 
about their parent’s hostility, whenever they were subjected to political myths such as Pavlik 
Morozov. These children were subjected to such rhetoric, whether they lived in the orphanages, 
went to school or to university, joined the Pioneers or Komsomol, or when they were enrolled in the 
anny and at work. They may not have believed it, yet they were aware o f  the expectations of the 
regime on this issue. This also suggests that the intention o f  state remained more or less unaltered 
concerning this, despite difficulties in implementing the educational programme: kulak children 
were expected to detest their class-hostile parents.
5.2.2 The perception o f Soviet propaganda
The question is whether kulak children believed the propaganda, and if they ever accepted that their 
parents were class enemies. It is a difficult question, since certain actions may be motivated either 
by sincere belief, or by “survival strategy” . After all, the alternatives to the Stalinist state were 
minimal -  it is, for example, questionable as to whether a person actually could survive as a Blatnoi 
his or her whole life. With this in  mind, Jochen Hellbeck has an interesting point in his analysis of 
the diary by a kulak son, Stepan Podlubnyi, which was written in the years fi-om 1931 to 1939 -  the 
very period being analysed. Hellbeck argues that this source clearly presents a picture o f a son who 
detested his father. The father was “old fashioned” and “ridiculous”, and only prevented the family 
and, o f course, the son from gaining the necessary insight into the “truth” o f  the state. It was almost 
like liberation for the family w hen the father was dekulakised. Hellbeck concludes that the young 
Stepan, by writing his diary, w as forming a  certain Stalinist identity, which was heavily influenced 
by the rhetoric he encountered in school or in similar public places. Stepan believed in the stories he 
was told about Pavlik Morozov and others.^^ The argument can be supported by the memoirs of the 
Soviet émigré, Boris Weil, who remembers that: “The achievement of Pavlik Morozov, denouncing 
his father and thus becoming a Pioneer hero, worried me and my consciousness was troubled. I was
Jochen Hellbeck, ’’Fashionmg the Stalinist Soul: The Diaiy o f Stepan Podlubnyi (1931-1939)” pp. 344-373 in 
Jahrbücher fü r G eschicke Osteuropas^ band 44 (1996), pp. 355-56.
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tormented by division: on the one hand I ate the honey cakes [his father had brought home to the 
family from work in a  cake factory], on the other hand I wanted to go to the militsia or the factory 
and report that my father pilfered”.^  Though he was not exhilarated about the situation, as 
Podlubnyi seems to have been, the effect o f  Soviet propaganda evidently made Boris Weil consider 
the action of his parents potentially wrong -  that is against the interest o f the Soviet state. This 
would imply that the Soviet regime awoke an emotional attitude in children, who had no 
recollection about what life had been before the October Revolution, and that this created certain 
scepticism between the generations.
There is, however, a problem with such an interpretation, as kulak children could hardly have 
acted differently. Even if  Podlubnyi was writing his personal diary, he was raised in a society where 
the possibility o f being denounced as a class enemy was ever-present. The aforementioned 
atmosphere o f being aware about children’s actions emphasised this. Podlubnyi knew that under 
such circumstances his diary could have been used as evidence against him, and he very well may 
have written it with this in mind. The question therefore is why Stephan Podlubnyi acclaimed the 
dekulakisation o f his father? German scholars have striven to explain the phenomenon o f  public 
support o f a non-democratic state by the concept o f “Rausch”, which refers to a certain emotional 
condition. The word is akin to “drunkenness” or “intoxication”, which refers to a condition where 
rational logic has been temporary s u s p e n d e d . I t  is important to emphasis that Rausch is not 
collective but entirely individual, and therefore the concept should serve to explain how individuals 
are willing to kill and vandalise in the name o f an ideology, and support a  dictatorial tyrant. The 
emotional intoxication o f the population can, from this perspective, be used as an instrument in 
order to mobilise citizens for a common cause. The question is, o f course, to what extent Rausch 
applies to the support by kulak children o f the Stalinist regime. Were they mentally intoxicated by 
the propaganda they were subjected to during their upbringing in the orphanages and schools o f the 
special settlements? One might argue that in the case o f  Stepan Podlubnyi, this idea could well 
apply. Given that he had been subjected to manipulation by the Soviet regime, it makes sense how a 
boy would be emotionally exhilarated and in a moment o f Rausch believe that his own father was 
an “enemy” o f the people.
^  Boris Weil, Ocoöo onacHbiü, London 1980, p. 21.
Arpad v. Kümo and Malte Rolf, ,Jlasuch und Diktatur” pp. 877-895 in Zeitschrift fü r  Geschichtswissenschaft 51. 
Jahrgang 2003, Heft 10 and Matthias Braun, „Vremja Golovokni&nija -  Zeit des Scv/inJels. Der Alkoholische Rausch 
als Geste kulturellen Beharrens in der Sowjetunion der 1920er- und 1930er- Jahre“ pp. 896-911 in Zeitschrift fü r  
Geschichtswissenschaft 5 1. Jahrgang 2003, Heft 10.
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The rational logic is, however, only temporarily suspended and subsequently does not entirely 
vanish in a moment o f  Rausch, and thus it is more problematic to explain the permanent impact of 
official rhetoric on Podlubnyi diary writing -  it was, after all, written over a period o f  8 years. This 
would give the impression of a more established psychological idea, which undermines the validity 
o f Rausch. Mikhail Geller has argued that the Soviet power strove to create the new Soviet man 
(“Homo Sovieticus”) by the means o f ideologising. This is not the same as to argue that every act 
made by the Soviet Union was determined by a distinct ideology, in this case Communism, but 
rather that public rhetoric, to which kulak children also were subjected, was permeated by a very 
strong ideological discourse. In newspapers, films, cartoons, radio programmes, and books these 
children, as with Soviet children in general, were presented w ith a  notion o f  a country in a constant 
danger: either from external or internal enemies. Terrorists, saboteurs, Trotskyites, kulaks and 
fascists all jeopardised the beautiful Communist project. The constant stories about how enemies 
had successfully undermined national security, which explained why it was necessary to use the 
harshest means in order to secure the survival o f .the Soviet state, created paranoia in Soviet society. 
This idea constructed a distinct psychological map among the citizens; people might not have 
believed every detail of what they heard in  public propaganda, but they knew it was necessary to 
follow the public discourse in order to avoid discrimination and exclusion.^^ We can, as in relation 
to the education o f  kulak children, discuss the effect o f such propaganda, but, to use Michel 
Foucault’s theory on subjectivity, kulak children were subjected to the dominating discourse of 
Soviet society, which was extremely difficxilt to avoid. We shall return to what such experiences 
did to kulak children, when as old people they recalled their lives in the special settlements.
5.2.3 Kulak children and class struggle
This leads to a discussion about the definition o f kulak children in the Soviet public discourse more 
thoroughly. Were they defined as “enemies” as their parents? Did such definition o f  the “enemy” 
change, and if  so, how did it affect these children? In order to answer this question it must be 
remembered that these children would always be aware that the effort o f  becoming full-citizens 
implied a risk o f  being rejected by the Soviet functionaries -  this became particularly clear, when 
we discussed the request of Elizabet Kirilovich Zykova from 1935. The content o f  Soviet education 
in the special settlements was to weaken the position o f kulaks, and through political indoctrination
“  Mikhail Geller, M cauma u eunmiiKU  ^London 1985.
Michel Foucault, “The Subject and the Power” pp. 326-348 in James D. Faubion, Michel Foucault. Power. The 
essential works 5, London 1994.
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to implement Soviet techniques and moral standards among kulak children. In other words, to 
undermine the economic basis of the traditional Russian peasantry (the family) and to construct a 
new socialist agriculture. The class terminology permeated the rhetoric o f education at the 
beginning of the 1930s, and in several correspondences among Soviet officials o f the People’s 
Commissariat o f  Education (NKPros) it was discussed how such a struggle could be carried through 
also m  relation to children. Already by 1929 the Central Committee o f  the Ukrainian Komsomol 
decided to “ ... conduct a purge o f  social-alien elements from the VUZy [institutes o f  higher 
education]”.^  ^ In a later Komsomol resolution from 1929, regarding “the ideological and political 
situation of Komsomol” it was further stressed that: “The increased class struggle around the 
socialist reconstruction o f the country has in its development also the class front in the struggle for 
the yoimg. The kulak in union with the landlords and under the assistance o f former people {byvshii 
Uudi) and kulak henchmen (podkulachniki) use all their strength, in order to get at least part o f 
youth to follow them”.^ ® Such rhetoric suggests that kulak children and young people, and other 
similar descendents o f class enemies must have been regarded with certain distrust, at least in the 
initial phase o f dekulakisation. The age differentiation o f kulak descendents has to be noted, since 
those older than 15 years, automatically were conceived as being “socially dangerous”.^  ^ This 
would raise an uncertainty whether such class struggle, as advocated by the Komsomol in 1929, 
also affected the interrelations of children younger than 15 years old.
Lynne Viola argues that the official aim o f the Soviet regime was not to exclude kulak children. 
Investigation o f the educational policy does give an impression o f  inclusion — even if  there were 
conditions. Theory is one thing, practices another and it quickly proved to be extremely difficult to 
realise the plan of providing kulak children with equal educational rights. The vivid phenomenon o f 
denying kulak children access to the schools located outside o f the special settlements has already 
been mentioned. Such treatment was a negative discrimination, as it placed kulak children in a 
worse situation than non-enemy children. Krupskaya described the dilemma o f defining kulak 
children in an article from 1929:
GANO, f  t-61, op. 1, delo 1127,11.9-10. 
TsDAGO, f. 1, op. 20, delo 2908,1.60. 
™Ibid., 1. 117.
Kokurin and Petrov, 2000 pp. 108-9,
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A young child’s parents are arrested. He goes along the street 
crying...Everyone is sorry for him, but nobody can make up his mind to 
adopt him, or take him into the home: “After all, he is the son o f a 
kulak.. .There might be unpleasant consequences.”
(Source: Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin's Peasants. Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village 
after Collectivization^ New York 1994, p. 219)
Such suspicion suggests that some would consider kulak children as class enemies, even if others 
would be more hesitant. Many non-enemy teachers and other officials often discriminated against 
kulak children, and they would experience such procedures as being degrading: On 23 October 
1934 the kulak son, V. Bushmanov wrote to Krupskaya explaining his situation in an orphanage in 
the Northern Russian town o f Krasno-Vishersk. Along with a  number o f other kulak children 
Bukhmanov had lived in deportation in the special settlements and resettled in the children’s home 
and was offered a  basic education. He explained that he received food, and that the teachers 
generally treated them well. At one point, however, Bushmanov reveals a very interesting aspect: it 
was extremely difficult to get rid of the stigma “special settlers”, even though they were children 
and not adolescents or even adult kulaks. He states, “Soviet functionaries still call us these special 
migrants wherever we go it is always special migrants, but we are hurt that we all attend school 
together, and we are called special migrants. What kind o f special migrants are we when we have 
been re-educated in the new way we are going to defend the Soviet Union.. .?”^^  This letter suggests 
that people working with children found it difficult to distinguish between kulaks and their children, 
and that this uncertainty existed as late as 1934. Hence kulak children yoimger than 15 years old 
would experience discrimination.
5.2.4 Social discrimination
In his elaboration on the construction o f  Soviet countryside, L. Kritsman discusses the social 
composition of school pupils. He was, i f  we recall, one o f  the spokespersons o f  the Marxist 
Agrarians and established that a capitalist farmer threatened the Russian peasantry by exploitation 
and grain speculation. One o f the indicators for such exploitation was, according to Kritsman, the 
overrepresentation o f  kulak children in local schools. He spoke o f  well-to-do (zazhitochnyi) rather
72 Fitzpatrick, 1994, p. 219.
^  A.K. Sokolov (predred.), Oóufecmeo u esacm\> 1930-e eodti. IJoeecmeoeoHue e doKyMenmax, Moskva 1998, p. 335. 
Translated in Lewis Siegelbaum, Stalinism as a  W c^ o f Life. A Narrative in Documents^ New Haven 2000, p. 403.
L. Kritsman, Knaccoeoe Pacatoenue e CoeemcKou depeene^ Moscow 1926, pp. 3ff.
154
than rich peasants (kulaki) indicating that even he had difficulties detecting the strata o f self- 
peipetuating and exploitative kulaks within Soviet peasantry. Nonetheless, he asserts that 30% of all 
pupils were children o f zazhitochnyi, even i f  they only comprised between 4 and 9% o f the total 
number o f peasant households by 1924. He also stresses that 41% o f the pupils were children o f poor 
peasants, which would indicate that their proportion was larger than that of zazhitochnyi. Yet poor 
peasants comprised 74% of all the households, indicating that the number o f pupils was 
disproportional.
Table 4 Social composition o f school pupils in 1924 according to L. Kritsman
Poor Peasants Middle Peasants Zazhitochnyi
% o f  households 74 17(22) 9(4)
%  o f  pupils 41 29 30
(source: L. Kritsman, Knaccoeoe Pacaioenue e CoeemcKou depeeue, Moscow 1926, p.l52)
There is a suggestion that key persons in the Soviet leadership were concerned by such 
disproportionate numbers in the mid-1920s. From 1925 to 1929 the school authorities in the cities 
experienced a decline in the proportion o f working class children, implying that the expected allies 
o f the regime were losing ground in the primary schools. The problem became even greater as this 
development was accompanied by a rise in the quantity o f  children with white collar background 
(among others, children o f the intelligentsia). This dilemma was clearer when the statistics analysed 
the composition of older pupils. In 1926 working class children comprised 47.72% o f  the total 
number o f Moscowian pupils in the grade, whereas white collar children comprised 33.29%. The
same distribution for 9* grade pupils was 18.61% of working children and 68.02% of white collar 
children. This suggests that white collar children tended to be more successM in the Soviet schools, 
and thus the Soviet authorities would depend on these children in development o f a new Soviet 
intelligentsia, rather than the ones they preferred: that is the working class children, A  similar 
development was recorded in the countryside from 1924 to 1926, where fewer poor peasants were 
admitted, while the proportion of children o f  middle and well-to-do peasants rose by almost 50%.
The highest department o f socialist upbringing (Glavsotsvos) was aware by this development, and 
advocated for massive changes. One o f  the changes proposed was a discriminative policy directed 
against children o f unwanted social groups, with socially imwanted children being excluded from
’^Ibid.. p. 152.
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schools/^ This was not a new occurrence in a Russian context: The Tsarist Minister o f Education 
had as early as June 1887 launched a similar strike on children from an undesirable social 
backgrotmd -  that is, children o f coachmen, cooks, washerwomen, small shopkeepers etc. This 
procedure was legalised by the time o f the October Revolution, although it was aimed at the 
diametrically opposite classes: the bourgeoisie. The Bolsheviks stated that Soviet schools were to 
conduct “ ...comprehensive and free education o f workers and the poorest peasants”.’  ^This implies 
that some Soviet school authorities traditionally legitimised the usage of discriminative measures in 
relation to school pupils and that it was only natural to use them at the end o f  the 1920s.
T able 5 Social composition in the schools by grade in December 1926
Grade Working children White collar children
1'' 47.72% 33.29%
gta 18.61% 68.02%
(Source: Larry E. Holmes, 7%c Kremlin and the Sckoolhouse. Reforming education in Soviet Russia, 1917-19SI, 
Bloomington 1991, pp. 98)
It is evident that when radicalisation occurred by 1929 it also had certain effect on the treatment of 
children in school. Lazar Kaganovich had in 1929 proposed extended method of grain procurement, 
where “compulsory quotas” were levied on individual peasant households, which was administrated 
by a village council -  the skhod. This was one o f many attempts to institutionalise the “Ural-Siberian 
method”, whose primary aim was to marginalise kulaks, or those who opposed to this method, 
economically, socially and politically.’* A number o f measures were proposed, including the 
exclusion of children o f designated kulaks from schools. This was approved by the Politburo on 20 
March 1929, and restrictive measures in relation to school pupils were institutionalised. It should 
be emphasised, that this was a culmination of a long and tense debate between the People’s 
Commissariat o f  Education (NKPros) and Komsomol, which arose in 1928-29. At the Eighth 
Congress o f Komsomol Organisation, held in May 1928, the League General Secretary, Chaplin, 
launched a massive assault on kulak children especially and children o f NEP-men, who according to
’^Holmes, 1991,pp. 98-99.
^ Ib id .,p . 97.
”  For more on the Ural-Siberian Method see: James Hughes, “Capturing the Russian Peasantry: Stalinist Grain 
Procurement Policy and the Ural-Siberian Method” pp 76-103 in Slavic Review  53, no. 1 (spring 1994) pp. 76-77 and 
Yuzuru Taniuchi, “Decision-making on the Ural-Siberian Method” pp. 78-103 in Julian Cooper, Maureen Ferried and 
E.A. Rees, Soviet H istory 1917-53, London 1995, p. 78-79.
^R G A SPI,f. 17. op ,2 ,delo417 ,l. 171.
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him dominated schools. This was not only an attack on a specific category o f children, but also on 
the leaders of the NKPros, who it seems had failed to prevent this undesired development. Thus 
Chaplin asserted: “We must send our best workers to the Narkompros apparat to shake it up for new 
work”. “New work” in this context obviously meant a more aggressive educational policy used to 
prevent the dominance o f  socially unwanted elements the schools. It also implied discrimination 
against kulak children and other children from similar socially unwanted background. Krupskaya, 
representing the NKPros hesitated, arguing that “[Purging was a] bureaucratic approach towards 
children that resurrects the Middle Ages” and further: “There is class struggle and then there is class 
struggle [to deny children access to schools] is not class struggle”.*’ Other institutions, such as the 
People’s Commissariat o f Justice and the People’s Commissariat o f  Internal Affairs both supported 
the Komsomol on this issue. Both commissariats assumed that a social class was self-perpetuating, 
implying that children belonged to the class into which they were bom . Consequently, the leaders of 
the commissariats assumed that the biological heritage was o f great significance in the formation of 
the kulak children’s consciousness. It was therefore asserted that kulak children at least were 
potentially dangerous, and accordingly could be subject to a restrictive class stmggle -  for example, 
by being excluded from the classrooms.
Such a notion can also be detected in a report “On some irregularities on the cultural front” issued 
by the Central Committee o f the Ukraine Communist Party (CK KP(b)U) in 1929. The “irregularity” 
was the social composition of students entering higher education (profshkola and VUSy), in which 
children of zazhitochnyi and kulaks apparently comprised a larger proportion than children of 
workers:
1 ) The number o f  students at different institutes and polytechnics is 21 o f which:
•  Children o f  kulaks and zazhitochnye 11 pupils (52.3%)
• Children o f  middle peasants 7 pupils (3 3.4%)
• Children o f poor peasants 3 pupils (14.8%)
2) The number o f students at the profshkola is 18 of which
•  Children o f kulaks and zazhitochnye 8 pupils (44.4%)
• Children o f middle peasants 3 pupils (16.7%)
• Children o f poor peasants 7 pupils (38.4%)
Holmes, 1991,p. 111.
Ibid., p. 113.
Carolli, 2004, pp. 140-156.
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(source: TsDAGO, F. 1, op. 20, delo 3019,1.67)
Calling the social composition an “irregularity” would indicate that the leading organs of the 
Ukrainian Communist Party were concerned about the situation. The further elaboration in the 
report, regarding the situation o f the elementary schools in VoTshan raion adds yet another element 
to this “irregularity” . It was stated that “Children’s organisations, existing at every school, work 
actively, yet their activity is directed against the Soviet state...hostile elements, who use children 
for carrying out counter-revolutionary work, use the weak leadership of the Pioneer organisation 
with the LKSM (Komsomol) ...the young, in as well as outside the school read old counter- 
revolutionary literature”. Such developments had to be corrected, which also indicates a 
strengthening o f the Pioneer and Komsomol among children and the young. Another aspect of the 
weakening o f kulak children in the schools is revealed in a  W est Siberian directive issued on 15 
November 1930.
No. 5002
The question o f assisting children o f  poor peasants {bednoty) in the school
organisations was discussed and the following decisions accepted:
1. Reorganising the links vrithin the group in a way that to the remaining children of 
bednoty a  stronger participation was attached, what also was implemented.
2. Acknowledge the necessity o f  separating the remaining children o f bednoty in 
individual circles, although not in every school, this decision is implemented in 
case o f absence o f a vacant room. Where the lessons take place unpaid teachers 
teach them as a part o f their social obligation (odmecTseHHaa paSoxa).
(source: GANO, f. r-61, op. 1, delo 1127,1,21)
This directive implies that the logic o f dividing society into friends and enemies, which, as argued 
earlier, constituted the main basis o f the class struggle, also existed within the vocabulary of 
education and upbringing o f children younger than 15 years old. The children of poor peasants were 
to be granted more attention than other groups in order to strengthen their social position. This 
would also indicate that kulak children and children o f  middle peasants were to be, if not 
marginalized, then at least weakened socially. This is, o f  course, not mentioned explicitly, but was 
the logical consequence of such a  separation o f children. It would therefore imply that teaching was
83 TsDAGO, f. 1, op. 20, delo 3019,1.67,
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permeated by rhetoric o f  strengthening some -  the children o f bednoty -  and at the same time 
weakening others -  the kulak children. That teachers had to work without any kind o f payment 
underlines the importance of such a plan -  it was their social obligation, and therefore in the interest 
o f society. The aim o f education was, in other words, that some children (children o f workers and 
poor peasants) should be subjected to positive discrimination, while others (children o f the 
intelligentsia and kulaks) were to be met with negative discrimination.
The fate of kulak children and their access to state schools was also developed in an imdated 
resolution from the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1930. 
The resolution discussed the situation o f kulak children in the primary, middle and higher schools, 
and it was asserted that:
Primary School
5, Children o f  kulaks are not excluded from [primary] schools, with the 
exception of, what concerns kulak and hostile influence against the rest o f the 
children. ..strengthen the work in the schools among children o f bednoty
Pioneer organisation
1. Children o f  kulaks are not accepted in the Pioneer organisation
Middle and professional schools
2. Exclusion from middle and professional schools o f socially dangerous 
elements...
(Source: TsDAGO, f. 1, op. 20, delo 3088 11. 8-10 -  Translation from Ukrainian, underlining 
and italicising is done by the author (MK))
This supports the impression that there were some within the highest level of the Soviet command 
stmcture -  in this particular case among the highest officials o f the Ukrainian Communist Party -  
who supported the idea o f separating at least part of the kulak descendents from other children. 
When, for example, the primary school was discussed in this document kulak children would be 
divided into those who were regarded as being harmless and those who were being influenced by a 
class-hostile behaviour. Whether such a distinction was related to the categorisation of their fathers
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is not explicit in the document. However, it seems reasonable to believe that those related to first 
and second category kulaks were expected to possess at least elements of a class hostile attitude. 
This would also indicate that children o f  the third category were more likely to be integrated in the 
classrooms in particular and society in general. If  this is the case, it can still be recorded that none 
o f the kulak offspring, whether they were related to first, second or third category kulaks, could be 
admitted into middle or professional schools. In their sociological investigation on Soviet émigrés 
jfrom the 1950s, Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer recorded that o f  the total numbers o f dekulakised 
at least 56%  explained that their social background prohibited them fi-om gaining sufficient 
education. In comparison only 27% o f  the non-dekulakised reported a similar problem, indicating 
that the social background was significant when the Soviet regime approached pupils.*^
Hence a  “social cleansing” o f the school system, supported at the very highest level o f the Soviet 
command structure, occurred by 1929-30. This supports the impression that a discrimination against 
kulak children in the school system was supported by Stalin and his henchmen at this phase, which 
is significant for an understanding of how  this particular category o f  children is defined. A shift 
seems to have happened by 1934-35, allowing kulak children to have their civic rights restituted and 
gave some a possibility o f progressing in Soviet society. Yet the treatment o f kulak children should 
also be understood against the background of the previous four years o f  repression and 
contradictions. I f  the official statistic holds for 1929-30 it should have been expected that a very 
high proportion o f  well educated by 1934-35 were kulak children. Since this is not the case it can be 
asserted that the discrimination o f kulak children by 1929-30 had been so devastating that it not 
only minimised their proportion in the higher educational institutions, but also weakened their 
position in Soviet society on a greater scale. A  rapprochement to kulak children may have occurred, 
but it was not enough to rectify the damages o f the previous years o f  dekulakisation.
5.3 The perfect stranger
The Russian historian T.M. Smirnova has discussed the position o f children of special settlers and 
finds that they -  whether they lived in the settlements or returned to society -  were termed as 
“social strangers” . Living in isolation fi-om society had marked them physically as well as mentally.
”  Alex Inkeles and Raymond A. Baur, The Soviei Citizen. Daily L ife in a Totalitarian Society, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1961, p. 29.
160
and when returning they would always in reality be greeted by distrust.*^ Fitzpatrick stresses that 
even if  dekulakisation formally ended by 1932, the mass kulak scare remained a fact throughout the 
decade. This obviously affected the conditions of kulak decedents, who would alw'ays be uncertain 
about the future. In the public mass culture, it became a commonly accepted fact that the “hidden 
hand” o f the kulak had survived, despite the restrictive dekulakisation policy by the beginning of 
the 1930s. This was clearly expressed in films like The Party Book from 1936, where it was 
explicitly stated that the kulaks had infiltrated society, and were hiding themselves until they were 
strong enough to act. The consequence of such mass hysteria was that any one having kulak ties 
would be latent victims in a period o f radicalisation, because ordinary citizens as well as 
functionaries at any level of the Soviet power structure would in reality find it difficult to 
distinguish between enemy parents and enemy children.*^
The Soviet leadership conducted a liquidation policy towards kulaks, which was formulated by 
January 1930, but was it also intended to discriminate kulak children? It is evident that children 
were deported to the furthest reaches of the Soviet Union as a consequence of the dekulakisation 
policy.*^ It might very well be, as Fitzpatrick asserts, that kulak children were never formally 
excluded fix»m the kolkhozy, as were their fathers,** and it may also be, as Viola stressed, that they 
were offered education with the aim of including them into society. They were, however, de facto  
victims, in the sense that children related to first and second category kulaks were deported as a 
result of the restrictive policies of the Soviet regime. This became even more apparent by July 1937, 
when the anti-kulak campaigns escalated once more. Even if kulak children younger than 15 years 
old were not formally termed “socially dangerous”, they were, nonetheless, forcibly removed from 
their families and placed in oiphanages and special settlements where the living conditions were 
characterised by mortality, famine and physical exhaustion. An explanation to this must be that 
the regime in the initial phase was focusing on weakening the fathers of the household. Everything 
was designed in order to destroy the father, as he was the enemy of the people. When problems
T.M. Smirnova, ”«B npoHCxo^eHHH cbocm hhkto hc noBHHCH...»? flpofijicMU HHTHrpauHH ^lereii «couHajiBHO 
HyflCMCHMX 3JieMeHTOB» B nocjiepeBOjnoiiHOHHoe poccidicKoe ofimecreo (1917-1936 rr.)” pp. 28-42 i OmeHecmeenHOit 
Ucmopwt, July/August 2003, Number 4 pp. 38ff.
Sheila Fitzpatrick, ’’Ascribing Class. The construction of social identity in Soviet Russia”, pp. 20-46 in Sheila 
Fitzpatrick (ed.), Stalinism. New Directions, Rewriting Histories, London 2000, p. 31.
”0  MeponpHJiTHax no jiHKBHnainm xyjianecKHx xosaiicTB b pafionax cn.iomHofi KOJuieimiBHsauHH” pp. 126-130 in 
V.P. Danilov et al. (red.), Tpazedusi Coeemacou ffepeenu, moM 2, Hosiópt Ì929 ~ JJeKadpb /930, Moskva 2000, pp. 
126-127.
“  Fitzpatrick, 1994, pp. 364-65 (note 20).
Regarding the escalation of the anti-kulak campaign in 1937 and the fate of children, see: OnepaTHBHufi npracaa 
Hapomioro KOMHCcapa BHyrpHHHx nen Coro la C.C.P Ns 00447 «o6 onepamm no penpeccnpoBaMHio Oubidhx KynaxoB, 
yrojiO B H H K O B  H np. aHTHCoBCTCKHX 3jieMe.i lOB», Moskva 30 June 1937,1.8,
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emerged in relation to kulak children, it was termed as an outcome of “disciplinary problems”, and '
I
never that the deportations of their parents were a mistake. Therefore, the kulak children constituted 
a serious dilemma during the dekulakisation: in theory they should be included, given that they ' 
belonged to the generation of the “happy childhood”. However, they were in reality victimised by 
the repression directed against their parents. This was the main paradox of their education.
Zygmunt Bauman notes that society comprises three main categories o f people: “friends”, , 
“enemies” and “strangers”. While the two first categories are easier to define, the last is more
I
difficult: the stranger is both/and and neither/nor. He or she is both friend and enemy, in the sense 
that they consist elements o f both, but neither enemy nor fnend, since they do not belong to the 
world order.^ Although it might be argued that Bauman has a simplistic and even pessimistic 
understanding, and that his reflection is based on national and ethnic “fnends”, “enemies” and 
“strangers”, his distinctions are nonetheless relevant. The Soviet regime had social enemies (in this | 
case, kulaks) which were random categories, and at the same time constructed social friends, or I
I
allies o f the proletariat -  like poor peasants or rural labourers, who supposedly assisted the regime 
implementing the dekulakisation. In this context kulak children turned out to be, as Smirnova 
stated, the “social stranger”, who the Stalinist regime found more difficult to define: they were not 
enemies, but neither were they fiiends. It would be possible to include them in society as a fiiend if 
they followed the required education and engaged in productive work, that is i f  they did not 
continue the work o f their parents. Yet, on the other hand the system would be permeated by a 
distinct notion o f distrust towards them, since these children still remained potentially “socially 
dangerous”. They had experienced the darker side o f  society -  repression, discrimination and 
dehumanisation — and would therefore be expected to possess anti-Soviet sympathies.®^ If Soviet 
children in general were, as in the case o f  the transpolar Soviet town of Igarka, the children o f the 
fi*ontline -  the doctors, engineers, tank soldiers, poets, pilots, teachers, actors, inventors and 
geologists o f the future as Gorky called them -  kulak children would consequently be the strangers 
o f the firontiers.
^  Zygmunt Bauman, M odernity and Ambivilancet Cambridge 1991, p. 2 and pp. 53-59. 
Fitzpatrick, ’’Ascribing Class...”, 2000, p. 31.
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Courtesy o f  Memorial in Tomsk. Pictures belongs to the collection o f  
“Memory on repression of collectivisation” in GATO
1
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(GATO f. r-1993, op. 2, del. 1, picture 32. Riverboat and deportees)
(GATO f. r-1993, op. 2, del. I, picture 1, Construction o f permenant settlement)
(GATO f. r-1993, op. 2, del. 1, picture 11. Construction of permanent settlement)
B
(GATO f. r-1993, op. 2, del. 1, picture 13. Permanent settlement)
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(GATO f. r-1993, op. 2, del. 1, picture 34. Office building for a kommendatura)
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(GATO f. r-1993, op. 2, del* 1, picture 26. Hospital in a settlement)
(GATO f. r-1993, op. 2, del. 1, picture 25-1, The commandant and children o f  a settlement)
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(GATO f. r-1993, op. 2, del. 1, picture 41. School class-notice the dressing of the children and 
compare it to that o f the commandant and teacher (at the far right))
(G A IO  f. r-1993, op. 2, del. 1, picture 22. School class)
(G A IO  f. r-I993, op. 2, del. 1, Picture 42. OGPU orphanage)
(GATO f. r-1993, op. 2, del. 1, picture 20. Orphanage or crèche in a special settlement)
(GATO f. r-1993, op. 2, del. 1, picture 39.0rphanage or crèche in a special settlement)
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(GAIO f. r-1993, op. '
picture 40. Nurser>' school in a special settlement)
(GATO f. r-1993, op.2, del. 1, picture 23. Official institution for placement o f children -  probably
an orphanage)
(GATO f. r-1993. op. 2, del. 1, picture 17. A family o f the special settlement)
H
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(GATO f, r-1993, op. 2, del. 1, picture 2. A special settler’s family)
(GAIO f. r-1993, op. 2, del, 1, picture 36. Barracks in a special settlement)

6. Memory and forced rejection in the Soviet Experience
One evening in 1929 a young Soviet boy was woken by a noise in the family living room. His 
father, a factory owner, had been gone for some days, so he believed it was him returning. He 
jumped out o f the bed, and ran into the living room, but was met by strangers: who were they? 
Were they thieves? Why had they come? W hat did they want? And where was his father? His father 
had been arrested and the “intruders” were Soviet officials confiscating his property. When they 
noticed the boy, the officials started to make remarks such as: “should we list him as well?” At one 
point one of the officials grabbed the boy’s arm, and led him out o f  the house. The boy began to 
cry, as he could not understand what was happening or where he was going. The destination was an 
orphanage, in which the official, who had grabbed the boy, led him into a room. When leaving him 
the official said: “Wait here, kid, and stop crying [.„ ] Nobody needs your tears. ITl tell them about 
you. I am sick o f  these degenerates [...] As for the past, the sooner you forget it, the better for 
you” .'
One o f the aims o f forced collectivisation and dekulakisation was, as shown earlier, to educate 
“kulak” children in order to separate them fix)m their parents and grandparents -  that is their 
heritage, their past. The ambition was to make them forget the traditions of the peasant family and 
replace it with political indoctrination. But could the past really be forgotten? Was it possible for 
the children to denounce their parents and grandparents and look towards the regime? Here we 
analyse how forced collectivisation and dekulakisation affected the kulak children. By following the 
children into old age it can be revealed how they remember their experiences in the Soviet state.
6,1. Memorising
Before addressing the narratives o f kulak children intentions should be made clear, when personal 
testimony is used as a source. In light o f  the massive restructuring o f  Europe at the end o f  the 1980s 
and beginning o f the 1990s, in which old regimes, such as the Soviet Union, collapsed and new 
state arose, the concept o f memory was re-emphasised among the populations o f  the former eastern 
and central European states.^ In the Russian context, the establishment of the Oral History Club in 
Moscow and the national ’’Memorial” foundation could especially demonstrate this awareness. The 
main purpose o f  the latter was to record and document the darker legacies o f Stalinism by collecting
‘ This story is told in: Nicholas Vionov, Outlaw, The Autobiography o f a Soviet W aif London 1955, pp. 8-9.
 ^Luisa Passerini”Introduction” pp. 1-20 in Luisa Passerini (ed.) Memory and Totalitarianism^ Oxford 1992, p. 3.
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written memoirs o f  victims, interviews, photographs and pictures.^ Much o f the written material for 
the present chapter and the pictures of the thesis originate from this work."* This public recollection 
o f the Stalinist past originated from volimtary and individual initiatives and was rarely supported by 
the Russian state.^ The collective memory o f Russia and other Post-Soviet societies is, as Catherine 
Mairidale argues, excluding, meaning that whereas a  very strong emphasis it put on the Second 
World W ar (or the Great Patriotic War), the public remembrance o f the dekulakisation and other 
examples o f political terror against Soviet society is very limited. There are, for example, no public 
commemoration sites recollecting the suffering o f kulak children in either of the former Soviet 
states.®
Memory, as used in the present chapter refers to “individual remembrance”, as individuals and not 
society remembers the past.^ Personal memory is verbalised either orally or written. Interviews and 
written memoirs are different kinds o f soirrces; while written memory is finished when the last full 
stop is placed and the text becomes public, oral testimony is much more fragile, fragmented and 
changeable: the person opens up in different ways to the surrounding world. In work done on 
Holocaust survivors it has been shown how the same memory varies between the oral and written
A
edition -  the semantic, rhythm and continuity are different In the oral testimony, we witness the 
memory process m uch more than in the written, as people being asked to deliver their life story tend 
to remember more and more as they speak about their life. If  they were confronted right away with 
a tape recorder and expected to talk freely, the outcome may often be different. While written 
testimony can be corrected and rewritten, oral memory has to be delivered on the spot. It is 
important to let the narrator become used to the situation, and forget about the interviewer and any 
audio-visual aids. The former kulak daughter M aria Vikentevna, who was the first to be interviewed 
by this author (16 August 2003), was visibly uncomfortable by the set-up. The tape recorder, the 
questions, and the uncertainty about the expectation o f  the interviewer made her nervous and only at 
the end o f the interview did she talk in a  more relaxed way. On the tape, it is very obvious when this 
shift happens in her narratives. Before the shift she stumbles over the words, breathes
 ^Daria Khubova, Andrei Ivankiev and Tenia Sharova, ’’After Glasnost. Oral History in the Soviet Union” pp. 89-101 in 
Luisa Passerini (ed.) Memory and Totalitarianism, Oxford 1992 p. 90.
* All material referred to as: GATO f. r-1993, op. 1 are these vritten memoirs.
 ^The president Vladimir Putin for example stated as late as May 2005 that the collapse of the Soviet Union was one of 
the great losses o f the late 20th century.
* Catherine Marridale “War, death, and remembrance in Soviet Russia” pp. 61-83 in in Jay Winter and Emmanuel 
Sivan, War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge 2000, p. 62
 ^Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, “Setting the firamework”pp. 6-39 in Winter and Sivan, 2000, p. 16.
* Lawrence Langer, Holocaust Testimonies. The Ruin o f memory. New Haven, pp. 17-18. Barbara T. has both publish ffl 
her memories of Auschwitz and has participated in a videotaped oral testimony session. At one stage during her 
interview, she reads from her written memory and Lawrence Langer explicates the differences.
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apprehensively, asserts that she only remembers little from her childhood, and asks the interviewer 
whether what she says is relevant or not; afterwards, however, her speech begins to flow and she 
starts to recall more details from her life as a deported enemy child. After the formal session ended, 
she remembered crucial details about, for example, homeless children in the special settlements 
which were not recorded on the tape recorder. In fact, much valuable information for this particular 
investigation came after the tape recorder was removed from the scene, either because people 
remembered more, or because they found the situation less stressful. Due to this and similar 
circumstances, it has often been recommended to break an interview into different sessions, if 
possible undertaken on different days, in order to give the narrator time, and to make him or her 
more relaxed about the situation. This is akin to the rewriting o f  A\Titten memory, as the narrator 
gets time to rethink the testimony given earlier.^
When the interview is conducted, it has to be adapted it into the overall body o f sources, and here 
again challenges arise. The traditional impression of oral history from the 1950s to the 1980s has 
been that there is a simple relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee: in other words, 
that the inter-subjectivity is uncomplicated, and when the interview is given it can easily be 
transcribed and published. This assumption is supported by the editors of the Russian memory 
collection ffem u  Duttzpai^uu. BocnoM unm  (Children of the Emigrants. Memory) (Moscow 2001), 
where the very first line in the introduction reads: "Every human being eagerly wants to talk about 
their own childhood, since their personal worldview is formed in these first years, and in many 
cases decides the outcome of their long term fate”.*® However, in work done on the Balkans it has 
been suggested that this is far from being the case -  inter-subjectivity is much more complicated 
and often influenced by a high amount o f non-remembering, or denial.** The state o f denial works 
on different levels: both among victims, bystanders and perpetrators. Denial is in this sense a matter 
o f seeing, but not being able to comprehend what actually happened. This can either work on a 
conscious or a subconscious level -  that is we actively decide to close our eyes to what happens, or
I
we simply repress our experiences, as they are traumatic, from the conscious level o f  our mind.
’ For more on the methods of collecting interviews see for example: Hugo Slim and Paul Thompson, with Olivia 
Bennett and Nigel Cross "Ways of listening” pp. 114-125 in Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, The Oral History 
Reader^ London 1998, p. 116.
V.V. Zen’kovskii, J^emv OMuepayuu, BocnoMunim, Moscow 2001 p. 5.
“  Luisa Passerini, "Epilogue” pp. 219-226 in Natale Losi, Luisa Passrini and Silvia Salvatici (eds.). Archives o f  
Memory: Supporting Traumatized Communities through Narration and Remembrance, Psychosocial Notebook^ Voi. 2, 
October 2001, p. 220.
Stanley Cohen, State o f D enial Knowing about Atrocities and Suffering, Cambridge 2001.
L
165
In the Soviet Union there was a public culture o f denial permeating the official ideology, where 
the tragedies of the 1920s and 1930s -  such as the forced collectivisation o f agriculture ~ were 
ascribed as historical necessities in the process of modernising a backward country. Euphemisms 
were used when the discrimination of the possessing peasants, being stigmatised as “kulaks”, and 
their families were analysed in Soviet historiography. Aside from Khrushchev’s denouncement of 
Stalin in 1956, which was not a  denouncement o f  forced collectivisation and dekulakisation, but 
only o f  the unjust arrest and execution o f  high level cadres within the Communist Party. The social 
experiments of the 1920s and 1930s were generally understood as being positive transformations of 
society. It was not imtil the Gorbachev era, when criticism o f Stalinism became increasingly 
legitimate, that the focus was placed on the human conditions during these years.
In the context o f  public denial it was difficult, if  not impossible, for the Soviet population to 
verbalise the darker legacies o f  the past; ordinary people would simply be afraid of the 
consequences associated with remembering.*^ And, they were inclined to forget the past, as the 
Communist project was a process going forwards not backwards.*^ This silence was witnessed 
during an oral history project undertaken in the city o f Vladimir, 300 kilometres east o f Moscow, in 
1984. The Oral History Club had the aim o f hearing the local population talk about the local prison, 
which was known for the high proportion o f political prisoners. At this stage perestroika and 
glasnost had not yet begun, and nobody dared to say anything. It was as i f  the prison -  which was 
located right opposite the railway station -  did not exist. In 1988, when Gorbachev’s reforms had 
been in process for two years, the oral historians returned to Vladimir. And, now on daily basis 
newspapers published articles about Stalinist repression and television and radio had several critical 
broadcasts. At this stage, the local population suddenly knew everything about the prison, and it 
was as if  it had only just been constructed, although it had been there for decades.'^ The populations 
o f post-Soviet societies were heavily influenced by the idea o f  public denial, which Olga Litvinenko 
experienced in her oral history project in the Urals. In 1993, after the collapse o f  the Soviet Union, 
she collected the life stories o f  former kulak children. All participants, however, demanded that 
their surnames remained anonymous, as they were afraid that someone would recognise them. An 
example o f how the insecurity exists, even today, can be seen in the interviews conducted during
D. Paillard «Russie/URSS; le discours national russe comme mémoire et refus. Mémoire, histoire, langage » pp. 98- 
108 in Langages. Paris 1994, Volume 28, Number 114.
Khubova, ïvankiev and Sharova, 1992, p. 100.
** Zygmunt Bauman, ”The Party in the System-Management Phase: Changes and Continuity” pp. 81-108 in Andrew C. 
Janos, Authoritarian Politics in Communist Europe. Uniformity and Diversity in One-Party States^ Berkley 1976 p. 88 
Khubova, Ivankiev and Sharova, 1992, pp. 95-96.
Litvinenko, 1998, p. vii.
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the summer o f 2003 in Novosibirsk by the present author. The kulak daughter Tatiana Ivanovna at 
one stage during her interview noticed the tape recorder and asked (in a critical way), i f  the 
interview was being recorded. When confirmed by the interviewer, she immediately responded -  
“perhaps I shouldn’t continue then”. She was persuaded to do so, but her reaction is worth 
mentioning. It could be interpreted as she found it imcomfortable to talk into the tape recorder, but 
in Tatiana Ivanovna’s case this was not the main cause. During the entire interview, she was aware 
o f the tape recorder, and she challenged the interviewer, spoke proudly about her past, and had no 
difficulties, apart from the mentioned incident, to talk freely. The most obvious reason for her 
hesitation would be that, based on previous experiences, she had reasons to doubt the intention of 
the surrounding world. This underlines the complex inter-subjectivity, which arises whenever the 
personal memory of “kulak” children and other repressed groups o f  the former USSR is addressed. 
Is the narrator really interested in talking about or hearing about his or her own childhood?^*
This leads to questions concerning general principle -  is personal memory an appropriate source at 
all? Traditionally, the idea has been that everyone possesses a memory, and that it is lasting and 
constant, following a person throughout his or her entire life.*^ “I remember everything” as Tatiana 
Ivanovna reassured several times during her interview, which would support the traditional 
impression of memory as a tape recorder, waiting to be played. Psychological literature has shown 
that memory changes overtime, and the greater distance in time we are from an event, the more 
problematic is it to know exactly what happened. It may be easier to talk about certain more 
traumatic events from a distance, but it is difficult to actually comprehend what happened. Details 
disappear and events tend to become confused. Even the lack o f  short term memory is familiar to 
most o f us, when we forget a certain word in a  sentence or a  name. Rather than consider memory as 
being something unchangeable, it has been suggested that we are dealing with a synthesis of 
experiences.^® The construction o f memory is, according to Elizabeth Loftus, a matter o f  three 
stages: firstly the acquisition, secondly the retention, and thirdly the retrieval. In the acquisition
** To create knowledge is, in the words of Dori Laub, M.D., a process o f constructing a narrative that does not yet exist 
“Massive Trauma precludes its registration; the observing and recording mechanisms o f the human mind are 
temporarily knocked out, malfunction. The victim’s narratives -  the very process o f  bearing witness to massive trauma 
-  does indeed begin with someone who testifies to an absence, to an event that has not yet come into existence, in spite 
of the overwhelming and compelling nature o f the reality o f its occurrence”. See Dori Laub, M.D: „Bearing Witness or 
the Vicissitudes o f Listening“ pp. 57-74 in Shoshan Fellman and Dori Laub, M.D., Testìmoy. Crises o f Witnessing in 
Literature, Psychoanalysis, New York 1992, p. 57.
Passerini, 1992, p. 6.
^  Elizabeth F. Loftus ”Our changeable memories: legal and practical implications” pp. 231-234 in Nature Reviews, 
Volume 4, March 2003, p. 231.
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stage we witness a certain incident, which is stored in our minds during the retention stage, and 
finally formulated in the retrieval stage. In other words, we experience a certain event, then time 
passes, which can be long or short, and finally the memories are communicated.^* In the 
construction of memory different intervening factors, which are not always appropriate, appear. 
Misinformation, misinterpretation, and misunderstanding, for example, also influence this shaping, 
and are important to include as points o f  critiques.^ It has often been argued that memory is not 
what happened, but rather what seems to have happened.^^ In his rethinking of Stalinism, J. Arch 
Getty argued that although the personal memory had importance as experience, it would never stand 
up as a  critical historical analysis. The argument was that the memoir was often recollected late in 
life and could be disproved, and hence was dubious.^"* Similarly, Mark B. Tauger, in a discussion on 
the internet-based H-Russia (18 April 2002) stated: "  [...]  I believe we have to approach memoirs 
and even letters fi-om the period extremely cautiously, and treat them not as absolute tmth but as 
emotional expressions of traumatized people. I write this not to minimize their suifering, but there 
is a substantial psychological literature on post-traumatic stress syndrome and on the effects of 
trauma on memory. This literature documents incontrovertibly that people's memories in such 
circumstances are highly unreliable. I refer interested and even sceptical readers to the writings of 
Elizabeth Loftus on this point. Her works have been used in numerous court cases related to 
historical memory, and I believe that they also apply here.”
This should, however, not lead us to conclude that personal remembrance is worthless, because of 
the human difficulties in remembering every detail o f a certain event. The individual memories of 
Holocaust survivors are, after all, still considered to be valid sources, in our attempt to understand 
Nazi atrocities and nobody would denounce the work of, for example, Primo Levi and Elie Weisel 
as dubious.^^ Tauger speaks o f  “absolute truth” as i f  it existed, yet it is not a matter of objectively 
recreating the past. Instead it is more about subjectively reconstmcting elements o f it. From this 
perspective it makes no sense to talk about “truth” as something “absolute”. Also he speaks of 
“post-trauma” implying that Soviet citizens were traumatised at some point. But who traumatised 
them, i f  the Soviet state was not repressing them? And, does their trauma not reveal cmcial aspects
Elizabeth F. Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony^ Cambridge 1979, pp. 21-22, pp. 52-53 and p. 88.
^  Elizabeth F. Loftus and Hunter G. Hofftnan ’’Misinformation and Memory, The Creation of New Memories” pp. 100-
104 in Journal o f Experimental Psychology: General 118 (1), March 1989.
23 Joanne Bourke, for example, stated so during the workshop: M emorizing War andHistoricizing the Senses in the 
Twentieth Century conducted at the European University Institute from 13-14 February 2004.
J. Arch. Getty, Origins o f the Great Purges. The Soviet Communist Party Reconsidered 193S-19Ì8, Cambridge 1985, 
pp. 4-5 and pp. 211-220.
"A n n e  Appelbaum, GULAG. A History^ London 2003, p. xxi.
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about the nature o f the society they grew up in? The main thing is to stress that we cannot talk about 
a “wrong” memory, since it all emerges from actual incidents.^® Memory, as used in this section, is 
considered personal in the sense that it reproduces the worldview o f the narrator.^’ There is a need, 
o f course, to be specific about one’s intentions, when this source is used. Therefore, this chapter 
discusses the nature o f the Soviet regime through analysing how people, having lived in this regime, 
later construct their identity. Being inspired by Michel Foucault’s understanding o f  the “subject” as 
a construction, shaped in relation to a power structure, we are not so much interested in what the 
narrators tell us, as in how they tell us.^* It has to be remembered that Foucault does not work with 
“memory”, but it should not prevent the use o f  his theory o f  “subjectivity”. How do the participants 
describe themselves in relation to their own position, to their families and to the system they were 
brought up in? How do they vocalise the past, and how do they avoid certain themes? How do they 
use irony, be sincere, reproduce stereotypes, and over-dramatise their experiences? The impression 
is that the “subject” constructs him- or herself according to certain categories.^^ For example, using 
a political group, such as “enemy o f  the people” in order to define themselves. The purpose o f our 
analysis is not to conduct a rigid discourse analysis. However, the terminology o f the narratives will 
be addressed and the maimer by which the “subject” is created verbally scrutinised. In more general 
terms, the interest is in specific findings in the narratives, which is constructed by the narrators and 
influenced by the experiences of the past. The narratives reveal how events like the deportations to 
Western Siberia influenced ordinary men, women and children to create their own “self­
understanding”. This is the crucial point o f departure for the present analysis.
The interviews conducted by the present author, and upon which we will extensively draw, 
included a son o f Volga-Germans, one being a kulak herself and eight kulak children. The Volga- 
German, Teodor Karlovich, was younger at the time o f the interview than the rest of the 
participants. At 66 years he found it more difficult to recollect his experiences. It is also important 
to remember that he and his mother were deported in 1941, when Volga-Germans were repressed 
by the Soviet regime, and not during the dekulakisation campaign o f 1929-32/33. The remaining 
interviewees were Tatiana Ivanovna (71 years old and bom in deportation in 1934), Maria 
Vikentevna (76 years old), Georgii Mikhailovich (77 years old), Anatolii Dmitrevich (81 years old).
^  Alessandro Portelli ”What makes oral history different” pp. 63-74 in Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, The Oral 
History Reader^ London 1998 pp. 68-73.
Ibid, 1998, pp. 70-73.
Michel Foucault, „The Subject and Power” pp. 326-348 in James Faubion (ed.), Michel Foucault. Power. The 
Essential works 2, London 1994.
® Ibid, 326.
169
Valentin Vasileevich (81 years old), Julia Vasilevna (81 years old), Aleftina Vasileevna (82 years 
old), Uliana Petrovna (85 years old), and Agrafena Alekseevna (99 years old). All interviews were 
conducted at the private homes o f  the participants. It is also important to remember that all 
participants were prepared by the contact o f the author, before they actually delivered their 
interviews. They would therefore be told by someone else than the author, what was interesting and 
what was not. Also we should remember that the author addressed them as “kulak children” and not 
something else, indicating that they would recollect their personal past knowing that this was of the 
main interest Finally we should also remember that all participants lived their childhood in the 
special settlements o f  the West Siberian krai, implying that their experiences might differ from that 
o f other kulak children, who lived in either the Northern part o f Russia, the Urals or Kazakhstan. 
Questions during the interviews varied from their recollection about the authorities; experiences 
with discrimination: incidents o f  mortality either in their nuclear family or within the local 
community; memories about the living conditions: their memory o f brothers, sisters, parents and 
grandparents. Daily matters, such as food supply, medical care, public nursing, and education were 
also topics that were discussed. Moreover, the “afterlife”, or the long-term impact their experiences 
had on their lives afterwards and evidently also their career, was discussed. Finally, all o f them 
were asked to reflect upon their childhood and characterise it. These interviews will be referred to 
as “interview"’, followed by the date it was conducted.
6.2. Nobody needs your tears
6.2.1 As fo r  the past...
In the introductory note above, we saw how a young boy was removed from his home after his 
father was arrested. The same physical intervention into the private sphere also appears in the 
narrative o f Georgii Mikhailovich, whose father was arrested in February 1930, and executed as 
“enemy o f  the people” in March o f that year. At aged only three, Georgii Mikhailovich was taken 
away from his mother and placed in an orphanage, located in Narym krai (some 500 kilometres 
north o f Tomsk). The administration o f the orphanage strove to make him forget his parents. His 
origins were changed: his identity, name, fathers name, surname, birthday and general background. 
He was bom  on 1 M ay 1927 and his parents had christened him Igor Tailakov, but when he was 
placed in the orphanage his birthday was changed to 1 December 1929 and he was renamed 
Georgii Nosikov. It was only by chance that he in 1992 discovered who he actually was, and 
considered re-taking his birth name. However he decided not to, as his given birth name was an
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empty shell. Everything -  his trade union book, his soldier’s book, his educational papers, his 
working papers, his identity cards, and his passports, were issued in his “Soviet” name, and it 
would therefore imply a fundamental restructuring of his life if  he took the name his parents had 
given him. Tlae Soviet authorities had successfully eradicated his link to his parents, and they had 
done so in order to transfonn Georgii Mikhialovich into a blank sheet, which could be filled 
through education, political upbringing and indoctrination.
It became clear during the interview with Georgii Mikhailovich that he was not the only Soviet 
orphan who had experienced this rather radical intervention in his life. He mentioned at least one 
other person, Dan Danilov, who had a similar story. He read about this particular case from the 
local Novosibirian newspaper, Chestnoe Slovo, which had published an interview with Dan 
Danilov.^ ^  Furthermore the Russian-bom professor, Misha Nikolayev, explains in his written 
memoir how he had his identity changed when his parents were executed as enemies o f the people 
in 1929. He states:
The authorities’ purpose in taking orphans away fi*om their relatives 
was that they should never think about their arrested parents. Lest 
they, God forbid, grow up into potential dissidents, potential avengers 
o f their parents’ death. It made very good sense to change a child’s 
surname. I ’m sure that the authorities achieved their purpose; the 
majority o f the children, if  not all, remembered nothing about their 
parents.
(Source: Misha Nikolayev, ’’Orphanage” pp. 166-179 in Natasha Perova and Arch 
Tait (eds.), ZIP and other Stories. Childhood, Moscow 1998 pp, 170-172.)
In a system, such as the Soviet one, which was based on the idea that generations could be 
separated emotionally and that personality was a matter of environmental upbringing rather than 
biological ties, it was only natural to believe that a person’s identity could be changed. The 
biologist, T.D. Lysenko, for example stated that heritage, and especially the human variant of it, 
depended entirely on environment. If an enemy child was placed in a Soviet orphanage, given a 
Soviet identity and taught the right morals and ethics, he or she would eventually be a well-
Interview 5 September 2003.
Viktor Timakov, h3 Bjia;xHBOcTOKa BonnomeHHe aMepHxaHCKoK mchtu ” in Hecmnoe O ioeo Xs 51,
2000.
Lynne Attwood, The New Soviet Man and Woman. Sex Role Socialization in the USSR, London 1990, p- 39
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disciplined Homo Sovieticus. That the circumstances in the orphanages were appalling and the 
political education was far from effective, was a  secondary issue. The main priority was that the 
children shoiild forget their pasts as the past -  the peasant upbringing -  represented a threat to 
society. Georgii Mikhailovich, Misha Nikolayev and many others repressed any recollection about 
their parents. Misha Nikolayev spoke o f a ‘‘pre-memory”, which was a synthesis o f what people 
(most notably the caretakers o f his orphanage) had told him. Georgii Mikhailovich was fortunate in 
that he could contact the Russian authorities in 1992 and get his personal files, but this did not 
mean that he suddenly had re-established a relationship to his parents.^^ He asserted that he was 
located in a  place o f  limbo, not knowing who he was.
The emotional separation was most effective among the younger orphan kulak children, since the 
influence o f  the parents had vanished completely. In the case where the children stayed with their 
families, as most o f  the narrators did, the system found it much more problematic to intervene. The 
impression is that kulak children, and those who remained with their parents, choose to forget and 
distance themselves from their biological heritage. As part the strategy to survive and to advance 
in society, they would denounce their past and adopt a Soviet identity. They were motivated by the 
knowledge that it could be dangerous i f  it was revealed that a  certain person had “kulak ties”. In 
the rare cases where peasants returned from deportation to their villages o f origin, it was well- 
known that they were vulnerable to the wrath o f their neighbours. Any conflict could easily result 
in yet another denouncement, yet another arrest, or at the worst -  yet another deportation. A 
significant number o f the narrators experienced more than one deportation during their childhood. 
The family o f  Aleftina Vasilievna was deported twice in 1929 and 1931. Pavel Fedorovich and his 
family was similarly deported twice in those two years, while Andrei Efimovich and his relatives 
were deported three times -  the first two times in the period 1929-31, and the third time in the 
autumn o f  1933. "^* Despite the fact that dekulakisation officially ended in 1932^^ the impact of the 
kulak still hung over the villages like a ghost in the years to follow. Therefore, a great number of 
previously deported peasants and their families decided to move to the cities, get employment in 
the factories, and live a quite lives as anonymous workers.^® The threat o f the kulaks, however, re-
”  This file was given to the author: “KoNurrer rocynapCTBennofi fieaonaCTHOCTH CCCP: ynpaBJiemie no 
HoBOCKfinpcKofl ofinacTH Xa 4/II-6820” Novosibirsk 20 February 1992.
Interview, 16 August 2003, GANG, F-400 d. 22, GANG A-72/11.03.96GANG, G-355,20.12.94 and GANG, G- 
107/24-03.95.
R.W. Davies and Stephen Wheatcroft, Years o f  Hunger, London 2003, p. 47.
Sheila Fitzpatrick, Stalin '$ Pesants. Resistance and Survival in the Russian Village After Collectivization, New York 
1994, pp. 238^6.
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emerged in July 1937, when the NKVD issued Order No. 00447 to round up “former kulaks and 
other anti-Soviet elements”, and a large number o f previously deported peasants and their families 
were re-arrested, shot in quotas or placed in GULAG camps.^^
Many “kulak” children decided to keep quite about their past, since they considered it to be 
dangerous. Maria Vikentevna was asked during her interview (16 August 2003), whether she had 
told her children anything about her past, to which she answered: “No I did not say anything”.^ * Her 
children wondered why she had lived in Naiym krai, which, after all, was known for the special 
settlements, but she avoided the questions by answering that they had lived in Tomsk and had been 
stationed there. It was not until 1991, when the Soviet Union broke up and the first democratic 
government o f the Russian Federation decided to rehabilitate former victims o f the Stalinist 
repression, that she started to speak about her experience. Elena Petrovna, who works in GATO 
(Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Tomskoi Oblasti), also said that her grandmother, a descendent of a 
”kulak”, remained silent about her past for decades. This strategy o f not knowing, or denying, still 
exists among some o f the survivors o f Stalinist repression. On 6 September 2003 the decedent of a 
Volga-German, Teodor Karlovich, was interviewed for this research, and he constantly stated that 
he could not remember anything. When he was asked to describe life in the special settlements, he 
replied: “can you imagine what it was like?” He would continue by talking about something else -  
either domestic contemporary politics or his life as a truck driver. He spoke fi-om the position of 
“not knowing” or distancing himself completely from the narrative. There was very little emotional 
link between the narrator and the subject o f the narrative, even if  he was clearly uncomfortable 
talking about his childhood. That which caused this is beyond the remit o f the thesis: one possibility 
is that he was so young that could not remember, but it has often been connected to the unconscious 
strategy o f protecting oneself from a traumatic past."*  ^ In light o f  this public denial, and its 
influences on personal memory before 1991, the analysis now moves on to how those who were 
“kulak” children participating in this investigation, were able to verbalise their own subjectivity in 
relation to the dekulakisation.
OnepaTHBHM0 npHKaa HapoflHoro KOMHccapa SHyxpHHHx aeji Coioaa C.C.P JS» 00447 «o6 onepaiiHH no 
penpeccHpOBamoo Oubhihx KynaxoB, yroJiOBHmcoB h ap. aHTHCOBeTCKnx ajieMeHTOB», Moscow, 30 June 1937.
All translation to English from Russian is done by the author, unless otherwise mentioned.
S.N. Ushakova, ”Pea6HnnTauHOHHwe ;tejia penpeccHpoBaHHoii Kpecrban xax HcxopiwecKHìi hctoihhk” pp. 87-111 
in S.A. Krasilnikov, MapeuHOJibt. B CoeemacoM odufecmee, 1920^1930-x eodoe, Novosibirisk2001.
^  Dori Laub and Nanette Auerhahn "Knowing and not Knowing Massive Psychic Trauma: Forms of Traumatic 
Memory” pp. 287-302 in TJie Intemation Journal o f  Pf^^cho-Analysis, 1993, Volume 74, Part 2, pp. 288 and p. 291.
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6.2.2 The lost home
The life stories often commence by describing their existence prior to the deportation, in the places 
of origin where either the parents or grandparents had been living as peasants. In most cases, this is 
based on what their parents had told the interviewees, since some were either very young, or had 
not been bom until after the deportation.“^  ^ Maria Vikentevna, who was only a one year old at the 
time, described how she and her family were exiled from Belarus -  their Poduna (motherland) as 
she referred to it. Uliana Petrovna also used this term, emphasising the connection to the region 
o f origin.^^ In this part of the narrative it is usually the energy and initiative o f either the father or 
grandfather who would be the centre o f attention. Vasilii Grigorevich, for example, explained how 
his grandfather had built their house, which his father inherited, thus signifying a continuation 
referring to the traditional way o f peasant life, where the son followed the father.^ Anatolii 
Dmitrevich stated: “...and, o f  course, [the authorities took] the cultivated land from those people, 
who loved the land...” indicating an emotional connection to the land from which they had been 
tom away from. His grandfather was described as an enterprising person, who knew the land, 
cultivated it, worked on it and based his entire identity upon it. But, he was prohibited from 
continuing in this way of life."*^
Uliana Petrovna explained how her large family -  comprising eight children and two parents -  
needed their three cows and three horses. The father had only employed members of the family, 
assisting him in fieldwork, cleaning the house and participating in other daily assignments. “They 
made us kulaks,” she asserted, suggesting that it was a groundless accusation.^^ In her interview 
with Anastasia Posadskaya-Vanderbeck Irina Ivanovna Kniazeva said: “There were no boys in the 
family, so by fifteen I was already plowing. First, they set me to harrowing. When I was ten or 
eleven, I harrowed the fields, and then when I got a  little bigger, I took up plowing, and I plow'ed 
and I plowed”."*^  This would suggest that the household o f  her father was based on the traditional 
organisation o f  the Soviet peasantry -  that is the family. She would argue that her family was not 
treated like “kulaks”, but on the other hand her narrative also reveals that “We didn’t join the 
kolkhoz. We were scared, you know. And so they ruined us, they took everything. They took the
See for example GANG B-142/29.02.96, where the writer, Aleksandra Sergeevna admits that most of her knowledge 
originates from her mother.
Interview 16 August 2003.
Interview 23 August 2003.
GANG Kh-89/13.12.94.
Interview 17 August 2003.
Interview 23 August 2003.
Irina Ivanovna Kniazeva, “A Life in a Peasant Village”pp. 117-131 in Barbara Alpem Engel and Anastaia 
Podaskaya-Vanderbeck, A Revolution o f Their Own, Voices o f  Women in Soviet History^ Oxford 1998, p. 121.
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animals, they took the horses, they took the cow -  we had one cow -  they took everything” . This 
was very close to the treatment that met the “kulaks”. Aleftina Vasilevna would state: “they 
considered us kulaks”."*^ They were not “kulaks”, but only stigmatised as such by forces outside 
their control. Maria Vikentevna in this connection highlighted that her father was a middle peasant 
who never hired “batraki” (rural labourer) and that the poor peasants, later labelling him as 
“kulak”, were those who did not want to work.^® Tatiana Ivanovna passionately asserted that it was 
only the poor they deported, while the real “kulaks” remained in the home region.®*
The last statement was clearly an emotional expression, and is difficult to prove. It is, in this 
context, unimportant what she says but rather why she does it. In relation to Foucault’s 
construction o f the “subject”, the “kulak” children clearly placed their fathers, and thus 
themselves, in the category of victims. They had not done anything wrong, and they were unjustly 
punished for trying to support their families and from their perspective there was no objective 
reason for their deportation. They all belonged to large families (comprising four to ten children) , 
who purchased livestock and tools in order to support their family -  they had to survive. “What 
kind o f kulaks were we?” Aleftina Vasilevna asked rhetorically.®^ They would support Aleksandr 
Chayanov’s theory, elaborated in chapter 2, that the Russian peasantry was a  family based non­
wage economy -  motivated by the needs, possibilities, construction and mobility o f its members. 
The impression o f “kulak” children was that the category “kulak” was a political construction, to 
which their parents were unjustly subjected during the repressive transformation o f  Soviet 
agriculture during the 1930s -  the children innocently suffered as part o f a larger event outside of 
their own control. This idea of victimisation can be detected in other types o f  Soviet life stories. 
Research done on narratives o f Russian women shows that they, in contrast to for example 
Western women, focus primarily on developments beyond the private sphere -  that is something 
they have no influence on. Whereas the autobiographies of Western women tend to narrate the 
story about private issues, such as the family, husband and children. Russian women lean on the 
testimony o f history -  “we were there, we suffered during the transformation o f  society and now 
we will tell you about it”.®^ This urge to relate their fate to external developments clearly
so
Ibid., p. 122
Interview 16 August 2003.
Interview 16 August 2003.
Interview 24 August 2003.
The size of ten children can be found in the tale o f  T.A. Akimtseva: GATO, f. r-1993, op. 1, d. 3,1. 1.
Interview 16 August 2003.
^  Shiela Fitzpatrick, "Life and Times” pp. 3-17, Shiela Fitzpatrick and Yuri Slazkine, Life Stories o f Russian Women. 
From 1917 to the Second World War^  ftincetone 2000, p. 3.
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resembles the kulak children’s narratives: their victimisation was caused by Communism, 
Stalinism or simply histoiy.
The kulak children’s connection to the home region or Poduua (motherland) has a  rather interesting 
angle when the narratives mention the expropriation o f their family household — when the private 
sphere was invaded and the family removed from their house. Only rarely do we actually get a 
description o f who committed these acts. An impression is that people found their homes violated. 
For example, Afanasii Avkeptevich explains how his family was given just twenty minutes to pack 
the bare necessities and to leave their houses.^^ This impression can also be found in Vladimir 
Ivanovich’s letter when he mentions: “ ...they gave nothing to the deportees” .^  ^ But the passive 
sentences dominate -  “they made us kulak”, “they considered us kulaks”, “they deported us”, or 
“the family was deported”. Who “they” were remains a mystery -  it is as i f  the intruders are 
invisible, or at least nameless. “Who is to blame?” Anotolii Dmitrevich asked rhetorically and 
answered: “The system we lived in!” ITiis clearly illustrates that what happened was an impersonal 
act undertaken by a “system”. What the system was, and who worked within it, is never revealed.
In Litvinenko’s study from 1993, Victor M.s recollects two men with hunter’s gun, who enter the 
house uninvited and sit at the bench in the kitchen “Where had they appeared from? Why had thev 
come to us? Why had thev walked in uninvited?”^^  The m en had no identity they simply arrived 
like thunder out o f  a clear sky. There is information that it is the local village Soviet that has sent 
the men, but this is information given by an old man looking back to his childhood: the boy did not 
see any names or faces. The next day the family was led into the yard, and here they witness the 
waiting “crowd”. Although it is neighbours who the family must have recognised, it is only the 
political activist, Aganka Bibkova, who is actually given a  name. The rest ju st stand there as 
“loafers and idlers who had come to get fat at the expense o f  others.” *^ Ivan Arkhipovich’s letter of 
rehabilitation is perhaps one o f  the exceptions where there is a  full record o f  the people responsible: 
’’...thrown out o f the house by: the chairman of the village Soviet Musiiak Aleksandr Timofevich 
(bom 1903); the activist Telebni Zakhar Mironovich and the executive chairman of the village
GANO, M-101/21.02.96.
"''GANO,Xo 13/12.09.95.
Litvinenko, 1998, p. 35 [My underline M.K.]. 
Ibid, 37.
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Soviet Akhonin Andrei Petrovich (bom 1903)”. ’^ This is the only time, at least in the material 
examined here, that we actually discover who the intmders were.
There are several reasons why an intruder becomes “invisible” when people are asked to recollect 
their past. A simple answer is that the former kulak children did not find their identity important: 
what was important was to emphasis the energy o f the father and that he was imjustly victimised. In 
this context the identity o f the persons intervening might very well be considered secondary, they 
were impersonal idlers and thieves.^® It is also conceivable that the children, in light o f  the chaos 
accompanying the collectivisation and dekulakisation, forgot this detail about the identity o f the 
intruder or were too young to remember. Additionally, it also reveals what their parents decided to 
tell their children afterwards, as the children formed their memory regarding this stage in life fi-om 
the tales o f the older generation. It is also possible that the kulak children simply did not know, 
since many o f the intmders were members o f the 25,000ners, OGPU agents and etc., who had been 
sent into the countryside as emissaries by the regime. However, Ivan Arkhipovich’s letter suggests 
that some o f the kulak children had some information about the identity o f the intmders. It seems 
reasonable to assume that the “invisible intmder” became “invisible” during the retention stage, 
when memory was transformed into a narrative, as the physical invasion o f the homes was so 
overwhelming that the narrator’s sight became clouded -  the kulak children did not see human 
beings degrading them or their families but an impersonal “they” or a certain “system”. Although it 
is disputable as to whether the former kulak children would describe their memory as being a 
“trauma”,^  ^ the inability to link the intmder to a person may well be caused by their own difíiculties 
in comprehending the full extent o f the invasion of the homes.
6.2.3 The deportation
The intmder, which transformed into a guard, remains “invisible” or impersonal when the story 
reaches the physical deportation, where the narrator is removed fi-om the European part o f the 
Soviet Union, and in the case o f the interviewees and the relatives to the Narym region o f  Tomsk 
Oblast in Western Siberia. As the children did not know who their guards were, they had probably 
never met them before, and since they were emotionally overwhelmed by what had happened the 
people guarding them are not relevant. Rather than focusing on who guarded them, we are told
’^ GANO,K-372/15.03.95.
^  The narrator and oral historian, who will later analyse the interview, might have different fields of interest. As Donald 
Ritchie assert: “People remember what they think is important, not necessarily what the interviewer considers most 
consequential” (Donald A. Ritchie, Doing Oral History^ New York 1995, p. 12).
** Catherine Marridal, Nights o f Stone. Death and Memory in Russia London 2000, p. 20-22.
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what the deportation was like, which adds another element to the construction o f victimisation. 
Since the in&astructure of this part o f  the country was underdeveloped, many different means of 
transportation were used in order to take the “kulaks” and their families to their final destination. 
In a letter o f rehabilitation Ivan Dmitrievich remembers that his family travelled by foot for several 
miles into the Taiga before arriving at their ultimate destination.^^ Serafima Afanasevna also 
recalls, in her written recollection, the long hike into the wilderness when she tells about her and 
her family’s deportation in 1931,^^ Another kulak child, Mikhail Sudorovich, tells, in his essay, 
that he and the family walked barefoot for 350 kilometres.^ Whether this is conceivable or if 
Mikhail Sudorovich is exaggerating in order to make his story more interesting is unclear. 
Undoubtedly, people were forced to walk for great distances. During the interview with Valentin 
Vasileevich, he remembered several stages of his deportation, which started with the train 
transportation. At their arrival in Novosibirsk they were placed on a riverboat, which would take 
them upriver -  via the Ob, to Narym krai. Here they arrived on an island, where the deportees were 
left with instructions to construct a settlement.^^ Anatolii Dmitrevich has, in his interview, a 
similar recollection of travelling by boat and being left on the shore o f an island with nothing to 
survive on .^  Aleftina Vasilevna also recalls in her interview that a large number o f people were 
left on an island with no food, housing or heating.^^ It is important to emphasise that there is no 
information, in any o f the interviews, as to whether they arrived at the same island, or if  these were 
different islands in the region.
These trips were very rough, with serious physical stress on people’s health. Kalashnikov recalls 
(in his written memory) that the sanitary facilities were more or less non-existent and people had to 
remain in their own excrements for days during his train journey. The odour within the train was 
terrible, and people became sick: “People were breathing fiig, and in stuSy air many became 
sick”. Anatolii Dmitrevich also stressed that the boat that brought his family to Narym krai was 
not suitable for human transportation -  it wns usually used for transporting animals and grains. 
Subsequently, the deportees on board were exposed to the rain and cold, and as they were 
travelling during autumn the deportees were all freezing, hungry and sick.^^ Many died during
“  GANO, B-409, 07.05.96 and GANO, B-35, 28.02.96.
GATO, f. r-1993, op. 1, d. 43,1. 1.
“  GATO, f. r-1993, op. 1, d. 26.1.2.
Interview 30 August 2003.
“  Interview 17 August 2003.
Interview 16 August 2003.
GATO, f. r-1993, op. 1. d. 17,1.1.
Interview 17 August 2003.
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these exhausting transportations and in her letter of rehabilitation Aleksandra Pavlova recalls that 
many died and were buried on the w ay/° A story, which would seem to sum up the whole 
development from expropriation o f  the family household, through deportation to actual placement 
in the special settlements, is the account o f  Nikolai Petrovich:
After the night o f the Easter holiday, in May, they arrested my mother, 
Averianova Varvara Egorovna, and the family o f 7 children, including myself, 
and threw us out o f the house. They placed us, the four oldest children, on two 
horses, and tied together the reins, so we would not run, and the three smallest 
were put to sleep naked.
They brought us to the Atiashevo station -  thirty kilometres away. [ ...]  On the 
third day the wagons arrived and we were loaded in these, some families per 
wagon, and [...] they locked it. There was no toilet [...] People became wild [...]
In the wagon seven people died from starvation. We got to Tomsk and they took 
us out with several other families. They also unloaded several corpses, children, 
yoimg people, and the elderly.
From Tomsk they sent us to the jetty, and loaded us on riverboats, and sailed us 
up the Chulim river. How many days we sailed, I don’t remember [...] On the 
way we had two children died, Nastia and Vania. [...] Four [more] children died.
They left my father, mother and me with people from our village. We walked 
through the small settlement. Everywhere here were dead people, hunger and 
epidemic.
(Source. S.S. Vilenskii,;7emw n/JIATa. 1918-1956, Moscow 2002, p, 117)’*
That which is added to the construction o f  victimisation are three important parameters: death, 
hunger and disease. We find in several accounts, as when Julia Vasileevna summed-up her 
existence in the special settlements, these three particular words. A fourth element can also be 
added; separation.
’®GANO,A-137,27.05.96.
’* My translation from Russian to English, except for the passage: “People became wild [...] In the wagon seven people 
died from starvation. We got to Tomsk and they took us out several families. They also unloaded several corpses, 
children, young people, and the elderly^’, which is translated in Appelbaum 2003, p. 318.
Interview, 30 August 2003.
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6.2 A  Separation
One aspect o f this separation was noted above, when the fate o f  orphan “kulak” children, who had 
their identities changed by the Soviet system, was examined. At this stage the separation was 
complete, and almost all the children forgot their parents. The separation from the parents is 
witnessed in many o f the narratives, either because the parents died from over-exertion in the 
Taiga and Tundra or because -  especially the father — was deported without their families. In the 
above recollection of Nikolai Petrovich, the father was the first arrested, while the rest of the 
family was left alone for a month -  when they also were thrown out o f  their house. In Uliana 
Petrovna’s interview we see this separation on two occasions: first when her father was arrested 
before the rest o f  the family, and sent away, while the children stayed with her mother; and 
secondly after having been reunited with the father, she was left alone with him when her mother 
died. Kalashnikov also explains how his father died, and later how his brothers and sisters, by 
being placed at different orphanages, were separated once again -  the total dissolution o f the 
family.^^ Matrena Semenovna explains in her written memory how she and her three sisters were 
deported without their parents: “ [...] we lived there [in deportation] for a long time, and our parents 
were not there at all, we were alone, starving, fieezing and sick”.^ ^
The separation o f the family also appears in recollections where families had already been 
deported to Narym krai. After being exiled from the Ukraine in 1930, the family of M.F. 
Abramenko managed in 1935 to re-establish a kind o f  life together in the special settlements. The 
father supposedly said to the children: “ ...now we can work, since they can not send us any 
further...” In 1937, however, the father was re-arrested as an “enemy o f the people”, as part o f  the 
re-escalation o f the anti-kulak campaigns that year, and deported with another eight men from the 
small settlement in which they lived. None of these men returned to their families, and left behind 
wives, children and other relatives who were grief-stricken: “ ...again there was pain and outrage in 
our souls”. A substantial number o f letters written by “kulak” children by the beginning o f the
7 71990s, addresses an uncertainty about the fate o f  their father especially. At some stage in the
^  Interview, 23 August 2003.
GATO f. r-1993, op. 1, d. 17.1. 3.
GATO f. r-1993, op. 1, d. 16,11. 1-2.
GATO f. r-1993. op. l .d . 1,1.2.
^  After the government of the Russian Federation decided to rehabilitate all victims of the political repression, many 
applications were send to the local authorities all over the country. For more details on this see; S.N. 
Uzhakova,”Pea6iinHTauHOHHi>ie aejia penpeccHpoBaHHLix KpecTMH kek HCTOpHHecKHfl HCTO*iHHK” pp. 87-11 in S.A. 
Krasilnikov (red.), M apeunam. B CoeemcKOM o6ti4ecmee 1920^1930~x zodoe, Novosibirsk 2001.
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place o f  origin or during deportation, he disappeared without any further record and relatives 
wished to gain information about what had happened to him/* Great uncertainty in the lives of 
kulak children was caused by the physical intrusion of the Soviet regime and consequently the 
separation o f the family. Many were uncertain as to what had happened to their closest relatives.
Separation works on several levels, and is much more than being merely separated from the 
parents. It is also the separation from their Podma (motherland or place of birth), which is very 
significant in the construction o f subjectivity in the stories of the narrators. This pattern -  o f relating 
themselves to a  certain geographical area which they no longer are part of -  can be recognised 
among Russian emigrant children as well. Even those who were bom in exile, and subsequently 
only heard about Poduna through their parents, would have emotional connections to the country 
they left: “The memory o f podm a, the longing for it, the hope to return to it and work for its rebirth 
pass-through the stories as a leitmotif [...] “ Although these children lived in one place they did 
not really belong. However, there is an interesting paradox in relation to at least the deported 
“kulak” children, since none of them returned to the region they thought of as their poduna, when 
the opportunities arose after 1991. The kulak children all stayed in the regions around Novosibirsk 
and Tomsk -  in the case of those deportees going to Narym krai -  and established a life there. 
Uliana Petrovna, who used the terminology of podma in her tale, stayed in Narym krai until 1980, 
when she as a pensioner moved to Novosibirsk in order to live with her children. She never left 
Novosibirsk when the Soviet Union disappeared in 1991.**^  The explanation is as Julia Vasileevna 
stated: “we did not have anything to return to”. In light of expropriation of the family household 
and deportation, everything that had belonged to the families in Belarus, the Ukraine, the Urals, 
Western Siberia, and the Black Earth region of Russia was confiscated by the Soviet state. The 
separation from the places of origin of the kulak families was complete, and what was left was an 
illusion about a geographical location far away. Despite the fact that it was difficult to see that these 
people had such experiences, as they all seemed to lead normal lives, they would naturally connect 
their upbringing to the terminology of losing their birthplace, childhood or youth. In Litvinenko’s 
study Victor M. states: “our childhood disappeared just as fast as the smoke in the air” and during
™ See for example: GANO Kh-55/Kh-94, GANO T-219/26.04.94, GANO F-409/18.10.95, GANO Ch-23/28.06.95, 
GANO F-55/05.04.95, GANO G-171/03.05.95, and GANO B-168/20.03.95.
™ Kn. Petr Dolgorukov, "HyscTBO Pojihhu y ;ieTeñ” pp. 162-186 in V.V. Zenkovskii (ed.)>!7ej7ni 3Miepai4uu, 
BocnoMUHanm., Moscow 2001, p. 162.
Interview 23 August 2003.
** Interview, 30 August 2003.
Litvinenko, 1998, p. 42.S2
181
the interview with Aleftina Vasilevna she asserts: “all my life I had no childhood -  no youth”.*^  
Despite the fact that the former “kulak” children lived in Novosibirsk or Tomsk, and had 
established a living, they still related to another place far away. The term “rootless” is not used in 
the material, but it seems plausible that many would consider themselves as such, if  the above were 
summarised into one word.
Olga Adamova-Sloizberg recalls how  she, before being victimised herself, experienced the 
separation for the first time through the eyes o f her housemaid. The housemaid had visited her sister 
in Moscow by 1930, and when returning to her village she realised that her family had been 
dekulakised. The husband was sent to a  camp, while her mother and children had been exiled to 
Siberia. She never again saw them and in 1935, by then working for Adamova-Sloizberg as a 
nanny, she received a letter about how her own children had died from scarlet fever. Not knowing 
that her fate would soon separate her own family, Olga Adamova-Slozberg said to herself, after 
having talked to her husband about this story: “if  you chop down trees, the chips are bound to fly.” 
This means that the separation o f the kulak family was seen by a substantial number of Soviet 
citizens as a historic necessity. The Soviet regime had collectivised agriculture, because it was 
necessary, and some had to be expelled, because they objected to the goal -  no innocent people 
were victimised.*'^ Stanley Cohen defines in his writing this emotional state as the interpretive 
denial. Soviet citizens saw that families got separated as a direct result o f the collectivisation 
campaign, yet they lived in a  society where they were afraid o f the consequences o f such 
knowledge. It was part of the official discourse to describe the ongoing process as necessary, and 
therefore people decided to follow this line in the hope o f  surviving themselves. It was true that 
people were victimised, but it was probably their own fau lt Olga Adamova-Sloizberg’s experience 
is a good example of how short-sighted such a strategy could be in a Soviet context. In 1936 she 
came home realising that her own husband had been taken by the Soviet authorities -  this was a 
man, who himself had said that the fate o f the housemaid was a historical necessity in the overall 
development o f  Soviet society. Now their family would also be a “ ... chip bound to fly”.*^
83 Interview, 16 August 2003.
^  Olga Adamova-Sloizberg, “My Journey” pp. 1-88 in Simoen Vilensky, Till My Tale is Told Women's Memoirs o f the 
GULAG, Indianapolis 1999, pp. 3-4.
** Stanley Cohen, State o f Denial. Knowing about attrocities and steering , Cambridge 2001, p. 7-9. 
Adamova-Sloizberg, 1999, p. 5.
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6.2.5 Relationships
Being settled in the Taiga and Tundra o f  Western Siberia, kulak children had to rethink their 
relationship to two “institutions” : their family and the authorities. Indeed, the authorities became if 
not the most important, then at least a very significant element in their lives. There was an attempt 
from the authorities, to break the traditional relationship between children and parents; either by 
education, political indoctrination, or by simple separation. The OGPU advised the local authorities 
o f the Narym krai to educate the kulak children in the collective manner, in order to eradicate the 
traditional skills o f their parents and grandparents.*^ Furthermore, those local schools outside the 
special settlements which did not admit the kulak children into the classrooms would be ordered to 
change their procedures immediately.** On 17 March 1933 the presidium of the Central Executive 
Committee o f  the Soviet Union allowed those kulak children, who acted conscioiisly and had 
attained the required education and had relevant work, to regain the right of voting in elections for 
the local councils,*^ Many of those children applying for the restitution of the voting seem to have 
been treated positively, which would indicate that there were attempts to include them in society, 
whenever they acted consciously.^® The question obviously is how the former kulak children 
remembered this and situated themselves. Would they emphasise the possibilities given to them by 
the authorities or the dehumanisation during the years o f  deportation?
When reading through letters, memoirs or listening to the interviews o f kulak children, the parents 
appear as crucial characters in the construction of “subjectivity”. In the aforementioned recollection 
o f Nikolai Petrovich, the narrative was constructed on a short presentation by the writer, and then an 
unravelling o f  the father’s fate: “I -  Averianov Nikolai Petrovich, was bom in 1921, with the 
nationality o f  Mordvin. I write about m yself and about my parents. In 1932 [in] April they arrested 
my father Averianov Petra Matveevich during the night and I do not know where they took him”.^ * 
In the letters o f  rehabilitation read for this research, this pattern in the constraction o f the text is 
repeated almost every time: always the father first, then the mother and finally the children. Despite 
the fact that the letters were written by one o f  the children, they appear to have been secondary; the
^  G.M. Adibekov, "CneinrepecejieniiM -  »eptsM «cnnoniHOH KOJineicTHBHsauHH». Ms aoKyMeHTOB «ocoSoií nanicH» 
nojurrSiopo LfK BKTI(6)” in ffcmopunecKitu apxue^ Volume 2, number 4,1994 p. 158.
“ Ibid.,p. 168.
“nocxaHOBjiCHHe npeananyMa UHK Coiosa CCP o nopamce BoccxaHOBJiCHM b H36HpaTejii>HMx npasax /lereH 
KyjiaKOB” V.P. Danilov and S.A. Krasilnikov, Cnetfnepecenemibt e  Sanadnou Cu6upu. 1933-1938, Novosibirsk 1994, p. 
14.
^  See; GATO f. r-430, op. 3, delo 2806,1.1; GATO, f. r-430, op. 3, delo 2867,1. 1; GATO f. r-430, op. 3, delo 2878,1. 
2; GATO f. r-430, op. 3, delo 2894,1.2; and GATO, f. r-430, op. 3, delo 2903,1.2.
Vilenskii et al,JJemu rVJIATa, 2002, p. 117.
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main object is Diaea ceMbu (the head o f the family).^^ The fate o f the father would become the fate 
o f the whole family. As Aleftina Vasilevna expressed: “They considered us outcasC^^ This was 
despite the fact that it was not her, but her father who had lost voting rights and would be reduced to 
being a social outcast. The children regained, as mentioned, voting rights in 1933, and it is not 
entirely correct that the whole family was considered as being made up o f outcasts.
There are many reasons the term “outcast” may be used. The first reason is related to public 
discourse introduced in 1987 by the last General Secretary o f  the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, 
where emphasis was placed on human issues. This was a conscious political shift launched in order 
to gain public support, which imtil then had not existed.^"* A significant part o f this emphasis would 
be a thorough attack on Stalinism, totalitarianism and political repression. Although the kulak 
children represent a significant part o f those victimised by political terror, it was mainly adults who 
attracted attention from the state: the “kulak” in the case o f dekulakisation.^^ Public terminology 
was constructed around the fate o f  the father, and in this context it makes sense why children would 
also speak from his position. As mentioned above, in relation to the projects in Vladimir in 1984 
and 1988 undertaken by the Oral History Club, there are examples from the Soviet context of how 
public discourse to a large extent significantly influenced the shaping o f  personal m e m o r y T h e  
second reason is possibly found in the nature o f the Russian and Soviet culture, which to a large 
extent is, and was, patriarchal. History is often written from a male perspective, while women and 
children are either unnoticed or at best secondary.®^ Whenever women and children appear it is 
often as passive participants standing on the sidelines watching how the men fight the important 
battles. Being thus situated, it makes sense as to why the kulak children would place the father and 
his fate at the centre of their own narratives. A third reason might be psychological -  as the 
narrators might have misunderstood the iimer logic o f  the event, and adjusted their parents’ fate as 
being that of their own. It has been suggested that when people undergo overwhelming experiences, 
misunderstanding o f  certain coherencies may occur in the memory and can be reproduced as
^  See as examples; GANG Iu-3.2802, GANG Kh-89.23/7.94, GANG Reab.Kul. 1 KuP5 28/6.94, and GANG N-155, 
28.08.95.
”  Interview: 17 August 2003.
^  William B. Husband, “Introduction: The Persistence of Memory in Modem Russia” pp. xiii-xviii in William B. 
Husband (ed.), The Human Tradition Modern Russia, Wilmington 2000, p. xiii.
Elena lur’evna Sutkova, Coeemacue nojiumunecKuepenpeccu e omnomenuu HecoeepmenHonemnux (1917-1953az.) 
(Unpublished doctoral dissertation), Inzhevsk 2003, pp. 3ff.
^  Khubova, Ivankiev and Sharova, 1992, pp, 95-96.
In Barbara Evan Clemments’, Bolshevik Women, Cambridge 1997 the point of departure, for example, is: “Less 
visible seen, as the eyes followed the men of the Council of People’s Commissars, were the tens of thousands of 
wom an...” (p.l).
See for example; Maurice Hindus, Red Bread, London 1931 p. 175.
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historical facts: things that never actually happened are recollected so convincingly that the 
narrators believe them to be the truth* A fourth reason might be that kulak children used irony in 
order to situate themselves in a larger historical development When Aleftina Vasilevna uses the 
sentence: “I am not a human being - 1 am an enemy of the people”*®® she obviously makes a  critical 
and ironic projection about perceptions o f  herself and her parents. Aleftina Vasilevna could also 
have used the terminology as an ironic indicator of solidarity, as when Afiican-Americans apply the 
tenn “nigger” to themselves as a  slang term suggesting group unity, coherency and solidarity. It is 
known from interviews with Holocaust survivors that irony is often applied when they recollect 
their experiences in the Nazi concentration camps.*®* However, this is not a very Russian way o f 
expressing o n ese lf- and it is questionable whether irony alone can explain the use of a term, which 
not necessarily applies to kulak children. It is more conceivable that such term serves as a metaphor 
very often used in the Russian culture: that o f  suffering. Although it would be wrong to claim that it 
only is the Russians who would focus on their suffering, and also misleading to assert that all 
Russians possess this mentality, it is an integrated part o f  Russian rhetoric: “we have suffered more 
than anyone else, thus nobody imderstands us”. There exists, what Daniel Rancour-Laferrier terms, 
a “cult o f suffering” in Russia, which influence the Russian way o f  conceptualising the “se lf’ or the 
“subject”.*®^ This cult o f suffering is probably important in the use o f the term “I am not a human 
being - 1 am an enemy o f the people”.
A fifth reason is the possibility that kulak children used the term of suffering consciously in order 
to place themselves along with their parents, in order to signal that the political project o f  dividing 
the generations had failed. In the narratives kulak children seldom consider themselves different 
from their parents. Tatiana Ivanovna argued that the komendatura^^^ treated everybody -  including 
also the children -  as “enemies o f the people”. Likewise T.A. Akimtsev argued that “the 
komendatura repressed us, they found themselves to be different fix>m us...”*®^ In other words; the 
komendatura and thereby the Soviet regime was alienated, when seen from the perspective o f the 
special settlers, but also from the position o f the regime. Maria Vikentevna was asked whether 
kulak children were treated any different from the local non-enemy children, to which she first 
answered “no”. However, upon thinking the question through, she changed this statement declaring:
”  Loftus and Hoffinan, 1989.
In order to summarise Aleftina Vasilevna interview she did so: Interview, 16 August 2003.
This information was given to the author by Dori Laub M.D. in a telephone conversation on Sunday 1 August 2004. 
Daniel Rancour-Laferrier, The Slave Soul ofRm sia. Moral Masochism and the Cult o f Steering, New York 1995, p. 
3.
The administrative organ within the special settlements.
GATO f. r-1993, op. 1, d. 3,1,2.
185
‘‘yes there was someone, who said “oh that is the children o f  “kulaks””/®^ This indicates that she 
remembered, or seems to have remembered, being categorised as a “kulak”. Aleftina Vasilevna 
emphasised that despite hunger, death and disease, ravaging the special settlements, the love of 
parents towards their children was unaffected. At one stage she was offered the chance to live wth 
a local family who could supply her w ith food and protect her against death and disease outside the 
settlements, but her mother replied: “you are still my child and I can’t give you away”.^ *^
When a rebellious attitude by a child is mentioned it is almost never directed against the parents, 
but rather in opposition to the authorities. Valentin Vasileevich explained how he had been a 
disobedient young pupil in school and always strove to subvert the official teaching. He was verj- 
proud when recollecting how he had spelled the name o f First Secretary in Leningrad S.M. Kirov 
backwards, so that it read “Vorik” (thief) ~  an action that resulted in him being expelled fix>m 
school.*®^
It is plausible that “kulak” children were disobedient against the Soviet authorities within the sites 
o f deportation. Georgii Mikhialovich lived in the Bokchar orphanage,*®* where there were reported 
senous disciplinary problems. He remembers how  non-enemy children from Leningrad were 
evacuated to the orphanage during the Second W orld War in 1942, and that the administration did 
everything in its power to separate these children from the “enemy children”.**® The orphan kulak 
children -  who had already lived there — were sent to another orphanage, and they had to walk for 
almost 300 kilometres. As he explained during the interview: “the Leningrad children are “oun” 
{nashii which emphasised that they belonged to the proletariat], whereas we were “enemies o f the 
people’”’.*** Therefore, it makes sense as to why a substantial number o f kulak children, when 
looking back at their childhood, emphasise their disobedience against Soviet authority and 
consequently placed themselves alongside their parents. They were proud o f  having resisted 
political indoctrination and having retained emotional connections to their parents. The question is 
to what extent this is representative for the behaviour o f all kulak children, even if  there were 
examples o f disobedience.
The distancing from the older generations does appear in the narratives, although it is more 
implicit than explicit. Victor M., for example, recalls: “ ... I became a student at the Sverdlovsk
Interview, 16 August 2003.
Interview, 16 August 2003.
Interview, 30 August 2003.
He mentions this in his written memoiy; Vilenskii,2?emtt rVIJATa^ Moscow 2002 p. 118. 
GANO f. r-895, op. 2, delo 4, L. 1 M 3.
Vilenskii t\ .2X,M em uryjíATa^ Moscow 2002 p. 118.
Interview, 5 September 2003.
186
Mechanical College. I relished the work. I was over the moon; before the host o f  fellow students I 
was no longer a  special migrant, though I never forgot that unique label; I was now one o f the team, 
with equal rights. I joined the trade union almost at the start of the Academic year, and then I joined 
the Young Communist League. I did this for the purpose o f entering the college and to distance 
myself even further from being a special migrant, to consolidate my equal rights”. It was, 
however, not his parents he turned away from, but the label of being a “special migrant”. This might 
be seen as his way o f addressing a darker part o f a personal past, which in reality meant denouncing 
the way his parents and grandparents traditionally had lived. Likewise, when Anatolii Dmitrevich 
remembers that while applying for the Komsomol in 1940, he was expected to denounce his 
grandfather as a “kulak”, he immediately focuses on two aspects that had disqualified his 
application: firstly that he failed to denounce his father, and secondly that his application was 
rejected due to this fa ilu re .^T h is  did not prevent him from a career in the Red Army, like many 
other former kulak children. In a letter by Fegon Sedorovich it is interesting that his brothers fought 
on the Soviet side during the Second World War and protected their motherland (that is the Soviet 
Union). The conscription of kulak children in the Red Army was highlighted by Soviet 
historians, who used it as an argument for the success o f  re-educating former “enemies”. The story 
of Major Davydov is significant, as it was a text book o f how a former enemy child was 
transformed into “Hero o f the Soviet Union”. Like other Soviet citizens, kulak children were also 
affected by public discourse, and would hide their true identity as a  survival strategy o f surviving. 
The kulak daughter Tatiana Ivanovna even went as far as admitting that she had shed a tear when 
the news about Stalin’s death on 5 March 1953 was released -  in other words, that she actually had 
emotions in coimection to him, who, in a figurative sense, had mistreated her parents.**^ The 
interesting aspect about this is that kulak children were aware o f their being part o f public 
discourse, but they were not, or only rarely, explicit about the price o f being so in the personal 
narratives, that is they had to denounce their upbringing and adapt the Soviet way o f life.
Analysing the personal memory is a matter of entering a “jungle”. It is uncertain as to what the 
narrators are prepared to share. Therefore, it is also difficult to decide whether this aspect o f 
denouncing kulak parents is toned-down. One possibility may be that none o f the participants o f
Olga Litvinenko and James Riordan, Memories o f  the Dispossessed Descendants o f Kulak Families Tell Their 
S/or/es, Nottingham 1998 p. 50.
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this investigation actually denounced their parents, and in the case o f Tatiana Ivanovna, she still 
lived together with her mother -  the 97-year-old Agrafena Pevnevna, Although she would pick on 
her mother, as daughters tend to do, she did have emotional feelings for her mother and to some 
extent, protected her. When her mother had to rest during her interview, the interviewer suggested 
that it had to be difficult to recall every detail, o f  which Tatiana Ivanovna responded: “she 
remembers everything - 1 remember everything”. In other words, reassuring the interviewer and 
the outside world that there was nothing wrong with either her or her mother. But, living together in 
old age is not the same as to say that, at some stage, they had not been separated either emotionally 
or physically. Anatolii Dmitrevich indicated that the children knew it was the price they had to pay 
in order to be re-included in society when he told about how he denounced his grandfather as 
“kulak” in the application for the Komsomol. This leads to a  second perhaps more plausible reason 
that kulak children preferred to forget that their extreme experiences in Narym krai had forced them 
to denounce the older generations. In m any cases it was a feeling o f being tom and deprived of the 
right to continue their way o f life. As a  grandchild o f a “kulak”, Irina Ch., argued: “During the 
collectivisation years, the Communist regime eliminated the entire class o f proprietors and severed 
all generational ties. It broke all labour and cultural traditions in terms o f a father to son, mother to 
daughter succession”. Instead of focusing on actual inclusion in the Communist transformation of 
the countryside -  as seen in the diary o f  Stepan Podlubnyi -  the kulak children would possibly 
prefer to accentuate their suffering and victimisation.
6.3 Emotions
Many o f the experiences o f kulak children in the special settlements o f Narym krai were 
overwhelming, when seen fi:om the perspective o f  outsider, and there is much death, hunger, 
disease, and uncertainty present in a great number o f  the narratives. For example, when Vitalii 
Konstantinovich recalls in his written memory; “M y sister Anna was sick with a  light inflammation 
and died in the hospital, where she was buried we don’t  know. Afterwards my youngest sister, Vera, 
also died, and since nobody dug a grave, our grandmother wrapped her in a blanket, and brought her 
to a graveyard and buried her” .^ ^^  Aleksei Aleksandrovich also remembers in his account: “Soon we 
had another misfortune. Vera [his elder sister] starved to death. She also found her place in the
Ibid.
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Taiga by t ie  large coniferous trees” Dmitrii Tikhonovich explains in his written story: “They 
drove us to the settlement of BoVshaia Galka (The big jackdaw), where there were barracks. They 
packed us in like sardines, we slept on freezing plank beds above the freezing ground. From the iron 
stove came smoke, children cried, screamed, young people died. We went to Bakchar and an 
epidemic o f typhoid fever broke ou t...” ^^  ^ Kseniia Markovna sums-up: “we starved at home”.^^ 
The question is how do such experiences affect those who lived through them: how do they define 
them emotionally?
When the participants o f the interviews were asked to recollect their childhood in the special 
settlements, they primarily focused on the physical difficulties o f  living in the special settlements. 
Julia Vasilevna claimed: ‘Sve had no childhood” and later said: ‘Sve were poor. We did not have 
anything. We had to work very hard. Everything we owned was taken away from us”.*^ She was 
using the lack o f  material possessions in order to define her misfortune, as this was what she could 
express. It was an attempt to make the outside world (here the present author) understand the extent 
o f her incomprehensible experiences. Maria Vikentenva, Aleftina Vasilevna and Uliana Petrovna 
also used the words “trudno” and “tiazhelo” (which both translate as “difficult”) whenever they 
summarised their l i v e s . T h e s e  adjectives generally refer to physical existences addressing the 
exhausting aspect o f living under such circumstances. Dmitrii Tikhovich additionally lists the 
rationing o f food for those special settlers being sent into to the worksite of the Taiga, which was 
280 grams o f bread for one person for the whole journey. It is not important, m this context at 
least, whether this estimation is right or wrong. It is relevant that he uses these numbers to illustrate 
the difficulties in being a special settler. It might appear as a mechanical reproduction where the 
events are remembered as facts “450 men and 55 women went to the work site...only 150 men and 
52 women returned”. H o w e v e r ,  since existence in the special settlements was exhausting it is no 
wonder that the physical aspect is so predominant in this account.
Another interesting aspect is the idea o f gratitude among many o f the narrators, despite their 
extreme experiences. Anatolii Dmitrevich was asked to sum-up his childhood, and characterise life 
in the special settlements, to which he responded: “in comparison to others we were relatively 
privileged. M y father was literate and worked at the komendatura^ and subsequently we received
GATO f. r-1993, op. 1, d  42,1.4 [My underlining M X ]. 
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many rights”. When he described the arrival o f  his family at Narym krai, Anatolii Dmitrevich 
stated that as his father had contacts he was able to find shelter for the family so they did not, as so 
many others, sleep on the bare ground. A similar pattern o f asserting that others had greater 
difficulties is found in the accounts o f Maria Vikentevna and Uliana Petrovna. Maria Vikentevna 
explained how she was settled in Tomsk, and therefore did not have to travel -  like many others -  
into the Taiga and Tundra Uliana Petrovna explained how she was able to earn money, and could 
supply herself and her family with bread: “therefore we survived, but many around us died and 
starved”. They witnessed a lot of death, hunger and disease, but were, after all, privileged and 
survived. This may be a sign o f  gratitude for having come out o f the special settlements alive -  
unlike so many others. It might also be a way o f making their experiences o f  the settlements easier 
to address, as it was a period in their life, which was permeated by a severe lack of food and an 
overwhelming frequency of death. Finally, the gratitude might also be a sign o f guilt. Anatolii 
Dmitrevich, Maria Vikentevna and Uliana Petrovna were lucky, unlike so many others, and should 
not take life for granted. We know from Primo Levi that guilt haunted him, as he felt he was 
pardoned, in contrary to his fellow inmates in the Nazi concentrations camps who were 
exterminated in the gas chambers.
The physical aspect of living in the special settlements has been examined, but how are the 
emotions expressed in both the interviews and the written accounts? Uliana Petrovna addressed the 
necessity o f working in the woods, collecting firewood, smoking out the mosquitoes from their 
house, cultivating the land, and purchasing livestock. Sad emotions, such as “tears” and “sorrow”, 
were either non-existent or suppressed in the story: when she mentioned the death o f her first child, 
she appeared imaffected and continued to unravel the difficult fact o f being in the settlements. 
Uliana Petrovna was, however, anything but unemotional: When summing-up her experiences she 
stated: ”it was the will o f fate” and laughed. In fact laughter was constant in her narrative and 
“gallows humour” accompanied the most terrible incidents. At one stage she explained how as a 
young married woman, she worked in the forest industry with her husband. At one point during the
Interview, 17 August 2003.
Interview, 16 August 2003.
Interview, 23 August 2003.
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winter she was almost killed by a falling tree, which she could not avoid because o f  the difficulty o f 
moving in the snow. Her husband immediately went up to her in order to make sure that she was all 
right, and said that it was too dangerous for her to work in the Taiga. He demanded that she should 
stay at home and take care of the daily tasks in the house. She related this situation by responding: 
“but then youTl just kill someone else” and laugh ed ,L au g h te r ,  in this context, is an emotional 
mean that enables people to address the imspeakable. Like when the fool o f  Mikhail Bakhtin’s 
carnival universe expresses amusement towards the king, he in fact exposes an otherwise 
unspeakable critique. The world-order in this universe does turn around, and with a grin the poor 
people are able to make fun o f nobility. Although we should be careful o f  reading too much 
Bakhtin into the narratives of Uliana Petrovna, it is evident that she uses laughter to verbalise her 
past, which, seen from an objective perspective, is otherwise difificxilt for her to address and this is 
an important ability.
One o f the interviewees appears to be different from the rest in how he talks about his childhood: 
he used stronger vocabulary and even shed tears. This is, Anatolii Dmitrevich, who on two 
occasions exposed the darker side o f the emotional spectrum. At first he talked about the 
deportation, where a  woman threw herself into the water and drowned. Apparently she had been 
forced (or so went the rumour) to leave behind her four children, which was unbearable for her. At 
this stage Anatolii Dmitrevich was avoiding directly describing the incident and he was obviously 
finding it difficult. On mentioning how many children the woman had, he also said that his mother 
only had three children -  information which strictly speaking was useless, but it nevertheless helped 
him in telling the story. After having talked about this incident, he reflected: “there were many such 
experiences. I remember it all “uzhasno” (terrible)”. The word “uzhasno” (“terrible”) is much 
stronger than “trudno” and “tiazhelo” (“difficult”), and expresses an emotion beyond the physical. 
Although Anatolii Dmitrevich mentioned the quantity o f  the daily rationing -  which again refers to 
the physical -  and talked about a less painful subject, such as his school, that he was able to 
verbalise the experience in stronger terms is significant. This was evident the second time he 
addressed the darker legacies of his childhood, where he actually cried. It was here he talked about 
the death o f his two year old sister, when recalling the scene from the bedroom -  his father and 
himself standing by her bed. In contrast to Uliana Petrovna, Anatolii Dmitrevich dwelt on this 
moment o f death, although he immediately after talked about a less painful subject. It was the
Interview, 23 August 2003.
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suffering o f children that influenced him , and which took him  a step further than the rest of the 
participants in Imking his experiences to sad emotions. W henever he wanted to express sympathy, 
as in the case o f  his family’s m ilitsia  neighbour he also used children as an argument: “he was nice, 
not like any o f the other brutal characters, he was good toward us children”. The role of the 
“children” is possibly determined by the fact that they are iimocent and easy to sympathise with­
in the written memory, emotions need to be expressed in words, and again there are various 
examples o f how this is done. In contrast to the interviews, tears appear quite often, as when T.A. 
Akimtsev recalls: “ -  we children cried day and night, whimpering like hungry kittens” Using the 
terminology “kitten” the narrator constructs an image of him self and his sisters and brothers as 
being fragile, vulnerable and weak, only having tears to hold on to. Kseniia Markovna verbalises 
the emotion through the eyes o f  her father:” [He] hugged me and cried heavily and we became 
one...” ^^  ^It would, however, be misleading to conclude that tears appear in all written memories, in 
fact the narrator often repressed them -  the written accounts were also influenced by the “nobody 
needs your tears” idea. In the tale o f  Kalashnikov we learn that his father dies, and he states: “I 
cried for three minutes and that was it!” .*^ ’ In addition, M isha Nikolayev says: “A  child must have 
some kind o f defence mechanism against things like that [ ...]  No small children grieves for long 
over parents who have disappeared; at that age woimds inflicted by fate heal quickly”. In other 
words, children do not suffer to the same extent as adults, they adapt quickly and accept their fate. 
Even while fighting back the tears the emotions appear quite strong, Hava Volovich had a daughter, 
Eleonora, who was placed in an orphanage so her mother could work: “I saw the nurses waking 
children up in the mornings. They would force them out o f their cold beds with shoves and 
kicks...pushing the children with their fists and swearing at them roughly, they took off their 
nightclothes and washed them in ice-cold water. The babies didn’t even dare cry. They made little 
sniffing noises like old men and let out low hoots.. .On some o f  my visits I found bruises on her [the 
baby’s] body. I shall never forget how she grabbed my neck vrith her skinny hands and moaned: 
“Mama, want home!” She had not forgotten the bug-ridden slum where she first saw the light of 
day, and where she’d been w ith her mother all o f  the tim e... Little Eleonora, who was now fifteen 
months old, soon realised her pleas for “home” were in vain. She stopped reaching out for me when
Interview, 17 August 2003 
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I visited her; she would turn away in silence” said Hava Volovich.*^’ Even if the girl was not able to 
communicate verbally, or to have a conversation, she intuitively understood that tears w'ere useless: 
she even dies in silence, with no one to take care of her. And as the mother stated: “That is the story 
o f how, in giving birth to my only child, I committed the worst crime there is”.‘^ *^ In this context the 
lack o f tears are perhaps even stronger than constant exposition of tears -  as witnessed in T.A 
Akimtsev’s account.
6,3.1 Double Identity
When analysing the emotional connection to the kulak children’s past, it is important to remember 
that these people have a double identity: both as children of dispossessed people, and as Soviet 
citizens, who managed to establish a career and progress in the Soviet Union. Most of the male 
participants o f the interviews, such as Anatolii Dmitrevich and Georgii Mikhailovich, served in the 
Red Army, and thereby became protectors of the Soviet state -  the same state that had originally 
excluded them and their families. We have seen that Anatolii Dmitrevich was emotional about his 
childhood, crying as he recalled the memory of his dying sister and hesitating while relating the 
painful experience o f a woman throwing herself into the water. All of this had an overwhelming 
impact on Anatolii Dmitrevich as it reminded him that despite a “relatively privileged” childhood, it 
had, nevertheless, been a traumatic period in his life. However, when recollecting his youth and 
career in the Red Army, the narrative changed character and became more “a matter of fact”. There 
were no tears and no ‘T remember it all, it was terrible”. Instead he asserted: “and then came the 
[Second World] War, and -  well you know what that is like...”.*^ * In other words, the narrative 
changed and this happened within few minutes, indicating that he constantly lived with this 
doubleness. The childhood experiences were personal, reflecting something that made Anatolii 
Dmitrevich special and to which he could relate emotionally, while his career as a soldier in the Red 
Army corresponded to the official version of a prosperous life course, integrating his experiences 
into the collective Soviet memory of the Great Patriotic War.
The identity o f  being a soldier in the Red Army was clearly very important in the tale of Georgii 
Mikhailovich — he talked in depth about the Korean War, which had very little relevance in his 
recollection o f dekulakisation and his years in the orphanages. This can partly be explained by the 
more recent nature o f  his recollection about his years of a soldier, as he was older when he served in
Appelbaum, 2003, pp. 320-321. 
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the army. Another reason for the emphasis on the Korean W ar might be that the Soviet regime 
would not have forced him to forget this part o f his life, as had occurred in relation to his identity as 
a child o f  executed parents. His recollection of the time in the army might also have had a diverting 
function, indicating that Georgii Mikhailovich used it to avoid more difficult aspects of his 
childhood. For example, when, asked to recollect painful topics, he delivered a short answer and 
quickly switched to his experiences as a soldier -  even if  this was not relevant for the question.*^  ^
Serving the army was a “white sheet” in his life where he distanced himself from his past in the 
orphanages, and received a legitimate identity as a Soviet citizen. He was clearly aware of the 
distinct nature o f his childhood, which the insistence on achieving official recognition of his past 
indicates. However, despite this effort to re-establish his childhood the stories about his time as a 
soldier took over his narrative, whenever asked to recollect the more painful elements of his past.
The double identity thus works differently, depending on the person telling the story. Apart from 
the differences between Anatolii Dmitrevich and Georgii Mikhailovich the influence of gender also 
appears as an important factor for the verbalisation o f the double identity. Whereas men would talk 
about both their childhood and the youth as a soldier -  tending to dwell with the career in the Red 
Army -  women focused more on their childhood. The female participants would talk about their life 
after dekulakisation and careers, but would rarely put the same emphasis upon this as the men. This 
was not only revealed in the actual stories, but was also expressed in the physical appearance of the 
interviewees as observed during the double interview with Valentin Vasileevich and Julia 
Vasileevna, who lived together in a  smaU and old Khrushchevian apartment in the suburbs of 
Novosibirsk. There was nothing particular in the way Julia Vasileevna dressed, while Valentin 
Vasileevich proudly wore the medals he had earned as a  soldier in the Red Army. They also 
recollected their past differently: Julia Vasileevna concentrated on her childhood, while Valentin 
Vasileevich tended to focus on both his experiences as a kulak child and as a war veteran.^^ The 
argument is not that women were more emotional about their childhood than men -  the above 
comparison o f  the tales of Anatolii Dmitrevich and Uliana Petrovna would in fact suggest the 
opposite. Instead the assessment is that the male participants constantly switched between the 
identities o f socially-excluded kulak children and socially-included soldiers, while the females 
appear to have concentrated on the aspect o f exclusion and victimisation during their childhood -
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perhaps lacking a similar 'ticket o f  entrance' into Soviet society as the Red Army provided for the
men. 145
6.3.2 Emotional knowledge
This would lead to a more principal discussion: why is it important to analyse the emotional 
element o f the narratives? The argument may be that Western societies reached a stage where it is 
necessary to insist on coming to terms with a traumatic past to such a  level that it appears as i f  there 
is an erosion o f  the concept of “memory”. There is an insisting on analysing traumas caused by 
historical events, which is closely connected to the situation in the late 20* century, where the 
darker legacies of the past very often were the centre o f attention.’^ ® There also is a  risk of 
watering-down the concept of “memory” by constantly using terms such “facing the past”, “coming 
to terms with the trauma”, and “bearing witness of a certain event” — and by an exposition o f  pain, 
suffering and tears, whenever extreme events of the past are addressed. By using this moral 
philosophical approach it is possible, that the academic and analytic skills are ignored, and instead 
the only thing conducted is a simple and empty calculation o f crimes. The state o f emotions has 
drawn quite a significant amount o f attention when human participation in a dictatorial regime is 
discussed: most notably when the emotional intoxication, or the “Rausch”, leading to the human 
support o f a certain non-democratic regime is examined.*^* If  it can be justified academically that 
historians detect public enthusiasm present in the Stalinist Soviet Union,*^^ it must also be 
recognised as useful to find the mental settings being caused by the dehumanisation o f this regime.
People sense emotionally and this aspect reveals how much the narrator knows about his or her 
past. “Knowledge” is as Foucault argues “ ...no t a faculty or a universal structure. Even when it uses 
a certain number o f elements that may pass for universals, knowledge will only belong to the order 
o f  results, events, effects.” *^® A substantial number o f misunderstanding, misinterpretation and
It is generally accepted that women and men tend to recollect differently: Women would often focus on the private 
and intimate sphere, while men prefers to talk about their career and social life. This differs a bit in the Russian context, 
as Russian women also will have a tendency to discus their fate in the context o f the bigger historical developments. For 
more on this see: Fitzpatrick, in Fitzpatrick and Slazkine, 2000, p. 3.
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inaccuracy -  which can be falsified by historical analysis -  appear in personal memory. When 
working with emotions, however, “knowledge” is not a  matter o f being right or wrong, but rather of 
revealing, as the American psychologist Dori Laub, asserts: “ ...the reality o f an unimaginable
occurrence.”^^ * To “know” is, as Primo Levi underlined “not a matter o f  arriving at the deepest
roots o f  knowing, but just o f going down from one level to another, understanding a little bit more
than before”. I f  the emotional traces o f  a certain event -  such as dekulakisation -  are analysed, it
is possible to further understand the human conditions in  such extraordinary times. Thus, the 
exposition of Uliana Petrovna’s laughter, Anatolii Dmitrevich’s tears and Hava Volovich’s 
suppression of emotions is far more than moralising: it reveals the influence o f the Taiga and 
Timdra on the construction of the narrator’s subjectivity.
To sum-up, a substantial number o f the narrators have emotional connections to their personal 
past. It is expressed differently, but they all appear to have senses related to this. Even Teodor 
Karlovich, who asserted that he could not remember anything, sensed the difficulties o f collecting 
potatoes, obtaining food, and o f  being excluded as an unwanted element: “we were all considered to 
be fascists”, he stated. They had not forgotten anything, despite the fact that the Soviet regime, 
forced them to. During the Soviet years, they might have chosen silence as a strategy o f surviving, 
as they knew that the past was something they had to forget. But, when it again became legitimate 
to recall the human consequences o f  the past, they easily re-established the senses o f their 
incomprehensible past. It is most probably in this context that we should understand Tatiana 
Ivanovnas statement: “I remember everything”. Even if  she could not remember all details, she still 
has the emotional ties connecting her to that period o f her life.
6.4 The aftermath
By establishing the emotional “landscape” o f the narrator, we arrive at a crucial point in the 
construction o f the personal memory. We can see the long-term impact o f  the exclusion o f kulak 
children from society: how these experiences affected the kulak children on a  longer term. When 
historians discuss dekulakisation as a  historical event, they have to stop at some stage. The years of 
1932/33 and later 1937, are in this connection relevant boundaries, as the deportations o f “kulaks” 
declined, as in the first period, or re-escalated, as in the latter period. However, those having lived 
through these experiences are not able to draw this line. They have to cope with the darker legacies
Laub, **Bearing Witness”, 1992, p. 60.
Marco Belpoliti and Robert Gordon, The Voice o f Memory. Interviews 1961-87. Primo LevU Cambridge 2001, p. 8. 
Interview, 6 September 2003.
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o f dekuIaJdsation, and integrate it into their daily lives. It is obvious that dekulakisation left 
emotional and physical scars on the minds and bodies of the “kulaks” and their children. The health 
o f  Anna R., for example, was highly affected by the hunger and disease in the special settlements. 
She had chronic stomach problems, which were not rectified until she had an operation in 1959 
(almost thirty years after her return fi-om the special settlements to society). A number o f the 
interviewees, participating in this work, were concerned about not being taken seriously or simply 
ignored. Tatiana Ivanovna emphasised the remembering o f  the past and validity o f  her memory. 
Julia Vasilevna stated: “y®^ 8^ honie and write, since what you hear is the truth”. G e o r g i i
Mikhailovich also expressed: “Write what you hear. They will think you are lying, but it is the 
truth”. '’*
The relation between “knowledge” and “historical tmth” has been discussed, so it is necessary 
now to examine why the narrators insist on calling their memory the “truth”. On the one hand, it 
could be detected as being some sort o f counteraction to the official Soviet project The past was to 
be forgotten, and if  necessary by force. Georgii Mikhailovich’s story is a good example o f  how 
force was used; his identity and link to his parents were simply eradicated. By asserting that he was 
telling the truth, he emphasised that this intervention had been in vain. He had not forgotten 
anything. On the other hand, the notion o f re-assuring the outside world of the validity o f the past 
evidently is a pattern recognisable fi-om the survivors o f other historical tragedies such as the 
Holocaust. Primo Levi was at one stage supposedly afraid of contracting Alzheimer’s disease, as 
this would take the only thing of value away fiom him -  his memory. There is a Yiddish saying; 
“you are not dead imtil you are forgotten” and these kulak children feared being forgotten. To forget 
would imply that their past, and therefore their identity as victim would vanish.
Georgii Mikhailovich had fought his entire adult life to be recognised as a victim o f Soviet 
repression. He searched for valuable information about himself, his birth, name, fathers name and 
surname, and he went to court in order to get a legal recognition and official acceptance o f his 
background. Nevertheless, he only partly used these names and dates afterwards, and his 
recollection about his past would, as aforementioned, tend to be taken over by his recollection o f his 
years as a soldier. This would indicate that while it was important for him to know what had 
happened, and to understand why he lived his childhood in an orphanages, he would not turn back 
time and completely reconstmct his past -  he only wished to let the world know what his fate was.
Litvinenko, 1998, p. 60.
Interview, 30 August 2003.
Interview, 5 September 2003.
Thomson 2002, p. 348.
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It is difficult to explain what drove Georgii Mikhailovich, as it must be seen as an uphill task to 
fight for such recognition. A possible explanation is that he was seeking revenge over the Soviet 
system that had subjected him to such inhumane treatment. In other narratives o f Soviet citizens a 
similar wish to let society remember that some actually were dehumanised in the name of history 
can be detected. Maria Belskaia, one o f  the many unknown victims of the Stalinist regime, wrote in 
1987 a response to an article written by the Party member, Ya. Gamaiun and this was published in 
the pro-perestroika magazine Ogonek. The message in Gamaiim’s original article was that time had 
healed all wounds, that the collectivisation was a necessity and everybody, including the victims, 
had accepted it. Therefore, it would be harmful to the results already achieved to continue Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s glasnost policy. Belskaia believed that this was nonsense and a sign o f complete 
misunderstanding regarding the legacy o f  human suffering. As she asserted: “Our childhood was 
poisoned and taken away from us; we did not have a happy youth; in fact, we did not have normal 
human lives at alL” *^ * Her response, which was never published in Ogonek^ was clearly motivated 
by the idea o f not only telling the “truth” , but also o f  explaining to society that some had suffered 
unjustly. As she ends her story: “I would like for my letter to be published, i f  only because of all our 
suffering and underserved torment”. In the preface to the English edition o f  his collections of 
narratives o f surviving GULAG women, Simoen Vilensky defines the testimony o f  the victims as 
an informal Nuremberg process. That is, the life stories should serve not only to secure that victims 
are not forgotten — and thereby “dead” -  but also with an aim  o f  having the guilty parties sentenced 
(if nothing else, then at least morally).
The idea that the personal story can judge the perpetrators might be one very important 
explanation for Georgii Mikhalovich’s urge to find out about his past. However, it is not the whole 
story, as he appears to be more complex. For one thing, he also placed an emphasis on the many 
successes o f his career in the Red Army, suggesting that he was proud of what he had contributed to 
the development o f  Soviet society. Also, he accepted the Soviet terminology used in relation to him 
and his fellow-sufferer, consequently describing him self as an “enemy” child in opposition to 
“Soviet children” as such. He coped with the fact that he was a “stranger” -  someone who did not 
really belong. This acceptance o f a binary “two camp” view o f  the world is also recognisable from 
other types o f Soviet life stories: a pro-Soviet versus an anti-Soviet model.^^^ Georgii 
Mikhalovich’s need to belong to Soviet society can also explain his desire to find out about his
Maria Belskaia, “Arina’s Children” pp. 219-234 in Fitzpatrick and Slezkine, 2000. p. 223.
Ibid., p. 234.
Simoen Vilensky, Till My Tale is Told. W omen’s Memoir o f  the GULAGt Indianapolis, 1999, pp. XII-XIII.
Fitzpatrick in Fitzpatrick and Slezkine, 2000, p. 14.
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childhood. This would imply that his motivation was not only that o f anger and revenge, but also a 
simple wish to find out where he came fi'om.
Another possible explanation should be found the interview o f Tatiana Ivanovna and Agrafena 
Pevnevna, They had lived in silence and uncertainty their whole lives, and on three specific 
occasions during the interview they mentioned how they had to avoid any attention -  including 
refusing fimdings from the Soviet authorities during the 1950s and 1960s, as it indicated that 
someone would get to know about their past. A  life under such circumstances must have created a 
wish to tell about their fate to the world -  especially when it was made possible by the mid-1990s. 
They had been told for almost fifty years that their past had to be forgotten, but then the regime, 
which had mistreated them collapsed, and thus a possibility to break the silence arose. Not that 
people all o f a  sudden started talking, in fact something would suggest the opposite, A substantial 
number o f former kulak children were still aware of the danger o f being recognised. Furthermore, 
they would also be modest about the value o f their testimony, as they had only had limited 
education, and thus their statement would be communicated in a very simplistic way. M.F. 
Abramenko finished his written memory with the following sentence: “You have to excuse me for 
my writing, but it is all true”.^ ^^  This suggests that even if Abramenko thought his writing was 
incomplete, he had an urge to break the silence after so many years.
6.4.1 D id everyone suffer?
Why should we remember the fate o f kulak children? Is it any different from the experiences o f 
other groups in the Soviet Union? The editor o f  A^ ovy Mir, Aleksandr Tvardovskii, described the 
dilemma in the following way:
“By Right o f  Memory”:
And fate made everybody equal 
Outside the limits o f the law 
Son of a kulak or Red commander 
Son o f a priest or commissar,..
Here classes were all equalized.
Ibid.
GATO, f. r-1993, op. 1, delo 1 ,1.3.
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All men were brothers, camp mates all.
Branded as traitors every one...
(source, Anne Appelbaum, Gulag. A History., 
London 2003 p. xv)
From Tvardovskii’s perspective everybody was equal, even the Red commandant and commissar 
were victimised by their experiences: they were brothers, camp mates and traitors. One might add 
that all Soviet citizens, whether they lived in the special settlements o f Narym, Northern Russia, 
Kazakhstan and the Urals, or in  a  Ukrainian or Russian village or town, were ravaged by starvation 
as noted above, The 20*** century was an extreme century w ith two devastating world wars, the 
October Revolution, a Ci\il War between the “Red” and the “Whites”, famine, restrictive anti-class 
policy, massive peasant rebellions, forced collectivisation, political purges, discrimination of 
political, social and ethnic minorities and many other major events.*®  ^ The list has almost no end, 
and even cautious historians accept that at least ten million died in peacetime alone during the 
construction o f the Soviet Union.*^^ The culture o f suffering is in this context important, as the 
conservative intellectual Feodor Dostoevsky puts it, “Russians need to suffer”.*®^ It is traditionally 
understood by Russian intellectuals to be an integrated part o f  the Russian national character, or 
PyccKosi dyuta (the Russian soul), to be subordinated to suffering. It is, a  simplistic understanding 
o f the Russian people’s psychological map, but the idea o f  being different, unique, tormented, 
devastated, subdued by pain, enslaved, and suffering, permeates the cultural production o f Russia 
and the Soviet Union. This pain and suffering is dominating in the literary work of Vasilii 
Grossman, Aleksandr Blok, and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. There is a tendency among Russians to
1 Aftsubordinate or at least dwell on the pain when they are defining themselves.
Similarities and differences between the experiences o f kulak children and others have already 
been discussed in the chapter on the living conditions, where it was asserted that despite remarkable 
similarities, there are substantial differences. The memory o f the long lasting and exhausting 
transports into the Siberian Taiga and Tundra on foot, train and by riverboat that were not intended 
for human transportation. This was beyond normality, even in Soviet society. The state intrusion in 
identity shaping, as most completely witnessed by Georgii Mikhailovich was significantly different
Catherine Marridale, Night o f Stone. Death and Memory in RussiOy London 2000 p. 198.
Eric Hobsbawm defines the 20* Century as such as the age o f extremes, although he neglects to discuss the full 
extent of the experiences in the Soviet Union — see: Eric Hobsbawm, The Age o f Extreme. The Short Twentieth Century 
¡914-1991, London 1994.
R.W. Davies, Soviet economic developmenty-om Len n to Khrushchev, Cambridge 1998, p. 2.
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from standard procedures. The mere fact o f  being forced to forget or denounce family ties, and thus 
the past, was also different from experiences o f  an ordinary peasant child, who stayed behind in the 
Ukrainian villages as son or daughter o f a icolkhoznik. This is far more than an eager dwelling on 
suffering, pain and enslavement, this was a human tragedy caused by a political ambition to change 
Soviet society. Kulak children -  even those who achieved a significant advancement in society -  
were after all strangers o f Soviet society. The large majority o f kulak children had to live in silence, 
hiding their identity and hoping that the regime would not recommence the anti-kulak campaigns -  
something they could not be certain o f -  based on the extreme existence in the special settlement of 
Narym krai. The lives o f former kulak children would afterwards, until Stalin’s death in 1953 and 
even until the collapse o f the Soviet Union in 1991, be shadowed by uncertainty. It was anything 
but an ordinary life these former kulak children had lived, and therefore testimonies o f kulak 
children add vital and unique elements to our comprehension o f the nature o f the Stalinist regime. 
By examining the testimonies o f kulak children the long term impact of this dehumanisation was 
analysed and traced. Although kulak children were part o f Soviet society, and even later made a 
career for themselves, what they look back on was death, hunger, disease and humiliation. The 
bodies and minds of kulak children were fundamentally changed by the massive social and political 
experiment termed as the forced collectivisation and dekulakisation. A historian can never fully 
comprehend this. However, by accepting and acknowledging the value o f these narratives, a useful 
way to imderstand a little bit more can be found: the cold facade of the written source and the 
statistical material is penetrated, and consequently we can recognize that ordinary and innocent 
people lived in Soviet society and were dehumanised not because o f  something they had done, but 
because they belonged to an unwanted group.
201
7. Conclusion
“Tell me Misha [the Russian nickname for Michael] what do your people know about this 
Genocide?” The author had been interviewing Anatolii Dmitrevich for an hour, and afterwards, as 
appears to be a Russian tradition, we sat down at the kitchen table ate, drank and talked. It was at 
this pointed the question was raised. Taken by surprise the answer was “I guess very little!” It is 
true that much literature has been published about the turmoil in the Soviet countryside and society 
in the 1930s; however, this is mostly scholarly work and consequently primarily aimed at a specific 
professional audience. A collective awareness about the fate o f  among others the kulak children is 
scarce in the Western public.^ The discussion o f  Soviet history has often been related to 
“terminologies”, such as whether the political repression o f the Soviet population really qualifies to 
be called “Genocide”. Such discussion addresses the nature o f  the exiting conventions -  in this case 
the UN Convention on Genocide -  and whether it applied to the Soviet case.^ Also scholars discuss 
whether collectivisation was motivated by economics or politics, and thereby whether or not the 
campaign was necessary. This is difficult to comprehend for a  lay person, since it often is a debate 
about definitions, details and nuances. As a  Danish journalist once said, while this author strove to 
elaborate on the different position in Soviet history: “are you not being terribly academic now?” It 
was in the light o f this, that the answer to Anatolii Dmitrevich was given. O f course, we know 
more, but the human consequence of dekulakisation still appears to be incomprehensible for many 
in the West. Anatolii Dmitrevich was apparently not satisfied with the answer, and continued the 
discussion by asking: “But was Maria Federovna^ not Danish?” When he received a positive 
response he reacted: ”why then do your people know so little about our fate?”
Part o f the aim o f  this project has been to enlarge our knowledge about the human aspect of a 
tragic event such as dekulakisation -  this was, after all, a  physical and forceful relocation of 
ordinary human beings, who were punished not for what they had done, but simply because they 
belonged to an undesired group. By focusing on a small and often neglected group o f these victims
* Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan define the difference between history writing and memory as: “Collective memory is 
not what historians say about the past [...] Collective remembrance is a set o f  acts which go beyond the limits o f the 
professional. These acts may draw from professional history, but they do not depend on it.”See Jay Winter and 
Emmanuel Sivan, “Setting Áe framework”pp. 6-39 in Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (ed.) War and Remembranc in 
the Twentieth Century, Cambridge 2000, p. 8.
 ^See: Jens Mecklenburg and Wolfgang Wippermann (eds./* **Roter Holocaust"? Kritik des Schwarzbuchs des 
Kommunismus', Hamburg 1998.
 ^The mother of the last Tsar Nicholai II was the Danish princess Dagmz^ who, when married to Aleksandr III, changed 
her name to Maria Federovna. For more on her fate see: Bent Jensen, Zarmoder blandí zarmordere. Enkekejserinde 
D affnar og Danmark 1917-1928, Copenhagen 1997.
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-  that is the children -  the aim was to expand our conceptualisation of victimisation. Even if  the 
father of the household — or the “man” -  was the primary target during these repressive periods, 
children often comprised the largest number o f  the deportees: 40% of the dekulakised were children 
younger than 15 years old. The scope has been to detennine the relationship o f the Soviet regime 
and the kulak children, and to discuss whether they were defined as “enemies”, “friends” or 
“strangers” of the revolution. The analysis was divided into four major parts: firstly, the distinction 
between kulaks and kulak children in the 1930s was discussed, and the development o f this was 
examined until the end o f that decade; secondly, there was a focus on the nature of the living 
conditions, with an attempt to place this in a  larger historical context: thirdly, the education o f  kulak 
children was analysed, by discussing both on the teaching and the nature of propaganda aimed at 
them: and fourthly, these children were followed into their old age, in order to analyse their 
childhood recollections. The core o f  this discussion has been: why were kulak children victimised 
and how did it affect them in the long-term?
When discussing the fate of kulak children, we should be aware that many different groups were 
excluded from Soviet society during the 1920s and 1930s. They included Cossacks, Fonner people 
{Eueutm  JiK>du\ bourgeois people, NEP-men, priests and many, many more. There were, 
consequently, different categories o f  enemy children as well, which logically differed from each 
other due to their national, ethnic and social composition."* There are many similarities in the fate of 
excluded children, but, o f  course, also a number o f  differences. One significant difference would be 
that kulak child was not part of a national or ethnical group, like Jews, Taters, Volga-Germans and 
others, but rather a social category existing in many different agricultural areas o f  the Soviet Union. 
This would also imply that the Soviet authority had different considerations regarding the treatment 
o f them. A similarity would be that the regime always would be confronted with the fundamental 
question of how far ideology and political zeal could justify the maltreatment o f children. Hence all 
children underline the paradox between ideology and political practices.
The October Revolution in 1917 affected that a Bolshevik regime rose from the ashes o f the old 
Tsarist Empire with the declared goal o f fundamentally changing society. The old regime was 
conceived as “backward”, “old fashioned”, “stubborn” and altogether undesirable. Instead 
“progress”, “modernisation” and “enlightenment” were suggested, which also implied that what had 
been before had to be swept away by revolutionary means -  whatever that entailed. Through 
propaganda, agitation and organisation the new power holders initially believed that it was possible
 ^For more on enemy children see: Youngok Kang~Bohr, Stalinismus in der ländlichen Provinz. Das Gebeit Voronez 
1934-1941, Essen 2006, p.l79ff..
203
to shape a society, mobilise the population towards a common goal and finally achieve 
Communism. The approach was “scientific”, in the sense that society was conceptualised as a 
mechanical body that could be adjusted and transformed according to the right ‘Values”. Standards 
for “correct” behaviour were defined, and “ incorrectness” emerged as a logical consequence of such 
a simplistic reflection on the world order. A binary division of society into “backward” or 
“progressive” materialised. The representatives o f the Tsarist regime -  most notably the 
traditionally Russian peasantry -  were defined as the ultimate example of this “backwardness”. But 
who classified “backwardness” and decided what “progress” and “modernisation” implied? It was 
the Bolshevik leadership, and although part o f their conception applied to elements of the social 
construction of agriculture, the fundamental understanding was based on a  misconception. Lenin 
and his colleagues were determined to divide the peasantry according to a class distinction, in which 
poor peasants (bedniaki), middle peasants (seredniaki) and rich peasants (kulaki) comprised the 
main elements. From this perspective a  self-perpetuating exploitative kulak threatened not only the 
poor peasants, but also the Soviet state by its grain speculation. The kulak was a “miroed” (a 
‘Village eater”); he enslaved Soviet society, and therefore had to be attacked by every possible 
means. A s Lenin expressed it in August 1918: “Death to them!”
Some Soviet agronomists, like A, Chayanov, warned against this conception, and argued that the 
Russian peasantry was not static, divided according to certain Marxist class lines, but was rather an 
organic body changing constantly depending on the demographic situation o f both the family and 
the local community. Between 80% and 90% of the Russian peasantry was based on a non-wage 
family economy at the time o f the October Revolution. This fundamentally undermined the validity 
o f the Bolshevik comprehension o f the covmtryside. The peasantry was not divided according to 
fixed social class; instead it was the demographic distinction that determined the various 
possibilities o f an individual peasant. We do not need to be Chayanovites in order to appreciate the 
fundamental strength o f this definition o f the social structure o f Russian agriculture. By ascribing 
the peasantry to three different class strata, the Soviet regime neglected this fact, and consequently 
entered the countryside with a misconception that created massive peasant resistance.
Even i f  social differences existed in the villages -  most notably during the Black Reparation in 
1905-07 and 1917, and also during the 1920s -  this was not the main reason for the erosion o f the 
countryside -  the social collapse of society was a logical consequence o f Bolshevik misconception. 
The Civil War o f  1918-21, and the accompanying peasant rebellions, were by no means 
coincidences. Given that the peasantry was considered “backward” and even “stupid”, and that the
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most independent and thereby resisting peasants were designated as class enemies and “kulaks”, led 
to scepticism, resulting in a state o f  civil war between the regime and those in the countryside. The 
position o f Chayanov was legitimate during the 1920s; however, by 1927-28 this had changed 
significantly. A  number o f agronomists from the People’s Commissariat o f Agriculture o f  RSFSR 
had been purged, which clearly indicate that the conception o f peasantry as an organic non-wage 
family economy never could be accepted by the Soviet regime. Rather it was essential to detect 
“kulaks” and liquidate them as a class, and this was formally adopted in January 1930.
The kulak concept existed in pre-revolutionary Russian society, yet they stood outside the local 
community and worked against the village commune. However, by 1928-29 the detecting o f  kulaks 
was random and suggests that the main Soviet aim was finally to liquidate the Tsarist leftovers in 
Soviet agriculture. The class definition was largely a political construction o f the countryside, 
which cannot explain the full extent o f the problems by the end o f the 1920s. This can be supported 
by the massive peasant resistance to the collectivisation process -  women who resisted were 
organised according to their gender rather than their social belonging. This would legitimise that the 
dekulakisation in reality was a "‘‘‘depeasentation*\ The paradox is that the Soviet state appears to 
have accepted that the Russian peasantry was a non-wage family economy, even when the regime 
was most ideological in its collectivisation campaign. It was decided on 30 January 1930 that the 
whole family -  that is the main economical body of the traditional peasant household -  had to be 
liquidated. Given that children and adolescents belonged to the traditional workforce and comprised 
an important element o f it, they were not unaffected by liquidation o f the kulak as a class. In the 
initial turmoil the kulak children were subjected to a devastating dehumanisation, and suffered 
immensely from this Soviet neglect. Not only did the kulak children comprise a larger proportion 
than the main target o f repression -  the kulaks -  they were also the first to become sick, starve and 
die during the deportation and in the special settlements. The demographic situation o f  those 
families being submitted to dekulakisation was terrible: infant mortality in these families rose 
dramatically by 1930-31 as a direct consequence of this repression.
Kulak children were therefore victimised, because the Soviet regime was unclear about their 
position in Soviet society. Belonging to a kulak household, and thereby comprising elements o f the 
individual kulak peasant’s workforce, it seemed only natural to remove the kulak children alongside 
the families. The Soviet regime discussed the definition o f  the kulak child throughout the 1930s, but 
never seemed to come to a final decision. Some kulak children would be expected to possess anti-
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Soviet sympathies, especially after having experienced deportation and life in the special 
settlements. The adolescents, those who were 16 years or older, were automatically considered 
“socially dangerous”. Yet the Soviet state was caught in a deadlock, between on the one hand 
repressing these children, but on the other portraying Soviet childhood in general as happy. Such 
reflections commenced by 1933-34, and also involved a calmer line towards kulak children. The 
restitution o f the civic rights by 1934, such as voting rights, in case they had participated in the 
required education, is one example. The climax o f this shift was Stalin’s expression from November 
1935, and something suggests that at least some kulak children were met positively by the Soviet 
regime. However, the line o f  the Soviet state towards right o f kulak children to attain a passport 
remained uncertain and even contradicting -  often with specific notation o f reservations. This w-as 
probably because o f the uncertainty regarding the sympathies of the kulak children -  could a 
regime, which was otherwise profoimd paranoid, really trust children, who were expected to possess 
elements o f a class hostile consciotxsness? The question was never answered completely, and thus 
the kulak children became the stranger: both belonging to the public discourse, but at the same 
treated as carriers o f class hostile attitude.
Dekulakisation therefore worked on different levels: one aspect was the expropriation of 
household effects, economic marginalisation and finally deportation o f  designated kulaks and their 
families. Another aspect, which is perhaps as important, was the transformation o f kulak children in 
schools. This changed throughout the 1930s, yet in its initial phase the ambition evidently w as to 
marginalise also the kulak children in society. Despite a  debate on this issue, between the NKPros 
and the Komsomol in 1928-29, the m ost immediate consequence o f this was a  significant exclusion 
o f kulak children from the schools and institutions o f  higher education by 1929. Kaganovich 
believed this was a useful instrument in repressing the kulaks, which was voiced during the 
institutionalisation of the Ural-Siberian method by March 1929. This was seen to be an efficient 
measure to undermine the social capital o f the kulaks, to minimise their influence on future 
development, or simply to “tear out the evil by the roots”. The distinction between kulaks and their 
children was non-existent until at least Januaiy-February 1930. It changed later on, especially after 
kulak families were deported, when kulak children in fact were offered education. However, the 
aim o f minimising the influence o f  the kulaks on the development remained: the traditional 
religious peasant upbringing had to be replaced by political education and indoctrination; the 
restitution o f  the civic rights o f  kulak children depended on their willingness to participate in public 
education; they had limited possibilities to leave the areas o f the special settlements, despite the
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restitution of voting rights and the issuing o f passports to them; and kulak children had to denounce 
the class hostility o f their parents in order to be accepted by the regime. Kulak children had to be 
turned into small “Pavlik Morozovs” -  that is heroic sons of the fatherland reporting on the class 
hostile actions o f their fathers. Whether they actually believed this, and subsequently distanced 
themselves permanently from their parents, is debateable, yet their life chances often forced them to 
at, least pretend that they detested the class hostility of their fathers especially. And thus, 
dekulakisation had the long-term impact that the different generations had been turned against each 
other.
It may be that the Soviet regime adapted a softer line towards the kulak children, at least by 1934, 
when the decision to restitute their civic rights was approved. And it is also important to mention 
that the living conditions of the deported and especially the kulak children seem to have stabilised 
byl935. Yet the impact o f the preceding period from 1929 to 1933 was so devastating that the 
negative influence was impossible to correct. Firstly, the demographic decline is of great 
importance, as so many children, who officially were offered the chance of integration into the 
generation o f  the “happy childhood”, died as a direct result of this policy. Secondly, it is relevant to 
remember that a significant number o f these children and adolescents had been excluded from 
schools and institutions of higher education because of their family ties. In the longer term, this also 
minimised their number in the different spheres of society. Thirdly, we should recall that a 
substantial number o f  kulak children became orphans as a consequence of the death of their parents. 
Fourthly, the aim o f forcing these children to forget their parents has a great significance for our 
understanding o f the nature of the public upbringing of kulak children. Fifthly, the criminalisation 
of kulak children during their stay in the orphanages of the special settlements is important, as it 
affected their relation to the Soviet state, which was tremendously concerned about the social 
disorder this constituted. The long term impact of this would be a distinct scepticism which 
followed kulak children throughout their entire life. Sixthly, we shall also remember that these 
children always, even when they returned to society, gained work, and an education, still had to 
avoid too much attention. The majority of these children never spoke of their past because it had too 
many negative implications. They never forgot about their experiences, but kulak children knew 
that it was crucial to keep a very low profile. It is important to also remember that so many families 
were dissolved and many children abandoned as a direct result of dekulakisation. The immeasurable 
psychological impact o f dekulakisation was immense on these children, and consequently a 
majority of them looked back on the dehumanisation, discrimination and exclusion, w hen they w ere
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older and asked to recollect their childhood. Only rarely could they appreciate the possibilities 
given to them by the Soviet regime.
From these points the liquidation o f  the kulaks as a class was a success -  these peasants, 
stigmatised as enemies of the people and vicious kulaks, were effectively marginalised. They never 
again had an opportunity to influence the development o f  society. They rarely had any influence on 
their children, and thus remained “outcast” not only in relation to society but in relation to everyone 
else -  including their own intimate sphere. This was already a fact by 1934/35, and therefore the 
Stalinist regime could reproach the kulak children without any danger of losing control of the 
development. It was a give and take tactic, depending on the situation and the strength of the 
designated enemies the regime would either tighten or loosen its grip on society. These children 
were treated like their parents, at least in the initial phase, yet the regime would also change its 
policy, when it had defeated the kulak parents. This battle was won in 1935, and Stalin could claim 
-  after having dismantled the kulak families -  that “a son does not answer for his father”. Even if 
such statement was controversial, and often contradicted by the political practices, it implied a 
redefinition o f  the approach to  kulak children.
Why did Anatolii Dmitrevich describe his experiences as genocide? The question appears to 
provoke an enormous debate, and is often associated w ith the nature o f  the excessive death o f at 
least 10 million Soviet citizens from 1926-39. Was it intentional, or rather an outcome of 
unintended and uncontrollable elements? It may be that the experiences o f Anatolii Dmitrevich 
from a historical point o f  view cannot qualify as being conventional “genocide”, but it is 
understandable why he associated his experiences with a  political term that has often been used in 
public during the late 20* century. He was an eyewitness o f “ ...an unimaginable occurrence”, and 
used a terminology that served to explain what is incomprehensible for an audience -  who have not 
lived through such degrading experiences. And, from this perspective his observation qualifies; he 
had as a child been caught in the “twilight zone” between emotional connections to his 
parents/grandparents, and to the obligation he as a Soviet citizen had to society in order to survive. 
He was a stranger o f Soviet society, and knew that survival was a matter o f adjusting to the 
requirements o f  the state. The result o f the political repression of his family was that it never 
returned to the village of origin, and thus his kin had vanished from this geographical area. The\ 
may not have been subjected to “genocide” strictly speaking, but they had, nonetheless, been 
uprooted and excluded from society because o f the dekulakisation policy.
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Therefore, it is highly plausible that Anatolii Dmitrevich used the term of “genocide” in order to 
make the world understand what it was like to be dehumanised. He was, as so many other kulak 
children, insisting on telling the world about his fate ~  about a tragedy he believed explained a lot 
about the country he grew up in. This was in part motivated by a wish to get revenge over the 
“system”, who treated him and his family imjustly -  who had taken the land away from the people 
that loved the land (that is his grandfather). In part, he believed that he was breaking years of 
silence, which had been caused by a distinct ideology o f deny dominating the discourse o f the 
Soviet Union. The tears he had shed over his dying sister mattered, and he wanted to share it with 
the world. His memory would make sure that she was never forgotten -  and thus that so many 
others o f his generation had not died in vain. His experiences, as the experiences o f thousands o f 
kulak children, had shaped a man, who throughout his entire life had done his duty (served in the 
Red Army and worked in the Soviet Union), but who nonetheless had been a “stranger”. Always 
living between the including “us” -  that is the Soviet citizens -  and the excluding “they” -  that is 
the designated “kulaks” . To survive in such a country, Anatolii Dmitrievich had to be silent -  but 
silence had not made him forget. This was the story o f a man, who had lived an anonymous life, but 
who at the same time had lived through the extreme chapters of the turbulent history of his country. 
Certainly, he was unfortunate and naturally he felt guilt o f  surviving the chaos deportation, but he 
was also proud that he, through his story, once and for all could tell the world: “I survived this 
“genocide””. This w as the long-term impact on kulak children. They had been offered education, 
work, career, but they would often identify themselves with their excluded parents.
I li
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